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Post-War Program

MORESBY TO TOKYO

BY COL. HARRY F. CUNNINGHAM
Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Fifth Air Force

ON 2 Oct. 1942, the Fifth Air Force was organized in Australia. On the fourth anniversary of that date, General Arnold sent the following by radio to Lt. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead, C. G., of the Fifth (at that time in Japan):

"Heartiest congratulations to you and the Five Air Force on this fourth anniversary. This is an occasion when you may well review your splendid record and enjoy the satisfaction of a job well done. We are proud of the results that your personnel have accomplished during these difficult war years, which have enabled us to achieve overwhelming victory in Japan. Each member of your organization is to be congratulated for their co-ordinated and ceaseless effort which have helped bring peace to the world. You all have set an example which reflects high credit on this command, greatly enriching the traditions of the Army Air Forces."

From the date of its organization until 15 June, 1944, the "business end" of Fifth Air Force was "Advon Five", commanded, from the beginning, by Ennis C. Whitehead, called by the Japs, "The Murderer of Moresby" and "Ennis The Menace." On 15 June, 1944, Advon Five became in name, as it always had been in fact, Fifth Air Force.

The record of Fifth Air Force achievements is a long and honorable one. Early innovations successfully carried out by Fifth Air Force included skip-bombing of enemy shipping in Rabaul Harbor by B-17s; the famous parachute drop in the Markham Valley by 54th Troop Carrier Wing which made possible the capture of Lae and Salamaua and which was made possible itself by the surreptitious construction of staging field at Tsilli, "over the hump." A later innovation was the series of Napalm strikes in Ipo Dam area northeast of Manila, which enabled the Infantry to move in "standing up and smiling", as the Division Commander said. Early accomplishments which were not necessarily innovations but were merely in the day's work, included the total destruction of the Lae reinforcement convoy and the annihilation of the enemy Air Force on the Wewak fields. We estimated 22 enemy ships sunk out of the Lae reinforcement convoy; since the cessation of hostilities, a Japanese Admiral reported that the entire convoy of between 30 and 40 vessels was destroyed.

In General Whitehead's own words:

"Our basic plan was to destroy the enemy air force including anti-aircraft defenses, the facilities including fuel, and to kill the personnel or force their withdrawal from the airdrome area. Naturally the status of our own supply and equipment affected operations. When we hit enemy air forces we either hit with everything we had on one airdrome or if we had more than enough for one airdrome, we used enough to accomplish our mission.

"Bombs used were frag clusters of 6 against enemy airplanes, 260-pound frags or 100-pounders to destroy anti-aircraft, and 1,000-pound bombs against enemy personnel and installations. When we were short of 1,000-pound bombs we used 500-pounders or 2,000-

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Navy Begins Laying Up Vessels in Reserve

In addition to its 1,670 fully commissioned ships, and 2,300 in reduced commission, it was announced this week that there will be 1,125 inactivated ships in the East Coast's 16th fleet and 1,079 in the West Coast's 19th Fleet.

The disclosure was made by Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, USN, Commander of the 16th Fleet and the Eastern Sea Frontier, who described the ships as "ships in mothballs" and which are being preserved for future use should the need arise.

When final plans are carried through the Navy will have a laid-up fleet of 2,204 ships. Fourteen ships in the 16th Fleet have been inactivated to date. The eight permanent berthing areas are located in the Navy yards at Boston, New London, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston, and at Green Cove Springs, Fla.; Bayonne, N. J., and Orange, Tex.

One or more ships in each berthing unit will be left in commission, with a skeleton crew aboard, for maintenance of the other ships in the unit. Reserve ships left in commission can be returned to active service within 10 days and those out of commission within 30 days.

For the first month after arrival at a yard, 70 per cent of wartime personnel allowance are retained. This is then cut to 35 per cent until the ship is inactivated. Vessels left in commission have a severely reduced complement, 6 officers and 66 men being that of a light cruiser.

To protect the outer skin of the vessels, a poisonous hot plastic paint is applied to the hull. This will kill barnacles or any other life that attempts to cling to the vessel's bottom. The treatment is effective for five years in salt water and fifteen years in fresh water.

In addition an unusual new technique has been developed to protect topside equipment. This is the weaving of a moisture-proof web by spray gun. Entire gun mounts are covered by means of these webs. The vessels will be grouped by types and moored to piers so that greater protection can be provided at minimum cost.

The Bureau of Ships has an appropriation of $20,000,000 to prepare the physical facilities for preservation of the inactive fleet. Once the ships are tied up and "sealed" it is estimated that about 2,500 officers and 24,000 enlisted men will be needed for inspection and maintenance.

Former Enlisted Men

While the exact character of their plan has not been approved, the War Department will definitely recommend legislation improving the retirement prospects of those former enlisted men of the Regular Army who have served as temporary commissioned officers during the war.

There are several bills in Congress giving such officers the right to retire with the pay of warrant officers, similar to that enacted after World War I. While the Department has not decided in favor of such a specific plan, assurances were given this week that some plan will be sponsored and that definite recommendations will be sent to Congress on the subject at this session.

The new 6,000 ton cruiser Juneau which became an official unit of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet in commissioning ceremonies at the Brooklyn Navy Yard 15 Feb. The new vessel, which will be under the command of Capt. Rufus E. Ross, mounts sixty guns ranging from 20 millimeter to 5-inch main batteries.

Special Marine Brigade

Marine Corps Headquarters announced this week the formation of the First Special Marine Brigade, with elements at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va., and Camp Lejeune, N. C. Brig. Gen. O. P. Smith, USMC, has been designated Brigade Commander.

The new brigade reconstitutes the basic elements of the traditional peacetime East Coast Unit of the Fleet Marine Force organization which existed prior to World War II. Personnel assigned to the unit will be given training previously conducted at training commands and overseas bases which have been disbanded.

All major combat units of the Fleet Marine Force which have not been disbanded are now occupied on duties in China, Japan, and islands of the Pacific. The new brigade will be composed of units and personnel released from the Pacific area.

ATOM BOMB TESTS

Army Studies Systems of Selection, Attrition

Various systems of promotion by selection and forced attrition are under active study by the Personnel Division, G-1, of the War Department General Staff, and there is a likelihood that some sort of bill will be sent to Congress during this session revising the present system of promotion by seniority and length of service.

The ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL was told officially this week that the General Staff is studying promotion by selection from "many angles," but that no final decision to sponsor selection has been approved nor has any single system of selection been determined as best for the Army.

While the Navy and Marine Corps have operated for years on a system of promotion by selection with the flow of promotion speeded by forcibly retiring a given number of officers each year, the Army has adhered to seniority promotion up to the grade of colonel, employing selection only to and within general officers' grades.

While thousands of Army war promotions were made on length of service, thousands of others were made on the basis of outstanding performance of duty, so that the theory of selection had a chance to operate during the expansion program. However, when temporary promotions are suspended at the end of the War, the Army must return to its old system of permanent promotions unless new laws are enacted.

There is every indication that the members of the Military Affairs Committees of the House and Senate will look with favor upon a selection system for the Army.

Representative May, chairman of the House Committee, told the ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL this week that he expects the War Department to propose a plan of promotion by selection and that he believes it to be a "good thing."

In the Senate, Senator Johnson of Colorado, an active member of the Military Committee, declared, "I was against automatic promotion when it was suggested a few years ago. I stood then for the idea of promotion by selection and merit, but my ideas were defeated. I believe that promotion should be by selection and that the Army should have selection out."

Representative Martin of Iowa, a retired officer of the Regular Army and a member of the Military Affairs Committee, already has been in conference with the War Department on the subject. Mr. Martin says that the War Department would like to carry out the plan on a percentage basis with a fixed percentage of promotions from each grade being by the selection method.

"We should give thought and study to it in working over the National Defense Act," Representative Martin said. "The National Defense is above the value of the individual. Officers whose records are persistently low should be weeded out. I favor the idea. It would have a wholesome effect."

Representative Sparkman, Ala., also a

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U. S. Daily Press Views

Army Recruiting

Philadelphia *Bulletin*—"Rapid upswing in the number of Army enlistments during the last three weeks has given the War Department hope that the desired strength of 1,500,000 men by 1 July may be reached through voluntary recruiting. ***If occupation forces by July are mostly made up of volunteers, less pressure for peace-time conscription is likely."

Wilmington *Journal*—"Results of the War Department's efforts to enlist the volunteers have proved encouraging. This success justifies the hope that it will be feasible to man the regular establishment with volunteers even though it will be several times larger than the pre-war Army. However, it is a little too early to say that the selective service act can be allowed to expire on May 15."

Philadelphia *Inquirer*—"Plans to rush into the Army thousands of physically or even mentally impaired individuals constitutes a desperate effort to accomplish a poor purpose. *** There are better ways to provide an interim Army, notably greater inducements to men who can pass high standard physical examinations, a point which apparently has not been examined by Congress."

Washington *Post*—"In lowering its physical requirements for induction, the Army has taken the only reasonable—indeed, the only possible—way to secure the number of men it needs."

Chicago *Tribune*—"Two days after announcing that the drive for volunteers had already brought in more than 500,000 men, the Army lowered its physical standards to extend the draft to 4-Fs. The authorization for selective service expires May 30 and the Army has apparently relaxed its standards as a hedge against refusal to renew the act."

New York *Times*—"The Army announces that more than a half million volunteers have enlisted for service during the past five months. This breaks all previous records. But before anyone in or out of Congress draws from this fact the conclusion that the Army's manpower problem has been solved, it would be well to take account of several considerations pointed out by Secretary Patterson. One of these is the fact that more than 40 per cent of the volunteers have signed up for only a year or eighteen months. *** A second factor is the Army's discovery that many of these enlistments are prompted by the fact that young men turning 18 still face the draft."

Cleveland *Plain Dealer*—"The Army takes a commendable step as it lowers physical standards for the draft. *** The new policy should go far toward removing the resentment which during the crisis of the war grew out of the fact that a small army of young men—4-Fs—were free to reap inflated wartime wages while their neighbors were fighting their country's battles."

Promote Gen. Schmidt

President Truman this week sent to the Senate the nomination of Maj. Gen. Harry Schmidt to be a Lieutenant General in the U. S. Marine Corps.

A Marine Corps officer of many years service General Schmidt's career began as a second Lieutenant in 1909. He advanced through grades to become a Colonel in 1937. At that time he was placed on the eligible list as head of the Paymasters Department with the rank of Brigadier General. Later in October of 1941 he was selected to be a Brigadier General of the line.

Maj. Gen. Schmidt

His foreign duty includes service in Guam, the Philippine Islands, China and Nicaragua, during which time he served in cruiser and Transport Forces. He entered the School of Applications, USMC in 1909, and in 1922-23 the Field Officers School at Quantico, Va., and during 1931 and '32 the Command and General Staff School, Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.

General Schmidt was commanding general of the V Amphibious Corps which seized Iwo Jima from the Japanese in one of the hardest fought battles of the war. Previously the Corps had engaged in the capture of Saipan and Tinian. General Schmidt is now at Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, Calif.

Pay Report With Secretaries

The service pay report, findings of the Interdepartmental Pay Board of which Lt. Gen. Wade H. Haislip is chairman, is still in the hands of the two Secretaries, Secretary of War Patterson said his week.

Congress had previously set 28 Feb. as the deadline for the submission of the two Departments' restudy of the pay situation in the Armed Forces.

Back-Dating Ranks

War Department orders issued this week reducing brigadier generals to colonels have discontinued the former practice of giving them dates of rank back to 1935, and instead has back-dated their ranks only to 1941 and 1942.

The practice of dating the colonel's rank of former general officers back to a period when many of them were still captains or majors was instituted so that all former temporary general officers would outrank all colonels who were not promoted to be generals, even though the latter may be considerably senior on the promotion list. It is understood, however, that an opinion has been rendered to the effect that the Department does not have the legal authority to give such hypothetical retroactive rank.

At any rate, back-dated ranks based on the temporary rank law would be ineffective after the "duration and six months period."

Marine Corps Promotions

President Truman 15 Feb. approved the temporary promotion to the rank of first lieutenant those second lieutenants of the Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve, including Women's Reserve whose number in grade on the combined lineal list of 1 July, 1945, is less than 4444.

No promotion is effected unless the officer concerned is on active duty status, including officers on terminal leave or at home awaiting retirement. Officers whose promotions have been withheld previously by competent authority are excluded.

All officers promoted as above will rank from 31 Jan., 1946, with increased pay and allowances to accrue from 15 Feb.

In addition to these promotions, Promotion Letter No. 16, 8 Feb., authorizes the temporary promotion of officers previously withheld because of physical disqualification. They are also of the Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve (the Regulars indicated by R) on active duty, on terminal leave or at home awaiting action of a Naval Retiring Board. Appointments are as of 15 Jan. as follows:

Lieutenant Colonels

E. L. Hamilton (R)	R. L. Skidmore,
J. L. Stonebanks (R)	(Ret.) (R)
B. D. Goodwin (R)	

Majors

C. R. Rogers, jr. (R)	W. Chase, jr.
R. W. Sullivan (R)	E. D. Hall
S. J. Seskowski	

Captains

W. S. Johnson	V. H. Higgins
W. Pince (R)	H. L. Shepard
R. Vernon (R)	H. M. Hardy (R)
J. L. Schwab (R)	J. H. Neil (R)
H. H. Bownes	R. D. Boddorff
S. A. LaRosa	P. L. Ainsworth
J. S. Ambrose	J. R. Hathorn
L. Wollman	A. F. Thibadeau
H. C. Woodward	W. G. Rafferty
J. A. Sabini	W. W. Koenig
J. P. Daniels	C. B. Fitzgerald
F. C. Clark	
C. "K" Livelsberger (R)	

First Lieutenants

A. L. Knight (R)	C. F. Temple
L. F. Vinch	C. K. Faught, jr. (R)
E. V. Reed	C. G. Moon
V. E. Austin (R)	G. E. Blitgen
E. Ostrove	R. E. Robertson
P. E. Corrigan	W. G. Hammel
A. R. Engelhardt	K. Prentice
D. L. Morse	C. E. Fulcher, jr.
R. L. Bauer	R. F. Warner
A. W. Vinson, jr.	V. Hollingsworth
E. "B" Ballard, jr. (R)	W. M. Schroeder
	L. H. Dunn
D. J. O'Connor	D. Bradley
A. J. Carignani	W. H. Dancy, jr.
R. E. Simpson	J. A. Davis, jr.
R. J. Beckwith	D. J. Bauer (R)
E. J. Keyes	C. A. Engman, jr.
J. E. Ryan	F. Gold, jr.
J. K. Johnson	A. E. Andriate, jr.
G. D. Carstensen	W. R. Albrecht
R. L. Buckley	J. B. Hill (R)
L. R. Ferrarini	R. D. Clubb (R)
D. Ganssle	C. W. Smith (R)
D. N. R. Hoff	S. J. Bonner (R)
R. "C" McIntyre	B. F. Roselle, jr.
S. B. Lipson	A. M. Dorfman
M. J. Bergstein	T. A. Levesque
E. "M" Drake	F. C. Adams
W. R. Lowe	C. E. White
E. S. Pennell	P. F. Caruso
C. E. Olewine	C. H. Leath
E. C. Fisler	R. B. Orr
M. I. Seal	J. C. Baker
H. "F" Fricker	R. G. Lowe, jr.
J. E. Dickson, jr.	E. J. Sakovitz
C. J. Carmody (R)	S. H. Rose
R. H. Downey, jr.	C. C. Cooper
B. S. Hardie	W. H. Bricker
J. G. Clemmer, jr.	J. H. Vincent
R. E. Kling	T. M. Matthews
M. J. Cooke	J. J. McGuire (R)
L. B. Adams (R)	R. J. McDevitt (R)

Commissioned Warrant Officers

D. Mayo (R) (MT)	G. E. Detty (R) (Gen.)
C. R. Butt (R) (QM)	
J. J. Welkey (R) (CP)	S. F. Baldassare (R) (Gen.)
P. McKenzie (R) (MT)	L. Pell (R) (Gen.)
R. R. Spoon (CP)	G. E. Heath (R) (Avn.)
A. Bertko, jr. (R) (Gen)	P. R. Arnow (R) (Arty.)
G. O. Dimmick (Avn.)	R. D. Robbins (R) (PM)
W. E. Augusten (R) (Ord.)	K. A. Gray (Gen.)
V. C. Morck (R) (Avn.)	J. C. Cardwell (MTO)
E. C. Scruggs (R) (QM)	D. D. Halley (R) (CP)
R. A. Pruitt (R) (QM)	H. E. Willis (R) (Avn.)
S. E. Humphrey (QM)	

Seek Dean for USNA PG School

Declaring that they want a faculty of "top notch" men, the Navy this week asked Congress to authorize the establishment of a civilian position of Academic Dean of the Postgraduate School" at the U. S. Naval Academy. The salary would be $12,000 annually.

Acting Secretary of the Navy Hensel wrote to Congress as follows:

"The emphasis in postgraduate education at the Naval Academy is largely on engineering subject matter. In order to properly direct study on the advanced level required in a graduate engineering course, it is necessary to employ a faculty of top-notch men who are specialists in the various engineering fields and who have contact with the latest engineering research and developments in their particular specialities.

"The geographical rotation of naval instructors has a very serious and undesirable effect in breaking the continuity of learning in the academic fields. It is proposed, therefore, that the academic department be staffed with the highest type of civilian instructors and that its policy and operation be coordinated by a civilian academic dean comparable in every way with the deans of the best engineering schools. It will be his function to advise the superintendent of the latest developments in engineering fields, to recommend policy, to engage the best instructional talent available and to administer the academic department in a manner comparable to that of the best engineering schools in the country. Continuity of service in this position is a very important factor.

Eligible List For Regulars

Temporary officers who qualify for commissions in the Regular Army under the current expansion program but who are not accepted because of the limited number of vacancies under the present law will be placed on an eligible list from which subsequent appointments will be made, according to present War Department plans.

Everyone realizes that the present authorized officer strength of 25,000 is far short of what ultimately will be sought. If the Army is granted a permanent strength of 1,000,000 enlisted men, as is now being discussed, the Department probably will ask for a commissioned strength of 100,000 to go with it. In such case there would be ample opportunity for those not accepted but who make the grade sufficiently to be retained on an eligible list.

Two New Cruisers Commissioned

Two new cruisers, one a 6,000 ton anti-aircraft cruiser, and the other a 13,700-ton vessel with a complement of 9 eight-inch 55's, were commissioned at the Navy yards at New York and Boston respectively on 15 Feb.

The 6,000 ton anti-aircraft ship was turned over to Capt. Rufus E. Rose and is known as the second "Juneau." Designed by Gibbs and Cox of New York City, the vessel is steam propelled and has a cruising speed of approximately 35 knots. Although the hull and machinery are the same as the ship's predecessor it actually represents a second version of the Atlantic class vessel, and in its new design would now be nearer the Cleveland Class.

The new Juneau carries 6 twin 5-inch guns, thirty-two 40 millimeter cannon and sixteen .20 millimeter cannon. The firstJuneau had sixteen-five inchers and less of the smaller weapons. The new vessel is referred to by the Navy Department as an "anti-aircraft cruiser" since all of its armament including her 6 twin 5-inch guns may be brought to bear against airplanes. It was explained that the reason for the change in design was to give the vessel's fire power greater range.

The Juneau has a low silhouette, trim lines and numerous anti-aircraft guns, most of which are controlled by the latest type of radar equipment. Twelve dual purpose five-inch guns in twin turrets are spaced along the ships 541 foot overall length. Secondary armament consists of thirty-two forty millimeter guns in six quadruple and four twin mounts, and sixteen twenty millimeter guns in eight twin mounts. The latest type of radar, both fire-control and search, has been installed in the ship.

She has a beam of only fifty three feet, and although designed for a speed of thirty-five knots, it is understood that she will cruise faster. She carries a complement of 27 commissioned officers and 695 enlisted men.

Considerably larger than the Juneau, the Oregon City was turned over to Capt. B. K. Culver at Boston Navy Yard. The vessel is 673 feet overall with a width of 71 feet. She will cruise at approximately 30 knots, and is known as an "Eight-inch" cruiser because of her heavy armament of nine 8-inch guns set in three triple units. In addition the ship carries six twin 5-inch guns which can be used in anti-aircraft combat. Lesser armament includes 48 .40 millimeter guns and twenty-eight .20 millimeter guns. She will be manned by a complement of 76 commissioned officers and 1,448 enlisted men.

The Oregon City is described by Navy Department officials as being of the Baltimore Class with redesigned armament.

Army Organization Study

The Army Organization Board, headed by Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson is still working on its final report.

Secretary of War Patterson said this week that neither he nor General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, have yet received the final report of General Simpson's board, although he had studied the changes suggested by the board when headed by the late Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch.

Equal Rights For Navy Officers

The War and Navy Departments have stamped with approval S.1412, a bill providing for amending the Pay Readjustment Act so as to entitle Naval officers who served prior to 12 Nov. 1918 to the same retirement benefits as are now enjoyed by Army officers who served in the same period.

The Navy Department stated in its report that the Pay Readjustment Act "was intended to limit inequities and discrepancies which had developed in the administration of the earlier law. However, there exists in section 15 of this statute several disparities which favor certain classes of Army officers."

The Navy Department continues by claiming that "there are three provisions of law under which officers of the Army who served prior to 12 Nov. 1918, may retire on 75 per cent of their active duty pay at the time of retirement before 1 June 1942; no parallel provision is made for Naval officers serving during the same period. Under the law as it now exists an Army officer of less service and a less degree of fitness for service, or a Philippine scout with less service, is governed by more liberal retirement laws than Naval officers who have served for longer periods and possibly with a higher degree of competence."

To allow flexibility in meeting the terms of any later pay laws, and so as not to "freeze" the retirement status of an officer so that he would be denied the benefits of future legislation, the Departments recommended the deletion of the words "at the time of retirement" from the end of the 4th paragraph in section 15 of the Pay Readjustment Act.

In conclusion, the Navy Department report stated that the bill "would place the officers of all services on a parity insofar as retirement of those who served before 1918 is concerned. The legislation is needed to correct an inequitable situation which was inadvertently created in the enactment of the Pay Readjustment Act."

The War Department, in giving its approval to the proposed bill, made the suggestion that a provision be added defining what, if any, back pay would be authorized.

Every Day Navy Day

The Navy Department this week called upon every present and former member of the Naval Establishment to "regard each day as Navy Day" by carrying the story of the need for a post-war naval force to all their friends and acquaintances.

In a message to all Navy personnel, Assistant Secretary Hensel declares:

"When the shooting stopped the United States Navy was the most powerful combination of Sea-Air Power ever concentrated under one flag. Its might was built by a combined effort, intelligence, and loyalty of more than three millions of men and women who fought and labored in all corners of the Earth; some fought in Tropic Jungles, some in the Frozen North, some on and under the Sea and some in the Air; still others contributed by arduous labor in Shops and Offices behind the Front; but all shared in the achievement of Final Victory.

"Now that the War is won we must think of the Peace, and with our pride in a task well done combine thought of our continuing responsibilities to our Nation and to Ourselves. Our Post-War Navy will be maintained at but a fraction of its wartime peak strength, but its efficiency can be maintained and increased by the Zeal, Industry, and Enthusiasm of its Active Duty Personnel and the loyal and sympathetic support of its Veterans. Our Navy and Marine Corps, with their Naval Flying Forces, must be adequate for their Peace-Time functions of patrolling the Sea Lanes of the World, protecting our Far-Flung Bases, and assuring our prestige as a member of the Family of Nations.

"For many years we have set aside one day, called Navy Day, when the Navy has been at home to the Public and explained its problems and methods of procedure. Each Navy Day Celebration has served to weave a closer bond of sympathetic understanding and appreciation of the Navy and its part in the overall plan for National Security in the Public Mind.

"During this crucial period of Transition from a War-Aime to a Peace-Time Navy it is hoped that each member of the Naval Establishment as well as each Veteran of the Naval Service, will regard each day as Navy Day and make himself or herself available to reply to the many questions concerning the Navy and the value of its Peace-Time Activities and will emphasize to friends and acquaintances their feeling of pride and loyalty and their determination to insure that a Navy which was powerful enough to play such a vital part in winning the War shall be maintained at sufficient strength to Guarantee the Peace."

Army-Navy Football Legislation

The War and Navy Departments have disapproved the bill, (S.1548), which proposes that, beginning in 1947, the annual service academies' football game be played in the various states according to alphabetical arrangement. This provision and others contained in the legislation called forth the following statements from the Departments, explaining why they oppose the proposal:

It would require the abrogation of a contract with the city of Philadelphia which runs to 1948.

The game is primarily an activity of the student bodies of the academies, and should be played within a reasonable distance of both schools to make the attendance of the student bodies possible. If played elsewhere the morale and spirit "which makes this game a service classic" would be affected and would result "in a complete loss of the color which makes it a great sports spectacle."

The game should be held in a location which provides a stadium seating capacity comparable to that in Philadelphia "which with a seating capacity of 102,000 could have been sold out three times over in 1945." Both Departments refer to the fact that there are very few such stadiums in the nation.

To the provision that no admission charge shall be made, the Departments made the objection that almost the entire athletic program at both academies depends on the revenue from football games, and that to lose that income would require curtailment of the program unless Congress were to make an appropriation to carry it on.

In reply to the provision of the bill that "no seats shall be reserved for spectators or guests, except that not to exceed 100 seats may be reserved for the President—if in actual attendance, and not to exceed 10 seats each may be reserved for the governor of the state in which the game is being played, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy—if in actual attendance," the Departments stated:

"It is impossible to handle in an orderly manner a large crowd unless reserved seats are provided. Without reserved seats the student bodies of the two service academies would be unable to attend the game. Even enthusiastic fans, who had stood in line for hours waiting to gain admission, would lose their seats under this arrangement should it be necessary for them to move for any reason during the game. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that people would not come from any appreciable distance to see a game unless reasonably assured that they would obtain seats."

Return to Permanent Rank

Present plans for easing the transition from higher temporary ranks to the permanent ranks of regular Army officers are based on dropping the officers a single grade at a time, it was stated this week at the War Department. This, it was pointed out, is being done in the case of general officers being reduced. Brigadier generals whose permanent grades are majors or lieutenant colonels are being dropped only to temporary colonels.

It was also said officially that even though only brigadier generals have been reduced in the Special Orders so far made public, there have been a number of major generals who have been reduced in rank.

Why the names of the brigadiers reduced were made public and not those of the major generals, was not explained. No lieutenant generals or higher have been "busted" yet, it was stated.

The General Staff is studying a number of plans for easing the transition from temporary to permanent ranks, it was stated, but no hope can be held out for the permanent retention of any part of the temporary ranks. When the authority for temporary ranks expires all officers must return to their permanent grades, it was said.

Pearl Harbor Inquiry

BY MARK S. WATSON

The Congressional Joint Committee for the investigation of the events leading up to the Pearl Harbor disaster closed its hearings on Wednesday, after well over three months of testimony (sometimes far afield) offered by diplomats, naval and army personnel, active and retired. If it exposed to public attention bitter animosities, some personal and some political, it also exposed them to the open air and their unwarranted outburst to refutation; thereby it quelled a good many small alarms and disproved a few rather shocking suspicions which otherwise would have gone on cankering American political thought indefinitely. If the evidence proved that some of our great men had their less inspired moments, it also suggested that other men who have long been fiercely blamed were not in fact so culpable as charged, nor in some cases culpable at all. It demonstrated beyond all doubt the dismal lack of coordination of intelligence between and even within the services. The evidence made it clear that what one man means to imply is not always what another man, equally intelligent, infers; that what one man sees as required is not what another (with different mission, different environment, different equipment) would even think of as required: that what we all see with crystal clearness in the shining sunlight and in the inspired retrospect of 1946 is not at all what we ourselves for the most part thought we foresaw through the mists of 1941.

Now that last is no great discovery, surely, and it would appear that to reach it should not have required two months of new testimony. Yet it was not the congressional committee alone which needed that period of time. It is surprising and instructive to observe how many times in the course of this inquiry others' judgments have swung back and forth, and how varying to this day are some of the judgments on what is, after all, the large issue—the ratio of responsibility which must be apportioned between Washington and Oahu, between civil and military chiefs, between army and navy. If the hearing did nothing else it made it clear to the public at large what the better informed knew instinctively—that there is no single and complete responsibility for such a thing as this.

One of the closing week's witnesses was Admiral Thomas Hart, presently Senator from Connecticut, but in 1941 and early 1942 the resourceful commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

Ten days before Pearl Harbor he too received the "war warning" from Washington, found it "absolutely significant" as far as he was concerned, and dispersed his ships accordingly. Clearly as he recited his own behavior, he declined with equal firmness to criticise Admiral Kimmel (who got a duplicate of that "war warning") for not doing the same thing. He remarked simply that the tasks of the two fleets were different. With a smile he mentioned his relief over certain pre-war instructions he received from Washington—he had attended to those matters on his own initiative and judgment, but felt somewhat more comfortable when that judgment was thus endorsed.

The famous "winds" message, which last week caused a new uproar, Admiral Hart spent little time in discussing. He said he regarded it as of very little importance, thereby supporting a view held by most others.

Other witnesses of the closing week added extremely little to the record. The major issues were covered long ago, and frequently re-covered. The value of the hearing's otherwise unnecessary prolongation — its transcript covers 14,000 pages—lies in the assurance thus afforded that there was no "muzzling" of any witness, and no barring of any statements desired by committeemen of either party. Now comes the preparation of the joint committee's reports, which almost certainly will include one or more in dissent; their completion can hardly be looked for until summer.

Ground Forces in A-Bomb Tests

Details of Army Ground Forces participation in "Operation Crossroads," the Army-Navy atomic bomb tests, were announced this week by Maj. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, AUS ground forces advisor of the staff of Vice Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, USN, Commander of the Joint Task Force Number One.

According to the Army Ground Forces' announcement items of clothing, ammunition, equipment and materials will be subjected to atomic bombing to determine the degree of damage inflicted under the varied conditions of the tests. Although the tests are primarily designed to determine the effects of the bombs on Naval vessels, the Army expects to gain valuable information on the effect of atomic bomb bursts on military equipment.

Approximately 60 officers and 300 enlisted men of the Army Ground Forces will comprise the Ground Force Group of the Task Force. The group will be commanded by Col. John D. Frederick, AUS. A number of other officers will accompany the task force as observers.

Effects of the atomic bursts on equipment will be determined by placing tanks, armored cars, trucks, military weapons of all kinds, fire control instruments, radio sending and receiving equipment, radar and other communications devices, clothing and rations on the decks of the target ships and examining such articles after the bombings.

All items will be present in sufficient quantity to assure successive tests under varying conditions, including effect of atomic bursts at different distances from the center of the explosion, and to obtain graded damage reports.

Representatives of military technical services charged with the development, design and manufacture of material, supplies and equipment then will inspect damage wrought on the equipment by the atomic bursts.

Much of the material to be tested will be assembled by the Army at Pearl Harbor and then loaded aboard target ships before sailing for the test area. Other items will be transported from the United States aboard vessels of the task force.

Task Force to Arctic

Headed by the 45,000-ton USS Midway, a picked task force will spend next month conducting equipment tests in the frigid region of the North Atlantic just south of the Arctic Circle, the Navy Department disclosed this week.

According to Rear Adm. John S. Cassady, USN, Commander of the task group, the tests will include the functioning of various types of aircraft in extreme weather conditions, to determine the effects of new ice resisting developments both upon planes and more particularly upon the flight deck and other equipment of the giant carrier. They will be a prelude to larger operations, in the same area next winter, he said.

Three destroyers, the Voglesang, Ware and Stormes, will accompany the Midway as will an as yet unnamed tanker.

With respect to new equipment to be tested the Navy plans to experiment with a Coast Guard operated Helicopter for air-sea rescues, snowplows to operate on the flight deck, and baskets attached to cranes projecting from destroyers, and so devised that they can reach out and snatch a pilot from icy waters. Each aviator will be equipped with new exposure suits recently developed in an effort to protect fliers forced down in frigid waters.

Capt. H. S. Duckworth, USN, Commanding Officer of the Midway, said that one purpose of the cruise is to determine behavior of the new class of carriers in Arctic weather. Aircraft carrier operations during the war, he said, were largely confined to tropical waters.

Admiral Cassady said that no foreign representatives would be present at the experiment.

Regular Army Nominations

The President on 18 Feb. sent the following Regular Army nominations to the Senate:

TRANSFERS

To Adjutant General's Department — Lt. Col. Eustace Maduro Peixotto, Inf., (temp. col.); Maj. Elvin Hamilton Burger, Inf., (temp. col.); Maj. George Henry McManus, jr., FA; (temp. col).

To Quartermaster Corps—1st Lt. Joseph Stephen Kujawski, Inf., (temp. lt. col.).

To Finance Dept.—Capt. George Lowe Eatman, Inf., (temp. lt. col.).

To Corps of Engineers—1st Lt. Arthur Harold Lahlum, Inf., (temp. lt. col.).

To Ordnance Dept.—1st Lt. Robert Sears Blodgett, Inf., (temp. col.).

To Signal Corps—Maj. Lee Roy Williams, Inf., (temp. col.); Capt. Ewing Chase Johnson, Cav., (temp. lt. col.).

To Field Artillery—2nd Lt. Hanford Nichols Lockwood III, AC, (temp. 1st lt.).

To Infantry—1st Lt. Herbert Mead Bowlby, jr., Cav., (temp. maj.).

To Air Corps—Maj. Oscar Carl Maier, SC, (temp. col.).

PROMOTIONS

To be majors, Air Corps

Wilbur Erickson	E. K. Warburton
L. D. Fator	LeRoy Hudson
A. M. Kelley	R. O. S. Akre
R. O. Brownfield	P. E. Shanahan
J. E. Mallory	R. V. Williams
W. H. Higgins	F. A. Pillet
W. R. Shephard	Reginald Heber
G. W. Hansen	H. LeR. Sanders
M. W. Kaye	D. F. Henry
A. L. Moore	Walter R. Agee
R. R. Walker	H. W. Pennington
L. H. Tull	Guy F. Hix
F. E. Glantzberg	M. C. Woodbury
E. H. Rice	P. B. Wurtsmith
L. S. Stranathan	W. A. R. Robertson

To be colonel, MC

James R. McDowell

To be lieutenant colonel, MC

James O. Gillespie

To be majors, MC

Fred W. Seymour	Joseph A. Baird
Lester O. Crago	Allan A. Craig

To be major, DC

John C. Hampson

CHAPLAIN

To be colonel

Paul B. Rupp

UNITED STATES ARMY

AAF To Handle Own Aid

Army Air Forces announced the conclusion of a two-day conference in The Pentagon, during which plans were discussed for the replacement of Army Emergency Relief Units on AAF installations by the Army Air Forces Aid Society, effective 1 March.

Commenting on the purpose of the conference, Maj. Gen. Howard C. Davidson, Director of the Society, stated, "The meeting was held for the purpose of discussing methods and procedures whereby the AAF Aid Society will supplant Army Emergency Relief Units on AAF installations. Personal affairs officers from all major commands were instructed in the purposes of the new society and will, in turn, advise their own personnel."

Present at the closing session were General of the Army and Mrs. H. H. Arnold, sponsors of the AAF Aid Society; General Carl Spaatz, Maj. Gen. Fred L. Anderson, Maj. Gen. Howard C. Davidson, Brig. Gen. Leon Johnson and Col. Walter M. Dunham.

Ft. Des Moines to Close

Ending its forty-three-year history as an Army center, Ft. Des Moines, Iowa, was closed as an Army post on 15 Feb.

During the war the facility trained 7,065 officers and 65,076 enlisted women of the Women's Army Corps. By 28 Feb. the present complement of 400 officers and enlisted men will be reduced to twenty officers and ninety enlisted men and women. The buildings will be used for veterans barracks and later, it is planned, the installation will become a national cemetery.

Officer Procurement Progress

Applications for commissions in the Regular Army continued to pour in this week, now at the rate of 4,000 per day, to reach a total of 56,000. The total last week was 32,972.

Applications in the three major forces are as follows:

Army Air Forces, 29,500; Army Ground Forces, 12,500; Army Service Forces; 14,000.

Capt. Scull Returns to Ad Work

Edward B. Scull, who was a Captain in the Engineers for three and half years and served on Okinawa and in Korea, has returned to the Copywriting Department of Geare-Marston, Inc., Philadelphia and New York.

Reports on Pacific Air Power

As special consultant to the Secretary of War, Maj. Alexander P. deSeversky has completed an inspection tour of the Pacific areas to observe and appraise the role of air power in the attainment of victory over Japan.

In his conclusions Major deSeversky states that in the war against Japan, even more so than in the war against Germany and Italy, victory was won through air power, and that the Japanese, like the Germans, failed to understand the potentialities of strategic air power until too late.

"Another conclusion from the facts," said Major deSeversky, "to which we must give due attention, even if it seems to detract from the magnitude of our victory, is that Japanese equipment became backward. Not only did it reflect backward strategic concepts, but it became technologically inferior, and in some respects relatively primitive. This, in some instances, operated to conceal certain of our own deficiencies, and in other instances, it made prodigious efforts and preparations superfluous."

Army Promotion by Selection

(*Continued from First Page*)

member of the House Military Committee; said: "I know the War Department wants to use selection to a limited degree. I would favor it if a fair method could be devised. However, until things quiet down, I favor continuing the present plan."

Representative Thomason, of Texas, who has sponsored much personnel legislation before the House Military Committee, declared, "There needs to be somt sort of a change; it is time to bring about an improvement. I am friendly toward promotion by selection or otherwise. However, I would want to know the method of selection and the tests to be used. To improve the quality of officer personnel I would welcome a hearing on it. I believe there is a lot of deadwood in the Army, and a system should be devised to get rid of it."

Representative Andrews, N. Y., also a member of the Military Committee, said that he favors promotion by selection.

Senator Gurney, S. Dak., a member of the Senate Military Committee, says that he has no reason to question the present plan. "It has won a war," he said. "I would need to go into the matter fully before arriving at a final decision."

Airplanes With Inf. Regiments

To give the ground forces the constant advantage of aerial reconnaissance, present Army plans indicate that each Infantry Regiment will have its own liaison plane, pilot, and crew, the plane to be employed as the situation demands.

Maj. James D. Loewus, representing the Infantry School, recently conferred with representatives of other Ground Forces Schools at Ft. Sill on the needs and future use of light airplanes in support of ground troops. He states that the AGF Training School at Ft. Sill recommends its use as follows:

"The primary use of the Infantry liaison plane is to locate and report information of enemy installations and troops; to locate and report the progress of adjacent friendly troops; to ascertain the nature of the unknown terrain; and to adjust fire on targets of opportunity."

Army Optometry Corps

The Senate Military Committee has reported H. R. 3755, a bill that provides for the establishing, in the Medical Department of the Army, an Optometry Corps. This bill, passed by the House last September, is strongly opposed by the Surgeon General and the War Department.

The legislation provides that officers of this corps are to be assigned to optometrical duty or to administrative duty in connection therewith. They would work under a medical officer who is an ophthalmologist. Sixty officers would compose the corps and they would be commissioned in grades from second lieutenant to colonel.

Ground Units Inactivated

Eleven miscellaneous Army Ground Force units that served in the European, Pacific, Mediterranean and Caribbean theater of operations have been inactivated recently at Fifth Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Special Troops, Fourth Army, Camp Swift, Tex.

These units are: 489th Motor Ambulance Company, 473rd Medical Collecting Company, 77th Ordnance Battalion, 141st Ordnance Motor Maintenance Company, 3557 Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company, 692nd Tank Destroyer Battalion, 550th Field Artillery Battalion, 662d Ordnance Ammunition Company, 658th, 659th and the 667th Quartermaster Truck Companies. The last four are Negro units.

Two hundred and eight persons were saved from downed service and civilian aircraft in the Hawaiian Sea Frontier area during the past 12 months, the Navy announced.

NOW THE SECRET OF "HUFF-DUFF" CAN BE TOLD



Magic Life-Saving Role of "Huff-Duff," U-Boat Nemesis, Revealed by Federal

The weapon that helped win the Battle of the Atlantic has just been revealed as a high-frequency radio direction-finder, invented by scientists of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation in collaboration with the armed services.

"Huff-Duff," as the device is known, was built by I. T. & T.'s manufacturing associate, the Federal Telephone & Radio Corporation, as a counter-measure against U-boat warfare.

Employing "squirt" radio transmissions that baffled ordinary direction-finders, the Nazis were confident that their U-boats were safe from long-range detection. They failed to allow for American ingenuity. I. T. & T.'s world-wide organization of distinguished scientists produced HF/DF ("Huff-Duff") which put the "electronic finger" on every U-boat transmitting within a radius of 3,000 miles.

"Huff-Duff" enabled our planes and patrol craft to destroy the submarines so effectively that Hitler declared, "Our U-boat warfare has failed due to some new long-range detector in the hands of our enemies."

Air-Sea Rescues

Peace-time uses of "Huff-Duff" are many. It finds "lost" planes and helps direct rescues at sea. In the past year, "Huff-Duff" has helped more than 1,000 "lost" planes to avoid disaster.

"HUFF-DUFF! . . . What does it mean to me?"

MAYBE it seems like a far cry from U-boats and sea rescues to the security and comfort of your own home.

But curiously enough the inventiveness that won a war is the greatest promise of better living in peace.

Yes, "Huff-Duff" means a lot to your personal design for living.

For the "know-how" of the same scientists who created "Huff-Duff" and many others of the war's great inventions is now turned to the development of new and finer electrical marvels for your home.

Today more than 1800 scientists of International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, world-wide leader in electronic research, and its manufacturing associate, Federal Telephone & Radio Corporation, are working to bring you a thrilling new kind of radio and a whole new line of electrical appliances. You will recognize them by the name:

Federal

So remember the name FEDERAL. The name that will stand for the best in research, engineering, precision manufacture and value — the name that will bring you the *world's finest* radios and home electrical appliances.

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Vessels for Test

Following is a complete list of target ships and support ships to be used in the atomic bomb tests, known as the "Crossroads" Project:

TARGET GROUP

Battleship and Cruiser Unit

BB-33 Arkansas, BB-34 New York, BB-36 Nevada, BB-38 Pennsylvania.

CA-24 Pensacola, CA-25 Salt Lake City.

Ex-Japanese BB Nagato, ex-Japanese CL Sakawa, ex-German CA Prinz Eugen.

Aircraft and Carrier Unit

CV-3 Saratoga.

CVL-22 Independence.

Destroyer Unit

DD-367 Lamson, DD-368 Flusser, DD-371 Conyngham, DD-378 Smith, DD-386 Bagley, DD-388 Helm, DD-389 Mugford, DD-390 Ralph Talbot, DD-402 Mayrant, DD-403 Trippe, DD-404 Rhind, DD-406 Stack, DD-408 Wilson, DD-410 Hughes, DD-411 Anderson, DD-413 Mustin, DD-419 Wainwright.

Submarine Unit

SS-196 Searaven, SS-184 Skipjack, SS-203 Tuna, SS-335 Dentuda, SS-305 Skate, SS-308 Apogon, SS-386 Pilotfish, SS-384 Parche.

Landing Craft Unit

LST-52, LST-153, LST-220, LST-283, LST-388, LST-545.

LCI-327, LCI-329, LCI-332, LCI-549, LCI-615, LCI-620.

LCT-412, LCT-414, LCT-705, LCT-845, LCT-812, LCT-816, LCT-818, LCT-874, LCT-1078, LCT-1112, LCT-1113, LCT-1114, LCT-1115, LCT-1116, LCT-1130, LCT-1132, LCT-1155, LCT-1187, LCT-1237, LCT-1175, LCT-1341, and nine other LCT's.

Merchant Type Unit

AKA-21 Artemis, AKA-22 Athene.

APA-57 Gilliam, APA-58 Appling, APA-60 Banner, APA-61 Barrow, APA-63 Bladen, APA-64 Bracken, APA-65 Briscoe, APA-66 Brule, APA-67 Burleson, APA-68 Butte, APA-69 Carlisle, APA-70 Carteret, APA-71 Catron, APA-73 Cleburne, APA-75 Cortland, APA-77 Crittenden, APA-79 Dawson, APA-81 Fallon, APA-82 Fergus, APA-83 Fillmore, APA-85 Gasconade, APA-86 Geneva, APA-87 Niagara.

SUPPORT GROUP

Transport Unit

AGC-7 Mt. McKinley (Force Flag), AGC-1 Appalachian, AGC-2 Blue Ridge, AGC-13 Panamint.

APA-27 George Clymer (F), APA-228 Rockbridge, APA-229 Rockingham, APA-230 Rockwall, APA-31 Saint Croix, APA-37 Cavalier, APA-45 Henrico, APA-235 Bottineau, APA-237 Bexar.

AKA-99 Rolette, AKA-101 Ottawa.

AV-5 Albemarle, AV-14 Kenneth Whiting, AV-17 Cumberland Sound.

AP-7 Wharton.

LST-817, LST-881.

LCT-(6)-1359, LCT-(6)-1361.

Navy Air Group

CV-38 Shangri-La.

CVE-117 Saidor.

Surface Patrol

DD-722 Barton, DD-723 Walke, DD-724 Laffey, DD-725 O'Brien, DD-770 Lowry, DD-692 A. M. Sumner, DD-693 Moale, DD-694 Ingraham, DD-781 R. K. Huntington.

Repair and Service Group

AR-6 Ajax (F).

AD-14 Dixie.

AG-76 Avery Island.

ARG-6 Ceru.

ARL-24 Sphinx.

ARB-3 Phaon, ARB-7 Sarpedon, ARB-8 Telamon.

AS-11 Fulton.

ATF-100 Chowanoc, ATF-105 Moctobi, ATF-107 Munsee.

AOG-25 Calamus.

AO-61 Severn, AO-69 Enoree.

AKS-4 Pollux.

ARD-29.

IX-50 Quartz.

YF-385, YF-733, YF-734, YF-735, YF-752, YF-753, YF-754.

Salvage Unit

ARS-8 Preserver, ARS-9 Shackle, ARS-22 Current, ARS-23 Deliver, ARS-33 Clamp, ARS-42 Reclaimer, Two ARS (D)'s building at Orange, Texas.

ARST-3 Palmyra.

ATA-180, ATA-185, ATA-192.

ATF-83 Chickasaw, ATF-148 Achomawi.

ASR-1 Widgeon, ASR-8 Coucal.

LCT-581, LCT-746, LCT-1184, LCT-1420.

Dispatch Boat and Boat Pool Unit

PGM-23, PGM-31, PGM-25, PGM-29, PGM-30, PGM-32.

LCI-977, LCI-1067.

LSD-5 Gunston Hall, LSD-25 San Marcos.

Medical Unit

AH-12 Haven, AH-13 Benevolence.

Survey Unit

AGS-4 Bowditch.

Marines a Guarantor of Security

Declaring that he is worried over the possibility of the Marine Corps being submerged under "current proposals," Secretary of the Navy Forrestal told a nationwide audience over the National Broadcasting Company's network 17 Feb. that the U. S. Marine Corps is a "proven guarantor" of our national security. After lauding the fighting ability of the Marines in taking Iwo Jima, the Secretary declared:

"Some of the current proposals for changes in the character of our armed forces seem to me to hold dangers of submerging the role of the Marine Corps and lessening the morale which has given this Corps its extraordinary fighting proficiency. I cannot help thinking what a loss our national traditions would suffer if the particular identity of the Marines were ever lost. Whatever may be the composition of the armed forces in the future, the fighting efficiency and the high spiritual quality of the Marines must never be impaired. National security is paramount, and the United States Marine Corps is a proven guarantor of that security."

U. S. NAVY & MARINE CORPS

Adm. King's Report

(Following is the conclusion from last week's ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL *of the text of the report of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King)*:

It would be unfair to others to single out by name individual scientists who made important scientific and technical contributions to the improvement of old or the development of new weapons. There were thousands of such contributions. It is generally conceded that with respect to originality of ideas and individual resourcefulness the scientists in the axis countries were as competent as our own. Where American science outdistanced the axis powers was in the superior administration of the over-all effort so that the available scientific manpower of the country could function with the maximum effectiveness. The leadership for what may be broadly termed the civilian emergency scientific effort was provided by the same individuals during the entire war period. These individuals deserve special mention among those responsible for the superb administrative efficiency which characterized the American conduct of the war throughout. Dr. Vannevar Bush as the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development carried the over-all administrative and technical responsibility for that organization. Under him Dr. James B. Conant as Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee; Dr. Alfred N. Richards as Chairman of the Committee on Medical Research, and Dr. Karl T. Compton as the head of the Office of Field Services administered the scientific and technical activities of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. Dr. Frank B. Jewett as the President of the National Academy of Sciences and of its working body the National Research Council, and Dr. Jerome C. Hunsaker as the Chairman of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics directed the activities of these organizations during this period. The coordination of the work of these groups with the Navy was handled by the Office of the Coordinator of Research and Development headed by Rear Admiral J. A. Furer.

I wish to pay particular tribute to the group of scientists, industrialists and officers of the Army and Navy who, under the direction of Major General L. R. Groves, USA, achieved the final outstanding technical success of the war—the development of a practical atomic bomb and the method of using it from aircraft.

Sufficient progress in the technical development and use of improved weapons and associated equipment has been made during the war to emphasize the necessity for continued progress. Working under the stress of an emergency, the factor of primary importance was immediate effectiveness against the enemy. This resulted in "crash designs" and production that required considerably more personnel, weight and space, than the more seasoned designs that might have been produced had time been available. Thus, the rapid expansion and development of new weapons and devices during the war was often at the cost of factors of major importance, such as the reserve buoyancy and stability of the ships in which they were installed. Those wartime designs, while they have well served their purpose against the enemy, have nevertheless created problems of refinement and improvement in the ultimate design of equipment, which must be so resolved that a minimum of personnel, weight and space will be required to attain the desired effect. These problems must be energetically attacked in the coming years of peace. Only by continuing vigorous research and development can this country hope to be protected from any potential enemies and maintain the position which it now enjoys in possessing the greatest effective naval fighting force in history.

VIII Conclusion

In my previous reports, I have touched upon the effective cooperation between our Allies which has been of such fundamental and signal importance in accounting for the success of our combined undertakings. This cooperation has continued and been extended in the period since my last report.

I have spoken before of the full measure of cooperation and support rendered by the ground, air and service forces of the Army in a partnership of accomplishment, which neither Navy nor Army could have carried out singly. For that cooperation, undiminished throughout the war, and to the wholehearted support from the great body of citizens who performed the countless and varied tasks which made up our war effort, I reaffirm my appreciation.

Just as the Navy depended upon its sister services and upon the multitude of activities which produced the implements of war, so also did the Navy rely for success upon the Reserves and the Regulars, the men and women who constituted in its mutually supporting elements—the Fleet, the Shore Establishment, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard and the Seabees—each of which contributed its full share to victory.

The end of the war came before we had dared to expect it. As late as August 1943 strategic studies drawn up by the British and United States planners contemplated the war against Japan continuing far into 1947. Even the latest plans were based upon the Japanese war lasting a year after the fall of Germany. Actually Japan's defeat came within three months of Germany's collapse. The nation can be thankful that the unrelenting acceleration of our power in the Pacific ended the war in 1945.

The price of victory has been high. Beginning with the dark days of December 1941 and continuing until September 1945, when ships of the Pacific Fleet steamed triumphant into Tokyo Bay, the Navy's losses were severe. The casualties of the United States Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard reached the totals of 56,206 dead, 80,259 wounded, and 8,967 missing. Many of these gallant men fell in battle; many were lost in strenuous and hazardous operations convoying our shipping or patrolling the seas and skies; others were killed in training for the duties that Fate would not permit them to carry out. All honor to these heroic men. To their families and to those who have suffered the physical and mental anguish of wounds, the Navy includes its sympathy in that of the country they served so well.

It is my sincere hope—and expectation—that the United States will hereafter remain ever ready to support and maintain the peace of the world by being ever ready to back up its words with deeds.

Deputy Chief CEC

The Senate on 15 Feb. confirmed the nomination of Joseph F. Jelley, jr., to be civil engineer with the rank of rear admiral, temporary, while serving as Deputy Chief of Civil Engineers, U. S. Navy, and the Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.

Navy Medical Commissions

The Navy Department this week urged all medical officers of the Naval Reserve to consider transfer to the Regular Navy and forward their completed applications immediately.

The Department is taking this action, it was pointed out, in order that applications may be reviewed for appointments as soon as legislation authorizing transfers is enacted.

Monotony Caused Neuroses

Monotony caused more cases of neuroses and psychiatric disabilities than actual combat duty, two Navy psychiatrists contended this week.

U. S. COAST GUARD

IN recognition of his fine work as wartime commandant of the U. S. Coast Guard, President Truman on 21 Feb. nominated Admiral Russell R. Waesche, USCG, to be placed on the retired list with the rank of Admiral.

Earlier in the week the Senate confirmed the nomination of Rear Adm. Merlin O'Neill to be assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard with the rank of rear admiral.

Rear Admiral Paul M. Stewart, former chief inspection officer of the office of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service has been appointed chief of the Coast Guard Division, headquarters announced this week.

Admiral Stewart was graduated from the University of Cincinnati and interned at Cincinnati General Hospital until December, 1914, when he was appointed assistant surgeon in the United States Public Health Service.

After eight years domestic duty, he was sent to the American Consulate in Italy. He spent the next four years developing procedures for the medical inspection of immigrants seeking admission to the United States, and also establishing the quarantine activities of the service. Since 1935 he has been in Washington, serving successively as medical director of the United States Employees Compensation Commission, head of the Division of Personnel and Accounts and at the Public Health Service.

The Motion Picture Board of Review, Navy Department has approved the production of a "Loran, Shipboard Operation" film as requested by the Coast Guard. The film will present a basic and fairly comprehensive view of the use of loran as an aid to navigation aboard ship.

In addition to its use for training service personnel, the film will be valuable in presenting to a widespread civilian audience the use and capabilities of loran.

The Coast Guard has issued an amendment to the USCG Auxiliary Instructions which restores the requirement of part-ownership in a facility as a prerequisite to the acceptance of members into the Auxiliary.

All members taken into the Auxiliary after 15 April, 1946, will be required to own not less than a 25 per cent interest in a motorboat, yacht, aircraft, or radio station. Headquarters, states, however, that this requirement will not jeopardize the status of present non-boat-owning members or of members who may join before 15 April.

The Pontchartrain and Mendota were issued orders on 29 January to proceed to Boston, and report by dispatch to the Commander International Ice Patrol, for assignment to duty as patrol vessels. On the same date, orders were issued to the Owasco to proceed to Boston and report to the Commander, International Ice Patrol, for assignment to duty as a radar research vessel.

Coast Guard-manned LST Flotilla 29 has returned to the United States. The ships are being dispersed to East Coast, Gulf and Pacific Coast ports for decommissioning. The Flotilla commander has been detached and the staff inactivated.

Documents recovered from the German Naval Office in Hakone, Japan, indicate extensive use of German submarines in Jap waters during the war, one report listing 30 such craft.

JCS Back Seaway

Army and Navy Chiefs this week urged Congress to approve the St. Lawrence seaway and power project.

Secretary of War Patterson, in a letter introduced by Dean Acheson, Under-Secretary of State, declared that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided that the seaway would be highly advantageous to national security. Secretary Patterson said further that it would serve as a reserve route reaching a relatively secure area for building and repairing ships as well as a source of industrial power.

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"Established in obedience to an insistent demand for an official organ for members of the American Defense and those concerned with it, The Army and Navy Journal will be published in the interest of no party; it will be controlled by no clique. Its independence will be absolute. Its interest will be directed solely to the inculcation of sound military ideas and to the elevation of the public service in all its departments."—From Vol. 1, No. 1, of the Army and Navy Journal, published August 29, 1863.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1946

"The efficiency of our field forces was solidly founded on training doctrines learned in the classroom, camp and maneuver area."

—GENERAL OF THE ARMY GEORGE C. MARSHALL.

OUR PRIORITY LIST

1. Maintenance in accordance with professional studies of our national needs and international commitments, of Regular Establishments organized and trained to utilize and employ materials of war developed by continuing Scientific research, and backed by Industry and Labor kept intimately familiar with the manufacture of such materials.
2. Reconstruction of National Guard and Reserve components federally aided and encouraged to maximum efficiency, and effectively coordinated with the Regular Services, and universal military training.
3. Increase in active and retired pay and allowances to meet risen costs so as to enable maintenance of American standards of living, and protection of such pay from reduction through income taxes.
4. Institution of orderly promotion systems in the Regular Establishments with recognition of war service and war ranks, to prevent future stagnation, and to insure the maintenance of high professional standards.
5. Continuance and expansion of service schools, including the Army and Navy Staff College, attendance of which shall be open to National Guard and Reserve officers.
6. Suitable rank and retirement benefits for former enlisted personnel who served as commissioned officers during the war.
7. Grant of the same rights and benefits to those who elect to remain in the Services as will be enjoyed by the discharged veterans.
8. Upward revision of pension scales to assure Service widows and dependents a living income.
9. Compensation for Service personnel who use privately owned automobiles on government business.
10. Maintenance of stock piles of strategic materials.

WITHIN a few days the recommendations of Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal with respect to upward revision of the Service pay scales will be sent to Congress. In suggesting therein a flat percentage increase for all grades and ranks, the Secretaries will be backed by the policy and administration is supporting on the national economy front where approval is being given to all wage increases within the "general pattern" established since last August, *i.e.* 15 to 20 per cent. As a matter of fact the percentage increase for the personnel of the Armed Forces should be considerably higher in view of the past history of their pay laws. In the commissioned grades there have been no substantial changes in pay since the revision of 1908. There were some readjustments in 1922, but the general average remained about the same as in 1908, while at the beginning of this emergency there were modest changes in a few of the allowances—but the overall schedule is pretty much today what it was thirty-eight years ago. No one need be reminded what great changes have been wrought in civilian incomes during those intervening years, both in industry and in the government service. As a matter of fact the changes in other fields of endeavor have been far beyond those necessary to meet rises in the cost of living and have resulted in raising the standards of living—neither of which has been done for the Armed Forces. Whatever increases are decided upon must certainly be extended to include the officers and enlisted men on the retired list, for in these days of high cost of living and high taxes it is this class which has suffered grievously. When a service man passes from the active to the retired list, he suffers about a fifty per cent reduction in his income (his base pay is cut to 75 per cent and he loses his allowances entirely), while on the other hand the $1,500 military deduction which he formerly was entitled to take in making out his income tax return is denied to him so that instead of getting relief when he needs it most he is subjected to the full force of the tax law.

It is particularly important that Congress make a substantial increase in Service pay rates at this time when every effort is being made to increase the size of the Regular establishments by securing volunteers from the best class of men. The calibre of men attracted to the forces now will have a great effect upon the character of our National Defense forces for many years to come.

IT can now be stated officially that the G-1 section of the War Department General Staff is engaged in studying various forms of promotion by selection with a view to recommending changes in the character of the permanent promotion system for the Regular Army. In the Navy and Marine Corps it is accepted that the Department will have to go to Congress to get a new personnel law to straighten out the situation that has arisen because of the total suspension of permanent promotion during the war. In view of the fact that the authority for temporary promotions is derived from war laws, and will in due time expire, there should be some determination of the permanent systems in the Armed Forces as early as possible. This is particularly true in order that temporary officers who are considering careers in the Regular Establishments may know what they have to look forward to and thus be better able to make up their mind. We urge the Military and Naval Affairs Committees of the two Houses to institute hearings promptly. By doing so they would be able to let every group and classification of officers present their special problems for general discussion and study and thus help to avoid the discontent and dissatisfaction that followed World War I and which plagued the Services in the years intervening between the wars. It is recalled that President Truman in recommending a single Department of Defense stated that the "inconsistencies" between the personnel policies of the two departments is "highly undesirable." It might be argued therefore, that permanent promotion policies will have to await the merger. However, it must be remembered that the promotion problem must be straightened out whether or not the merger is approved. Therefore time spent now in hearings and studies and the formulation of legislation will not be profitable, for if the merger succeed the data will then be ready for attempts at a single personnel policy, which if the merger fail each department can proceed with its own personnel bills.

Service Humor

Safety First

Three Boots entered a roadside bar and, looking around cautiously, made their way to the bartender.

"I'll have a coke," said the first.

The bartender looked at the man on the next stool.

"I'll take an orangeade," was the quiet dignified reply.

Disgust written on his face, the bartender glared at the third.

"Just a glass of water for me," was the request, "I'm driving."

—*Skyscrapers.*

Censorship

Restricted news very often has been inside information obtained from civilian sources.

—*Kearns Post Review.*

Efficiency

A businessman who was a great believer in efficiency was commissioned a captain. One of his first acts upon assuming command of the squadron was to call all the officers and enlisted men together and lecture them for an hour on the subject, "Do It Now!"

To underscore his point he had large signs hung in every office which repeated his admonition, "Do It Now."

Within 24 hours, a corporal went over the hill, the company clerk punched the first sergeant on the nose, a staff sergeant deserted his wife, and the mail clerk threw an ink well into the electric fan.

—*Lu Komunique.*

Youth

The seven ages of woman—the infant, the little girl, the miss, the young woman, the young woman, the young young woman, and the young woman.

The Works

Navy bridegroom: "With all my worldly goods I thee endow."

Father (aside): "There goes his seabag and fountain pen."

Angels

A doctor and a lawyer were arguing over their respective professions.

"I don't say that all lawyers are crooks," said the doctor, "but you'll have to admit the legal profession doesn't make angels of men."

"You're right," replied the lawyer. "You doctors certainly have the better of us there."

Fuzzy Phonetics

When George Bernard Shaw pronounces the word ghoti as fish, one must say "Oloighphtheau!"

Pronounce olo as in colonel—R,
igh as in high—I,
phth as in phthisic—T,
eau as in beau—O,
and the total summation is "Righto!"

(Shaw's ghoti. Gh as in rough; o as in women; ti as in nation.

R. S. B.

Pay Up

First Sailor (telling of his rescue at sea): "I had abandoned all hope. As I sank for the third time my past life seemed to rise before me in a series of grim, realistic pictures."

Second Sailor: "Well, didja happen to notice a picture of me lending you ten bucks in the spring of 1943?"

—*Jax Air News.*

Ask The Journal

Please send return postage for direct reply.

H.S.B.—The new Army Regulation 150-9, dated 13 Feb. 1946 makes it possible for any member of the armed forces of the United States who has served a period not less than six months on active duty, and have been honorably discharged to join the Enlisted Reserve Corps.

K. W. M.—When the original discharge papers are lost, the War Department issues a certificate to that effect, in lieu of the lost papers. This can be obtained by applying to The AGO in Washington, D. C.

H.L.S.—Often officers are kept overseas for what seems an undue length of time because their particular skills and abilitie are needed, and it is difficult to find replacements for them. There is a new policy in effect which will limit time overseas to 2½ years, those men who have not yet served overseas will be expected to replace men who have served the required time.

In The Journal

One Year Ago

Since the Ninth and First Armies jumped off (on 23 Feb.) Germany's Roer River defense line has caved in, various enemy units have been overrun, several score towns have been captured; we are at the gates of Industrial Cologne and the whole German position is jeopardized.

10 Years Ago

Brig. Gen. Charles D. Roberts, USA, will come to Washington 1 April to take command of the 16th Brigade; Brig. Gen. Perry L. Miles, USA, will leave the 16th Brigade and take over General Roberts' present command, the 2nd Brigade, at Ft. Ontario, N. Y.

25 Years Ago

A bill in Congress: "Directing the Secretary of the Navy to turn over to the Air Service of the Army one obsolete battleship, two obsolete destroyers and two obsolete supply ships, or their equivalents, same to be used for the purpose of serving as targets for the development of aerial armament and method of aerial attack against seacraft."

50 Years Ago

The haste with which England rushed into an understanding with France respecting the partition of Siam and now with Russia upon the acquisition of an ice-free port on the Pacific, a project which within a very few years has been denounced as hostile to English interests, ought to be significant to the United States of the solidarity of interests among European nations.

80 Years Ago

A House Joint Resolution was reported in Congress which "instructs the Secretary of the Navy to detail a steam vessel of war to assist in making surveys and soundings in that part of the Pacific coast, both of America and Asia, where it is proposed to establish the said telegraph, in laying the submerged cable, and giving other needed assistance to the enterprise."

WAR DEPT. & ARMY

Secretary of War—Robert P. Patterson.
Under Secretary of War—Kenneth Royall.
Assistant Secretary of War—Howard C. Petersen.
Chief of Staff—General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Deputy Chief of Staff—General Thomas T. Handy.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces—General Carl A. Spaatz.
Deputy Commander, AAF, and Chief of Air Staff—Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker.
Commanding General, Army Ground Forces—General Jacob L. Devers.
Commanding General, Army Service Forces—Lt. Gen. LeRoy Lutes.
Deputy Commanding General, ASF, and Chief of Staff—Maj. Gen. Daniel C. Noce.

THEATER COMMANDERS

U. S. Forces, European Theater—General Joseph T. McNarney.
U. S. Air Forces in Europe—Lt. Gen. John K. Cannon.
Office of Military Government for Germany—Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay.
Commander of Allied Forces in Japan—General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.
U. S. A. Forces, Middle Pacific—Lt. Gen. R. C. Richardson, jr.
U. S. A. Forces, Western Pacific—Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer.
Pacific Air Command—General George C. Kenney.
U. S. Forces, China Theater—Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer.
U. S. Forces, India-Burma Theater — Maj. Gen. T. A. Terry.
U. S. Forces in Mediterranean Theater—Lt. Gen. J. C. H. Lee.
U. S. Forces in African-Middle East Theater—Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Giles.

ARMY COMMANDERS

First Army—General Courtney H. Hodges.
Second Army—Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson.
Third Army—Lt. Gen. Lucien K. Truscott, jr.
Seventh Army—Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes.
Eighth Army—Lt. Gen. C. P. Hall (Acting).
Fifteenth Army—

AIR FORCES

First—Maj. Gen. Robert W. Douglass.
Second—Maj. Gen. Robert B. Williams.
Third—Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton.
Fourth—Maj. Gen. Willis Hale.
Fifth—Maj. Gen. Kenneth B. Wolfe.
Sixth—Brig. Gen. Earl H. DeFord.
Seventh—Brig. Gen. T. D. White.
Eighth—Brig. Gen. Patrick Timberlake.
Tenth—(Col. in command).
Eleventh—Brig. Gen. Edmund Lynch (Acting).
Thirteenth—Maj. Gen. Paul B. Wurtsmith.
Fourteenth—(Col. in command).
Twentieth—Maj. Gen. James E. Parker.

SERVICE COMMANDS

First—Lt. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold.
Second—Maj. Gen. James A. VanFleet.
Third—Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy.
Fourth—Maj. Gen. Edward H. Brooks.
Fifth—Maj. Gen. Robert S. Beightler.
Sixth—Maj. Gen. Louis A. Craig.
Seventh—Maj. Gen. William G. Livesay.
Eighth—Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker.
Ninth—Maj. Gen. William E. Shedd.

Army Orders

GENERAL OFFICERS

Lt. Gen. S. D. Embick, advanced on retd list to gr of Lt. Gen. and rev to retd status.

Maj. Gen. V. D. Mudge, reld from Det of Patients, Walter Reed GH, Washington, D. C., and assgd to OSW, Washington, D. C., for duty with Secty of War's Pers Bd.

Maj. Gen. G. M. Barnes, aptd 18 Feb. Assistant to the Chief of Ordnance with rank of Brig. Gen. This apmt will not vacate his earlier apmt as Maj. Gen. AUS with rank fr 11 Mar. 1943.

Maj. Gen. H. B. Sayler, aptd 18 Feb. Assistant to the Chief of Ordnance with rank of Brig. Gen. This apmt will not vacate his earlier apmt as Maj. Gen. AUS with rank fr 2 June, 1945.

Maj. Gen. J. W. Heard, reld fr Fld Agencies III Sec, WD Manpower Bd, Baltimore, Md., and asgd to Det of Patients, Valley Forge GH, Phoenixville, Pa.

Maj. Gen. E. P. King, jr., named Deputy Inspector General.

Brig. Gen. E. H. Lastyo, from duty as Asst C of T, Highway Transp., OCT, Washington, D. C., to NYPE, Brooklyn, N. Y. as Deputy Port Comdr.

Brig. Gen. R. E. Jenkins, Hq AGF, Washington, D. C., to GSC asgd to WDGS and OC of S, Washington, D. C.

Brig. Gen. E. P. Denson, fr asgmt as CG SEPE, Seattle, Wash., to Det of Patients, Madigan GH, Ft. Lewis, Wash.

Brig. Gen. L. J. Fortier, Mil Staff Comm, UNO Off, Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secty of War's Gp, Washington, D. C.

Brig. Gen. D. C. Faith, Hq Repl and Sch Comdr, Birmingham, Ala., to Mich. State Col. of Agric. and Applied Science, East Lansing, Mich., as Asst PMC and T.

Brig. Gen. H. S. Clarkson, reld fr Det of Patients, Brooke GH, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., to his home to await retmt.

Brig Gen. L. A. Lawson (Lt. Col. AC) retd as Col. upon own app.

Brig. Gen. J. H. Johnson (Col. QMC) retd as Col. upon own app.

Brig. Gen. R. M. Perkins, fr asgmt as CG 13th Hq and Hq Det Sp Troops Second Army, Cp Campbell, Ky., to IGD OC of S, Washington, D. C.

Generals Reduced

Brig. Gen. T. K. Brown, temp apmt as Brig. Gen. AUS terminated. Rev to perm gr Col. Cav. with rank fr 1 July, 1942.

Brig. Gen. G. E. Hartman, temp apmt as Brig. Gen AUS terminated. Rev to perm gr Lt. Col. QMC and temp pro to gr Col. AUS with rank fr 24 Dec. 1941.

Brig. Gen. C. A. French, temp apmt as Brig. Gen. AUS terminated. Rev to perm gr of Col. CAC with rank fr 16 Oct. 1940.

Brig. Gen. R. L. Burnell, temp apmt as Brig. Gen. AUS terminated. Rev to perm gr Lt. Col. FA and pro to Col. AUS with rank fr 14 Oct. 1941.

Brig. Gen. M. B. Bell, temp apmt as Brig. Gen. AUS terminated. Rev to perm gr Lt. Col. Inf. and pro to Col. AUS with rank fr. 24 Dec. 1941.

Brig. Gen. H. C. Brown, temp appointment as Brig. Gen. terminated. Rev to perm gr of Lt. Col. Inf. and temp pro to gr of Lt. Col. Inf. and temp pro to gr of Col. AUS with rank fr 11 Dec. 1941.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPT.

2nd Lt. R. E. Dickerson, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., to Hq 8 Sv C, Dallas, Tex.

Lt. Col. J. W. Hill, Atlanta, Ga., to Hq 7 Sv C, Omaha, Neb.

2nd Lt. C. Covotsos, Brooklyn, N. Y., to AGO, Washington, D. C.

Lt. Col. J. L. Schaefer, Brooklyn, N. Y., to AGO, Washington, D. C.

2nd Lt. W. L. Hyder, New Orleans, La., to 4 Sv C, TAG Sch, Ft. Oglethorpe, Ga.

1st Lt. W. J. Collins, Boston, Mass., to TAG Sch, Ft. Oglethorpe, Ga.

1st Lt. R. W. Fisher, Brooklyn, N. Y., to 2 Sv C, Ft. Monmouth, N. J.

Lt. Col. M. C. Pertl, New Orleans, La., to Hq Fourth Army, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex.

Capt. H. F. Lord, Ft. Bliss, Tex., to TAG Sch, Ft. Oglethorpe, Ga.

Lt. Col. P. L. DeHaas, Brooklyn, N. Y., to AGO w/sta Baltimore, Md.

Lt. Col. L. S. Moore, Dallas, Tex., to AGO w/sta Atlanta, Ga.

Capt. R. G. Moss, Ft. Mason, Calif., to Hq Repl and Sch Comdr, Birmingham, Ala.

Lt. Col. R. W. Fitzpatrick, Washington, D. C., to AG Pool NYPE, Brooklyn, N. Y.

1st Lt. R. S. Kotras, Ft. G. G. Meade, Md., to 6 Sv C WDPC, Ft. Sheridan, Ill.

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S DEPT.

2nd Lt. F. F. Hutchins, jr., Washington, D. C., to Br Off, JAGO, Baltimore, Md.

Capt. W. Ia Whalen, Wash. d. c., to Hq 1 Sv C, Boston, Mass.

Capt. O. F. Walker, Washington, D. C., to JAG Repl Pool Hq 6th Sv C, Chicago, Ill.

1st Lt. J. A. Boyce, Ft. Douglas, Utah, to SEPE, Seattle, Wash.

Capt. R. H. Marquis, Ann Arbor, Mich., to JAG Repl Pool, Governors Island, N. Y.

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S DEPT.

Col. W. H. W. Young, Ft. Hayes, O., to Hq 7 Sv C, Omaha, Neb.

Maj. J. M. Fuller, Brooklyn, N. Y., to MDW, Ft. Belvoir, Va.

QUARTERMASTER CORPS.

Col. F. N. Insinger, Washington, D. C., to 9 Sv C, Cp Roberts, Calif.

2nd Lt. C. C. Johnson, Atlanta, Ga., to 4 Sv C ASF Pers Repl Dep, Ft. Jackson, S. C.

Capt. C. J. Thompson, Maxwell Fld, Ala., to ASF Tng C, Cp Lee, Va.

Maj. W. W. Thybony, Kansas City, Mo., to QM Dep, Chicago, Ill.

Lt. Col. C. E. Bledsoe, Kansas City, Mo., to Hq Fourth Army, Ft Sam Houston, Tex.

Maj. D. L. Jenkins, Cp Lee, Va., to IU, Bloomington, Ind.

Maj. D. D. Ebaugh, Cp Lee, Va., to Natl SS Hq, Washington, D. C.

2nd Lt. A. J. Seddon, Cp Lee, Va., to 1st Sv C, Ft. Rodman, Mass.

2nd Lt. S. M. Cagan, Ft. Ord, Calif., to Repl Pool, Cp Lee, Va.

MEDICAL CORPS

1st Lt. J. M. Badway, Chillicothe, O., to USA GH, Cp Edwards, Mass.

Capt. F. J. Veve, Ft. Dix, N .J., to NYPE, Brooklyn, N. Y.

Capt. W. G. Vonstein, Ft. F. E. Warren, Wyo., to Hq 2 Sv C, Governors Is, N. Y.

1st Lt. W. C. Smith, Atlanta, Ga., to Hq 3 Sv C, Baltimore, Md.

Capt. C. C. Levy, Ft. MacArthur, Calif., to LAPE, Wilmington, Calif.

Capt. P. A. Dressel, Ft. Benj. Harrison,

(*Please turn to Page* 799)

OFFICIAL ORDERS

The Hon. Harry S. Truman, Commander in chief of the Army and Navy
Chief of Staff—Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, USN-Ret.
Military Aide—Brig. Gen. Harry Vaughn; Naval Aide—Comme. John K. Vardaman

NAVY DEPT. & FLEET

Secretary of the Navy—James Forrestal.
Assistant Secretary of the Navy—H. Struve Hensel.
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Air—John L. Sullivan.
Chief of Naval Operations — Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.
Naval Inspector General—Adm. C. P. Snyder, (Ret.)
Vice Chief of Naval Operations—Vice Adm. D. C. Ramsey.
General Planning Group—Rear Adm. E. W. Burrough.
Deputy CNO (Personnel)—Vice Adm. L. E. Denfeld.
Deputy CNO (Administration) — Vice Adm. R. L. Connoly.
Deputy CNO (Operations)—Vice Adm. F. P. Sherman.
Deputy CNO (Logistics)—Vice Adm. W. S. Farber.
Deputy CNO (Air)—Vice Adm. A. W. Radford.
Deputy CNO (Special Weapons)—Vice Adm. W. H. P. Blandy.
Commandant, United States Marine Corps—General Alexander A. Vandegrift, USMC.
Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet — Adm. John H. Towers.
Seventh Fleet—Adm. C. M. Cooke, jr.
Fifth Fleet—Vice Adm. Frederick C. Sherman.
Atlantic Fleet—Adm. Jonas H. Ingram, USN Commander in Chief.
Eighth Fleet—Adm. Marc A. Mitscher.
Tenth Fleet—Vice Adm. Bernard H. Bieri.
Commander, Naval Forces, Europe — Adm. Henry K. Hewitt.
Chief, Bureau of Ordnance — Vice Adm. George Hussey, jr.
Chief, Bureau of Ships—Vice Adm. Edward L. Cochrane.
Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics—Rear Adm. Harold B. Sallada.
Chief, Bureau of Yards and Docks—Rear Adm. John J. Manning, (CEC).
Chief, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and Paymaster General—Rear Adm. W. J. Carter, (SC).
Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Surgeon General—Vice Adm. Ross T. McIntire, (MC).

Navy Orders

15 Feb. 1946

Vice Admiral

William L. Calhoun to Western Sea Frontier.

Rear Admirals

Robert B. Carney to Asst. CNO, (Logistics).
Fred D. Kirtland to Comdr., Amphibious Training Command, Atlantic Fleet.

Captains

Edward D. Anderson, MC(S), NR, to Ret. Bd. and to home.
Bradford Bartlett to Off. in Charge Civilian Housing, Pearl Harbor.
Maurice M. Bradley to Com. Officer, USS George Clymer, APA 27.
Werner E. Carlson, (DM), NR, to ND, temp. duty.
James L. Chapman, (MCS), NR, to Separation Center (Officer), Los Angeles, for duty.
Neale R. Curtin to duty on Staff—16th Flt.
John R. Diffley to Naval Air Base, Yonabaru, Okinawa.
Hartwell T. Doughty, (DE), NR, to ND, tem. duty.
Harold F. Fick to Naval Air Base, Saipan Island, add. duty Comdr., NAB, Kobler Fld, Saipan.
Guy Fish, (MC), to Naval Ret. Bd. and to home.
Donald Frothingham, (SI), NR, to Nav. Oper.
Robert Goldthwaite to NAS, Willow Grove, Pa.
John W. Haines, (SC), to NA Mat. Center, Philadelphia.
Harry E. Jenkins, (MC), (Ret.), to proceed home.
William Kirten, jr., to Com. Of., USS Canisteo, AO 99.
James S. Laidlaw to Com. Of., Naval Ord. Plant, Canton, Ohio.
Ruthven E. Libby to C. O., USS Bremerton, CA 130.

(*Please turn to Page* 808)

MARINE CORPS

Commandant—General A. A. Vandegrift

Asst. Commandant—Maj. Gen. A. H. Turnage

Maj. Gen. Henry L. Larsen, Guam, to duty as Commanding General of the Department of the Pacific.

Brig. Gen. Ford O. Rogers, Marine Wing Service Squadron 4, to Washington, D. C.

Brig. Gen. Ray A Robnson, Headquarters, Wash., D. C., to Pacific Fleet.

Col. Thomas B. White, Quantico, Va., to home to await retirement orders.

Col. Orin H. Wheeler, Fleet Marine Force, to Washington, D. C.

Col. Elmer H. Salzman, ordered to Headquarters, Wash., D. C., with modified orders.

Col. John S. E. Young, Fifth Amphibious Corps, to Marine Air West.

Col. Luther A. Brown, Quantico, Va., assigned other duty at same base.

Col. Caleb T. Bailey, Marine Air West, to Fleet Marine Force Aircraft.

Col. Edward A. Montgomery, Marine Air Group-24, to Washington, D. C.

Col. Lucian W. Burnham, ordered to Camp Lejeune, N. C., with modified orders.

Col. Jesse S. Cook, jr., Fleet Marine Force, to St. Louis, Mo.

Col. William F. Brown, Fleet Marine Force, to Wash., D. C.

Col. James P. Risely, Fifth Fleet, to San Diego, Calif.

Col. William C. Purple, Pacific Fleet, to Wash., D. C.

Lt. Col. Calvin C. Gaines, First Motor Transport Battalion, to Parris Island, S. C.

(*Please turn to Page* 802)

COAST GUARD

Commandant—Admiral Joseph F. Farley

Assistant Commandant—Rear Adm. Merlin O'Neill

Captains

Capt. William Wishar, (Ret.), to the retired list upon relief by Capt. Harold S. Berdine, as ADCGO, 7 ND.

Capt. J. S. Baylis, Manhattan Beach Training Station to Coordinator, Atlantic and Gulf Coast, for duty.

Capt. Thomas A. Shanley from Western Inspector Office to duty as DCGO, 5 ND.

Capt. Paul B. Cronk—Leonard Wood to Admiral Hughes.

Capt. Alexander L. Ford from Admiral Hughes to Training Station, Alameda, for temporary duty pending assignment.

Capt. N. S. Fulford from Manhattan Beach Training Station to DCGO, 17 ND.

Commanders

Comdr. E. W. Holtz from Alameda Training Station to DCGO, 14 ND, for duty.

Comdr. Chester McPherson Anderson—Admiral Capps to DCGO, 11 ND, for duty.

Comdr. Elden G. Wigle from FAO Boston to DCGO, 1 ND, for duty.

Comdr. Fred T. Schelber from Casper to DCGO, 17 ND, for duty.

Air Role in Atom Bomb Test

Resources of the Army Air Forces and the Navy's Aviation will be dovetailed in the air operations of "Crossroads," the Joint Army-Navy atomic bomb tests project, scheduled for May and June in the Pacific, Vice Adm. W. H. P. Blandy, USN, commander of the operation, announced this week.

In releasing information concerning this phase of the combined operation of the Army, Navy and Manhattan Project, Vice Admiral Blandy covered the following major points:

1. Drones (pilotless, radio-controlled aircraft) will be directed into the atomic blast by both the Army Air Forces and the Navy. Employing Wildcat F6F "control" planes in the operation, the Navy will catapult F6F "Drones" from the decks of the carrier USS Shangri-La while the Army Air Forces will operate B-17 "Drones" from Eniwetok.

2. "Crossroads Airlines" will operate in and out of the country, employing C-54s and C-46s, Air Force transports, to move project air freight and personnel from the United States to the base at Kwajalein. Navy R-5Ds will aid in the transportation if necessary. Tieing into this operation will be a squadron of Navy Mariner seaplanes which will operate between the Kwajalein terminal and Bikini Atoll. Six PBMs (Mariners) will be employed for air-sea-rescue duties.

3. A fleet of Army Air Forces B-29s will operate over the target area to record scientific information with aerial cameras, in addition to the strike B-29 for the first test. Navy two-man helicopters will be used for scientific research communication liaison between vessels and photographic missions. The Naval photo unit will consist of F6Fs (torpedo bomber planes) and Mariner seaplanes.

4. The Crossroads Air Staff, under Maj. Gen. W. E. Kepner, Deputy Commander of Joint Task Force One, for Air, is comprised jointly of Army and Navy Aviation personnel. Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Power is the Assistant Deputy for Air, and Capt. H. D. Riley, USN, is the Assistant Deputy for Naval Air.

Admiral Blandy announced that the 509th Composite Group, now incorporated into Army Air Forces Task Group 1.5, commanded by Brig. Gen. Roger M. Ramey, will be called upon for a repeat performance of its original atomic bomb missions in the tests.

Units composing Task Group 1.5, part of Joint Army-Navy Task Force One, were organized under the 58th Wing, Fourth Air Force, which operates under Continental Air Forces, Headquarters Bolling Field, Washington. Brig. Gen. Charles F. Born, Chief of Staff of the Continental Air Forces, is the Project officer. Units are now training at Roswell Army Air Field, New Mexico, and at Clovis, New Mexico, where the 10 B-17s which will be used as "Drones" are based. The Navy "Drone" ships are being prepared for their operations at the Naval Air Material Center, Philadelphia.

The combined Navy air groups, Task Group 1.6, will be commanded by Rear Adm. C. A. F. Sprague, USN. His flagship is expected to be the USS Shangri-La. In addition, units of the force will include the USS Saidor, a seaplane squadron and an air sea rescue squadron.

The use of "Drones" is expected to uncover facts of radioactive phenomena as well as supply data on blast effects on airborne aircraft. The "Drones" will be directed into the atomic bomb cloud from varying altitudes. Each "Drone" will be under the direction of a piloted "control" airplane. It is planned to land the Navy "Drones" at Roi Island. The Air Forces "Drones" are scheduled to return to Eniwetok. Control of air traffic at the scene is an additional problem.

In addition to carrying the scientific instrumentation of the Manhattan Project, as the Army-directed organization which developed the atomic bomb is known, the Air Forces plan to subject a cross section of its equipment to durability tests. This Army Air Force material, including air frames, wing panels and engines, as well as service units, will be subjected to the blast on decks of target vessels. Additional data will be gained from Naval aircraft placed on the target carriers and on other target vessels.

Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Knerr who has assumed his new duties as Special Assistant to General Carl A. Spaatz, Acting Commanding General of the Army Air Forces.

Flight Engineer Training

Army Air Forces Headquarters has announced that a flight engineer course is conducted within the AAF Training Command for the primary purpose of training selected officers to perform the duties of Flight Engineer.

The following eligibility requirements are prescribed:

All applicants must be Regular Army officers or officers who have indicated in writing their willingness to remain on active duty. Must be on duty with the AAF at time of application in the grade of first or second lieutenant and must not have reached 36th birthday. Must be physically qualified for flying, class I, II or III, and must possess the MOS Aircraft Maintenance Officer and have been assigned as an aircraft maintenance officer for a minimum of nine months. Must have completed two years of college training leading toward an engineering degree or have a minimum of 18 months' experience in maintenance of aircraft (civilian or military). Must not have been eliminated from aircrew training, Army, Navy, Marine Corps or Coast Guard, for air sickness, fear of flying or disciplinary reasons.

Gen. Meloy to Civil Aviation

Brig. Gen. Vincent J. Meloy, a veteran of thirty years with the Army Air Forces who organized and commanded the North African wing of the Air Transport Command, has been named an assistant to H. M. Horner, president of United Aircraft Corporation. He has assumed his new duties with headquarters in New York.

A native of Brooklyn, Mr. Meloy attended Augustinian academy and Curtiss high school, later studying at Vanderbilt University. He enlisted in the First Separate Aero Squadron of the New York National Guard in 1916, and was commissioned a first lieutenant in the aviation section of the Signal Reserve corps the following year. He was a flying instructor at Kelly Field in World War I.

He was commissioned in the Regular Army Air Service in 1920 and subsequently saw a wide tour of duty as an officer in posts from McAllen, Texas, where he commanded the 2nd Bomb Group of the border patrol, to Corregidor, P. I., where he was in command of the 2nd Observation Squadron.

Mr. Meloy was graduated from the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, in June, 1936, and immediately was given command of the 20th Bomb Squadron, one of the three original B-17 units. Two days after Pearl Harbor, he was transferred from his post as plans and training officer of the Third Air Force to serve as the air corps member of the joint and combined intelligence committee of the War Department General Staff.

In December, 1942, he was named commanding general of the Caribbean wing of the ATC, and the following fall he organized and commanded the North African wing of the ATC. He had been in command of the Air Corps School at Truax Field, Madison, Wis., for fourteen months when he went on terminal leave 1 Jan. prior to retirement.

Appointment of FOs as 2nd Lts.

The following policy regarding the appointment of flight officers as second lieutenants has recently been promulgated by Army Air Forces Headquarters:

It is desired that all returnee flight officers who have been recommended in a theater of operations for appointments as second lieutenants and whose appointments were not completed because of the suspension of such appointments within their organizations be immediately processed for appointments as second lieutenants, with the following exceptions:

Flight officers who hold aeronautical ratings other than as pilot and who are not graduates of aviation-cadet or aviation-student courses of training, will not be processed as the AAF has no procurement objective under which they may be appointed.

Flight officers eligible for and desiring immediate separation from the service will not be processed.

Moresby to Tokyo

(Continued from First Page)

pound bombs.

"The principal fuses were instantaneous and air burst except in special situations where it was economical to put a runway out of commission permanently. We seldom bombed runways. The objective in war is to kill the enemy and destroy his equipment. The Fifth Air Force followed out the objective throughout this war. We not only not only heavy bombers against airdromes but used attack-bombers and fighter-bombers. When the general situation permitted attack-bombers to obtain surprise, these airplanes carrying para-frags or para-demos, in addition to their great strafing power, were by far the most effective weapon for the destruction of any target on land or on the sea.

"Formation depended on the target. A heavy bomber squadron or group went in abreast, in train, or broke up and bombed by flights as circumstances and type of target dictated. Our attack-bombers approached abreast or in waves to cover their target area plus beat down anti-aircraft positions on their flanks. Against large targets we used as many as one hundred (100) attack-bombers abreast.

"If the enemy wanted to move in personnel and equipment, even though he lost it, we merely went ahead and cracked him until he ran out of personnel and equipment. If the Nip had a mud airdrome as was the case with his Wewak airdromes, heavy bombs with delay fuses dug swimming pools. After we put a group on each runway he never used his runways again. He could have repaired these runways but he had been hit so hard and so many of his personnel killed that he had lost his will to repair his airdromes.

"War is an art, not a science. During this entire war the Fifth Air Force solved each problem on the basis of the various factors entering into the situation. During the entire three years, I have never seen two situations which were exactly alike."

Fifth Air Force spearheaded General MacArthur's drive from Australia to Tokyo and enabled General Krueger's superb Sixth Army to advance, advance and advance with minimum losses.

This is the first war in history in which the enemy surrendered without the conqueror's having set foot on the enemy soil. Fifth Air Force played a major part in this victory. We are proud of our part in it and proud of the comrades in other branches and services for whom and with whom we worked and fought and whose courage and persistent determination have been a constant source of inspiration to us of Fifth Air Force.

Most of all, we are proud of our great Fifth Air Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead, who always employed his forces—often inadequate—with skill, precision, power and economy.

Effective 29 Jan. 1946 all transactions in stocks, bonds and other interests of I. G. Farben Industry, A.G., in the United States Zone of Germany are prohibited by Military Government Law.

Army Orders

(*Continued from Page 797*)

Ind., to AGF Repl Depot No. 1, Cp Pickett, Va.

1st Lt. E. R. Kinney, Ft. Dix, N. J., to AGF Repl Depot No. 1, Cp Pickett, Va.

Capt. J. W. Davis, Greensboro, N. C., to Tilton GH, Ft. Dix, N. J.

Capt. G. O. Helden, Cp Campbell, Ky., to Hq 2 Sv C, Governors Is, N. Y.

1st Lt. C. L. McKinney, Santa Fe, N. M., to Med Det, Cp Stoneman, Calif.

Col. G. R. Hamilton, Springfield, Mo., to Brooke GH, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex.

Capt. C. L. Mazzarella, Ft. Devens, Mass., to Repl Pool, Ft. Dix, N. J.

1st Lt. W. C. Hambley, Cambridge, Ohio, to 8th Sv C, Cp Chaffee, Ark.

Capt. W. J. McGee, Cp Carson, Colo., to 8th Sv C, Ft. Bliss, Tex.

Capt. Nathan N. Jaret, Cleveland, Ohio, to Hq 2d Sv C, Governors Island, N. Y.

Capt. J. Klugler, Ft. Dix, N. J., to Hq 2d Sv C, Governors Island, N. Y.

Capt. C. C. Gass, Denver, Colo., to Hq 2d Sv C, Governors Island, N. Y.

1st Lt. G. L. Dybdahl, Louisville, Ky., to 5th Sv C, White Sulphur Springs, W. Va.

Capt. M. Gould, Ft. Devens, Mass., to Repl Pool, Ft. Dix, N. J.

Capt. W. F. Pearce, Ft. G. G. Meade, Md., to Hq 2d Sv C, Governors Island, N. Y.

Col. J. L. Snyder, Washington, D. C., to Brooke AMC, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex.

Capt. A. Treitman, Terre Haute, Ind., to Hq 2d Sv C, Governors Island, N. Y.

Capt. P. J. Parisi, Utica, N. Y., to 4th Sv C, Cp Gordon Johnston, Fla.

Lt. Col. D. B. Peterson, Washington, D. C., to Repl Pool, San Francisco, Calif.

Capt. W. H. Ries, Murfreesboro, Tenn., to VARO, Nashville, Tenn.

Lt. Col. C. H. Arnold, Albuquerque, N. M., to VASRO, El Paso, Tex.

DENTAL CORPS

Capt. R. W. Lewis, Ft. Benj. Harrison, Ind., to MDW Gen Disp, Washington, D. C.

Capt. D. P. Brown, Ft. Benj. Harrison, Ind., to MDW, Ft. Belvoir, Va.

Capt. J. C. Brown, Ft. Benj. Harrison, Ind., to MDW AWC, Washington, D. C.

1st Lt. P. B. Sweeney, Ft. Benj. Harrison, Ind., to MDW Gen Disp, Washington, D. C.

Capt. B. J. Tropauer, Ft. Benj. Harrison, Ind., to MDW, Ft. Belvoir, Va.

Capt. P. P. Harris, Ft. Benj. Harrison, Ind., to MDW AWC, Washington, D. C.

1st Lt. J. Z. Dembo, Cp Atterbury, Ind., to NYPE, Brooklyn, N. Y.

Capt. S. K. Goldfarb, Ft. Dix, N. J., to Hq 2nd Sv C, Governors Island, N. Y.

1st Lt. J. L. Dilibero, Ft. Dix, N. J., to 1st Sv C, Framingham, Mass.

Lt. Col. H. J. Malan, Denver, Colo., to Williams Fld, Ariz.

Capt. M. R. D'ambrosio, Ft. Dix, N. J., to Hq 2 Sv C, Governors Is, N. Y.

MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS

2nd Lt. F. Clardy, jr., Cp Crowder, Mo., to Fitzsimons GH, Denver, Colo.

Capt. E. LeBrun, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., to 4 Sv C, Cp Rucker, Ala.

1st Lt. R. D. Lewis, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., to 8 Sv C WDPC, Ft. Bliss, Tex.

2nd Lt. B. Jensen, Ft. Jackson, S. C., to Br Off PMGO, w/sta at Ft. Eustis, Va.

2nd Lt. B. D. Willenbrock, jr., Staunton, Va., to 5th Inf Div, Cp Campbell, Ky.

2nd Lt. E. J. Opperman Cleveland, Ohio, to Hq 6th Sv C, Chicago, Ill.

1st Lt. H. L. Clark, Denver, Colo., to 7th Sv C, Denver, Colo.

VETERINARY CORPS

Capt. A. W. Brecheisen, Detroit, Mich., to QM Dep, Chicago, Ill.

Capt. A. R. Gemberling, jr., Brooklyn, N. Y., to 76th AAF BU, Langley Fld, Va.

PHYSICAL THERAPISTS

1st Lt. C. M. Bender, Atlantic City, N. J., to Lawson GH, Atlanta, Ga.

1st Lt. M. E. Marshburn, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., to Sta Hosp NOPE, New Orleans, La.

DIETITIANS

1st Lt. H. M. Hesburg, Denver, Colo., to Brooke AMC, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex.

2nd Lt. R. E. Coffee, Brigham, Utah, to MD Repl Pool, San Francisco, Calif.

SANITARY CORPS

1st Lt. L. M. Levin, Ft .Devens, Mass., to Hq 2 Sv C, Governors Is, N. Y.

1st Lt. C. C. Flora, Ft. Benning, Ga., to 8 Sv C, Cp Swift, Tex.

ARMY NURSE CORPS

1st Lt. J. H. Harrington, Cp Patrick Henry, Va., to 3 Sv C, Ft. Eustis, Va.

1st Lt. C. S. Ondeck, Brentwood, N. Y., to Fitzsimons GH, Denver, Colo.

Maj. H. C. C. Borg, Cp Bowie, Tex., to ASF RSH, Ft. Monmouth, N. J.

2nd Lt. J. M. D. Pancoast, Ft. Sheridan, Ill., to Halloran GH, Staten Is, N. Y.

Capt. J. L. Miller, Cp Anza, Calif., to Madigan GH, Tacoma, Wash.

1st Lt. E. Stinson, Atlanta, Ga., to 4th Sv C, Augusta, Ga.

1st Lt. R. L. Crowell, Atlanta, Ga., to 4th Sv C, Augusta, Ga.

2nd Lt. M. E. Horne, Springfield, Mo., to 2nd Sv C, Ft. Jay, N. J.

CORPS OF ENGINEERS

Maj. J. W. Blessing, Baltimore, Md., to ASF Tng C, Ft. Belvoir, Va.

(*Please turn to Page 802*)

SERVICE NEWS AND GOSSIP

► **FOREIGN AFFAIRS.** Because the war's end, not yet formalized or even clearly indicated by peace treaty, has left unsettled so many problems of boundaries and controls and guarantees, military considerations still prevail and hence military men's judgments and perhaps their prestige may be more than usually useful to our diplomatic establishment. It has been recognized on two significant occasions. General Marshall's recent departure on his embassy to sorely troubled China and his prompt initiation of mediatory measures (with encouraging results so far) was followed at the weekend by the designation of Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith as our ambassador to Soviet Russia. Here is a test indeed. One week hence is the scheduled date of Russia's evacuation of Iran. Will it take place on time? And when it does take place, will the "sympathy" lately demonstrated in northern Iran serve as a sufficient substitute for actual occupation by Soviet troops? Thereafter will Russia again press upon Turkey those recent views about the frontier south of the Black Sea? And upon Greece those continuing views about Greece's internal politics? And upon Austria (as already hinted) those suggestions which were so promptly successful when presented to Hungary? And upon the United Nations that surprising demand for trusteeship in Tripolitania, on the other side of Britain's traditional lifeline to the East? Not one of these is a minor matter and not one of them can be examined away from the background of Stalin's momentous speech or the Vishinsky expressions in London. It is therefore of interest that at such a stage in world affairs President Truman should send to Moscow, potentially the most important of all our embassies today, a professional soldier whose acquaintance with diplomatic chancelleries is slight but whose industry and military judgment and devotion and sense of responsibility are notable. General Smith had in 1941-42 the advantage of work as the Secretary of the General Staff and then as the first secretary of both the Joint Chiefs and the Combined Chiefs of Staff under the observant eye of the persuasive influence of General Marshall. Thereafter he had the advantage and the great responsibility of serving as chief of staff to General Eisenhower in the European Theater, in the Mediterranean campaigns and throughout the hard days and the eventual triumph of the Western Front. Here was a test of a soldier's qualities and —in the coordination of American, British, French, Belgians and Hollanders, and of ground and sea and air forces, and of combat and supplies elements—here too was a test of diplomatic skill. As the Western Front moved eastward, there was contact decreasingly remote and increasingly frequent with our Russian Allies. Eventually SHAEF's chief of staff benefited from the close and friendly contact which General Eisenhower himself had with Marshall Zhukov, a contact which was of the very greatest benefit to both armies at the time and which may prove to have been of lasting benefit to the nations themselves. Great soldiers speak forthrightly to each other. Their differences are stated bluntly and ticketed as differences, their agreements likewise, and in time the agreements are found to be numerous enough and important enough to permit friendly understanding even of the differences, and to provide a basis for practical settlement. It is a good method. Certainly in the present Washington-Moscow discussions are differences which can neither be ignored nor quickly leveled save through friendly effort, and nobody is so foolish as to be unaware of it. But there also are points of complete agreement, some actually accepted and some potential, where the welfare of Russia coincides with the welfare of America and of the world, and nobody is so foolish as to be unaware of that either. Mr. Truman published no directive for General Smith's guidance (the China case had been exceptional) and offered no forecast. His hopes can be surmised. . . . Meantime the London meeting of the UNO has come to an end with original earnest hopes for its solid accomplishments only partially fulfilled and largely postponed, but with fears for its failure most happily allayed. The situation in South America is far from soothed by the American Blue Book's exposure of proven Axis influence in Argentina. It affords impressive proof of our charges made during and after the war, and Colonel Peron, the Argentine man on horseback has not answered the charges. Rather, he has sought to exploit them to his own advantage in the coming election by declaring that the voter must choose "between Peron and Braden"—referring to Mr. Spruille Braden, lately our distinctly combative ambassador in Buenos Aires and currently our State Department chief policy-maker in the Argentine matters. Just how the Argentine voter will respond to that dodge should be known soon, after election. The longer-range question is how other South American nations, whose friendship we greatly need, will view the matter, and on this, unfortunately, there will be no clear guidance for a long time to come; in their case there is no imminent election to afford an answer.

► **NATIONAL GUARD.** Following issuance of tentative troop allotments for the post-war National Guard of 622,000 officers and men, the National Guard Bureau is awaiting acceptances from the Governors of the states. While changes in the tentative allotments may be necessary in some cases, it is understood that piecemeal organization is favored rather than an overall delay.

The National Guard Bureau has notified each state that upon request by the Governor a Regular Army colonel of recognized ability will be supplied for a two year period as chief of staff to each division.

Lt. Col. Lee R. G. Ward, AGD, was recently relieved from duty in the Adjutant General's Office, Washington, D. C. and detailed for duty with the National Guard Bureau.

► **ARMY GROUND FORCES.** The following officers have recently reported for duty: Col. Mason J. Young, CE, Engr. Sec., Lt. Col. Ward C. Howard, OD, Ord. Sec., Maj. Lemuel C. Downs, FA, G-1 Sec., Maj. Stanley P. Hidalgo, Cav., Dev. Sec., Maj. Robert L. Sweeney, jr., Cav., G-1 Sec., Capt. Walter A. Haine, CAC, Dev. Sec., Capt. Farr J. Porter, AGD, AG Sec. and 1st Lt. Charles J. Warner, Inf., SI Sec.

Officers relieved from assignment at this headquarters are: Col. George L. Simpson, Inf., Lt. Col. Robert F. Bourne, CAC, Lt. Col. Robert C. Ewbank, FD, Lt. Col. Arthur H. Warner, CAC, Maj. Roger L. Atteberry, jr., FA, Maj. Dennis H. Holliday, Inf., Maj. Gordon W. Jones, Inf., Maj. Bertram H. White, FA, Capt. Roger A. Alexander, jr., FA, Capt. Francis Dockx, AGD, Capt. George V. Stennes, AGD and Chief Warrant Officer Lester E. Montieth, AUS.

First Army—Col. Hugh Mackintosh has been appointed Quartermaster of First Army succeeding Col. A. T. McNamara.

Capt. Harold L. Simpson recently received his separation from the service.

III Corps—The Commanding General, Maj. Gen. James A. Van Fleet has departed from this headquarters to take up his new duties as Commanding General, Second Service Command. Capt. John C. Swearingen, Inf., Aide-de-Camp, accompanied General Van Fleet to his new station.

Col. V. F. Burger, Col. John D. Cole, Maj. T. J. Sharpe, and Maj. Leland W. Butterfield on a recent visit to the 2d Infantry Division at Camp Swift, Tex. observed the squad combat tests and other activities.

Maj. Jose A. Andino, CWS, who recently joined the Corps has been appointed Actg Chemical Officer.

Capt. Metcalf Hatfield, MAC, has departed for his home on terminal leave.

V Corps—Col. Richard H. Harrison and Lt. Col. Ralph J. Hanchin have received assignments to attend the Twenty-seventh General Staff Class at the Command and General Staff School, Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.

Antiaircraft Artillery School—Gen. Walter Krueger visited Fort Bliss recently together with Maj. Gen. George H. Decker and Brig. Generals Philip G. Blackmore, William A. Hagins, Charles R. Lehner, and Samuel D. Sturgis, jr.

Col. Archibald D. Fisken has been assigned to duty as executive officer of the School.

Armored School—The School was host recently to the director of the Peruvian Military School at Lima, Brig. Gen. Jose Vasquez Benevides, and official party.

Officers newly assigned include the following: Lt. Col. Wallace J. Nichols, Lt. Col. Paul A. Pickhardt, Maj. John R. Etling and Capt. William F. Wadsworth, Tactics Dept.; Lt. Col. Howard E. Von Kaenel, 1st Lt. Kinsley Snyder, 1st Lt. Raymond J. Bell and 1st Lt. John F. Moale, Weapons Dept.; Capt. Bruce Harrison and 1st Lt. Wilbur Frank Munch, Communications Dept.; Lt. Col. George C. Dalia and 1st Lt. John J. McCarthy, General Instruction Dept.; Capt. Robert C. Bobb and 1st Lt. Charles J. Bouchard, Wheeled Vehicles Dept.; 1st Lt. Robert C. Brannock, Officers Div.; 1st Lt. Robert C. Giles, jr., Staff Judge Advocate Sec.; Capt. Paul D. MacGarvey, Full Track Dept.; and 1st Lt. Allan H. Jonas and 2nd Lt. Robert L. Downey, school troops.

The graduation exercises of the 92nd Class of the Armored Officer Candidate School took place recently with fourty-five new officers receiving gold bars upon completion of a rigorous 17 week training course. Honor graduate of the class was candidate Sam W. Sacra, Anchorage, Ky., who received his bars from Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey, Commandant of School. Speaker for the occasion was Maj. Gen. Robert W. Grow, USA.

Cavalry School—Lt. Col. Francisco Portugal accompanied by 11 other officers of the Brazilian Army recently completed a five-day tour of School installations.

Ten more officers sent to separation centers for relief from active duty include: Lt. Col. Jay R. Prillaman, Lt. Earl A. Fardy, Lt. Logan L. Page, Lt. Edward F. Morris, Lt. Harrison F. Barns, Lt. Joe Gross, Lt. Fred Running, Lt. Carl V. Garner, Lt. Susan E. Wolf and CWO Charles F. Tucker.

The following officers have been relieved from duty with the School: Capt. Frank W. Adams, Capt. Lloyd House, jr., Capt. Frank N. Ritter, Capt. John H. Weber, Lt. Fred S. Bolick, Lt. Sylvester W. McClain, Lt. William F. Gieffe and Lt. Harley H. Sutton, Camp Hood, Tex.; Lt. Col. Peter H. Dahmlow, Post Hostilities School, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.; Maj. Kenneth E. Rice, Hq., XIX Tactical Air Command, Ground Liaison Officers' School, Biggs Field, Tex.; Maj. John H. Walters, Anti-Aircraft Artillery School, Fort Bliss, Tex.; Capt. Hugh F. Harlin, Fort Sam Houston, Tex.; Capt. William A. Burke, Command & General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., and Lt. Thomas E. Buck, ARTC, Fort Knox, Ky.

Field Artillery School—Assignments to staff, faculty and detachment the period 6 Feb.-13 Feb. follow:

School Dets: Capt. Raymond McSwane; S-3 (operations): Col. William D. Williams; Adjutant General Sec.: Capt. Donald D. Whitaker; Dept. of Combined Arms: Lt. Col. Sydney E. Sacerdote; Dept. of Communication: Maj. William S. Lancey, Maj. Edward W. King, Capt. Ralph H. Kurtright, 1st Lt. George C. McGee and 1st Lt. Richard L. Featherstone; Dept. of Gunnery: Maj. Francis X. Olney, Maj. Edward B. Millett and Capt. Richard G. Marriott; Dept. of Motors: Capt. Robert Waller; Dept. of Observation: 1st Lt. Henry M. Owen, jr.

Assignments to School Troops follow:—Hq. & Hqs. Det.: Maj. James A. Poindexter and Capt. James T. Jones; Infantry Training Det.: 2nd Lt. Frank V. Hutton; Motor Pool Det.: Capt. Willis H. Rawlins; Training Det. No. 5: 1st Lt. Eldon R. McCord.

Field Artillery—The 417th Field Artillery Group was inactivated as of 14 Feb. 1946.

This Field Artillery Group was activated 28 April 1944 at Camp Breckinridge, Ky., with a cadre from the 411th FA Group. It participated in the Battle of the Ruhr Pocket under the command of Col. M. P. Echols.

At the time of inactivation, the Group Staff officers include: Lt. Col. Roy E. Hatten, Acting C.O.; Maj. Harry S. McDonnell, Acting Exec. and S-4; Capt. James T. Williams II, S-2 and S-3; 1st Lt. Richard P. Tinkham, jr., S-1; Capt. Newton B. Gililland commanded the Headquarters Battery at the time of inactivation.

Infantry School—Infantry Officers' Class No. 3 which begins this week is composed entirely of combat-experienced American officers . . . 110 in number, plus seventeen Philippine students and one Peruvian officer. They begin seventeen weeks of intensive training in weapons, tactics, logistics, communications and administration.

Lt. Col. George M. Davis, Chief of Automotive Section, awarded diplomas this week to 62 graduates of Enlisted Motor Course No. 153 at The Infantry School. Pvt. Leslie F. Brown of Boothwyn, Pa., was honor graduate.

Ninety enlisted men this week began training for fourteen weeks in the second interim motor course for 1946 to qualify as motor mechanics. Instruction will be given by the Infantry School Automotive Section.

Karl B. Radde of Huntington Park, Calif., was honor graduate when eighty-seven men of Officer Candidate Class No. 534 were commissioned second lieutenants; and John E. Boehm took similar honors when 124 men of Class No. 535 won their gold bars at recent graduation ceremonies. Maj. Gen. John W. O'Daniel was the principal speaker at both events.

The Mexican Minister of National Defense, Lt. Gen. Francisco L. Urquizo, was a visitor at Fort Benning for three days last week. Brig. Gen. Jose Vasquez Benavides, director of the Military School at Lima, Peru, also visited The Infantry School last week.

► **MARINE CORPS.** A memorandum, prepared by Headquarters, Third Marine Amphibious Corps, and distributed to members of the House of Representatives when they inspected Marine installations in North China, stated that original plans for

the landing of the Third Amphibious Corps in North China called for an authorized strength of combined Marine and Naval personnel of 4,012 officers and 58,530 enlisted men, or a total of 62,542. On 24 Jan. the authorized strength of the Third Amphibious Corps was 2,718 officers and 38,085 enlisted men of the Marine Corps and 434 officers and 4,024 enlisted men of the Navy, a total of 45,261. The reduction in personnel strength was effected in two ways. First certain units were deleted. In several instances the landing of these units was cancelled. In other cases units were landed, high point men sent home and low point men absorbed in other units. Second, reduction of ground elements of command to 90 per cent of authorized strength and aviation elements to 80 per cent of authorized strength.

One-third of the Marine Corps personnel being processed in Hawaii prior to return to the United States for dishcarge will continue their education. A survey by the Fleet Marine Force Personal Affairs and Rehabilitation Office also shows that 19 per cent of those returning expect to return to their former employment and that the remainder of those interviewed are uncertain of their post-war plans.

Claimants for baggage and personal effects of deceased Marines, and Marines who have lost such articles during the war, are advised that the activity handling such matters is the Marine Corps Personal Baggage Center, San Diego Area, Base Depot, Camp Elliott, Calif. All communications from owners or next-of-kin claimants must be so addressed.

Personnel of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, received 11,544 decorations ranging from the Medal of Honor to the Commendation Ribbon with Ribbon for action against the Japanese on Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Breakdown of awards for the above campaigns is: Medal of Honor, 36; Navy Cross, 528; Distinguished Service Medal, 11; Legion of Merit, 252; Silver Star Medal, 2,711; Distinguished Flying Cross, 114; Navy-Marine Corps Medal, 266; Bronze Star Medal, 5,107; Air Medal, 293; Letter of Commendation with Ribbon, 2,226.

Almost 300 of the U. S. Marine Corp's crack marksmen, assembled from all Pacific outposts, are firing practice rounds at the Puuloa Point Rifle Range, Pearl Harbor in preparation for the Pacific Division Rifle and Pistol Competition, scheduled for 25 Feb. to 2 March.

The winners of the competition will be sent to the Marine Corps Rifle and Pistol Competition at Quantico, Va., in May. The Pacific Division will also send unit teams to the San Diego, California, Trophy Team Match, which will he held in April. Five pistol shooters will participate in the Inter-Division Pistol Team Match at Quantico in June.

► **NAVY PERSONNEL.** Rear Admiral Walter A. Buck has been appointed Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts at Washington, D. C. Rear Admiral Horace D. Nuber has been made Deputy Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

Commodore Jasper T. Acuff has been appointed District Operations Officer, 11th Naval District, San Diego, Calif.

Commander Fletcher Hale, has been assigned duty at the Naval Academy at Annapolis, and Commander Winthrop D. Hodges has been made executive officer, USS Admiral W. S. Sims. Commander Charles R. Norris has been made executive officer of the USS New Orleans.

► **ARMY SERVICE FORCES. Corps of Chaplains**—Chaplains of the Army and Navy on duty in or near Washington held their February luncheon-meeting at the Continental Hotel, 19 Feb. In attendance were about 75 members of the two corps plus some wives, invited guests, and retired chaplains.

The guest of honor was Senator James M. Mead, of New York. Addressing those present, Senator Mead stated it as his belief that unity of the nations, as he found it emphasized in the work of chaplains as he made his recent world-tour, can be attained only as it is backed by the philosophy of religion.

Claiming that chaplains can aid legislators and the nation by emphasizing the need of a military preparedness program, Senator Mead suggested that they should engage in public discussion of the subject "so that our military strength will not be disintegrated too soon. America never needed more the cooperation of men who believe in America as against the isms of the world."

Transportation Corps—The New Orleans Port of Embarkation—named recently as one of the Army Transportation Corps' four permanent ports of embarkation—was inspected by the War Department's Chief of Transportation, Maj. Gen. Edmond H. Leavey, last week.

The ASF Training Center at Camp Plauche, La., and the Transportation Corps School at the New Orleans Army Air Base also came under the scrutiny of the lean Texan who recently assumed command of the Army's youngest Technical Service.

Just returned from a tour of inspection of the Seattle, San Francisco and Los Angeles Ports of Embarkation is Brig. Gen. Robert H. Wylie, Assistant Chief of Transportation and Director of Operations. He was accompanied by Brig. Gen. Paul F. Yount, Chief of the Commercial Traffic Service, OCT.

Col. John R. Fountain, formerly Commanding Officer of the Camp Patrick Henry Staging Area (Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation), has been named Commanding Officer of the Transportation Corps Training Center at Fort Eustis, Va. All TC units and personnel formerly at Camp Gordon Johnston, Fla., are being transferred to Ft. Eustis.

The Chief of the Highway Transport Service, OCT, Brig. Gen. Edward H. Lastayo, has been appointed as a War Department representative on the President's Highway Traffic Safety conference committee.

All transportation procurement activities for the War Department now will be centralized in the TC's Procurement Division at Cincinnati. Formerly, such purchases also were made by area offices in New York, Chicago, San Francisco and New Orleans. However, the area offices will conclude their contract termination and property disposal functions.

Movement of troops and cargo through the Los Angeles Army Port of Embarkation will cease after 28 Feb., Brig. Gen. James K. Herbert, port commander, revealed recently.

After that date, vessels carrying returnees and materiel will be diverted to other Army Transportation Corps ports at San Francisco and Seattle, General Herbert said.

Quartermaster Corps—The retirement of Brig. Gen. Guy I. Rowe after 36 years of service in the Regular Army was announced recently by the War Department. Until last month Commanding General of the Jeffersonville Quartermaster Depot, General Rowe reaches the statutory retirement age on 25 Feb. He is now on terminal leave. Col. I. S. Dierking, the Depot's Director of Administrative Services, is serving as Acting Commanding Officer.

Clothing and materials valued at $29,000,000 have been declared surplus recently. This declaration brings to approximately $63,000,000, original cost, the clothing and materials used to make clothing recently released by the Army.

Office of Fiscal Director—Officers of the Receipts and Disbursements Division and some invited from other divisions of the Office of the Fiscal Director joined in a stag dinner party at Hall's Restaurant in Washington to honor Col. A. C. Harden, Chief, Receipts and Disbursements Division, just prior to his entering Valley Forge General Hospital. During Colonel Harden's absence, Col. J. H. Doherty has been appointed Acting Chief of the Division.

Officers recently relieved from the Office of the Fiscal Director, Washington, include: Lt. Col. Harry C. L. Feast, Maj. Edwin Harding, Jr., and Captain Philip J. May.

Ordnance Department—The Senate on 15 February confirmed the nominations of Everett Strait Hughes to be Chief of Ordnance with the rank of major general and Gladeon Marcus Barnes and Henry Benton Sayler to be Assistants to the Chief of Ordnance with the rank of brigadier general. Both Generals Barnes and Sayler already hold the temporary rank of major general.

Col. Selby H. Frank has been assigned as Commanding Officer of the Red River Arsenal, Hooks, Texas, succeeding Col. Robert N. Bodine, transferred to duty as Commanding Officer, San Antonio Arsenal, vice Col. Reiff N. Hannum, relieved.

The following officers of Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., have been temporarily assigned to the Ordnance Overseas Maintenance and Modification Detachment for duty with the Research and Development Service, OCO, Washington: Col. John H. Weber, Maj. Gilvary P. Grant, Capt. Austin Haley, Maj. Leon E. Clark, Maj. William L. Harrison, Maj. John A. Ulrich, Capt. Warren E. Novak, Capt. Ralph A. Miekle and Capt. Edward E. Buchanan.

Brig. Gen. Guy H. Drewry has been awarded the Oak Leaf Cluster to the Legion of Merit for services as Commanding General of Springfield Armory from July 1942 to July 1945.

Signal Corps—Col. Hugh Mitchell, commandant of the Eastern Signal Corps Schools, has assumed command of the Eastern Signal Corps Training Center at Fort Monmouth, N. J., during the temporary absence of Brig. Gen. Jerry V. Matekja. General Matekja will serve for about three months on a War Department board of officers at Fort Dix, to interview applicants for Regular Army commissions.

Lt. Col. Vincent A. MacDonald has been appointed Inspector General of the Eastern Signal Corps Training Center at Fort Monmouth, N. J.

The Meritorious Service Unit Plaque has been awarded to the 9547th Technical Service Unit at the Signal Corps Contract Settlement Agency for the period from August to November 1945 inclusive. The award was for maintenance of a high standard of discipline and outstanding devotion to duty.

Forty-two enlisted men from various Signal Corps organizations are attending a 30-day training course in the Storage Division at the Lexington Signal Depot, Lexington, Ky. Officers accompanying the group are serving as instructors in the packaging course and are in charge of the training program.

► **BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY.** Capt. H. K. Sessions, (MC), USN, will visit the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Va., next week, to study silicosis claims of employes of Naval Shipyards.

Capt. Louis H. Roddis, (MC), USN, has relieved Comdr. R. C. Ransdell, (MC), USNR, as editor of the Naval Medical Bulletin and Chief of the Division of Publications.

Lt. Morwick Ross, USNR, was separated from the Bureau last week and has returned to civilian life in Washington.

Lt. Wilbur V. Charter, USNR, has reported to the Medical Statistics Division, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, from U. S. Marine Barracks, Klamath Falls, Oregon, where he was Statistics Officer to the Special Research Station studying malaria and filariasis in returning Marines.

Navy Nurse Corps—Comdr. Nellie Jane DeWitt, (NC), USN, Superintendent of the Nurse Corps, U. S. Navy, will attend a meeting of the National Nursing Council in New York City, 1 March.

Lt. Wilma Leona Jackson, (NC), USN, reports to the Dispensary, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., from overseas duty as Senior Nurse on Guam during the past year. Mrs. Jackson was among a group of Navy nurses who were taken prisoners on that Island, when it was captured by the Japanese earlier in the war. These nurses were repatriated six months later in an exchange of prisoners, and Mrs. Jackson was again among the first group of Navy nurses to set foot on the Island after it was re-captured by our forces.

Lt. Ruth A. Houghton, (NC), USN, goes to the U. S. Naval Hospital at Portsmouth, N. H., from the Naval Dispensary at Klamath, Falls, Ore.

Lt. Mary R. McHale, (NC), USN, leaves Comdr. Nellie Jane DeWitt's staff in the Nurse Corps Office, Washington, D. C., to report for duty at the Naval Hospital, in Long Beach, Calif.

Lt. Rose A. Flanagan, (NC), USN, goes soon to the U. S. Naval Fleet Hospital No. 114, in the Philippine Islands from the Naval Convalescent Hospital, Asbury Park, N. J.

Army Day Parade

The Veteran Second Infantry Division less the 38th Regimental Combat Team will parade in San Francisco in honor of all American Soldiers of World War I and II, on Army Day 6 April, enroute to a new station at Fort Lewis, Wash.

Approximately 7,000 officers and men from the division will take part in the parade along with an estimated 130 vehicles and guns.

Navy May Employ Non-Citizens

The House on 18 Feb. passed the bill, (S. 1618) to exempt the Navy Department from statutory prohibitions against the employment of non-citizens. The measure was designed to permit the Navy to pay German scientists.

Gen. Gillen to China

Formerly commander of the XIII Army Corps in France, Lt. Gen. Alvin C. Gillen has been assigned to assist General of the Army George C. Marshall, USA, Ambassador to China.

According to reports from Chungking, General Gillen, arrived with Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, commander of American forces in China. It is understood that General Gillen may substitute for General Marshall if the former Chief of Staff visits Washington shortly.

Army Promotion Status

Promotions and Vacancies on the Promotion List (Cumulative) Since 8 Feb. 1946

Last promotion to the grade of col.—Shuey E. Wolfe, CAC, No. 120; Vacancies—19; Last nomination to the grade of col.—Richard W. Carter, CAV, No. 510; Senior lt. col.—Joseph L. Philips, CAV, No. 121.

Last promotion to the grade of lt. col.—Aloysius E. O'Flaherty, jr., INF, No. 128.

Last promotion to the grade of maj.—Paul E. MacLaughlin, INF, No. 197.

Last promotion to the grade of capt.—Harrison S. Markham, CWS, No. 288.

Last promotion to the grade of 1st lt. — Cecil G. Young, jr., CAC, No. 938.

Marine Corps Orders

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Lt. Col. Arthur B. Hammond, jr., from Second Anti Aircraft Group, ordered home.

Lt. Col. LePage Cronmiller, jr., ordered home on inactive status.

Lt. Col. James H. Moffatt, jr., Marine Schools, Quantico, Va., to Great Lakes, Ill.

Lt. Col. James B. Glennon, jr., Quantico, Va., to Parris Island, S. C.

Lt. Col. Frank L. Kilmartin, Quantico, Va., to the Fifth Fleet.

Lt. Col. John H. Coffman, 14th Naval District, to Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Lt. Col. Shelton C. Zern, Guam, to Department of the Pacific.

Lt. Col Richard K. Schmidt, ordered to San Diego, Calif.

Lt. Col. Charles B. Nerren, Portsmouth, Va., to Naval Hospital Bethesda, Md.

Lt. Col. Woodrow M. Kessler, Philadelphia, Pa., to Quantico, Va.

Lt. Col. Alonzo D. Gorham, 7th Military Police, to Naval Hospital, Philadelphia, Pa.

Lt. Col. Harold Granger, Quantico, Va., to Bainbridge, Md.

Lt. Col. Wyman, Bainbridge, Md., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Thomas F. Forrester, Fifth Amphibious Corps to Quantico, Va.

Lt. Col. Henry J. Revane, Fifth Amphibious Corps, to Quantico, Va.

Lt. Col. James M. Masterss, Fleet Marine Force, to Wash., D. C.

Lt. Col. Richard I. Moss, Quantico, Va., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Robert C. McGlashan, Quantico, Va., to Headquarters, Wash., D. C.

Lt. Col. Lemuel A. Haslup, Washington, D. C., to home on inactive status.

Lt. Col. Francis X. Beamer, Quantico, Va., to Department of the Pacific.

Lt. Col. William H. Barba, Quantico, Va., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. John P. Brody, Quantico, Va., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Albert Creal, Quantico, Va., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Paul A. Fitzgerald, Quantico, Va., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Allen B. Geiger, Quantico, Va., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Harry J. Smart, ordered to Philadelphia, Pa.

Lt. Col. Harry S. Leon, Quantico, Va., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. James C. Bigler, Philippine Sea Frontier, to Commissioner of the Philippines.

Lt. Col. Floyd E. Beard, Marine Air Service Group-46, to Norman, Okla.

Lt. Col. Samuel S. Wooster, Boston, Mass., to home on inactive status.

Lt. Col. Rolland F. Smith, Marine Wing Service Squadron-2, to home on inactive status.

Lt. Col. Birney B. Truitt, Oakland, Calif., to Cherry Point, N. C.

Lt. Col. Lawrence H. McCulley, Washington, D. C., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. John C. Miller, relieved from temporary duty and assigned permanent duty Quantico, Va.

Lt. Col. Clarence A. Barninger, jr,. detached from present duties at Marine Schools, Quantico, Va., assigned other duty at same base.

Lt. Col. Walter N. Flournoy, detached from present duties at Marine Schools, Quantico, Va., and assigned other duty at same base.

Lt. Col. Roy L. Kline, Pacific Fleet, to Quantico, Va.

Lt. Col. Thomas C. Kerrigan, Parris Island, S. C., to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

Lt. Col. William B. Oldfield, Parris Island, S. C., to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

Lt. Col. John E. Rentsch, Parris Island, S. C., to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

Lt. Col. Jean H. Buckner, Camp Lejeune, N. C., to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

Lt. Col. William F. Kramer has been detached Camp Lejeune, N. C., to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

Lt. Col. Edwin A. Law, Camp Lejeune, N. C., to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

Lt. Col. Arthur C. Prine, Camp Lejeune, N. C., to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

Lt. Col. Claude S. Sanders, jr., Camp Lejeune, N. C., to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

Lt. Col. Frank R. Worthington, Camp Lejeune, N. C., to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

Lt. Col. Carl J. Cagle, Camp Pendleton, Calif., to Barstow, Calif.

Lt. Col. Walter S. Campbell ordered home on inactive status.

Lt. Col. Virgil M. Davis, Boston, Mass., to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

Lt. Col. Noah P. Wood, Quantico, Va., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Thomas R. Belzer, San Diego, Cal., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Daniel P. Closser, Camp Pendleton, Calif., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Kenneth P. Corson, 97th Replacement Draft, to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Edward L. Peoples, San Diego, Calif., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Robert E. Stannah, San Diego, Cal., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Edmund M. Williams, San Diego, Calif., to duty with the Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Henry E. Barnes, San Diego, Cal., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Bernard H. Kirk, San Diego, Calif., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Spencer S. Berger, San Diego, Cal., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Robert W. Boyd, San Diego, Calif., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. William W. Lewis assigned other duties at Marine Schools, Quantico, Va.

Lt. Col. Charles S. Todd assigned other duties at Marine Schools, Quantico, Va.

Lt. Col. Robert E. Eklund, Moffett Field, Calif., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. William N. McGill, Alameda, Calif., to Fleet Marine Force.

Lt. Col. Jack Hawkins, Camp Lejeune, N. C., to Wash., D. C.

Army Orders

(*Continued from Page 799*)

Capt. A. E. Clifford, Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo., to Hq First Army, Ft. Bragg, N. C.

Maj. H. A. Schauffler, Washington, D. C., to P. A. Div ASF, St. Louis, Mo.

Capt. R. J. Matthews, Cp Haan, Calif., to ASF Tng C, Ft. Lewis, Wash.

Col. J. H. Kerkering, Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo., to Iowa SC, Ames, Ia.

Capt. B. M. Lloyd, Washington, D. C. ,to MI Sv Language Sch, Ft. Snelling, Minn.

1st Lt. L. H. Judge, Charlottsville, Va., to ASF Tng C, Ft. Belvoir, Va.

Capt. J. J. Finn, Ft. Belvoir, Va., to Hq First Army, Ft. Bragg, N. C.

1st Lt. E. B. Sievwright, Ft. Belvoir, Va., to 244th AAA Bn. Orlando, Fla.

Capt. E. Bondy, Washington, D. C., to German Mil Doc Sec, Cp Ritchie, Md.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT

Capt. J. E. Johnson, Cp Butner, N. C., to Rep Pool, Aberdeen Pr Gr, Md.

Capt. G. A. Fowler, Cp Hood, Tex., to Red River Ars, Texarkana, Tex.

Capt. A. P. Miller, jr., Washington, D. C., to Pacific MI Research Sec, Cp Ritchie, Md.

Capt. W. C. Brannon, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., to Frankford Ars Fld Serv Suboff, Phila., Pa.

1st Lt. E. B. Sievwright, Ft. Belvoir, Va., to OCO, Washington, D. C.

Maj. E. J. Tingle, Louisville, Ky., to ASF Tng C, Ft. Benj. Harrison, Ind.

Capt. E. Watten, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., to Hq 7 Sv C, Omaha, Neb.

SIGNAL CORPS

1st Lt. G. D. Mulloy, Tacoma, Wash., to Readjustment Div ASF, Washington, D. C.

Col. R. N. Kunz, Ft. Monmouth, N. J., to C and GS Sch, Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.

Maj. R. G. Winckler, Ft. Monmouth, N. J., to University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Ark.

1st Lt. J. A. Bongard, Phoenixville, Pa., to Philadelphia, Pa.

FINANCE DEPARTMENT

Capt. E. D. Hageman, New York, N. Y., to Army War Bond Off, Chicago, Ill.

Capt. J. P. Presby, Ft. Benj. Harrison, Ind., to Hq 7 Sv C, Omaha, Neb.

Capt. E. R. Slye, jr., Ft. Benj. Harrison, Ind., to Hq 4 Sv C, Atlanta, Ga.

Maj. E. M. Teel, Ft. B. Harrison, Ind., to Cent Fld Fiscal Office, St. Louis, Mo.

Capt. M. Rein, Ft. B. Harrison, Ind., to Hq 6th Sv C, Chicago, Ill.

Maj. W. J. Warren, Houston, Tex. ,to Hq 8th Sv C, Dallas, Tex.

Capt. L. J. Cavallero, Wilmington, Calif., to OC of S, Washington, D. C.

2nd Lt. J. J. Kenyon, Edgewood Ars, Md., to 2 Sv C, Ft. Monmouth, N. J.

CHAPLAINS CORPS

Capt. J. B. Shelton, Cp Crowder, Mo., to Hq 9 Sv C, Ft. Douglas, Utah.

Capt. C. P. J. Krug, Cp Blanding, Fla., to Hq 2 Sv C, Governors Is, N. Y.

Maj. H. P. Mannion, Brooklyn, N. Y., to Hq 9 Sv C, Ft. Douglas, Utah.

Capt. A. J. Kolatch, Orangeburg, N. Y., to Hq 4 Sv C, Atlanta, Ga.

Capt. F. Newman, Boston, Mass., to Hq 8 Sv C, Dallas, Tex.

Lt. Col. E. P. Walsh, Brooklyn, N. Y., to AGF Repl Dep No. 1, Cp Pickett, Va.

1st Lt. Thomas L. Doyle, Brooklyn, N. Y., to Hq 1st Sv C, Boston, Mass.

Capt. J. J. Fitzpatrick, Cp Rucker, Ala., to Hq 8th Sv C, Dallas, Tex.

Capt. C. J. Murphy, Brooklyn, N. Y., to Hq MDW, Washington, D. C.

CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Capt. T. D. Lloyd, Edgewood Ars, Md., to Deseret CW Depot, Tooele, Utah.

Capt. D. P. Hillhouse, Edgewood Ars, Md., to Gulf CW Dep, Huntsville, Ala.

Capt. R. E. Humphrey, Ft. G. G. Meade, Md., to Gulf CW Dep, Hunstville, Ala.

Lt. Col. W. S. Hutchinson, Ft. Benning, Ga., to Manhattan Eng Dist, Oak Ridge, Tenn.

Capt. J. H. Ritter, Ft. Bragg, N. C., to Manhattan Engr Dist, Oak Ridge, Tenn.

TRANSPORTATION CORPS

2nd Lt. P. A. Delospedale, Ft. Eustis, Va., to NYPE, Brooklyn, N. Y.

1st Lt. D. J. Hanley, Ft. Eustis, Va., to NYPE, Brooklyn, N. Y.

1st Lt. R. G. Hollinde, New Orleans, La., to NYPE, Brooklyn, N. Y.

2nd Lt. H. E. Glynn, Brooklyn, N. Y., to 6 Sv C WDPC, Ft. Sheridan, Ill.

Capt. J. K. Ferguson, New Orleans, La., to SEPE, Seattle, Wash.

Capt. L. B. Hoskins, Washington, D. C., to NYPE, Brooklyn, N. Y.

1st Lt. R. E. Madden, Ft. Mason, Calif., to MPD ASF, Washington, D. C.

2nd Lt. A. B. Pieczura, New Orleans, La., to NYPE, Brooklyn, N. Y.

Col. A. D. Higgins, New Orleans, La., to NYPE, Brooklyn, N. Y.

Lt. Col. P. E. Gavin, Brooklyn, N. Y., to TC Repl Pool, New Orleans, La.

Col. R. M. Hare, Indiantown Gp Mil Res, Pa. to OCO, Washington, D. C.

Col. A. P. Taber, Wright Fld, O., to C and GS Sch, Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.

CORPS OF MILITARY POLICE

2nd Lt. S. M. Baker, Roswell, N. M., to 728th MP Bn, Cp River Rouge, Mich.

Capt. F. Jones, Ft. Benning, Ga., to PMGO, Washington, D. C.

2nd Lt. D. L. Grove, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., to 739th MP Bn, Cp Haan, Calif.

Maj. L. A. Arnold, Ft. Devens, Mass., to PMGO, Washington, D. C.

2nd Lt. J. H. Moller, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., to Br Off PMGO, New York, N. Y.

Capt. H. Reagan, Ft. Story, Va., to 712th MP Bn, Ft. Belvoir, Va.

Capt. H. Hulin, Ft. Bliss, Tex., to 7th Sv C, Ft. Snelling, Minn.

CAVALRY

1st Lt. J. R. Paul, Ft. Belvoir, Va., to Armd Rep Pool, Ft. Knox, Ky.

Col. W. C. Burt, San Francisco, Calif., to ODM, ASF, Washington, D. C.

1st Lt. J. C. Bork, Cp Campbell, Ky., to 6 Sv C, Detroit, Mich.

Col. J. M. Thompson, Ft. Bliss, Tex., to Hq 2nd Sv C, Governor's Island, N. Y.

Capt. S. H. Legendre, Ft. Douglas, Utah to JAGD, Washington, D. C.

FIELD ARTILLERY

Col. E. W. Martin, Ft. Sill, Okla., to Hq 6 Sv C, Chicago, Ill.

Lt. Col. R. A. Broberg, Hot Spgs Nti Pk, Ark., to FA Sch, Ft. Sill, Okla.

1st Lt. W. L. Stewart, Norfolk, Va., to 9 Sv C, San Luis Obispo, Calif.

Lt. Col. G. P. Cochran, Ft. Mason, Calif., to FA Repl Pool, Ft. Sill, Okla.

Capt. C. E. Koerper, jr., Ft. Bragg, N. C., to USMA, West Point, N. Y.

Capt. B. P. Wilson, Washington, D. C., to OC of S. Washington, D. C.

Lt. Col. J. A. Steere, Oakland, Calif., to Hq 3rd Sv C, Baltimore, Md.

Col. W. Hayford, Ft. Sill, Okla., to Hq 2nd Sv C, Governors Island, N. Y.

1st Lt. W. J. McLeod, Ft. Sam Houston, Texas, to Baltimore, Md.

Maj. J. Mosbach, Washington, D. C., to Counter Intelligence Corps, Baltimore, Md.

Col. John M. Lentz, New York City, to Hq AGF, Washington, D. C.

INFANTRY

2nd Lt. J. D. Bryant, Cp Ritchie, Md., to 2 Sv C WDPC, Ft. Dix, N. J.

Capt. O. H. Westerman, Norman, Okla., to 8 Sv C, Ft. Sill, Okla.

Capt. M. Rick, Cp McClellan, Ala., to ODB, Newark, N. J.

2nd Lt. S. Omata, Baltimore, Md., to MI Sv Language Sch, Ft. Snelling, Minn.

1st Lt. S. H. Young, Denver, Colo., to Inf. RTC, Cp J. T. Robinson, Ark.

1st Lt. D. Rose, Cp Beale, Calif., to Inf. RTC, Cp Roberts, Calif.

1st Lt. C. H. Dym, Cp Shelby, Miss., to 6 Sv C, Detroit, Mich.

Col. C. H. Owens, Cp Roberts, Calif., to Hq MDW, Washington, D. C.

Capt. W. E. Slezak, Cp J. T. Robinson, Ark., to ASF Tng C, Ft. Benj. Harrison, Ind.

1st Lt. D. R. Yandell, Cp J. T. Robinson, Ark., to Hq EDC, Governors Is, N. Y.

Maj. W. C. Schmoock, Ft. McClellan, Ala., to Sp Ser Repl Pool, Cp Lee, Va.

Capt. J. K. Hope, Ft. McClellan, Ala., to Hq 4 Sv C, Atlanta, Ga.

Col. C. H. Andrews, Cp J. T. Robinson, Ark., to Disch Review Bd, St. Louis, Mo.

2nd Lt. J. A. Neuman, Ft. McClellan, Ala., to 1 Sv C ATS, Amherst, Mass.

Capt. E. A. Gulick, Ft. Snelling, Minn., to CIC Center, Batimore, Md.

Col. E. C. Erickson, Ft. McClellan, Ala., to Disch Review Bd, St. Louis, Mo.

Lt. Col. W. L. Ferguson, Ft. G. G. Meade, Md., to Armd Rep Pool, Ft. Knox, Ky.

Capt. W. J. Greenwalt, Cp J. T. Robinson, Ark., to USMA, West Point, N. Y.

Maj. G. R. Schnurr, Baltimore, Md., to Inf Rep Pool, Ft. McClellan, Ala.

Lt. Col. A. D. Poinier, Ft. Lewis, Wash., to OC of S, Washington, D. C.

1st Lt. F. P. O'Malley, Cp J. T. Robinson, Ark., to OASW WD Strat Serv Unit, Washington, D. C.

Col. R. Wiltamuth, Washington, D. C., to PMG Repl Pool, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex.

Col. W. H. H. Jones, Ft. McClellan, Ala., to OSW, Washington, D. C.

Lt. Col. H. Lutz, Cp J. T. Robinson, Ark., to 6 Sv C, Cp McCoy, Wis.

Col. S. P. Marland, Washington, D. C., to NG Bureau w/sta Hartford, Conn.

Col. S. W. Wurfel, Charlottesville, Va., to JAGD, Washington, D. C.

2nd Lt. D. E. Campbell, Temple, Tex., to Inf Repl Pool, Cp J. T. Robinson, Ark.

Maj. C. W. Hinkle, Birmingham, Ala., to OC of S, Washington, D. C.

Maj. C. B. Kennington, Ft. Ord, Calif., to AGF Repl Depot, Cp Pickett, Va.

Capt. N. Keller, Cp J. T. Robinson, Ark., to MPD ASF, Washington, D. C.

Maj. L. W. Smith, Ft. McClellan, Ala., to Mobilization Div ASF, Washington, D. C.

Capt. K. S. Raeder, Cp Beale, Calif., to Inf Repl Pool, Cp Roberts, Calif.

2nd Lt. L. A. Aughenbaugh, Ft. Huachuca, Ariz., to Repl Pool, Oakland, Calif.

1st Lt. A. B. Boudman, Washington, D. C., to Hq 2nd Sv C, Governor's Island, N. Y.

Capt. R. J. Gworek, Ft. Jackson, S. C., to 4th Sv C, Ft. Jackson, S. C.

Col. J. B. Gregorie, Ft. McClellan, Ala., to OSW, Washington, D. C.

Capt. A. C. Leckie, Cp Shelby, Miss., to 4th Sv C, Cp Shelby, Miss.

Lt. Col. G. S. Peters, Cp Joseph T. Robin-

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Army Orders

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son, to PMG Repl Pool, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex.

1st Lt. H. T. Rosas, Baltimore, Md., to Intelligence Div ASF, Washington, D. C.

2nd Lt. J. H. Sperry, Ft. McClellan, Ala., to OC of S, Washington, D. C.

Capt. L. D. Gibson, Washington, D. C., to MI Service, Washington, D. C.

Lt. Col. J. R. Ulmer, Washington, D. C., to OC of S, Washington, D. C.

2nd Lt. L. W. Faucett, Ft. Sheridan, Ill., to 4th Sv C, Ft. Oglethorpe, Ga.

AIR CORPS

1st Lt. J. E. Wisner, Bay City, Mich., to Grand Island AA Fld, Neb.

1st Lt. C. L. Dodgen, Bay City, Mich., to Grand Island AA Fld, Neb.

1st Lt. W. L. Nolop, Washington, D. C., to 3705th AAF BU, Lowry Fld, Colo.

Maj. W. K. Day, Minter Fld, Calif., to Natl SS System, Washington, D. C.

Col. K. W. Mosher, Santa Ana AAB, Calif., to Disch Review Bd, St. Louis, Mo.

Maj. V. D. Kadanka, Providence, R. I., to 100th AAF BU, Mitchel Fld, N. Y.

2nd Lt. C. J. Olmstead, Ft. Jackson, S. C., to 4020th AAF BU, Wright Fld, O.

2nd Lt. B. P. Fusilier, Alexandria, Va., to 138th AAF BU, Lake Charles AA Fld, La.

Lt. Col. B. I. Mayo, jr., Selfridge Fld, Mich., to USMA, West Point, N. Y.

Maj. W. F. Zeller, Smoky Hill AA Fld, Kans., to MI Sv, Washington, D. C.

Capt. W. W. Huffman, Baltimore, Md., to 4117th AAF Base Unit, Robins, Fld, Ga.

Maj. F. E. Skipp, Washington, D. C., to Hq AAF, Washington, D. C.

1st Lt. S. Z. Fredman, Baltimore, Md., to 268th AAF Base Unit, Peterson Fld, Colo.

1st Lt. J. G. Rensel, Baltimore, Md., to 8th Sv C, Ft. Bliss, Tex.

2nd Lt. G. F. Coons, Ft. Devens, Mass., to Hq AAF Tng Cmd, Ft. Worth, Tex.

1st Lt. K. D. Blackshaw, Columbus, Miss., to OC of S, Washington, D. C.

Maj. J. E. Harrold, Mitchel Fld., N. Y., to Hq 5th Sv C, Ft. Hayes, Ohio.

1st Col. S. C. Gordon, MacDill Fld, Fla., to Engr Repl Pool, Ft. Belvoir, Va.

Lt. Col. C. Wray, Washington, D. C., to 300th AAF Base Unit, Tampa, Fla.

Col. C. F. Bond, Santa Ana, Calif., to Off Repl Pool, Louisville, Ky.

COAST ARTILLERY CORPS

Lt. Col. W. H. Vail, Ft. Bliss, Tex., to USMA, West Point, N. Y.

Lt. Col. C. R. Beaumont, Ft. Bliss, Tex., to Mob Div ASF, Washington, D. C.

Lt. Col. W. S. Fults, Washington, D. C., to SS System, Ft. Lewis, Wash.

Col. C. R. Adams, Ft. Bliss, Tex., to Dis Review Bd, St. Louis, Mo.

Col. G. W. Easterday, Bethlehem, Pa., to AAA Repl Pool, Ft. Bliss, Tex.

Lt. Col. J. K. McCormick, Ft. Bliss, Tex., to 9th Sv C, Ft. Lewis, Washington.

Col. R. J. Van Buskirk, Washington, D. C., to Department of State, Washington, D. C.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

2nd Lt. R. E. Donnelly, Washington, D. C., to Pac MI Desearch Div, Cp Ritchie, Md.

1st Lt. A. G. Boyer, Washington, D. C., to Pac Research Div, Cp Ritchie, Md.

1st Lt. B. J. Friedelson, Washington, D. C., to Pac Research Div, Cp Ritchie, Md.

1st Lt. G. B. Oujevoik, Brooklyn, N. Y., to MI Sv Language Sch, Ft. Snelling, Minn.

Lt. Col. J. A. Steere, Ft. Mason, Calif., to Hq 3rd Sv C, Baltimore, Md.

ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

2nd Lt. G. W. Rugg, Baltimore, Md., to Manhattan Engr Dist, Oak Ridge, Tenn.

2nd Lt. R. T. Takai, Washington, D. C., to Pacific MI Research Sec, Cp Ritchie, Md.

CHIEF WARRANT OFFICERS

R. Young, Indiantown Gap Mil Res, Pa., to AAF R and C Hosp, San Antonio, Tex.

G. E. Wadsworth, Jefferson Bks, Mo., to AAF OCS, Kelly Fld, Tex.

W. L. Hickle, New Orleans, La., to Hq 4 Sv C, Atlanta, Ga.

J. D. Marymee, Ft. Mason, Calif., to ASF Tng C, Ft. Lewis, Wash.

D. Madias, Ft. Mason, Calif., to Hq 9 Sv C, Ft. Douglas, Utah.

R. Wilson, Ft. Mason, Calif., to ASF Tng C, Ft. Lewis, Wash.

WARRANT OFFICERS (JG)

David G. Wire, New Orleans, La., to AMC, Washington, D. C.

L. Yancofski, Brooklyn, N. Y., to 3 Sv C, Aberdeen Pr Gr, Md.

J. S. Milucky, Brooklyn, N. Y., to AMC, Washington, D. C.

RETIRED

Col. R. N. Mackin, (Lt. Col.) CAC, as Col. upon own app.

1st Lt. D. M. Davidson (FA) AC, rev to retd status.

Col. A. J. Wick (Lt. Col.) QMC, as Lt. Col. upon own app.

Lt. Col. W. E. Bashore, Inf., as Col. upon own app.

Col. C. W. Steinmetz (Lt. Col.) AC, as Col. upon own app.

Col. L. V. Sunnicutt (Lt. Col. Inf.) TC, as Col. upon own app.

Col. R. Arthur, CAC, p.d.

Col. C. R. Bonney, DC, p.d.

Col. A. E. Rowland, CAC, p.d.

Col. S. S. Winslow, QMC, p.d.

Col. I. A. Duffy (Maj.) OD, as Maj. upon own app.

Col. H. A. Fudge (Lt. Col.) QMC, as Col. p.d.

1st Lt. R. G. Boyd, ANC.

1st Lt. V. H. Hagen, ANC.

1st Lt. M. O. Armstrong, ANC.

1st Lt. L. V. Ronning, ANC.

1st Lt. H. R. Williamson, ANC.

1st Lt. G. S. Robinson, ANC.

2nd Lt. A. M. Wyche, ANC.

1st Lt. E. S. Holt, ANC.

1st Lt. M. MacMillian, ANC.

Lt. Col. R. W. Fuller III (Capt.) Cav., as Lt. Col. p.d.

Lt. Col. R. R. Guthrie, Sig C, rev to retd status.

Col. C. A. Chapman (Lt. Col.) CAC, rev to retd status.

Col. L. P. Hodnette (Lt. Col.) Inf., rev to retd status.

Col. R. E. Shum (Lt. Col.) Inf., as Col. p.d.

Col. W. V. Davis (Maj.) CAC, as Col. p.d.

Col. J. L. Gallagher (Maj.) MC, as Col. p.d.

Col. W. H. Shimonek (Capt.) CWS, as Col. p.d.

1st Lt. J. E. Worley, ANC.

1st Lt. E. M. Harris, ANC.

Lt. Col. D. Bell, QMC, as Col. p.d.

Lt. Col. G. A. Bahe, (1st Lt.) Inf., as Lt. Col. p.d.

Col. I. B. Hill (Lt. Col.) CAC, as Col. upon own app.

Col. P. E. Sheppard, MC, upon own app.

2nd Lt. E. Thompson, ANC.

1st Lt. W. C. Jones (2nd Lt.) Inf., as 1st Lt. p.d.

1st Lt. R. B. Maras, ANC.

Maj. H. M. Haynes (Capt. Inf.) TC, rev to retd status.

Lt. Col. G. E. Abrams, Inf., rev to retd status.

Col. E. R. Strong, MC.

Col. Y. D. Vesely, FA, upon own app.

Lt. Col. J. E. Vickers (Capt.) MC, as Lt. Col. p.d.

Lt. Col. G. A. Hunt, Inf. as Col. upon own app.

Col. C. D. Calley (Lt. Col.) FA, as Col. p.d.

Col. E. A. Gans (Maj.) Inf., as Col. p.d.

Lt. Col. N. A. Congdon (Capt.) CAC, as Lt. Col, p.d.

1st Lt. H. E. Dull, ANC.

1st Lt. H. F. Buckley, ANC.

1st Lt. M. E. Bennett, ANC.

Lt. Col. A. S. Harrington, FA, rev to retd status.

Maj. J. H. Healy (Capt.) Cav. rev to retd status.

RESIGNED

Capt. E. Shaw, MC.

Capt. D. H. Mullen, jr., (1st Lt.) CE.

Capt. M. K. Langberg (1st Lt.) AC.

Maj. E. H. Wood (Capt.) DC.

CHANGE OF NAME

Maj. Fred E. Szorady, CE, to Fred E. Sorady.

Capt. Martin Lewis Berkowitz, DC, to Martin Lewis Benson.

Capt. Charles N. Ciaccia, MC, to Charles Chasier.

Ch (Capt.) Florian Charles Gallagher, to Jerome C. Gallagher.

Capt. George Gering Holzman, MC, to George Gering.

1st Lt. Bel Kaufman, ANC, to Bel Guber.

1st Lt. Howard Allen Rosenblum, FA, to Howard Allen Ross.

1st Lt. Ruth G. Smith, ANC, to Ruth Smith Thomas.

1st Lt. Marian S. Wenhold, ANC, to Marian S. Turner.

2nd Lt. Susan C. Frey, ANC, to Susan Frey Feagin.

2nd Lt. Molly M. Jaksha, ANC, to Molly M. Jaksha Berlin.

2nd Lt. Norma H. Shuler, ANC, to Norma M. Shuler Stoufer.

WOJG Lee M. Greenberg, AUS, to Lee Myron Greene.

Capt. Irving Lebedinsky, CAC, to Irving Lawrence.

1st Lt. Elaine M. Antonopoulos, ANC, to Elaine Antonopoulos Coon.

1st Lt. Mabel D. Ayers, ANC, to Mabel D. Kapp.

1st Lt. Roy Robert Freedman, QMC, to Roy Robert Freeman.

1st Lt. Ethel G. Mann, WAC, to Ethel G. Haas.

1st Lt. Barrett Marshall Rifkind, Inf., to Barrett Marshall Reed.

2nd Lt. Doris Canty, ANC, to Doris Canty Ravlin.

M/Sgt. L. R. Day, Inf.

M/Sgt. W. Felder.

1st Sgt. S. Armes.

M/Sgt. J. W. Hampton.

1st Sgt. W. M. Goodwin.

M/Sgt. R. E. Fillingim, Inf.

M/Sgt. A. Gabriels, CMP.

M/Sgt. W. A. Gibson.

M/Sgt. E. H. Gidley, DEML

M/Sgt. J. T. Hardie, CMP.

M/Sgt. M. E. Henry, AAF.

1st Sgt. W. E. Foust, Inf.

1st Sgt. D. L. Gimble, MD.

1st Sgt. J. V. Graham, Inf.

1st Sgt. J. Green, FA.

T/Sgt. W. Dooley, AAF.

T/Sgt. M. W. Henry, Cav.

T/Sgt. Heredia, AAF.

S/Sgt. T. Doucett, QMC.

S/Sgt. E. D. Easter, DEML.

Sgt. W. Efcovitz, QMC.

Tec. 4 A. H. Eldred, Inf.

ENLISTED MEN RETIRED

M/Sgt. G. T. Ashmore, rev to retd status.

M/Sgt. A. H. Moore, rev to retd status.

M/Sgt. H. E. Satterwhite, sr., rev to retd status.

M/Sgt. A. Schifanella, rev to retd status.

M/Sgt. A. Schlanz, rev to retd status.

M/Sgt. G. P. Stowe, rev to retd status.

1st Sgt. J. Booker, rev to retd status.

T/Sgt. C. Hernandes, CA, as 1st Lt.

M/Sgt. F. Balcarcel, rev to retd status.

M/Sgt. L. R. Tankersley, rev to retd status.

M/Sgt. A. J. Vancelette, rev to retd status.

M/Sgt. J. C. Dodd, AAF.

S/Sgt. G. Bassett, Inf.

M/Sgt. H. Alexander, AAF, p.d.

M/Sgt. C. S. Bell, AAF, p.d.

M/Sgt. D. B. Bradford, CMP, p.d.

M/Sgt. J. C. Collier, AAF, p.d.

M/Sgt. A. Chestock, AAF, p.d.

1st Sgt. P. J. Algunas, Inf., p.d.

T/Sgt. J. J. Adams, AAF, p.d.

T/Sgt. W. E. Carr, Inf., p.d.

T/Sgt. G. Cobet, Inf., p.d.

S/Sgt. N. J. Barger, MD, p.d.

S/Sgt. R. L. Boland, FA, p.d.

S/Sgt. H. J. Chappell, Inf., p.d.

M/Sgt. M. W. Blanchard, rev to retd status.

M/Sgt. H. M. Cope, DEML.

M/Sgt. R. H. Pugh, Inf.

M/Sgt. C. Sears.

M/Sgt. R. B. Deering, DEML.

M/Sgt. M. H. Bruaw, AAF, p.d.

M/Sgt. H. Bruce, AAF, p.d.

M/Sgt. M. H. Cone, AAF, p.d.

M/Sgt. M. E. Crawley, Cav., p.d.

1st Sgt. R. D. Calfee, DEML, p.d.

T/Sgt. A. J. Covington, Inf., p.d.

T/Sgt. V. Ramos, Inf., p.d.

S/Sgt. L. Brown, DEML, p.d.

S/Sgt. A. Dezensio, QMC, p.d.

S/Sgt. J. E. Glass, Inf., p.d.

Sgt. H. H. Holmes, QMC, p.d.

T/4 V. A. Burgee, Inf., p.d.

Maj. Emil Herman Sheldon, MC, to Emil Herman Schnap.

Capt. Edwin Bblofsky, DC, to Edwin Belden.

Capt. Louis J. Bonanno, AUS, to Louis J. Bonann.

Capt. Ateo B. Ciabattoni, AC, to Arthur Bruno Chabaton.

Capt. Emuel Minkoff, DC, to Emuel Myles.

Capt. Leo Harold Raport, AUS, to Leo H. Roper.

1st Lt. Ruth P. Cooper, PT, to Ruth Anne Pipenhagen.

1st Lt. Maurice Freshman, TC, to Robert Douglas Freshman.

1st Lt. Eva E. Gawry, ANC-Ret., to Eva Gawry O'Brien.

1st Lt. Raymond Grossgold, AUS, to John Raymond.

1st Lt. Marion C. Nielsen, ANC, to Marion Lee Cashen.

1st Lt. Stanley Zelmanovitz, MC, to Stanley Zelman.

2nd Lt. Eslie M. Culver, ANC, to Eslie Culver Reins.

2nd Lt. Jane R. Hutcheson, WAC, to Jane R. Wilson.

2nd Lt. Anthony Joseph Panepinto, CE, to Anthony Joseph Pane.

CWO Valeria F. Bringegar, WAC, to Valeria F. Conway.

Mid-East Theater to Close

Liquidation of the Africa-Middle East theater was announced 18 Feb. by Maj. Gen. Henry S. Aurand, USA, who said the theater will be closed down entirely within a few months and that all of its personnel will be sent home or transferred to other theaters.

General Aurand did not say whether the Air Transport Command would continue to function in the area after the ground forces had departed.

SERVICE SOCIAL NEWS

MRS. Truman was hostess at tea at the White House last Friday and among Service personnel attending were the Deputy Surgeon General and Mrs. R. W. Bliss, Rear Admiral and Mrs. D. McD. Le Breton, Maj. Gen. F. A. Blesse and his daughter, Mrs. A. K. Whitehea, Vice Admiral and Mrs. Theodore Wilkinson, Brig. Gen. and Mrs. Benjamin O. Davis, Brig. Gen. Charles Bolte, Mrs. Henry C. Pratt, Admiral and Mrs. James Holloway, Mrs. William Glassford, Admiral Felix Johnson, and Capt. and Mrs. William John Murphy.

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Mrs. Truman was also luncheon hostess, entertaining Tuesday a large company in the state dining room. Among the guests were Mrs. William H. P. Blandy, Mrs. Thomas C. Hart, Mrs. Russell Maxwell, Mrs. Allan H. Turnage, and a large group of wives of Latin American diplomats.

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Rear Admiral William O. Spears, USN, retiring chief of the Pan-American Affairs Section, and Mrs. Spears entertained a company of some two hundred and more guests at a reception at the Mayflower Friday. Honor guests were the newly appointed Naval Attache of Brazil, Rear Admiral O. F. de Madeiros and Senhora de Madeiros.

Tuesday a party was given in honor of Admiral and Mrs. Spears by the naval and air contingent of the Pan American group, cocktails preceding a dinner party at the Mayflower Hotel.

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Mrs. Alan G. Kirk, wife of Vice Admiral Kirk, recently named U. S. Ambassador to Belgium, was the guest of honor at a luncheon given by Mrs. Joseph E. Davies, wife of the former U. S. Ambassador to Russia. In the large company recruited mostly from the wives of European diplomats, were also Mrs. Emory S. Land, Mrs. Robert Patterson and Mrs. Russell Maxwell.

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Mrs. Robert Patterson, wife of the Secretary of War, was hostess Wednesday afternoon at a tea in compliment to Mrs. Kenneth Royall, wife of the Under Secretary of War, and Mrs. Howard C. Petersen, wife of the Assistant Secretary. Among the guests who assisted the hostess were Mrs. Carl Spaatz, Mrs. LeRoy Lutes, Mrs. Jacob L. Devers, Mrs. Thomas T. Handy, Mrs. J. Lawton Collins, Mrs. Chan Gurney, Mrs. Lister Hill, Mrs. Edwin C. Johnson, Mrs. Warren Austin, Mrs. Styles Bridges, Mrs. Kenneth Wherry and Mrs. Elmer Thomas.

MRS. CONRAD JOHN LINDERMANN,
who before her recent marriage to Lt. Lindermann, AAF, was Miss Patricia Marie Elliott, daughter of Col. and Mrs. Walter A. Elliott, USA.

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General and Mrs. Jacob L. Devers entertained guests at dinner Tuesday evening at the Army War College.

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Capt. Ernest W. Brown, MC, USN-Ret., formerly of Research Division, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy Dept., was initiated a member of Sigma Xi (University Scientific Honorary Society) on 29 Jan. at ceremonies and a dinner at the Cosmos Club, Washington, D. C. Captain Brown addressed the chapter on the subject: "The Submarine."

The Office of Military Government has ordered all German local and provincial authorities to take immediate steps to properly care for and maintain the graves of all United Nations persons who are buried in places other than cemeteries operated by Allied military or civil agencies.

Weddings and Engagements

TODAY, 23 Feb., is the wedding day of Miss Maisie Howard, daughter of Rear Admiral and Mrs. Herbert Seymour Howard, who will become the bride of Lt. Col. Anthony Edward Balloch, OBE, of the British Royal Artillery. The ceremony will take place at St. John's Episcopal Church in Washington, D. C. She will be given in marriage by her father and her brother, Lt. Macauley Howard, USNR, back from the Pacific, will be best man.

The matron of honor is to be Mrs. Ralph Hunter, daughter of Vice Admiral Theo S. Wilkinson, USN. Other attendants are to be Mrs. H. Seymour Howard jr., and the Misses Betty Huidekoper, Anne Peter, and Yvette Baillieu, here from England for the event. She is the daughter of Sir Clive Baillieu, recently head of one of the war missions in Washington.

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Fort Myer Chapel, alight with candles was the setting 18 Feb. for the marriage of Miss Caroline Tarbell Tupper, daughter of Brig. Gen. and Mrs. Tristram Tupper, to Lt. Robert Stevens Overbeck, AUS, son of Dr. and Mrs. Robert M. Overbeck of Baltimore. Chaplain Cecil Propst officiated.

Given in marriage by her father, the bride wore a gown of white silk and pina cloth—the silk brought from China by her husband-elect, and the pina, part of her own souvenirs from the Philippines, which she brought back last year. The full length veil was held by a coronet of white lilacs and her bouquet was of orchids and lilacs.

Miss Olive Ann Miller, Capt. in the Wacs, was maid of honor and the six-year old niece of the bridegroom, Caroline Tieslau was flower girl. Lt. Evans Smith was best man and ushers included Col. William McWilliams, Lt. Col. Edward E. Shumaker, Lt. Lawrence Brandon, AUS, and Mr. Ivan Drechsler. They are to make their home in Haiti where Lieutenant Overbeck will be with a mining firm. The bride is a niece of Gen. and Mrs. George C. Marshall.

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Brig. Gen. and Mrs. Roger M. Wicks of Fort Sheridan, Ill., announce the engagement of their daughter, Phoebe-Helen, to Lt. (jg) Robert G. Greeley, USNR, son of Mr. and Mrs. Julian F. Greeley of Milton, Mass.

Miss Wicks attended the Prospect Hill School, New Haven, Conn., and Penn Hall Junior College, Chambersburg, Pa. Lieutenant Greeley graduated from Milton Academy, Milton, Mass. and Princeton University, class of 1944.

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At a tea Thursday, 14 Feb. Mr. and Mrs. Louis Richard Howson of Hinsdale announced the engagement of their daughter, Louise Ruth, to Lt. (jg) John Frederic Kurfess, USN, son of Mr. and Mrs. William Frederic Kurfess of Milwaukee, formerly of Hinsdale. Miss Howson attended the University of Chicago. Lieutenant Kurfess, a graduate of the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, Md., served aboard a battleship in the Pacific and now is in flight training at Corpus Christi, Tex. The wedding probably will take place this summer.

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Col. and Mrs. Charles M. O'Connor of Edgewood Arsenal, Md., announce the engagement of their daughter, Marie Leontine, to Ens. Charles Newton Adams, jr., USNR, Moffett Field, Calif., son of Mr. and Mrs. Charles N. Adams of Carrollton, Ga.

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Miss Patricia Marie Elliott, daughter of Col. Walter A. Elliott, USA, and Mrs. Elliott of Tuscaloosa, Ala., was married to Lt. Conrad John Lindemann, son of Mrs. Lindemann and the late Wm. J. Lindemann of Baltimore, 30 Dec. in the Sacred Heart Church, Augusta, Ga.

Colonel Elliott gave his daughter's hand in marriage. She wore an ivory duchess satin gown combined with rare Belgian lace—the full skirt ending in a train, and her veil of French illusion held by a coronet of lace. She carried an arm bouquet of bride roses centered with orchids.

Her attendants were Mrs. B. H. Franklin, the Misses Dorothy McWilliams, Mary Furr, and the matron of honor was her sister, Mrs. Charles B. Thompson, jr.

Three-year old Charles B. Thompson III, the bride's nephew, was ring bearer.

Mr. William Lindemann was his brother's best man and ushers were Maj. Charles B. Thompson, jr., Capt. B. H. Franklin, Lt. Richard Robinson and Lt. Don Raese.

A small reception followed in the Green Room of the Sheraton-Bon Air Hotel. The bride cut her cake with a "Sheridan Saber."

The honeymoon was spent in New Orleans and they are now at Fort Sumter, S. C., where Lt. Lindemann is stationed with the Army Force.

The bride's father Colonel Elliott was commanding 38th Inf. on D Day and awarded first decoration in 2nd Div.—Silver Star. He was later with ETO Staff and now with USFET. He was on a 45 day leave in the States when his daughter was married, and has just returned overseas.

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The marriage of Miss Melville Minge Hobbs, daughter of Mrs. Thomas Gibson Hobbs and the late Mr. Hobbs, to Capt. Lewis F. Samusson, CE, AUS, son of Col. E. Samusson, USA and Mrs. Samusson, all of Lynchburg, Va., was solemnized Saturday afternoon (16 Feb.) in Rivermont Presbyterian Church.

Thomas Gibson Hobbs, jr., gave his sister in marriage. She was gowned in ivory satin with fitted bodice and full skirt falling into a train. Garnitures of heirloom lace and a long veil of French illusion was secured by a cap of lace. Her flowers were showered white lilacs and freesias.

The bride was attended by Mrs. Benjamin Rives Kearfott, matron of honor with Mrs. T. Gibson Hobbs, jr., and Mrs. S. Bolling Hobbs, sisters-in-law of the bride. Colonel Samusson was his son's best man with Lt. S. Bolling Hobbs, Lt. T. Gibson Hobbs jr., and Lt. Robert Franklin, of Lynchburg, and Captains A. Darby Williams, B. Whitehead McKenzie and Claude Hayes of Fort Belvoir, as groomsmen.

The bridal party was entertained at a reception following the ceremony. Mrs. Hobbs was hostess also to members of the two families, a number of out of town guests and other close friends at the Columns.

The bride attended Virginia Intermont College and Randolph Macon Woman's

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Posts and Stations

WEST POINT, N. Y.
21 Feb. 1946

General of the Army H. H. Arnold, retiring Chief of the Army Air Forces addressed members of the First Class of the U. S. Corps of Cadets and other West Point personnel on the "Composition of the Future Air Forces."

General Arnold was presented to the assembled class by Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Superintendent.

General Arnold's talk was the culmination of three lectures on Air Power which have been given recently at West Point.

On 11 Feb. Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay spoke on "B-29 Operations over Japan," and supplemented his lecture with a thirty-five-minute technicolor movie.

Maj. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada lectured on 14 Feb. choosing as his subject, "Air Power in Support of Ground Forces."

This series of lectures was given under the auspices of West Point's General Lecture Committee.

ANNAPOLIS, MD.
19 Feb. 1946

Col. Douglas Duval, USA-Ret., entertained at his home on Duke of Gloucester Street last Sunday afternoon, in honor of Madame Fellippo Camperio, widow of Admiral Camperio of the Italian Navy.

Mrs. Edgar Keats, wife of Commander Keats, USN, of Washington, D. C., has been visiting her brother, Prof. Robert S. James, at his apartment on Maryland Ave.

Capt. T. L. Schumacher, USN, and Mrs. Schumacher, of Silver Spring, Md., and their daughter, Miss Betty Schumacher, were the week-end guests of Mr. and Mrs. Carroll T. Worthington.

At the duplicate bridge tournament held at Carvel Hall last Tuesday, Capt. H. V. McKittrick and Mrs. P. T. Newlon were first North-South winners; Admiral and Mrs. Sinclair Gannon took second place. Mrs. Lyman Kells and Mrs. C. D. Thomas were first East-West; and Lt. Alva Leo and Mrs. James W. Lewis were second.

Commo. and Mrs. William Greenman are occupying the home of Mrs. Ridgely P. Melvin on Hanover St., while Commodore Greenman is on duty in Washington.

Commo. Edward Lloyd gave a cocktail party last Thursday afternoon at his home on Prince George St., in honor of Madame Fellipo Camperio.

Mrs. Wilton McCarthy of Carvel Hall left Sunday for Charleston, S. C., to visit Rear Adm. and Mrs. Laurence DuBose.

Capt. H. V. McKittrick, USN-Ret., gave a luncheon last Friday at his home on King George St.

Mrs. Arthur B. Owens, widow of Major Owens, USMC, was co-hostess with Mrs. Henry Carter last Monday, at Mrs. Carter's home on King George St., to the Book Review Club of the Navy Women's Club.

MEMPHIS, TENN.
18 Feb. 1946

Three new Section Chiefs have been named at Second Army Headquarters to replace Brig. Gen. Raymond E. S. Williamson, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Col. William E. Shambora, Army Surgeon, and Col. John T. Kilcoyne, Army Chaplain, who have left this post.

Brig. Gen. Charles C. Brown has been named as Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 in addition to his duties as Second Army Artillery Officer. Col. Richard H. Eckhardt has been announced as Army Surgeon and Col. Paul J. Maddox, as Army Chaplain.

Col. Joseph P. Donnovin of the G-3 section, Second Army Headquarters, received the Italian decoration, the Cross of Knight of Chevalier in the Order of Saint Maurice and Saint Lazarus which is the highest Knightly Order now bestowed by the Kingdom of Italy.

New arrivals at Second Army Headquarters include Lt. Col. Melvin B. Harris, Ord, from Ft. Dix, N. J.; Lt. Col. Harry M. Murray, Ord, from Ft. Sam Houston, Texas; Capt. Alfred K. Palmer, Ord, from Ft. Devens, Mass.; 2nd Lt. James Vineyard, Inf., from Cp. Carson, Colorado; Maj. Leonard B. Amick, Inf., from Ft. Devens, Mass.; and 1st Lt. John E. Snozek, CE, from Ft. Belvoir, Va.

Officers departing from this headquarters are Col. David P. Gibbs, Maj. Harry A. Horstman, Maj. Glenn W. Summers, Capt. Thomas M. Guerro, Capt. Golden L. Lindwall, 1st Lt. Fred W. Conard, WO (jg) Clemens J. Wiese, Capt. Bruce R. Dunwiddie, 2nd Lt. Harry N. Corbin, Col. William E. Shambora, Capt. Alfred K. Palmer, 1st Lt. Jack Harrington, and Brig. Gen. Raymond E. S. Williamson.

FORT BENNING, GA.
18 Feb. 1946

The Mexican Minister of National Defense Lt. Gen. Francisco L. Urquizo arrived at Fort Benning 17 Feb. with several distinguished Mexican and Peruvian officials to make a three-day tour of the post during which demonstrations will be staged by the Airborne School and the Infantry School in honor of the visitors.

There have been a number of new arrivals to the post who have taken quarters within the past week.

Col. and Mrs. Stanley R. Larsen have moved into quarters at 510 Wickersham Ave. Colonel Larsen, assigned to the Academic Dept. of The Infantry School served in Japan with the 35th Infantry, 25th Division. In Honolulu at the beginning of the war, Mrs. Larsen has made her home in Talledega, Alabama, during Col. Larsen's tour of duty overseas.

Recent arrivals to the post who have taken quarters at 108 Eames Ave., are Col. and Mrs. Donald C. Cubbison, jr., AGF Board No. 1 and their three children, Donald III, Mary Paige and Edwin. Stationed at Fort Bragg, N. C., for four months previous to assignment here, Col. Cubbison served as Field Artillery Executive Officer for the 87th Division. During this time Mrs. Cubbison resided in Columbia, S. C., with her mother, Mrs. Sevier Tupper. Colonel Cubbison is the son of Maj. Gen. Donald Cubbison, retired, who makes his home in Carmel, Calif.

Mrs. Whitfield P. Shepard, who has been named to lead the 1946 Red Cross Auxiliaries of Fort Benning in the annual drive to raise funds for the Red Cross, has announced features of the coming program.

First there will be a Benefit Bridge with Mrs. Thomas Aarons as chairman, to be held 1 March at the Polo-Hunt Club.

Mrs. Lloyd Brown will assist in the drive not only in handling tables and booths for the Bridge party but also in arranging for the placement throughout the post of conveniently located tables manned by the ladies of the post, at which contributions for the drive may be made.

Word has been received by Mrs. D'eliscu, residing at present in Columbus that her husband, Lt. Col. Francois D'eliscu has received the French Legion of Honor and the Croix deGuerre with palms.

Col. D'eliscu, now on Detached Service with the French War Ministry in Paris, was formerly stationed with the Infantry School as Chairman of the Physical Training Course of the Weapons Section.

The Army Daughters of Fort Benning held their monthly meeting Monday night at the Miller Loop home of Mrs. Frederick R. Weber, president, with twenty-two members present. This marked the first meeting at which newly elected officers of the organization presided.

Reports were given by Mrs. Clair B. Mitchell, Secretary, Mrs. Eric Ramee, Treasurer, by Mrs. Sevier Tupper, Vice President and Mrs. Julian Dayton, who has recently taken over the management of the Thrift Shop.

Miss Mary Hobson submitted a letter from Lt. Col. George A. Dieter expressing his appreciation for the Army Daughters contribution to the March of Dimes Campaign.

Army daughters attending the meeting in addition to those mentioned were Mrs. Donald F. Thompson, the Misses Dallas Haralson and Jeanne Jones, Mrs. Samuel W. Jenkins, Mrs. Robert Dickerson, Mrs. John H. Keatley, Miss Jean E. Hearn, Miss Patricia Chamberlain, Miss Margaret Aaron, Mrs. Jodie G. Stewart, Mrs. Carroll A. Bagby, Mrs. C. A. Dahlen, Mrs. Nelson I. Fooks, Mrs. Earl F. Heltor and Mrs. Fred V. Harris.

KELLY FIELD, TEX.
18 Feb. 1946

A farewell banquet in the Officers' Club, at which Brig. Gen. George H. Beverley, Commanding General of the San Antonio Air Technical Service Command, Kelly Field, was toastmaster, honored a group of Chinese officers, and marked the end of their aviation technical training in the United States. They had been studying bombsight maintenance at Kelly.

Lt. Col. H. H. Hollowell, Maj. Louis S. Korens and Maj. Milford J. Foster attended the National Salvage and Disposal Conference held at Wright Field, Ohio on 4, 5 and 6 February.

Capt. Thurman J. Beene, former Chief of the Employment and Placement Branch, Civilian Personnel Section, Kelly Field, left 31 Jan. for separation from service at Sacramento, Calif., and sailed 6 Feb. for Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, where he will be engaged in business. Capt. Beene had been at Kelly Field since November, 1942.

Capt. and Mrs. W. T. Fleming, after his relief from active duty, left Kelly Field this week for their new home in Pensacola, Fla.

Homer J. Harpin and William F. Myers, former Captains in the AAF, and employed at SAATSC, Kelly Field, in the Supply Division, met in New York City immediately after their discharge recently. They saw all the shows, enjoyed the snow and ice—didn't even miss Texas weather

Lt. and Mrs. Thomas A. White of Kelly Field announce the birth of a girl, born at the Personnel Distribution Center hospital, Monday, 14 Jan. The new arrival, named Gretchen Edytha White, weighed six pounds and four ounces.

Lt. Paul J. Skarda, Kelly Field Physical Training Officer, was separated from the service 8 Feb. He will return to Kelly to resume his former position in a civilian status.

LONG BEACH, CALIF.
18 Feb. 1946

With delightful Valentine decorations as the theme, the Officers' Wives Club of Long Beach, met for desert bridge at the Army-Navy Club on Wednesday, 6 Feb.

Baskets of sweet peas, red geraniums and Valentines were effectively used on the table. Card games followed the luncheon and business session over which Mrs. Willis W. Bradley, jr. presided.

Mrs. John George Ziegler, senior hostess for the day, was assisted by Mesdames Harry Hayes, Selby Gilpin, Truman Carpenter, Carl R. Brandt, Rufus Langsford, R. E. Thomas, Guy O'Neil, J. W. Ryles, K. Gilbert and Julius Thompson.

Members of the executive board and committee chairmen present were:

Mrs. W. W. Bradley, jr., President; Mrs. A. C. Wood, Vice President; Mrs. G. F. Cottle, 2nd Vice President; Mrs. R. F. Featherstone, Treasurer; Mrs. W. S. Peck, jr., Assistant Treasurer; Mrs. Scott D. McCaughey, Corresponding Secretary; Mrs. H. Larner, Recording Secretary; Mrs. M. H. Bassett, Hospitality Chairman; Mrs. M. W. Graybill, Publicity Chairman; Mrs. W. R. Moore, Hospital Recreation Committee; and Mrs. K. Gilbert, Assistant Hospital Recreation Committee.

NORFOLK, VA.
21 Feb. 1946

Comdr. and Mrs. George H. Harrison, USMS were hosts Friday night at a cocktail party and buffet supper given at their home on Ashland Circle, Winona, for the officers of SS William F. Jerman and their wives.

Comdr. and Mrs. Carl Henry Amme, jr. entertained Friday evening at an informal dinner given at the Chamberlin Hotel, Ft. Monroe. The dinner preceded the weekly dance at the hotel. Among the guests from Norfolk were Lt. Col. and Mrs. Merrill M.

(*Please turn to Next Page*)

Posts and Stations

(*Continued from Preceding Page*)

Day, who are here visiting Mrs. Day's relatives.

Miss Frances Elizabeth Winstead, whose marriage to Lt. George William Drennen, USNR, will take place 2 March, is being honored at a number of delightful pre-nuptial parties. Mrs. Wyndham Brown was hostess on Thursday evening at her home on Eastwood Terrace, at a bridge party given for the bride-elect, when Contract was played at three tables: On Friday afternoon, Miss Winstead was guest of honor at a tea given by her sister, Mrs. J. Warren White, at her home on Warren Crescent; and on Saturday afternoon both Miss Winstead and her fiance were guests of honor at a large and beautiful party given by Mrs. William Augustus Valentine of Richmond, who is visiting Mrs. William T. Stonecypher, on North Fairwater Drive.

Miss Mary Jean Crowley, whose marriage to Lt. Comdr. Edward Zernzach, USNR, will take place today, was guest of honor this week at a lingerie shower given by Miss Sheila Wheat at her home on Maury Place. The bride-elect was honored earlier at an informal tea given by Miss Anne Marie Sullivan, in the tearoom of Ames and Brownley.

Miss Mildred Louise Robbins, whose marriage to Lt. Glen Ellsworth Whitaker (SC) USNR, will take place next month, was guest of honor on Saturday, at a luncheon and kitchen shower, given by Miss Mary Anne Bunting in the Algonquin, the guests, in addition to the bride-elect, included Mrs. Herbert Robbins, Mrs. C. R. Deller, Mrs. T. C. Gibbs, and the Misses Ruth Hartman, Wave, Doris Robbins, Marjorie Hayes, Edith Jane Foster, Margarer McCloud and Pauline Harrell.

FT. BENJ. HARRISON, IND.
19 Feb. 1946

A dinner was given Friday night at Ft. Benjamin Harrison by Col. Edward L. Strohbehn, post commander, and Mrs. Strohbehn. Their guests included Brig. Gen. John E. McMahon, chief of staff of the Fifth Service Command, Ft. Hayes, Ohio; Mr. and Mrs. Warrack Wallace of Indianapolis; Col. Charles L. Maxwell, and Lt. Col. and Mrs. William F. Northam.

Lt. Col. and Mrs. Edmund H. Van Dervort spent last weekend in Chicago. Colonel Van Dervort, dental corps, is stationed at Billings General Hospital.

Lt. Col. William B. Weston, long a patient in Billings General Hospital, now is marked sick in quarters.

Maj. Glenn H. Park has assumed command of USDB guard battalion. His wife and two daughters, now living in Kansas City, Mo., expect to join him soon at Ft. Harrison where he has been assigned quarters on the post.

Mrs. William Clune and daughter, Marcia, are returning this week from Oakland, Calif., where they have been visiting since the holidays.

Mr. and Mrs. M. J. Helle of Ft. Thomas, Ky., were recent guests of Col. Leighton N. Smith, ASFTC commander, and Mrs. Smith.

Lt. Col. Alexander J. Rouch, former post executive officer at Ft. Harrison, and his daughter, Miss Marjorie Rouch, visited the post last week. Colonel Rouch was en route from the Philippines to Brooklyn Port of Embarkation.

Col. George R. McElroy, who retires 31 May, and Mrs. McElroy have gone to York, Ala., to make their home. Colonel McElroy came to Ft. Harrison for duty with USDB from Ft. Knox, Ky.

RANDOLPH FIELD, TEXAS
16 Feb. 1946

Graduation exercises for a class of medical officers who have successfully completed the Aviation Medical Examiners' Course were held 8 Feb. at the AAF School of Aviation Medicine.

Brig. Gen. Eugen G. Reinartz, USA, is Commandant of the School.

The graduation address was made by Col. Edwin M. Day, GSC, Deputy Chief of Staff, AAF Flying Training Command. Presentation of the diplomas was made by Brig. Gen. Eugen G. Reinartz, USA.

The list of Medical Corps students graduating follows:

1st Lt. William F. Betsch, Maj. Sidney C. Brockman, 1st Lts. Buford H. Burch, Thomas N. Davis III, Guy W. Dean, jr., Conrad DeBold, Joseph A. Diaz, Richard N. Eckroth, Bernard Eisenstein, Rufus P. Ellett, jr., David J. Geigerman, Louis A. George, Samuel J. Hagen, Raphael R. Haley, Vernon K. S. Jim, Victor Kassel, Maj. James K. Kelley, 1st Lts. Vito J. Kemezis, Henry J. Klos, James F. Lemmon, Harry L. Levett, Solomon F. Lifton, John W. Payne, Earl B. Pearce, Ronald D. Price, Louis M. Privitera, Douglas F. Ramsey, Fred W. Robinson, Capt. George J. Sabrin, 1st Lts. Rolfe W. Salin, Stephen S. Sternberg, Col. William Stone, 1st Lts. Richard B. Streeper, Oscar Syme, Salvatore Tabacco, Eugene J. Tartaglino, Henry P. Thode, jr., Merrick D. Thomas, jr., Jerry H. Todd, John R. Troxell, John F. Ullsperger, Hector M. Valles, Gordon P. Van Nuys, Emmett P. Waddell, Darwin E. Wagoner, Alfred Wallner, Capt. Edward T. Williams, 1st Lts. Frank A. Wilson III, Joseph N. Wilson, Norman R. Wilson, George F. Wood, jr., Merrill H. Woolmington, Duane R. Worgess.

BROOKS FIELD, TEX.
18 Feb. 1946

The Officer's Wives Club at Brooks Field held election of officers at their regular monthly meeting. Officers elected were: Mrs. Joseph H. Hall, president; Mrs. E. B. Tigner, vice-president; Mrs. Z. L. Milsap, treasurer; Mrs. M. P. Melvin, secretary.

The retiring officers are: Mrs. Victor Cook, president; Mrs. Gordon Barrett, vice-president; Mrs. S. L. Mayes, treasurer; and Mrs. L. C. Scharmer, acting secretary.

The February get-together of the Club carried out the Valentine theme. After a delicious luncheon members played bridge and rummy. Prize winners for the afternoon's entertainment were Mesdames C. F. Magner, J. J. Gill, George Mortod, Victor Cook, G. M. Farmer, W. S. Richardson, and R. V. Archuleta.

Col. Minton W. Kaye, deputy commander of Brooks Field, has been notified that he is to receive the Legion of Merit for his efforts and accomplishments in revolutionizing aerial photography. Colonel Kaye served as Director of Photography, Maps, and Charts for the AAF and completed a tour of both theaters of war before joining the Third Air Force and assuming his duties at Brooks.

While everyone at Brooks Field is eagerly awaiting the return of Brig. Gen. Homer L. Sanders, commanding general, who has been on a tour of duty in the Caribbean Area to set up Regular Army officer selection boards for that area, three little people at Brooks are the most eager. For "Daddy" Sanders is almost sure to bring some "south of the border" souvenirs home to his children, Connie, 11; Joyce, 8; and the baby, Ned.

Before taking off for Panama, General Sanders attended a conference of general officers at Scott Field, Ill., on 13-15 Jan. regarding Regular Army officer selection.

FORT DIX, N. J.
15 Feb. 1946

Col. Joe L. Mason, and Lt. Col. George F. Ceuleers have begun processing before a Board of Examiners at the Fort Dix Regular Army Commission Section, where their applications for commissions in the Regular Army will be passed upon.

Colonel Mason, at present stationed at Headquarters of the First Air Force, Mitchel Field, N. Y., commanded a fighter group in England and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross with two Oak Leaf Clusters for operations over Germany in 1944. In the service six and one-half years, he has been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross; the Silver Star; Air Medal with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters; Croix de Guerre with Palm; the ETO Ribbon with 4 Battle Stars, and a Presidential Unit Citation.

Colonel Mason is the husband of Mrs. Gona Moss Mason of San Antonio, Texas. He attended Ohio State University before entering the service of his country.

"I like the Army very much," Colonel Mason told a reporter here, "and I would like to spend the remainder of my life in the service."

Lt. Colonel Ceuleers, who is stationed at the 125th Air Base Unit at Dover, Del., attended the University of Illinois two years before entering the service. He was a baseball and basketball player in high school and college.

While leading a group of 24 P-51 fighters over the Ardennes Sector in World War II, Lt. Colonel Ceuleers' command broke up an attack by more than 100 German fighter planes and prevented them from reaching an Allied bomber flight. Lt. Colonel Ceuleers, singlehandedly, destroyed four of the enemy planes in the air. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross in Paris by Gen. Carl W. Spaats for that exploit. On another occasion, Lt. Colonel Ceuleers destroyed a German ME262, jet-propelled fighter, after a 250-mile chase from Hamburg to Leipzig. He also scored 13 victories in the air over ME109s and FW190s.

Lt. Colonel Ceuleers also holds the Distinguished Flying Cross with three Oak Leaf Clusters; the Air Medal with 10 Oak Leaf Clusters; the ETO Ribbon with 6 Battle Stars, and the Presidential Unit Citation.

Weddings and Engagements

(*Continued from Page* 804)

College. She was pledged to Alpha Omicron Pi sorority and is a member of the Spinsters Club and the Junior League of Lynchburg.

Captain Samusson was graduated from The Citadel, Charleston, S. C., in '42 and served in the Corps of Engineers. They will make their home in Alexandria after a brief honeymoon.

In the chapel at Fort Sill, Miss Betty Ann Bevan, daughter of Col. and Mrs. Wendell Lowell Bevan, became the bride of Capt. Charles Shelly Graybill, MC, USA.

The bride, given in marriage by her father, wore a gown of white faille made with fitted basque, long sleeves and a full skirt which fell into a circular train. Her finger-tip veil was held by a coronet of faille and seed pearls and she carried a bouquet of orchids and freesia. She wore a strand of pearls, the gift of the bridegroom.

Her attendants were Miss Anne Mosey, as maid of honor; Miss Sally Bevan, her sister; Mrs. Edward Worthen, sister of the bridegroom, and Mrs. Raymond H. Kietz jr.

Mr. Edward Worthen was best man for his brother and ushers were Capt. Frank C. Sneed, Maj. Wendall L. Bevan, jr., Mitchel Field, N. Y., Capt. Ewing Gafford and Messrs. James W. Aust, Lyle Ozmun, and Tom D. Hedley.

A reception followed at the Officers' Club, the bride and bridegroom riding from chapel to the club in a horse drawn vehicle in traditional army style.

The young couple will be at-home at 227 Artist St., Santa Fe, N. M., where Captain Graybill is on duty at the Burns General Hospital.

The bride graduated from Stephens College, Columbia, Mo., and received an A.B. degree from Iowa State University, where she was a member of Kappa Alpha Theta.

Captain Graybill graduated from the Oklahoma University School of Medicine, and is a member of Beta Theta Pi. After completing his internship at University Hospital in Oklahoma City, he entered the army and served overseas with the 36th Division.

The Searchlight

(Navy—Address: The Searchlight, U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md.)

THE wanted list for this month's Searchlight includes the following names:

Bunner, Mrs. James J., wife Comdr. (SC); Cass, Mrs. William F., wife Lt., USCG; Cook, Mrs. A. B., wife Comdr., '15; Davis, Mrs. Robert, wife (MC); Griswold, Mrs. W. A., wife Comdr., '21; Harenburger, Mrs. C. H., wife Lt.; Hawes, Mrs. R. R., wife Lt. (SC); Henry, Mrs. G. R., widow Lt. Comdr.; Kenny, Mrs. E. T., wife Lt.; Leomer, Mrs. Robert, widow Comdr. (MC); Morton, Mrs. Dudley, widow Comdr.; Overand, Barbara, daughter of Lt. Comdr., USN (SC); Quinn, Mrs. Lawrence A., widow Lt. Col., USMC; Rogozienski, Mrs. Frank, wife Ens., USNACR; Stocker, Mrs. Louis J., wife Comdr., '26; Taffinder, Mrs. Sherwood A., wife Rear Adm., USN, '06; Troxell, Mrs. Charles E., wife Ens.; Wilson, Mrs. O. O., wife of Col., USA; Wilson, Mrs. John M., widow Lt., '34; Wilson, Mrs. Ronald L., wife Comdr., '32.

U. S. Chaplains See Pope

The Pope gave a special audience on 20 February to more than 200 American and British Army chaplains who went to Rome to attend the Consistory.

At the same time it was reported that the Primate of Hungary, Josef Cardinal Mindszenty, against whom several demonstrations were staged recently in that Russian-occupied country, arrived in Rome in an American military-commission plane flown by Maj. Gen. William F. Key, the American representative on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary.

Births • Marriages • Deaths

(No charge for service announcements. Please notify promptly.)

Born

ATZENHOEFER—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 11 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. Daniel Raymond Atzenhoefer, a son, Edward Keith.

BANKS—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 4 Feb. 1946, to WO (jg) and Mrs. William T. Banks, a son.

BARNWELL—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 31 Jan. 1946, to 2nd Lt. and Mrs. Marion P. Barnwell, a daughter.

BASHISTA—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 12 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. Edward M. Bashista, a son.

BECKETT—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 16 Feb. 1946, to Lt. Col. and Mrs. James Dunceith Beckett, a daughter, Virginia.

BROOKS—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 14 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. Charles Lee Brooks, 1st, a son, Charles Lee, 2nd.

BYRAM—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 7 Feb. 1946, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Fred P. Byram, a son.

CAIRNCROSS—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., 9 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. Reynolds Loyd Cairncross, a daughter, Carol Ann.

CORSO — Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 12 Feb. 1946, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Ernest S. Corso, a son.

DAY—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 15 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. Alfred K. Day, CE, a son.

DESOBRY—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 13 Feb. 1946, to Lt. Col. and Mrs. William R. Desobry, their second daughter, Virginia Robertson Desobry, grandchild of Lt. Gen. and Mrs. Geoffrey Keyes, USA, and of Col. and Mrs. Elmer C. Desobry, USA.

DRUEHL—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., 9 Feb. 1946, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Frank William Druehl, a son, Richard William.

DRYDEN—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 13 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. John R. Dryden, AC, a son.

DUNCAN—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, 16 Feb. 1946, to Lt. Col. and Mrs. Norman Duncan, a son.

EGBERT—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 12 Feb. 1946, to CWO and Mrs. Francis Egbert, a son.

ELY—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 14 Feb. 1946, to Col. and Mrs. William J. Ely, a son.

EVANS—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 18 Feb. 1946, to Lt. Col. and Mrs. Benjamin F. Evans, jr., USA (USMA '36), a daughter, Sandra Guyler.

FLANAGAN—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 14 Feb. 1946, to 2nd Lt. and Mrs. Jessie Laddie Flanagan, a daughter, Judy Carol.

FOSS—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 17 Feb. 1946, to Lt. Col. and Mrs. Philip Foss, Inf., a son.

FRANZ—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., 6 Feb. 1946, to Maj. and Mrs. Fred John Franz, a daughter, Ruth Ellen.

GAGNON — Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 7 Feb. 1946 to Maj. and Mrs. Lorenzo A. Gagnon, a son.

GRIFFITH—Born at Mercy Hospital, San Diego, Calif., 8 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. Thomas Parker Griffith, a daughter. Mrs. Griffith is the former Jean C. Cocroft, daughter of Col. and Mrs. Reginald B. Cocroft, USA, of Washington, D. C.

GULLION — Born at Garfield Hospital, Washington, D. C., 14 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. Allen W. Gullion, jr., AC, USA, (USMA '43), a son, Allen Wyant Gullion, III, grandson of Maj. Gen. Allen W. Gullion, USA-Ret.

HANNA—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., 6 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. Russell James Hanna, a son, Mason Ray.

HOGZETT—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 10 Feb. 1946, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Donald Dean Hogzett, a son, Michael Terry.

HORSLEY—Born at Fort Totten (N. Y.) Hospital, 15 Feb. 1946, to Lt. and Mrs. Edwin L. Horsley, jr., AUS, a son, Edwin L. Horsley, III.

JACKSON—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 10 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. Morgan Eugene Jackson, a daughter, Cynthia Lynne.

JONES—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 2 Feb. 1946, to Lt. Comdr. and Mrs. Barton F. Jones, a son.

JOYCE—Born at Patterson Field Regional Hospital, Dayton, Ohio, 7 Jan. 1946, to Lt. and Mrs. Francis E. Joyce, AC, a daughter, Suzanne.

KAPLAN—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 17 Feb. 1946, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Samuel Kaplan, a son, Leonard Joel.

LEACH — Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 14 Feb. 1946, to Col. and Mrs. Walter B. Leach, AAF, a son.

LEVETON — Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 3 Feb. 1946, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Irving N. Leveton, a son.

LINK—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 8 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. Robert E. Link, a daughter.

LOURING—Born in Monmouth Memorial Hospital, Long Branch, N. J., 12 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. Ralph Louring, of Ft. Monmouth, a daughter, Wendy Macgregor Louring.

MARSHALL—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 8 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. James W. Marshall, a son.

MEYER—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 31 Jan. 1946, to 1st. Lt. and Mrs. Lloyd F. Meyer, a son.

MILLER—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 1 Feb. 1946, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. William W. Miller, a daughter.

MILLER — Born at Tilton General Hospital, Fort Dix, N. J., 11 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. Gordon K. Miller, CAC, their second daughter, Nancy Karen Miller, granddaughter of Col. and Mrs. Holmes G. Paullin, Cav., of Camp Pickett, Va.

MINCER—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 11 Feb. 1946, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Neil S. Mincer, a son.

MORLEDGE—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 12 Feb. 1946, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. John D. Morledge, a daughter.

MYERS — Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 15 Feb. 1946, to M/Sgt. and Mrs. George O. Myers, a son.

NOLL—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 8 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. Jack W. Noll, a son.

NORMAN—Born at Station Hospital, Mitchel Field, N. Y., 2 Feb. 1946, to Lt. Col. and Mrs. Henry H. Norman, jr., AC, USA, a daughter, Betsy Nan Norman.

O'BRIEN—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., 7 Feb. 1946, to 1st. Lt. and Mrs. Alden Walton O'Brien, a son, Patrick Arnold.

PENNELL—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 12 Feb. 1946, to T/Sgt. and Mrs. Walton Franklin Pennell, a son, William Franklin.

PETERS—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 3 Feb. 1946, to Lt. Col. and Mrs. Joseph F. Peters, a son.

PETERSON—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 17 Feb. 1946, to Maj. and Mrs. William Henry Peterson, a daughter, Carls Cutting.

POLLIO—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 11 Feb. 1946, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Jean M. Pollio, a daughter.

PORTER—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 17 Feb. 1946, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Ray A. Porter, FA, a son.

REARDON—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 12 Feb. 1946, to Lt. Col. and Mrs. James V. Reardon, AAF, a daughter.

ROSE—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 2 Feb. 1946, to T/Sgt. and Mrs. John Henry Rose, a daughter, Carol Jean.

ROTH—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospita, Denver, Colo., 10 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. Herrick S. Roth, a son.

SALLEE—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 13 Feb. 1946, to CWO and Mrs. Paul Sallee, a son.

SCHUMACHER—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 4 Feb. 1946, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Edward Daniel Schumacher, a daughter, Dorothy Ann.

SCHWEIZER—Born in Baltimore, Md., 7 Feb. 1946, to Lt. and Mrs. Thomas Schweizer, USMCR, a son, Peter Jennings Schweizer.

SHAW—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 12 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. William H. Shaw, a daughter.

SMITH — Born at Raleigh General Hospital, Beckley, W. Va., 14 Feb. 1946, to Maj. and Mrs. Harold Henkel Smith, Inf., a son, Harold Henkel, jr.

TABER—Born at Glockner Hospital, Colorado Springs, Colo., 11 Feb. 1946, to Lt. Col. and Mrs. John H. Taber, MC, USA, a son, John H., jr. Col. Taber is on duty at the Convalescent Hospital, Camp Carson, Colo.

TAYLOR—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 3 Feb. 1946, to Lt. Col. and Mrs. Roger Williams Taylor, a son, William Ott.

TENNEY—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 17 Feb. 1946, to Maj. and Mrs. Dudley B. Tenney, FA, a daughter.

TIPRE—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 30 Jan. 1946, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. John F. Tipre, a son.

TOCH—Born at Fort Totten Hospital, Fort Totten, N. Y., 21 Jan. 1946, to 1st Lt. and Mrs. Leo Toch, Ord., a son, Maximilian.

TUCK—Born at Regional Hospital, Fort Knox, Ky., 7 Feb. 1946, to Lt. Col. and Mrs. William R. Tuck, USA, a son, William Robert Tuck, jr., grandson of Col. and Mrs. Charles Unger, USA.

VIZARD—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., 5 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. George John Vizard, a son, Edward Copeland.

WAGNER—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., 7 Feb. 1946, to Col. and Mrs. Otto Wagner, a daughter, Koetha Barbara.

WAXER—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 14 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. Joseph H. Waxer, FA, a daughter.

WILSON—Born at Brooke General Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 12 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. Francis Howard Wilson, jr., a son, Francis Howard, III.

WINGQUIST—Born at Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colo., 8 Feb. 1946, to 1st. Lt. and Mrs. Richard M. Wingquist, a son.

WOFFORD—Born at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., 15 Feb. 1946, to Capt. and Mrs. William T. Wofford, SC, a daughter.

Married

AHEARN-OLIVER—Married at the Shrine of the Sacred Heart, Washington, D. C., 12 Feb. 1946, Miss Elinor Shea Oliver of Washington, to Maj. John William Ahearn, AUS, of Texarkana, Ark.

ANDREW-HUNTLEY — Married at Northfield, Vt., 1 Feb. 1946, Miss Evelyn Huntley, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Austin Huntley of Norwich, Vt., to Lt. William C. Andrew, son of Col. and Mrs. George S. Andrew, Mill Hill Road, Northfield, Vt.

ARMSTRONG-WISEMAN—Married in the Protestant Chapel, Mitchel Field, Long Island, N. Y., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Mary Gwen Wiseman of Gramercy Park, New York, N. Y., to Lt. Donald Merritt Armstrong, AAF, of Babylon, Long Island.

BATTEN-THOMAS—Married in the Naval Chapel, Corpus Christi, Texas, 14 Feb. 1946, Miss Mary Ellen Thomas, daughter of Lt. William Lewin Thomas, USN-Ret., to Lt. (jg) Hugh Nash Batten, USN.

BEESON-WATERS—Married in Baltimore, Md., 25 Jan. 1946, Miss Ruth Tracy Waters of Baltimore to Lt. Col. Duane W. Beeson, AAF, of Boise, Idaho.

BOGGS-McCALLUM — Married in Christ Episcopal Church, Washington, D. C., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Helen Jane McCallum to Capt. James Reeves Boggs, both of Washington.

BOWER-VOSE—Married in St. Paul's Episcopal Church, Port Townsend, Wash., 13 Jan. 1946, Miss Elizabeth Gerrish Vose, daughter of Mrs. Robert Emory Vose, and the late Maj. Vose, USA-Ret., to Mr. Charles Thorn Bower of Syracuse, N. Y. Both bride and groom formerly were of the Army.

BUYS-PETTUS — Married at Fort Mason, Calif., 29 Jan. 1946, Miss Frye Pettus of Edenton, N. C., former WAC, to Capt. William O. Buys, AUS.

CARTER-CLOWE—Married in the chantry of St. Thomas Episcopal Church, New York, N. Y., Mrs. Louise Bates Clowe, widow of Capt. Charles F. Clowe, AAF, to Mr. John Tredway Carter, former Captain in the AAF.

CARTER-CORBIN — Married in Grace Church, Orange, N. J., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Hannah B. Corbin to Lt. Ogden Bowers Carter, jr., MC, AUS.

CHARKINS-SELIGMAN—Married in Cincinnati, Ohio, 10 Feb. 1946, Miss Mitzi Leigh Seligman to Comdr. Leo J. Charkins, DC, USNR.

CHERBAK-ELLINGER — Married in St. Anthony's Church, Long Beach, Calif., 28 Jan. 1946, Miss Clarissa Jane Ellinger of Baltimore, Md., to Lt. Alfred Anthony Cherbak, USN.

CROWELL-QUINN—Married in St. Mary's-by-the-Sea, N. Y., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Jean Brough Quinn, to Lt. (jg) Reginald Bulkley Crowell, USNR.

DANAUSKAS-LEWIS—Married in the Memorial Chapel, Army Medical Center, Washington, D. C., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss F. Jeanne Lewis, daughter of Maj. and Mrs. Earl R. Lewis, USA-Ret., to Mr. Joseph X. Danauskas of Waterbury, Conn.

FERRERA-MADDOX—Married in the chapel of US Naval Training Station, Newport, R. I., 14 Feb. 1946, Lt. Edna Mae Maddox, USNR, to Lt. Robert Ferrera, USNR.

FOSTER-JOPSON—Married at St. Lawrence Parish Church, Bovington, England, 15 Jan. 1946, Miss Nancy Jobson of the American Red Cross, to Capt. Victor H. Foster, AAF.

GESSNER-CLARK — Married in Blessed Sacrament Chapel of the St. Louis (Mo.) Cathedral, 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Elizabeth Jennette Clark, to Lt. James Francis Gessner, MAC.

GLEASON-BREITUNG—Married in Baltimore, Md., 2 Feb. 1946, Miss Nancy Eleanor Breitung of Baltimore, to Lt. Donald F. Gleason, MC, AUS, of Litchfield, Minn.

GOODWIN-PATTERSON—Married in the Community Church, Garden City, Long Island, N. Y., 15 Feb. 1946, Miss June Schuyler Patterson, daughter of Lt. Comdr. Schuyler Patterson, to Lt. Robert Delmege Goodwin of Wilmette, Ill.

HARRIS-FOX—Married in Faith Lutheran Church, Arlington, Va., 19 Jan. 1946, Miss Dorothy Angelene Fox of Alexandria, Va., to Lt. Robert Thompson Harris, USNR, of Danville, Va.

HEALY-WITHAM—Married in the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception, Burlington, Vt., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Marjorie Witham to Capt. Richard Gerard Healy, AAF.

JONES-WATSON — Married in Rowland, N. C., 26 Jan. 1946, Miss Flora M. Watson to Lt. Richard Andrew Jones, jr., AAF.

KILLILAE—GUST—Married in the post chapel, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 9 Feb. 1946, Miss Ione Lauraine Gust, to Lt. Col. Walter Killilae, USA.

KNIGHT-PENCE — Married in Sacred Heart R. C. Church, Washington, D. C., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Helen Louise Pence of Benton Harbor, Mich., to Maj. Foster Knight, AUS, of Pittsfield, Mass.

LEGGEWIE-CLIFFORD—Married in the chantry of St. Thomas Episcopal Church, New York, N. Y., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Jean Clifford to Capt. Edward Charles Leggewie, AUS.

LEWIS-ALBIN — Married in St. Mary's Episcopal Church, Arlington, Va., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Marjorie Elizabeth Albin to Lt. Comdr. Markham Van Fassen Lewis, USNR.

LINDERMANN-ELLIOTT — Married in Sacred Heart Church, Augusta, Ga., 30 Dec. 1945, Miss Patricia Marie Elliott, daughter of Col. and Mrs. Walter A. Elliott, USA, to Lt. Conrad John Lindermann, AAF.

LONG-HALLER—Married in the Episcopal Cathedral of the Incarnation, Garden City, Long Island, N. Y., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Mariam Jean Haller to Comdr. David Daniel Long, jr., USNR.

LOWELL-BROWN—Married in St. Paul's Episcopal Church, Edenton, N. C., 2 Feb. 1946, Miss Evelyn Brown to Maj. Arthur Carter Lowell, USMC.

MATTIMORE-MEYER — Married in the Church of the Incarnation, New York City, 16 Feb. 1946, Lt. Jean Meyer, USNR, to Lt. J. Clarke Mattimore, USNR.

McHENRY-HARRIS—Married recently in Christ Episcopal Church, Rockville, Md., Miss Mona L. Harris to Capt. George W. McHenry, jr., USMC, son of Col. and Mrs. G. W. McHenry.

MILLER-BURNS—Married in St. David's Episcopal Church, Baltimore, Md., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Lorraine H. Burns to Maj. William Marshall Miller, USMC.

NELSON-SCHAFFER — Married in New York City, 17 Feb. 1946, Miss Violet Schaffer to Lt. Col. Joseph Nelson, AUS.

NOEL-HUNTINGTON—Married in Bethlehem Chapel, Washington Cathedral, Washington, D. C., 14 Feb. 1946, Miss Joanna Carpenter Huntington to Lt. Peter Noel, USNR, both of Washington.

OVERBECK-TUPPER — Married in the Chapel, Fort Myer, Va., 18 Feb. 1946, Miss Caroline Tarbell Tupper, daughter of Brig. Gen. and Mrs. Tristram Tupper, of Washington, to Lt. Robert Stevens Overbeck, AUS.

PETERS-HERO — Married in Bethlehem Chapel, Washington Cathedral, Washington, D. C., 16 Feb. 1946, Mrs. Andrew Hero, III, of Baltimore, Md., to Capt. James Girvin Peters, AUS.

PRESTI-ALIOTO—Married in SS. Peter and Paul's Roman Catholic Church, San Francisco, Calif., 2 Feb. 1946, Miss Angelina Theresa Alioto to Capt. Joseph Charles Presti, MC, AUS.

PRITCHETT-DEVERS — Married in Emmanuel Episcopal Church, Alexandria, Va., 9 Feb. 1946, Miss Anita Jane Devers of Alexandria to Capt. Joseph C. Pritchett, of San Marcos, Texas.

RASMUSSEN-HILLIS — Married in the Reformed Church, Bronxville, N. Y., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Elizabeth Rogers Hillis to Lt. Donald Louis Rasmussen, USNR.

RUBAY-DAVEY—Married in Manila, P. I., 25 Dec. 1945, Miss Ruth Latta Davey of the American Red Cross, to Lt. Paul Rubay, AUS.

SAMUSSON-HOBBS — Married in Rivermont Presbyterian Church, Lynchburg, Va., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Melville Minge Hobbs, to Capt. Lewis F. Samusson, CE, AUS, son of Col. and Mrs. E. Samusson, AUS.

(*Please turn to Next Page*)

Births, Marriages, Deaths
(Continued from Preceding Page)

SINCLAIR - HINTZ — Married in the Church of the Transfiguration, New York City, 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Betty Hintz to Ens. Joseph Samuel Sinclair, USNR.

SMEAD-KNIPE — Married in Princeton, N. J., 14 Feb. 1946, Miss Ellen Graham Knipe to Capt. Richard Peer Smead, AUS.

SMITH-JACKSON—Married in Emmanuel Baptist Church, Ridgewood, N. J., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Lois Jackson to Lt. (jg) Robert S. Smith, USNR.

SOIGNIER-DAY — Married in Memorial Chapel, Army Medical Center, Washington, D. C., 18 Feb. 1946, Lt. Jeane E. Day to T/5 Lionel Francis Soigner.

SPIEGEL-WILSON — Married in Dwight Memorial Chapel, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., 12 Feb. 1946, Miss Genevieve Wilson to Lt. Hart Hunter Spiegel, USMCR.

STEIN-CASHMAN—Married in New York City, 14 Feb. 1946, Miss Betty Lois Cashman of New York, to Lt. (jg) Harold Stein, USNR, of Waterbury, Conn.

SULLIVAN-PALMER — Married in the Church of St. Thomas the Apostle, Washington, D. C., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Mary Evans Palmer, daughter of Commo. and Mrs. John Ray Palmer, USN, to Mr. Donal E. Sullivan of New York, N. Y.

TAPPIN-KRACZEK—Married in the chapel of the Palace at Caserta, Italy, 15 Feb. 1946, Miss Helena Kraczek, of Crakow, Poland, to Col. John L. Tappin, AUS.

TUCKER-SHOUP—Married in her home at 24 Gramercy Park, New York, N. Y., 17 Feb. 1946, Miss Martha Leonard Shoup to Ens. Richard Clement Tucker, USNR, on duty at Green Cove Springs, Fla. Mrs. Tucker is the granddaughter of Brig. Gen. A. L. Smith, USA-Ret., of Carmel, N. Y.

WARD-RUSSELL — Married in Emory Methodist Church, Ellicott City, Md., 3 Feb. 1946, Miss Marie Russell to Lt. Hal G. Ward, AAF.

WENNER-RHODA—Married in St. John's Roman Catholic Church, Darien, Conn., 16 Feb. 1946, Y John Rhoda Morrison, USNR, to Lt. Charles B. Wenner, AUS.

WIER-SENGE — Married in St. Alban's Episcopal Church, Washington, D. C., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Jean Marion Senge of Washington, to Lt. Ruebert Sam Wier, AUS, of El Paso, Texas.

WILSON-MacDONALD—Married in Park Place Baptist Church, Norfolk, Va., 16 Feb. 1946, Miss Alice Virginia MacDonald to Lt. Andrew Clinton Wilson, AUS.

Died

ALLEN — Killed in action March, 1945, (formerly listed as missing), Ens. William Joseph Allen, USNR. Survived by his wife, Mrs. Dolores Allen of 1228 Dale Drive, Silver Spring, Md., and by his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Harold Allen of 10407 Amherst Ave., Silver Spring.

BAUGHMAN — Killed in action (formerly listed as missing in action), May, 1945 ,Lt. Comdr. Daniel Sparks Baughman, USN, (USNA '39). Survived by his widow, Mrs. Mary H. Baughman of 3100 Connecticut Ave., NW, Washington, D. C.

CHESTER—Killed in action in the Pacific area, January, 1944, Lt. (jg) Peter Tracy Chester, USNR. Surviving are his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Hawley T. Chester of 1120 Fifth Ave., New York, N. Y., and a brother, Hawley T. Chester, jr.

DEVANE—Killed by an airplane propeller during maneuvers off Rio de Janeiro, 7 Feb. 1946, Lt. (jg) Harry Elmore Devane, USNR, attached to the USS Franklin Roosevelt. Survived by his mother, Mrs. Caule Devane of Ray City, Ga.

HARDING—Died at U. S. Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Md., 18 Feb. 1946, Mrs. Orinda Ray Harding, wife of Lt. Dean Herbert Harding, (MC), USNR. Besides her husband there is surviving her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Roscoe C. Ray of Kansas City, Mo., two brothers and two sisters.

HUBER—Died at his home, 1001 Park Ave., New York City, 14 Feb. while on leave, Lt. Col. Charles Eugene Huber, jr., MC, AUS. Survived by his mother, Mrs. Elizabeth Huber, and a brother, Dr. Francis D. Huber, both of New York. Also survived by a sister, Mrs. Henry J. Hauser, of Ridgewood, N. J.

JOHNSON—Died at Mt. Alto Veterans' Hospital, Washington, D. C., 16 Feb. 1946, Edwin A. Johnson, editor of Army Times, and former sergeant, AAF, AUS.

KIBLER—Died suddenly at Newberry, S. C., 14 Feb. 1946, Dr. Edgar H. Kibler, father of Col. E. H. Kibler, jr., GSC, USA (USMA-'33). Survived by his only son, and two granddaughters.

LEARY—Killed in action February, 1945, (formerly listed as missing), Lt. John W. Leary, Parachute Infantry. Survived by his wife, Mrs. Frances S. Leary, of Rosebank, Staten Island, N. Y.; a son, John W. Leary, jr., and a daughter, Carolyn.

LLOYD—Died at his home "Wicomico Knoll," Mt. Victoria, Md., 14 Feb. 1946, Maj. William Henry Lloyd, MC, USA-Ret. Survived by his wife, the former Edith B. Butler and two daughters, Mrs. Mead Hartwell of Weston, Mass., and Mrs. Harry W. Blunt of Bethesda, Md.

LOCKE—Died at Letterman General Hospital, San Francisco, Calif., 11 Feb. 1946, Col. Thomas C. Locke, USA-Ret. Survived by his widow, Mrs. Marion Locke of 12 Westlake Park, San Francisco, and by two step-sons, Lt. Col. John Payne, AAF and Maj. Roger Payne, AAF.

MORIARTY—Died in San Francisco, Calif., 21 Jan. 1946, Lt. Daniel Moriarty, USN-Ret. Survived by his widow, Mrs. Catherine S. Moriarty of 1929 Grove street, San Francisco. Interment at US National Cemetery, Presidio, 24 Jan.

MUNRO—Died on night attack over Formosa, 22 Jan. 1945, (previously reported missing), Lt. Uri A. Munro, USNR. Survived by his parents, Mr. and Mrs. A. F. Munro of 40 West Elm St., Greenwich, Conn.; his wife, Mrs. Elizabeth D. Munro, and a four-year-old son, both of Columbus, Ohio.

OATES—Died at US Naval Hospital, Bethesda, Md., 15 Feb. 1946, WO Carson C. Oates, USCGR. Survived by his widow, Mrs. Edna E. Oates; his mother, Mrs. Sallie Oates of Canon Bridge, W. Va.; two sisters, and two brothers.

PATCH—Died in Atlanta, Ga., 12 Feb. 1946, Alexander McCarrell Patch, IV, aged 2½ years, son of the late Capt. Alexander M. Patch, III, USA, and Mrs. Genevieve Spalding Patch; grandson of the late Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, jr., USA, and Mrs. Julia Littell Patch of Staunton, Va., and of Col. Basil D. Spalding, USA-Ret., and Mrs. Spalding, of 172 Rumson Road, Atlanta, Ga. Funegal services and burial at the US Military Academy, West Point, N. Y., 16 Feb.

RAVENHALL—Died at Palm Beach, Fla., 14 Feb. 1946, Mr. Richard Ravenhall, grandfather of Mrs. Clayton C. Townes of Palm Beach and three great grandchildren, Lt. Geo. R. Guyer of Biarritz; Richard Guyer, and James T. Guyer.

SIMMONS—Died at Fort Belvoir Hospital, Fort Belvoir, Va., 19 Feb. 1946, Lt. Col. Albert E. Simmons, USA. Survived by his wife, Mrs. Harriet A. Simmons, a daughter, Aileen, and two sons, Albert E., jr., and Valjean.

WILKINSON—Killed as the result of an automobile accident at Norfolk, Va., 21 Feb. 1946, Vice Adm. Theodore S. Wilkinson, USN. Surviving is his widow.

Obituaries

The Navy Department in an official statement expressed its regrets upon learning of the sudden death of Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, USN, who was killed at Norfolk on 21 Feb. as the result of an automobile accident.

Secretary of Navy James Forrestal described Admiral Wilkinson as one of the officers who took the lead during the war in development of the art of amphibious warfare.

"The Navy has lost a splendid officer in the death of Vice Admiral Wilkinson, and I have lost a close personal friend," the Secretary said. "He directed the assault on Bougainville, and achieved outstanding success in conduct of operations in support of the New Georgia campaign."

Mrs. Wilkinson who was with her husband in the small coupe, managed to fight her way clear and was rescued. She was rushed to a hospital where attendants said she was suffering from shock. Police attributed the tragedy to faulty brakes on the Wilkinson car. The Admiral was trapped in the car as it sank in 30 feet of water. His body was recovered nearly an hour after the accident.

Admiral Wilkinson was Director of Naval Intelligence in the Navy Department at the time of Pearl Harbor and recently was a witness before the Joint Congressional committee investigating the disaster.

He was appointed Deputy Commander of the South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force in January, 1943, and later became commander of the South Pacific Amphibious Force.

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Maj. William Henry Lloyd, MC, USA, Ret., died after a short illness at his home, "Wicomico Knoll," Mount Victoria, Md., 14 Feb. 1946. Interment was in Arlington Cemetery, 16 Feb.

Major Lloyd was born at Germantown, Pa., 16 June 1877, and was graduated from New York University, and from Bellevieve Medical College in 1900.

He served in the Navy on the USS "Yankie" in the Spanish-American War, in the punitive expedition into Mexico, and overseas in World War I. Retired from the Army in 1935 and established his home at Mount Victoria.

He is survived by his wife, the former Edith B. Butler, and two daughters, Mrs. Mead Hartwell of Weston, Mass., and Mrs. Harry W. Blunt of Bethesda, Maryland.

—o—

Funeral services for Edwin A. Johnson, editor of *Army Times*, who died suddenly 16 Feb. at Mt. Alto Veterans' Hospital, Washington, D. C., were held 18 Feb. Interment was at Cody, Wyo., 21 Feb.

Mr. Johnson was born at Cody, Wyo., 31 Oct. 1916, the son of Mr. and Mrs. Algott Johnson. He attended the Universities of Wyoming and Nebraska, and was a past worthy master of Alpha Tau Omega at the former college.

After serving as both editorial and advertising executive on newspapers at Cody and Rock Springs, Wyo., Mr. Johnson entered the Army Air Forces. He served at Lowry Field, Denver, Colo.; Ft. Leavenworth, Kans., and with antisubmarine units stationed on the East Coast. He was discharged 13 Feb. 1943, with rank of sergeant, and joined the staff of Army Times, weekly service newspaper, a month later, becoming editor and managing editor.

In addition to his parents and wife, he is survived by two sisters, Mrs. Valentine Payne, of Cody, and Mrs. Elmer Ready, of Cheyenne.

Navy Orders
(Continued from Page 797)

Barren G. Lowrey to Bureau of Ships.

Almon E. Loomis to nearest Fleet Air Com., temp. duty.

Brook S. Mansfield to Oper. Off., U. S. NB, New York.

Clifford L. McAuliffe, (DE), NR, to Staff—19th Fleet, San Franc.

James H. McKay to Comdr., NAB, Marcus Island, Admiralty Islands and add. duty as Island Commander.

Harold L. Meadow to Bu. Nav. Pers.

Edward E. Saunders, (CEC), NR, to Pub. Works Dept., U. S. NB, San Fran.

Chandler W. Smith, (MC), (Ret.), to proceed home.

Wendell Switzer to CO, NAS, Pensacola.

Lloyd H. Thomas, (SC), to Sup. Off., U. S. NB, Boston.

David M. Tyree to Chief of Staff and Aide—Task Force 74.

William H. Vondreele to Ind. Survey Div., Navy Dept.

Henry W. Wickes, jr., (A3), NR, to Naval Opers., Navy Dept.

Commanders

Charles W. Aldrich to Exec. Off., Service Force, Atl. Fleet, Sub. Command, Norfolk.

Chester W. Beaman, (SC), NR, to Asst. Sup. Officer, MC AS, Cherry Point, N. C.

John P. Bell, (MC), to NAS, Quonset Point, R. I.

John G. Blanche, jr., to C. Off., USS San Marcos, LSD 25.

Ellwood Boger, (MC), to ND, temp. duty.

Robert M. Bolton, (MC), NR, to Naval Ret. Bd. and to home.

Ernest A. Chappell, (Ret.), NR, to proceed home.

Francis B. Connell, (A3D), NR, to NAB, Kobler Field, Saipan Island, Marianas Islands, as Exec. Off.

Robert C. Cotner, (D)L, NR, to Sep. Center, Washington, D. C.

Edward H. Gessner, (CEC), NR, to Sep. Center, Wash., D. C.

William F. Handley, (EM), NR, to Eng. Off. USS Prinz Eugen, IX 300.

Richard D. Harwood to Exec. Off., USS Prinz Eugen, IX 300.

Richard C. Holbrook, (CEC), NR, to Office of Pub. Wks. Offr., 14th ND, Pearl Harbor.

John R. Keener, (A), NR, to Chief of Fin. Div., Office of the Fiscal Dir., Navy Dept.

James C. Kimball, (MC), (Ret.), to proceed home.

William H. Lipsitt, (SC), NR, to Nav. Sup. Depot, San Pedro.

Myron G. Marlay, MC(S), NR, to Med. Dep., NTC, San Diego.

Bowen F. McLeod to USS Bunker Hill, CV 17.

Fred D. Michael to U. S. N. A., Annapolis.

John C. Parham, jr., to Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth.

Lorne C. Parks, (CEC), NR, to Sep. Center, Washington, D. C.

Lowell S. Price, Op. Off. NAS, Terminal Island, San Pedro.

John Rhodemyre, (CD), NR, 6th ND, Charleston, S. C.

James C. Rider, (S), NR, Off. of Indu. Manager, 9th ND, Great Lakes.

Boris Schuster, (MC), NS, Seattle.

Herbert E. Smith, (CEC), NR, to Pub. Works Off., NAS, Jacksonville, Fla.

William J. Stribling, (CEC), NR, to Pub. Works Off., Navy Pilotless Aircraft Unit, NAS, Mojave, Calif.

Marvin Sukov, (MC), NR, to Naval Retraining Command, U. S. Naval Center, Farragut, Idaho.

Howard S. Westin, (Ret.), to Proceed home.

Frederic F. Wipperman, (MC), to NAS, Minneapolis, Minn.

18 Feb. 1946

REAR ADMIRALS

Joseph F. Bolger, to Commander, Fleet Air Wing One.

William R. Furlong (Ret.), to Naval Ret. and release from active duty.

John F. Shafroth, jr., to Commander, Gulf Sea Frontier—additional duty.

Clifton A. F. Sprague, to Commander, Combined Navy Air Group, Joint Task Force One, Washington, D. C.

COMMODORE

William M. Quigley, to NB, Terminal Island, San Pedro, Calif.

CAPTAINS

Charles B. Beasley, to 19th Fleet, San Diego, Calif.

Phillip G. Beck, (DM), NR, to CO, USS Caloosahatchee, AO 98.

Albert R. Behnke, jr., (MC), to Naval Med. Research Inst., Med. Center, Bethesda, Md.

Walter S. Benham, to Texas Group, 16th Fleet, Orange, Tex.

Harry L. Bixby, to 11th ND, San Diego, Calif.

Lannie Conn, to Bu. Nav. Pers., Navy Dept.

James P. Conover (Ret.), to proceed home.

Philip S. Creasor, to Bu. Ships, Navy Dept.

Howell J. Dyson, to Bu. Naval Pers.

Otis J. Earle, to Bu. Ships.

Edward H. Eckelmeyer, jr., to CO, USS Albemarle, AV 5.

Edward B. Ellis, (DM), NR, to CO, USS Catron, APA 71.

John F. Gallaher, to 19th Fleet, San Francisco.

Harry L. Goff, (MC), to Staff—Texas Group, 16th Fleet.

Rowland H. Groff, (DE), NR, to Bu. Naval Pers.

Henry O. Hansen, to CO, USS Boston, CA 69.

Truman J. Hedding, to CO, NAS, Kahului, Maui, T. H.

Harry B. Heneberger, to 1st ND, Boston.

Andrew S. Hickey (Ret.), to Nav. Oper.

Marion R. Kelley, to C of S and Aide—4th Fleet.

Carl F. Kottler, (D), NR, to CO, Naval Pers. Sep. Center, NTC, Bainbridge, Md.

Walter H. Lassing (Ret.), to proceed home.

William R. Lawrence (DM), NR, to 3rd ND, New York.

John C. Lusk (Ret.), to Naval Oper.

John B. Lyon, to Commander, NAB, 10th ND, San Juan, P. R.

John B. Mallard, to Bu. of Naval Pers.

Edward I. McQuiston, to Bu. Naval Pers.

James B. Moloney, (MC), to Fla. Group, 16th Fleet—duty on Staff.

Edward B. Peterson, to 14th ND, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

William L. Rees, to Asst. Naval Attache, Student Imperial Defense College, London, England.

Herbert D. Riley, to Staff—Joint Task Force One, Wash., D. C.

Charles Schaaf, (SC), to Fiscal Officer, Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Wash.

Albert E. Schrader, to Naval Attache and Naval Attache for Air, Madrid, Spain.

Walter W. Strohbehn, to Office of Research and Invention, Navy Dept.

James C. Tily, (CEC), NR, to Bu. Y&D.

Earl K. Vanswearingen, to ND temp. duty.

William E. Verge, to Bu. Ships.

Bosquet N. Wev, to Naval Oper.

COMMANDERS

John C. Allen, (S), NR, to Office of Research and Inventions, Navy Dept.

Arthur F. Anderson (Ret.), to proceed home.

Richard S. Andrews, to CO, USS West Virginia, BB 48.

Howard W. Baker, to Bu. Ord.

Max H. Bailey, to CO, USS Hyades, AF 28.

Frederic A. Bardshar, to NAS, Alameda, Calif.

William M. H. Beck, jr., (S), NR, to CO, Naval Base, Peleliu, Palau Is.

Marion H. Buaas, to ND tempo. duty.

Douglas R. Byth, (DE), NR, to Off. Asst. Indl. Mgr., 12th ND, San Franc.

Walter V. Combs, jr., to Bu. Naval Pers.

Gideon A. Cox, (D), NR, to Bu. Naval Pers.

Albert T. Donnels, (CEC), NR, to Pub. Works Off., 13th ND, Seattle.

Francis L. Edmondson, (DL), NR, to Fla. Group, 16th Fleet, Green Cove Springs, Fla.

Thomas T. Ellsworth, (A), NR, to Recruiting Bureau, White Plains, N. Y.

Allen R. Faust, to CO, USS Spinax, SS 489.

Baird N. French, (CEC), NR, to Sep. Center, Wash., D. C.

Walter R. Fuller, S(E3), NR, to Sep. Center, Wash., D. C.

Carl L. Gilbert, (SE), NR, to CO, NS, St. Thomas, V. I.

Richard H. Hamilton, (DE), NR, to ND tempo. duty.

Sigurd Hansen, (D), NR, to CO, USS Provo Victory, AK 228.

Frank E. Hayler, to CO, USS Ronquil, SS 396.

John B. Honan, (A), NR, to NAS, Quonset Point, R. I.

Arthur C. House, jr., to 11th ND, San Diego, Calif.

Ralph R. Humes, to CO, USS Savo Island, CVE 78.

John E. Johansen, (DM), NR, to ND temp. duty.

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Navy Orders

(Continued from Preceding Page)

Nels C. Johnson, to CO, USS Witek, DD 848.
Wilfred D. Jones, (S), NR, to Staff—Joint Task Force One, Navy Dept.
Carmel F. Kerley, (EM), NR, to Off. Asst. Indl. Manager, 12th ND, San Fran.
Robert D. King, to nearest ND tempo. duty.
Harry F. Mackay, (CEC), to Pub. Works Off., NAB, 14th ND, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
Daryl S. McClung, (DC), to NAS, Jacksonville, Fla.
Woodrow W. McCrory, to CO, USS Cero, SS 225.
Preston J. McNurlin, (S), NR, to Sep. Center, Great Lakes, Ill.
Millard M. Mier, (SC), NR, to Asst. Supply Off., NAS, San Diego.
Harold J. Murray, (A3), NR, to Exec. Off., NAF, Columbus, Ohio.
Chester W. Nimitz, jr., to CO, USS Sarda, SS 488.
Jay T. Palmer, to Exec. Off., USS Wyoming, AG 17.
Claudius G. Pendill, (S), NR, to Bu. Naval Pers.
Ernest R. Perry, to CO, USS Oberon, AKA 14.
Wilmot F. Pierce, (MC), NR, to Nav. Hosp., Santa Margarita Ranch, Calif.
Walter E. Reed, (DM), NR, to CO, USS Bullock, AK 165.
Joseph E. Rice, to Army and Navy Staff College, Wash., D. C.
Palmer W. Roberts, (CEC), NR, to Off. in Charge Const., Seattle, Wash.
Malcolm E. Selby, to CO, USS Artemis, AKA 21.
Alfred G. Sherman, (MC), to NAS, Glenview, Ill.
David Y. Taylor, (CEC), NR, to Civil Works Eng., Quincy Civil Works Dist., New York.
Archibald E. Teall, to San Diego Group, 19th Fleet, San Diego, Calif.—Gunnery Officer.
Peter K. Wells, (D), NR, to Office of Research and Inventions, Navy Dept.
Richard D. White, to 5th ND, Norfolk, Va.
Paul C. Williams, (A3), NR, to CO, USS Tulagi, CVE 72.
John T. Workman, to Exec. Off., USS Curtiss, AV 4.

19 Feb. 1946

REAR ADMIRALS

Walter A. Buck, (SC), to Assistant Chief Bureau Supplies and Accounts.
Horace D. Nuber, (SC), to Deputy Chief Bureau Supplies Accounts, Navy Dept. and also for duty as Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Navy Dept.

COMMODORE

Jasper T. Acuff, to District Operations Officer, 11th ND, San Diego.

CAPTAINS

Clarence L. Blew, (MC), to Staff—Fourth Fleet.
Harry S. Butler (Ret.), to District Legal Officer, 8th ND, New Orleans.
Edwin B. Coyl, (MC), to Staff—Third Fleet.
Frank L. Durnell, to Operations and Planning Officer, N Base, San Pedro.
Miles P. Duval, jr., to Bu. Pers., Navy Dept.
James M. Farrin, jr., to Bu. Ships.
Harold S. Harnly, to Bu. Pers.
LaFayette J. Jones, to Bu. Pers.
Bernard S. Pupek, (MC), to Hospital, Chelsea.
Edgar Ricen, (MC), to Hospital, Corona.
Walker P. Rodman, to nearest ND assignment.
Alexander E. Rosenberg, (MC), NR, to Hospital, St. Albans.
Francis R. Scholly, (A3), NR, to nearest Fleet Air Command, pending assignment.
Selden B. Spangler, to Assembly Repair Officer, Air Station, Alameda.
Harry J. Verhoye, to Commanding Officer, USS Andromeda.

COMMANDERS

Truman O. Anderson, (MCS), NR, to Separation.
Willard H. Branch, (A), NR, to Separation.
James A. Brown, (MC), NR, to Hospital, Naval Base, Norfolk.
Emil G. Carlson, to Executive Officer, Naval Station, Tacoma.
John S. Cowan, (MC), to Bu. Med.
Irvin L. Dew, to Executive Officer, Air Station, Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
John Donovan, S(A), NR, to orders home.
Thomas K. Dunstan, (D), NR, to Bu. Pers.
Daniel M. Entler, jr., to Executive Officer, USS Saratoga.
Konrad E. Eriksson, (SCS), NR, to Assistant District Supply Officer, 13th ND, Seattle.
Karl S. Farnum, (SC), to Supply Officer in Command, Trinidad, B. W. I.
Cyril Fox, (DE), NR, to nearest ND.
Edward J. Haddon, (DE), NR, to orders home.
Fletcher Hale, to Academy, Annapolis.
Thomas F. Halloran, to Operations, Navy Dept.
Winthrop D. Hodges, to Executive Officer, USS Admiral W. S. Sims.
Roy H. Jones, (D), NR, to Separation.
Gustav M. Kahn, (MC), NR, to Hospital, San Diego.
Carmel F. Kerley, (EM), NR, to Office Industrial Manager, New Orleans.
Harold P. Lair, (DM), NR, to nearest ND pending assignment.
John F. Latimer, (CD), NR, to Staff—Fourth Fleet.
Lucile G. Merritt, (W), NR, to Separation.
Keith C. Middleton, (S), NR, to Office Port Director, 13th ND, Seattle.
Lewis R. Miller, to Material Officer, Texas Group, 16th Fleet, Orange.
Tilden I. Moe, (MC), to Medical Center, Bethesda.
Charles R. Norris, jr., to Executive Officer, USS New Orleans.
Charles E. Odom, (S), NR, to orders home.
Robert Ohagan, (SC), to Assistant District Supply Officer, 13th ND, Seattle.
Millard H. Pryor, (S(E), NR, to Separation.
Arthur R. Quinn, to Base, Philadelphia.
Hilary C. Rowe, to Executive Officer, USS Blue Ridge.
Stephen J. Ryan, (MC), to Hospital, Chelsea.
Thomas W. South, II, to Public Information Office, 11th ND, San Diego.
William J. Stribling, (CEC), NR, to Public Works Officer, Air Station, Mojave.
Ernest B. Sykes, (CEC), NR, to Staff—U. S. Naval School, Newport.
Clinton B. Tracy, (EM), NR, to nearest ND.
William E. Walsh, (MC), NR, to Recruiting Station, Cleveland, Ohio.

20 Feb. 1946

CAPTAINS

Archer M. Allen, to relieved active duty.
Parke H. Brady, to Naval Attache, The Hague.
Floyd C. Bedell, CEC, to Staff, Commander Marianas.
Everett W. Brown, SC, to relieved active duty.
Martin C. Burns, to Commanding Officer, USS Sappho.
Harry S. Butler (Ret.), to District Legal Officer, New Orleans.
Spencer A. Carlson, to Naval Opertaion.
Francis M. Carter, to nearest ND, pending assignment.
Thomas Cochran (Ret.) SC, to Naval Supply Depot, Oakland.
Raymond J. Connors, MC, NR, to Naval Air Station, Quonset Point.
Howard N. Coulter, to Commanding Officer, USS General W. C. Langfitt.
George C. Currier, (D), NR, to Office Director Naval Reserve, Third ND, New York.
Royce P. Davis, to temporary duty pending further assignment.
William H. Green, D, NR, to 7th ND, Miami.
Charles C. Hartman, to 11th ND, San Diego.
Einar R. Johnson, to 7th ND, Miami.
Lewis A. Marbet, (EM), NR, to 12th ND, San Francisco.
Adolph J. Miller, to Training Center, San Francisco.
Erwin H. Osterloh, MC, to Hospital, Memphis.
Lannie A. Parker, to relieved active duty.
Theodore T. Patterson, (Ret.), to relieved active duty.
Norman W. Sears, to Executive Officer, Training Center, San Diego.
Emmett J. Sullivan, to Training Center, San Francisco.

COMMANDERS

George L. Abrams, MC, to Air Station, Clinton.
George K. Briggs, D, NR, to Staff, Amphibious Group One.
Abram L. Broughton, (Ret.), to relieved active duty.
Marion H. Buaas, to Commanding Officer, USS Mayrant.
Romandi Budd, to General Line School, Newport.
Virgil L. Cameron, MC, NR, to Marine Corps Air Depot, Miramar.
Paschal R. Chambers, S(E), NR, to Separation.
Lewis H. Cutting, (Ret.), to relieved active duty.
George H. Davis, MC, NR, to Distribution Center, Port Hueneme.
Paul F. Dickens, jr., MC, to Hospital, Bethesda.
Francis J. Enright, SC, NR, to Bureau Supplies and Accounts.
Owen E. Fang, (S), NR, to Separation Center (Officers), Washington, D. C.
Robert F. Farrington, to Navigator, USS Ranger.
Andrew C. Flinn, SE, NR, to U. S. Naval Facilities, Sasebo.
Shirley A. Fuhring, MC, to Hospital, Bethesda.
Joy B. Hancock, W(A), NR, to Bu Pers, Navy Dept.
Billy Johnson, SC, to nearest ND, pending assignment.
Roy H. Jones, (D), NR, to Separation.
Draper L. Kauffman, SC, NR, to Joint Task Force One, Navy Dept.
John N. Kenefick, MC, NR, to relieved active duty.
William J. Laxson, (Ret.), SC, to relieved active duty.
Roy E. Lemoine, CH, to Naval Center, Sampson.
Theodore C. Linthicum, to Assistant Industrial Manager, San Pedro.
Maurice C. Lipp, CEC, NR, to Public Works Office, Green Cove Springs.
Francisco J. Llanso, DM, NR, to Commanding Officer, USS Mauna Lca.
Marshall L. McClung, DE, NR, to 1st Lt. Damage Control Officer, USS Midway.
DeWitt C. McIver, jr., to Naval Science and Tactics, Columbia, S. C.
Thomas J. Montgomery, SC, to additional duty Operations, Navy Dept.
Henry Mullins, jr., to Naval Science and Tactics, Palo Alto.
Edelen A. Parker (A1), NR, to temporary duty involving flying connection fitting out USS Riskany CV 34.
John H. Paul, DC, to Marine Corps Base, San Diego.
Joseph G. Polak, SO, NR, to Bu Ord.
Joseph E. Rice, to Army and Navy Staff College.

21 Feb. 1946

REAR ADMIRALS

Freeland A. Daubin, to Commandant, 17th ND, Kodiak.
Charles T. Joy, to Bu. Pers., pending assignment.
Edgar L. Woods, MC, to relieved active duty.

COMMODORE

Ralph S. Moore, D, NR, to 12th ND, San Francisco.

CAPTAINS

Walter C. Ansel, to Chief Staff aide, Cruiser Division One.
Rae E. Arison, to Bu. Pers.
Charles E. Brunton, to Bu. Pers.
Charles W. Gray, to Additional duty, Commander, Inactive Fleet, New London.
Lloyd R. Gray, (Ret.), to relieved active duty.
William W. Hargrave, MC, to Medical Officer in Command, Hospital, Portsmouth.
Hamilton W. Howe, to Staff, Commander Cruiser Division One.
Edward H. Jones, to Additional duty, Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, Commander Gulf Sea Frontier.
John S. Keating, to 7th Fleet.
Carl F. Kottler, D, NR, to Commanding Officer, Separation Center, Bainbridge.
Owen M. Murphy, SI, NR, to Commanding Officer, Military Government Unit, Yap Island.
William J. Murphy, to Shipyard, San Pedro.
Powell M. Rhea, to Boston Naval Shipyard.
Andrew G. Shepard, to Chief Staff Aide, Commander Minecraft, Pacific Fleet.
Archibald E. Uehlinger, to Training Center, San Francisco.
Edson H. Whitehurst, to Commander, Destroyer Division 82.
James D. Wilson, CEC, to Additional duty, San Juan.
Charles J. Zimmerman, SC(S), NR, to Separation Center, (Officer), Washington, D. C.
Dillon F. Zimmerman, SC, to Repair Base, San Diego.

COMMANDERS

Marion S. Alexander, A1, NR, to Operations.
Charles S. Arthur, jr., to Staff, Cruiser Division One.
Edward M. Bingham, (Ret.), to relieved active duty.
James J. Bowe, SE, NR, to Bu. Ships.
Thomas J. Brady, CEC, to Public Works Officer, Inactive Fleet Berthing Area, Boston.
Harold V. Brown, D, NR, to Executive Officer, USS Europa.
Herbert V. Burkart, to Executive Officer, USS Oklahoma City.
George E. Cannon, (A5), NR, to Air Reserve Training, Glenview.
Roger V. Chastain, DC, to Training Distribution Center, San Diego.
James W. Darroch, (D), NR, to 12 ND, San Francisco, Calif.
George S. DeShazo, DC, NR, to Separation.
John M. Doo, D, NR, to 13 ND, Seattle, Wash.
Raymond W. Fischer, S(A), NR, to Bureau Aeronautics Representative, Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Columbus.
James A. Fitzgerald, CEC, to Air Station, Quonset Point.
Louis E. Hathaway, jr., MC, NR, to Hospital, Newport.
Josiah O. Hoffman, (Ret.), to relieved active duty.
Roderick B. Jones, S(E), NR, to Office Research Inventions.
Kenneth H. Kalmbach, S, NR, to Operating Base, Okinawa.
Asel B. Kerr, to 11th ND, San Diego.
Louis R. Laporte, CEC, NR, to School (CEC Officers), Davisville.
William R. Lennok, (DE), NR, to Separation.
Edwin E. Lord, III, to Temporary Duty connection fitting out USS Toledo.
Frank N. Haas, (S), NR, to Personnel Officer, San Francisco.
Joseph G. McKinnon, NC, NR, to Operating Base, Trinidad.
George S. Rader, MC, to Bu. Med.
Victor W. Randecker, A3, NR, to Executive Officer, Air Station, Atlanta.
William A. Reishtein, MC, to Air Station, Miami.
Roland W. Rickertis, SC, to Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia.
George D. Roulard, to Operations.
Robert B. Simons, MC, to Hospital, Aies.
Arthur C. Smith, to Bu. Ships.
Rutledge F. Smith, MC, NR, to Hospital, Long Beach.
Frank H. Tammany, A3, NR, to Air Reserve Training, Glenview.
Derrick C. Turnipseed, MC, to Air Station, Vero Beach.
Daulton G. Viskniskki, S(D), NR, to Separation.
Ralph G. Walling, E-T, USN, to Inspector Material, Syracuse.
David P. Wheichel, S, NR, to release active duty.
Henry S. White, (A), NR, to Separation.
Frederick D. Witzel, SC, to Joint Task Force One, Navy Dept.

Awards and Decorations

Medal of Honor

*2nd Lt. Harry J. Michael, Inf., captured more than 70 Germans and silenced a row of enemy pillboxes and two machine gun nests in a series of advances before he was killed.

*T/Sgt. Morris E. Crain, Inf., gave his life to maintain the Moder River bridgehead near Haguemau, France.

*S/Sgt. Archer T. Gammon, Inf., singlehandedly killed nine Germans and forced a Tiger Royal tank to withdraw before he was killed by a direct hit from the tank's 88 mm. gun.

*T5 Forrest E. Peden, FA, at the cost of his life guided two tanks to the aid of his comrades in the 3rd Infantry Div., in France.

*Pfc. A. L. Krotiak, Inf., smothered a Japanese hand grenade under his own body to protect four comrades on Luzon.

*Pvt. William D. McGee, (Medical aid man), exacuated a wounded comrade from a German minefield and was fatally wounded when he returned to rescue a second.

Distinguished Service Cross

Capt. Theodore S. Bell, USA.

Distinguished Service Medal

Adm. T. C. Kinkaid, USN (GS)	Col. W. W. Warner, USA
Maj. Gen. J. E. Moore, USA	Col. M. B. Stokes, jr., TC

Legion of Merit

Brig. Gen. K. P. Lord, USA	Col. D. Parmentier, GSC
Maj. R. S. Armentrout, TC	Lt. Col. David Scribner, TC
Col. F. V. Schneider	Col. L. D. Brown
Brig. Gen. R. S. Chavin, USA	Lt. Col. H. C. Britt, (OLC)
Lt. Col. C. L. Reed, Ord.	Brig. Gen. H. J. Lawes, USA
Lt. Col. S. F. Musselman, Ord.	Col. W. H. Kite, jr., Ord.
Lt. Col. H. A. Mitchell, Ord.	Col. W. E. Laidlaw, Ord.
Capt. M. B. Lawton, Ord.	Lt. Col. W. C. DeBill, Ord.
Col. H. S. Morton, Ord.	Col. P. G. Rutten, Ord.
Capt. H. P. Goets, Ord.	Lt. Col. G. L. Cox, Ord.
Lt. Col. W. J. Wilhelm	Lt. Col. C. G. Knudson
Col. L. A. Skinner	Lt. Col. A. J. Plant
Rear Adm. L. Sheldon, jr., (MC) USN	Lt. Col C. M. Huth
Col. L. M. Morris, CE	Capt. L. J. Roshar, QMC
*Capt. R. W. Clark, USN	Col. W. M. Blunt
Maj. Gen. J. W. O'Daniel, USA	Lt. Col. J. F. Rider, SC
Lt. Col. J. J. Healy, SC	Col. H. F. Chrisman, FD
Capt. F. G. Letzler, MC	Lt. Col. H. M. Burnett, FD
Col. J. B. Haley, FD	Maj. J. Palsbrok, FD
Lt. Col. T. P. Corwin, FD	

Bronze Star

Capt. F. J. Eckhoff, USN	Capt. W. K. Dielman
Lt. Col. F. R. Harrison, (OLC)	

Foreign Decorations

Capt. Cyrus E. French, MC, was awarded the order of Knight of Orange-Nassau, from the Netherlands government.

* Posthumous award.

New Leavenworth Class

Fort Leavenworth, Kans.—Opening exercises were held 11 Feb. for the 27th General Staff Class of the Command and General Staff School. After the invocation by Chaplain (Maj.) John Sagar, Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, Commandant of the School, gave an address welcoming the students and outlining the course they will study for the next sixteen weeks. Maj. Gen. O. P. Weyland, Assistant Commandant of the School, delivered the Orientation address.

Gen. Terry to U. S.

Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Terry, commanding the India-Burma theater, is en route to the United States where he will undergo medical treatment for injuries received in an automobile accident on 6 Feb. Maj. Gen. Vernon Evans, Chief of Staff, will be in temporary command during General Terry's absence.

A total of 89,479 men enlisted in the Regular Navy between the surrender of Japan and 2 January, 1946, the Secretary of the Navy has announced.

RR Experts Honored by Army

Ten railroad passenger traffic experts who were responsible for routing more than 39 million troops over American railroads during the war were presented War Department Certificates of Appreciation by the Army Transportation Corps on 20 Feb. in Washington, D. C.

Presentation of the awards was made by Col. J. R. Messersmith, Deputy Chief, Commercial Traffic Service, Office of the Chief of Transportation. Maj. Gen. Edmond H. Leavey, Chief of Transportation; Brig. Gen. Robert H. Wylie, Assistant Chief of Transportation and Director of Operations, and Col. Luke W. Finlay, Executive to General Leavey, were honored guests. Col. E. C. R. Lasher, 2nd Zone Transportation Officer, and Col. I. Sewell Morris, 6th Zone Transportation Officer, each of whom had preceded Col. Messersmith as head of the troop passenger branch of the Transportation Corps, also witnessed the ceremonies.

Those receiving the awards are:

Mr. E. P. Burke, General Passenger Traffic Manager of the Pullman Co., Chicago.

Mr. A. B. Chown, Chairman of the Trunk Line-Central Passenger Association, of New York.

Mr. W. C. Clifford, Secretary of the New England Passenger Association, of Boston.

Mr. M. B. Duggan, Chairman of the Southern Passenger Association, of Atlanta.

Mr. J. M. Vonau, jr., Chairman of the Southwestern Passenger Association, of St. Louis.

The five others who were honored served throughout the war within the Office of the Chief of Transportation itself. They are:

Mr. J. J. Kelley, Manager of the Military Transportation Section, Association of American Railroads.

Mr. J. W. Porter, Joint Agent of the Trunk Line—Central Passenger Assoc.

Mr. F. H. Jones, Military Routing Representative of the Southern Passenger Assoc.

Mr. G. C. Roney, Passenger Traffic Representative of the Western Military Bureau.

Mr. D. R. Culver, Special Representative of the Pullman Co.

Admit Chinese Wives

The House on 18 Feb. passed a bill, HR 4844, providing that alien Chinese wives of American citizens may be admitted to the U. S.

Airport for USNA

Need for a $12,000,000 airport for use in conjunction with the U. S. Naval Academy was stressed this week by Capt. R. B. Pirie, USN, head of the Academy's Department of Aviation.

FINANCE ⁂ MERCHANT MARINE

Financial Digest

Chester Bowles, at present chief of the Office of Price Administration and designated to be Stabilization Administrator, appearing this week before the House Banking and Currency Committee urged speedy Congressional action on extension of the Price Control Act. He declared that prices of food, clothing and rent would be kept from rising under the new wage-price policy of the Government.

Mr. Bowles appealed to Congress to demonstrate its determination to block inflation by enacting at the earliest possible moment price control and other stabilization statutes, legislation to stop inflation in the real estate market and continuation beyond 30 June of subsidy payments on the production of essential foods.

"It would be difficult to exaggerate the gravity of the inflationary crisis we face," Mr. Bowles said. "An expectancy of higher and still higher prices is sweeping the country. The speculative fever is reminiscent of 1929. We can see it in the stock market, in the real estate market, and even in almost every commodity market."

Commercial and industrial failures for the second consecutive week showed a small decrease during the week ended 14 Feb., according to Dunn and Bradstreet, Inc.

The National Association of Investment Companies reported this week that investment companies as a group made relatively little change in their cash positions during the fourth quarter of 1945.

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has announced that bank debits as reported by banks in 334 leading centers for the month of January aggregated $89,131. During the past three months total debits for the same centers amounted to $270,109 million or seven per cent above the total reported for the corresponding period a year ago. At banks in New York City there was an increase of 13 per cent compared with the corresponding three-month period a year ago, and at the 333 other centers there was an increase of three per cent.

New Post for Comdr. Treadwell

Comdr. Paul C. Treadwell, U. S. N. Ret., has been named executive assistant to the president of the J. P. Riddle Co., Miami, Fla. For the past year Commander Treadwell has been naval technical advisor for the Riddle Aviation School.

The new official was graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1923 and was continuously in naval aviation until 1944 when he retired with the grade of commander.

Merchant Marine

Allocation of nine coastal cargo vessels for Pacific coastwise service is expected to relieve the car shortage in the Pacific Northwest and in California, War Shipping Administration officials announced this week.

Three of the nine ships were allocated to Coastwise Line and three to Pope & Talbot, Inc. One each were allocated to Olympic Steamship Co., Burns Steamship Co. and James Griffiths & Son.

As agents of the War Shipping Administration and under authority granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission, weekly service is to be maintained between California Ports and the Columbia River, and semi-weekly service between California and Puget Sound.

Awards made by the Merchant Marine Decorations and Medals Board during the month of January included four distinguished Service Medals, four meritorious Service Medals and Mariner's Medals to 44 seamen sustaining injuries and to the next of kin of 64 seamen who lost their lives in service.

The Maritime Commission this week announced tentative approval of an application of the Mississippi Shipping Company of New Orleans for the construction-differential parity payment to aid in certain improvements on four vessels.

Final approval is subject to action of the Commission's Technical Division and the Navy Department, if required, on the plans and specifications, as well as upon other formal determinations required by Sections 501 and 502 of the Merchant Marine Act 1936. The construction differential parity will offset lower foreign construction costs, but will not exceed 50 per cent of the actual cost of construction in a United States shipyard.

Creation of a Reserve Fleet Division, to have charge of the acquisition and maintenance of all vessels not needed in operation of the post-war American Merchant Marine but required by national security, was announced this week by the United States Maritime Commission.

Acting director of the new division is Frank E. Hickey while Ernest W. Gorman is the Acting Assistant Director. The Reserve Fleet already under its jurisdiction and moored in the James River, Virginia, Mobile River, Alabama, and Suisun Bay, California, numbers nearly 400 vessels of various types.

Locate U. S. PW's

The Prisoner of War Information Bureau, European Theater, has located and cleared all but 107 American prisoners of war, it was announced recently by Col. Thomas H. Dameron, Chief of the Prisoner of War Division. Theater Provost Marshal's Office, USFET. Of this number, it is believed, a major portion will eventually be located.

Calendar of Legislation

ACTION ON LEGISLATION

H. R. 3755. To establish an Optometry Corps in the Medical Department of the United States Army. Reported by Senate Military Committee.

S. 1746. To govern distribution of war trophies. Reported, amended, by Senate Military Committee.

H. J. Res. 243. Tendering the thanks of Congress to General of the Army George C. Marshall, and the members of the AUS who have fought under his direction during the recent war, and to provide that the President shall present to him a gold medal and a parchment in the name of the people of the United States. Reported, amended to include Admiral of the Fleet Ernest J. King and the personnel of the Navy, by the Senate Military Committee.

BILLS INTRODUCED

H. R. 5475. Rep. Havenner, Calif. To promote on the retired list officers and enlisted personnel of the Army commended for gallantry in the performance of duty in actual combat in World War II.

H. R. 5479. Rep. Morrison, La. To provide that retired enlisted personnel of the Army who served as commissioned officers during World War II shall receive the pay of retired warrant officers.

H. R. 5501. Rep. Bunker, Nev. To broaden the scope and raise the rank of the veterans' preference provided for in the Surplus Property Act.

H. R. 5505. Rep. Rivers, S. C. To grant to enlisted personnel in the armed forces of the United States upon their separation from the service certain benefits with respect to accumulated leave.

S. 1844. Sen. McFarland, Ariz. To provide for the retirement of certain officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men of the Reserve components of the Army and Navy.

S. 1845. Sen. Walsh, Mass. To increase the amount of Federal aid to State or Territorial homes for the support of disabled soldiers and sailors of the United States.

S. 1847. Sen. Thomas, Utah. To amend existing law providing for the detail of United States military and naval missions to foreign governments.

S. 1854. Sen. Walsh, Mass. To establish the civilian position of Academic Dean of the Postgraduate School of the Naval Academy and compensation therefor.

Airmail Overseas

In order to speed the delivery of mail to and from soldiers overseas, arrangements have been made with the Post Office Department to fly airmail on commercial aircraft under contract to the Post Office Department.

Enlisted Terminal Leave

Bills to authorize terminal leave with pay to enlisted men are in active status in both houses of Congress. The House Military Committee expects to take up one next week, while in the Senate a subcommittee is working on a new draft to replace S. 721.

Ships to China

The Rules Committee this week voted to grant the right of way to a Navy sponsored bill permitting the President to sell, exchange, lease, or give 271 naval vessels to China. A list of the ships to be given to China has been sent to the House Naval Affairs Committee, but not released to the public.

Col. Klein to Secretary's Office

Col. Julius Klein, formerly Special Consultant on the staff of Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, jr., Commanding General, Mid Pacific Ocean Areas, has assumed his new duties as Special Assistant to the Secretary of War.

Col. Klein

Colonel Klein, a well-known newspaper and motion picture executive, is a native of Chicago. He entered active duty in March, 1941, with the 33rd Infantry Division of the Illinois National Guard. After his graduation from several service schools, including the School of Military Government, he went overseas in command of troops, serving from early 1943 until late 1945 as commanding officer of a large Quartermaster group in the South and West Pacific Areas, afterward being attached to General Richardson's staff.

As commanding officer of troops, as port commander and special staff officer in the Pacific Ocean Areas, Colonel Klein furnished vital logistical support to the assault problems engendered by vast distances and limited shipping facilities. Acting as special consultant to the commanding general he was entrusted with several highly important missions which had a direct bearing on the successful overall mission of the command. In June, 1941, he prepared a complete plan for the organization of "Combat Public Relations" which became one of the most important public relations functions of all the armed forces.

As special consultant on General Richardson's staff, Colonel Klein had a responsible part in the redeployment of troops, repatriation of our prisoners of war and the demobilization mission of the command. His planning ability, foresight and professional knowledge contributed in large measure to the successful execution of all those plans and measurably aided the advancement of our military forces, both before and after the surrender of Japan. He was decorated three times during the war—with the Legion of Merit, the Soldier's Medal, and the Bronze Star.

Colonel Klein, who recently returned to the United States to complete a mission for the Pacific Command, agreed to defer his return to business life in order to carry out his new duties.

Interviewed this week by the Army and Navy Journal, Colonel Klein declined to elaborate on the scope of his new duties but emphasized that they will be of whatever nature the Secretary of War deems most necessary at this time.

Navy Promotions

The following temporary promotions and reappointments of officers of the Regular Navy have been made:

Rear Adm. to Vice Adm.

L. D. McCormick	E. W. Mills

Comdr. to Capt.

H. F. Carlson	J. Maginnis
F. M. Carter	C. J. Ballreich
H. J. Verhoye	H. F. Mulley
W. H. Albach	J. A. Guard

Reappointed Comdr.

C. H. J. Johnson

Lt. Comdr. to Comdr.

A. Segerstrom	W. R. Lowndes
R. C. Huston	J. E. Eppley

Lt. Comdr.-Ret. to Comdr.-Ret.

D. M. Page

Reappointed Lt. Comdr.

F. R. Raleigh	J. F. Koons

Lt. to Lt. Comdr.

J. R. Shirley	J. T. Long
F. C. Atnip	J. R. Roberts
W. I. Hobbs	C. W. Dukelow
J. M. Hamill	

Lt. (jg) to Lt.

J. W. Kinder	V. G. Osbeck
R. L. Posey	T. D. Crumpler
W. T. Sterling	R. W. Dye
E. W. Downey	W. R. Cole
L. E. Biechlin	P. A. C. Verdon
J. W. Reid	J. M. Murphy
J. M. Morrison	Addie Morris
A. D. Blanchat	L. E. Bauman
J. S. Weaver	J. J. Stretch
George Lott	W. R. Hiland
C. H. Mundell	G. H. Jensen
W. J. Mosley	R. W. Ferris
C. C. Doyle	C. R. Underdown
Fabus Jarrise	B. D. Craig
Abner Akemon	F. E. Alssa
J. F. Murray	

Reappointed Lt. (jg)

A. E. Lamberson

Ens. to Lt. (jg)

P. L. Coe	M. W. Recknor

Army Shifts

The historic buildings in Washington, D. C., formerly used by the Army War College and subsequently by the headquarters, Army Ground Forces, will be taken over by the expanded Army and Navy Staff College in late Spring.

Army Ground Forces, most of whose officers already have been transferred to the Pentagon, probably will be moved to Fort Monroe, Va.

The Staff College transfer is in accordance with the expanded program recently decided for it, whereunder it becomes a top service school and will take in also students from the State Department.

The new curriculum is now under study by several outstanding civilian educators. It is planned to bring in a number of civilian experts along international and global polictics lines as members of the faculty.

The Fort Monroe expansion program involves the taking over of the Hotel Chamberlain property by the War Department. The land there is owned by the War Department but leased to the corporation which owns the hotel. The hotel, in turn, was taken over by the Navy to provide facilities for officers and their families at low cost. The proposed return to the Army was the subject of a protest by Representative Taber on the floor of the House this week, the contention being made that such matters should be brought before Congress for approval.

Another shift involves consolidating the training activities of the Army Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth, N. J. The Central Signal Corps School now located at Camp Crowder, Mo., will be deactivated and the Enlisted Men's School of the Eastern Signal Corps Schools will be reactivated at Ft. Monmouth.

Starting 1 March, the consolidation will take about four months to complete. Almost all of the 2,000 students now enrolled in the Central Signal Corps School will complete their training at Camp Crowder. A small selected group will be transferred to Ft. Monmouth to assist in the reactivation of the school there.

The Signal Corps school at Camp Crowder represents only about 10 per cent of the activities of that post, Maj. Gen. Harry C. Ingles, Chief Signal Officer, said. Reactivation of the Enlisted Men's School at Fort Monmouth, where it was formerly conducted, will bring all of the Signal Corps training schools together with the exception of the photographers' school at Astoria, Long Island. Now located at Fort Monmouth are the Signal Corps Officers' School, Officers' Candidate School and the Radar School, all components of the Eastern Signal Corps Training Center.

General Ingles said that it is planned to expand the Enlisted Men's School to a maximum capacity of about 4,500 trainees by 1 June.

Retired Officers Association

The Retired Officers Association which was organized 23 Feb. 1929, and whose 3,200 members are retired Commissioned and Warrant Officers and Nurses of the regular Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey and Public Health Service, held its biennial Membership Meeting at the Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C., 18 Feb.

Guest of honor at the Association luncheon was Rear Adm. Leo O. Colbert, Director of the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey.

Resolutions were adopted favoring an increase in the retired pay of enlisted men, warrant officers, and commissioned officers of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey and Public Health Service; approving the recommendations of its Public Relations Committee to:

(a) Exempt from Federal income tax all pay allowed by law to a Commissioned Officer, Chief Warrant Officer, or Warrant Officer, on the retired lists of the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, Coast & Geodetic Survey and Public Health Service, when he or she shall reach the statutory retirement age.

(b) Grant to all those officers named in (a) above, now or hereafter retired, three-quarters of the allowance for subsistence and quarters of the rank in which retired.

(c) Establish a system of social security benefits for dependents of officers, payments to become effective upon the death of an officer, either active or retired,

and favoring the passage of Senate Bill 1412 and its companion Bill 1444 of the 79th Congress, first session.

The officers and directors for the ensuing two years are:

President: Admiral David F. Sellers, USN; First Vice President: Maj. Gen. Louis McCarty Little, USMC; Second Vice President: Maj. Gen. Walter C. Baker, USA; Third Vice President: Lt. Comdr. Charles W. Cairnes, USCG; and Executive Vice President and Treasurer: Rear Adm. Harry G. Hamlet, USCG.

Board of Directors

Chairman—Admiral D. F. Sellers, USN.

Army—For term of four years: Maj. Gen. John H. Hughes, Brig. Gen. Charles D. Roberts, Brig. Gen. Francis H. Pope, and Col. Lawrence C. Crawford. For term of two years—Maj. Gen. Walter C. Baker, Col. James Totten, Col. Albert G. Love, and Col. Harry La T. Cavenaugh.

Navy—For four years—Comdr. Lincoln Humphreys, Capt. George A. Alexander, and Lt. Comdr. Hugo Frankenberger. For two years—Admiral David F. Sellers, Rear Adm. Charles Conard, and Capt. Robert Henderson.

Marine Corps—For four years—Maj. Gen. Louis McCarty Little and Maj. Frank M. Sherwood. For two years—Maj. Gen. Rufus Lane and Capt. John D. Roberts.

Coast Guard—For four years—Rear Adm. H. G. Hamlet and Comdr. Frederick A. Hunnewell. For two years—Rear Adm. William J. Wheeler and Comdr. Charles W. Cairnes.

Coast and Geodetic Survey—For four years—Lt. Comdr. George E. Morris. For two years—Capt. G. T. Rude.

Public Health Service—For four years—Medical Director Bolivar J. Lloyd. For two years—Medical Director Allan McLaughlin.

More Pay Instead of Draft

Declaring that a peace-time draft will not be necessary if Congress makes the services more attractive, Philip F. LaFollette, former governor of Wisconsin and an assistant chief of staff to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific, this week urged upon the House Military Committee that service pay scales be revised based on $100 a month for privates. LaFollette urged that the United States:

(1) Establish a minimum pay scale starting at $100 a month, plus the usual allowances, for privates, with a corresponding increase in scale for non-commissioned officers; (2) provide a system of promotions from the ranks and a program of education and in-service training to enable G-1's to qualify for advancement and to become trained technicians; (3) strike at the military "caste system" by narrowing the differences in clothes, quarters, mess, legal rights, and social life between G-I's and officers; and (4) improve the officer class by putting appointments to West Point and Annapolis on a civil service basis and by putting peacetime promotions on a basis of competitive examinations.

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DECEMBER 7, 1944 ★ **UNITED STATES AT WAR** ★ DECEMBER 7, 1945



Mesta 29" Structural Mill, showing Traveling Tilting Table, installed at Kaiser Company, Inc., Iron and Steel Division, Fontana, California.

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The myriad requirements of war demonstrated the amazing versatility of Vickers Hydraulic Controls. There were so many kinds of jobs to do—jobs which had to be done better than ever before—jobs which had never previously been accomplished.

For example, in this illustration, the plane has Vickers Hydraulic Control for brakes, automatic pilot and cargo door operation. The lift trucks have Vickers Hydraulic Control which lifts and positions the load accurately at the finger-touch of the operator. The graders building air fields use Vickers Hydraulic Power for steering front and rear wheels, raising, lowering or side shifting the blade, and operating the attachments.

These are just a few of the war jobs Vickers Hydraulics have done. Others include the precision movement of heavy battleship turrets—the automatic aiming of anti-aircraft guns—the fast precision positioning of ammunition hoists—the control of bomber gun turrets—and others which cannot yet be described.

Many of the intricate machine tools that produced the machines that won the war depended for their accuracy, production speed, and ease of operation upon Vickers Hydraulic Controls.

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ANY SEQUENCE OF MOTIONS · ANY ACCELERATION OR DECELERATION · ANY THRUST . . . . . .



A Nation Strong...to Keep the Peace

GENERAL CABLE CORPORATION

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Foreword

ON this Fourth Anniversary of Pearl Harbor, our enemies of the Global War, beaten to surrender, are under Allied Occupation—but the Peace remains to be secured. Once the might of America reached its peak, once there was effected the essential cooperation with our Allies which we had strengthened from our resources, the outcome of the titanic struggle was assured. Italy hauled down her flag on 8 September 1943. A year and eight months later to the day, Germany was compelled to acknowledge defeat. Four months subsequently, Japan signed the terms we dictated. Thus with complete victory, the United Nations ended the conflict provoked by dictators and their peoples lusting to enslave mankind. Those dictators and those peoples have met the fate that was their due. Hitler committed suicide as Russian shells burst against the shelter where he had hidden; Mussolini was horribly killed by his outraged dupes, and Hirohito is serving as our pawn in the imposition of Allied rule upon his country; and their chief aides, who have not resorted to poison or bullet to escape punishment, are before the Bar of Civilization answering for their savage crimes. Under military government, the German people, separated amongst four zones, American, British, Russian, and French, and the Japanese, controlled to date only by our forces, are suffering the penalties demanded by their obedient execution of the brutal orders given to them. Brought home to them at last is the fact that War does not pay. And that they may never again desire to employ this weapon of human misery, they are being taught the ways of the Democracy they had derided, and held out to them is the hope that right conduct based upon the concept of Freedom, may admit them eventually to equal rank in the brotherhood of peaceful Nations.

When America was thrust into the Global War, our enemies realized her potential strength, but jeered at the notion that that strength could be transformed in time into the striking power required to overcome their formidable forces. Rude was their awakening. Protected by our ocean barriers and by the combined resistance which we and our Allies offered, we created Armies that had no peer, expanded the Navy until it became the greatest the world ever has seen, and filled the skies with Air Armadas that drove enemy aircraft from them, and dropped devastating bombs upon their ships and homelands. It was a miracle that America wrought, a miracle expressed in the contribution made in mighty fashion to the united strength that vanquished Italy and then Germany, and in the single-handed destruction of Japan. It was America who, in conjunction with Great Britain and other Allies, cleared the seas of hostile craft, and in huge quantity and with amazing rapidity, furnished the tonnage for the transport of men and materiel to strategic battle theaters. It was America from whose farms and factories poured to the Allies the food and munitions that, supplementing their own resources and the products of their scientific research, enabled them to meet assault and to engage in counter-thrusts that drove the conquerers from the territory they had seized or invaded, and forced them back into their homelands and to ignominious surrender. It was this unity astonishingly demonstrated in all fields, and promoted and maintained in spite of clashing interests and conflicting policies largely by the conferences held by the Heads of State at Teheran, Ottawa, Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam, and by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, that enabled diplomatic, economic, financial, and military coordination by the United Nations. It was lack of unity, caused by basically antagonistic national interests and suspicion which its member states could not reconcile or dispel, that made the Axis Alliance a scrap of paper. Thus developed the ideal situation of military strategy: The powerful United Nations acting as a coordinated force, their enemies mutually arrogant and contemptuous, with each concerned only with its own war and fearful of the designs of a partner. Again, while the United Nations made remedial, the Axis made fatal mistakes. It inevitably followed that victory came to the United Nations, and defeat to their foes.

During these four fateful years, the Horsemen of the Apocalypse have ridden roughshod over Humanity. America mourns her 1,037,169 dead, wounded and missing. Our stout-hearted Allies, particularly Great Britain and Russia, mourn their millions of slain and suffering. Writ by all these valiant souls and by those who lived daringly through the Ordeal, is this glorious truth: They lived and fought, they fought and died, that men might be Free, and that our own American Way of Life might endure.

Mankind has entered upon a new era of frightfulness, that of the lethal rocket guided by distance smashing electronic devices, and that of the atomic bomb, the explosion of which annihilated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Clearly either the Battle-Flags must be furled, or Civilization will perish. Whittier truly said that "the Olive waves with roots deep set in battle graves." From those graves has sprouted the United Nations Organization. There is universal hope that this Agency will be of use in evolving order from the prevailing chaos which contains the seed of another war, that it will prevent aggression, and that to it eventually, nations will resort for the settlement of all disputes which negotiation and the World Court fail to adjust. But, meanwhile, let America not forget the lesson of Pearl Harbor and prior wars, the lesson Washington impressed upon the infant Republic, that a proper posture of defense is essential for our security.

JOHN CALLAN O'LAUGHLIN,
Publisher,
ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL



U. S. Army Signal Corps Photo

Marshal Josef Stalin, President Harry S. Truman, and the Honorable Winston Churchill, then Prime Minister of England, with their interpreters, photographed in informal conversation just before the opening of the conference at Potsdam, Germany. The Honorable Clement Attlee, subsequently elected Prime Minister of England, may be seen in the background between President Truman and Mr. Churchill. It was this conference which drafted the Potsdam Declaration calling upon Japan to choose between unconditional surrender or destruction — the terms of which were formally accepted by Japan aboard the U.S.S. Missouri 2 September 1945.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1945

Dear Colonel O'Laughlin:

The global war was won by Allied unity. We are determined that that unity shall continue in order to assure enduring peace. The terrible struggle which cost us and the other members of the United Nations so much of our finest blood and treasure, stirred humanity to its depths. As a natural consequence, old issues were revived and new ones created. To their adjustment we are addressing ourselves, and doing so with the realization that mutual dependence, understanding and tolerance must be the basis of our discussions, as they were of the common war effort. There is no doubt in my mind that the vital decisions the world is requiring will be made.

It is fortunate that as we are passing into the era of more deadly atomic and electronic weapons, there is not only amongst the United Nations the will to peace, but that they have devised a method and procedure to promote and protect it. In the United Nations Organization, the Charter of which I was glad to welcome and the Senate to ratify, we have an Agency charged with the duty of stopping aggression at its source, and of intervening by an international police force, if and when necessary, in disputes that might lead to war. It is an Agency also which through its Social and Economic Council will make for a wider distribution of the fruits of the earth, and thus improve the lot of mankind. Still in its formative stage, it already promises usefulness for the solution of problems that unilaterally approached might emphasize differences and thus provoke irritation in international relations. As we gain experience and as this Agency becomes more and more the means for peaceful settlements, farther and farther the idea of war as an instrument of policy will recede into the background of barbarism and savagery.

While we vision this fair prospect for the world, we cannot, our country never will, forget the magnificence and power which we, together with our Allies, developed and displayed in achieving victory. In our own case, our Armies, Fleets and Air Forces with unexcelled valor participated in crushing our foes, our farmers toiled to produce record breaking crops, and our labor and management cooperated to provide the huge quantities of munitions for our fighting men and also for our Allies. We became in fact the Arsenal of Democracy which President Roosevelt inspired. As I look back over the period of self-sacrifice which began for us at Pearl Harbor and ended with the surrender first of Germany and then of Japan, I see in it a Divine purpose to prevent the slavery of mankind, and to open the way to an era of peace in which the freedom loving peoples of the earth will vie with each other to raise the standards of living everywhere, to promote social justice, and to advance the arts and sciences to greater heights.

Very sincerely yours,

Harry S. Truman

Colonel John Callan O'Laughlin,
Publisher,
Army and Navy Journal,
Washington, D. C.

Army Signal Corps Photo

The late President Roosevelt at the Crimean meeting—the last of the Big Four conferences he was to attend. Left to right: Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, Secretary of State Stettinius (in foreground), Fleet Admiral E. J. King, General of the Army George C. Marshall, Ambassador Averill Harriman, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, and President Roosevelt. The photograph was taken in the Livadia Palace, Crimea, Russia, 4 February 1945.

Franklin D. Roosevelt in History

by Robert E. Sherwood

War-time Director of Overseas Operations, Office of War Information*

ON 7 April 1945, five days before President Roosevelt's death, Walter Lippmann published a column on "The President as a Strategist," in which he wrote:

"He has served these [the vital interests of the United States] with audacity and patience, shrewdly and with calculation, and he has led this country out of the greatest peril in which it has ever been to the highest point of security, influence and respect which it has ever attained.

"If we do not recognize that he is a great war President, history will."

It is dangerous to anticipate history, which has a mind of its own and makes up that mind in a manner which is not always predictable. But there is one fact about Franklin Delano Roosevelt of which we may be sure: no other individual in our history has left behind him so vast and varied a record of achievement for future historians to study and appraise.

Mr. Sherwood

It is our tendency now to make a sharp distinction between Mr. Roosevelt's domestic and foreign policies — between Mr. Roosevelt as author of the New Deal and Mr. Roosevelt as war leader. There are many who opposed him bitterly in the one capacity and supported him valiantly in the other. It is my belief, however, that history will not draw this sharp distinction.

For it will be evident that Mr. Roosevelt could not have rallied the nation to action as he did in 1940 and 1941, he could not have inspired the American people to work and fight as we had never worked and fought before, had he not previously established himself firmly as one who could be trusted to understand and to champion the people's most profound interests.

It will be evident that the first great weapon that we had in fighting this war was President Roosevelt's

(*Continued on page* 192)

*Mr. Sherwood, distinguished American playwrite, winner of the gold medal for drama, National Institute of Arts and Letters, and thrice Pulitzer Prize winner, is a veteran of World War I and contributed immeasurably to the winning of World War II through his work with the OWI which brought him in close contact with the late President Roosevelt.

The Root of Our Victory

by the Honorable Robert P. Patterson

Secretary of War

THE peace and world leadership we now enjoy are the entire nation's accomplishment, the product of a vast effort by every element of the American people. The singleness of purpose that for forty-four months characterized our national life is the root of our victory.

In its attainment the skills of factory and farm and office were pooled with the prowess of our Armed Forces. Heroism and sacrifice on the battlefields were complemented by steadfast endeavor on the home front. Combat might was forged and reinforced by production power. National unity was the keynote of our war effort. In our long history, no greater unity has ever been achieved.

Secretary Patterson

Had it been otherwise, we might still be engaged in bloody struggle and far from victory. For the assault launched against us was a coordinated global drive whose terrible impact no halfway, partial measures could withstand. To the most fearful menace we had ever faced, only the mightiest response could be adequate. Our answer was the total conversion of our country from a peace to a war economy and the development of the largest military establishment in our history.

The war mission of that establishment has been successfully ended. But two immediate major tasks remain. First, we must so order our military strength as to assure maintenance of peace in the conquered countries. Second, we must to the maximum extent and with the maximum speed demobilize an Army that on V-J Day exceeded eight million men.

The first task, the occupation of conquered countries, is of primary importance. Nothing can be permitted to jeopardize the victory we have won. Firm military control over the enemy must be continued until disarmament is complete and the industry and civil institutions of the defeated nations are purged of menace to world peace.

The occupation force must be adequate if the job is to be done effectively. The duration of our occupation depends on how long it takes to complete the job. Any shirking of our occupation responsibility will be a repetition of the fatal mistake committed after the first World War.

The second task—demobilization of the Army—is being pressed with all the vigor at our command. In immensity, it is comparable to the initial deployment of our armies across the globe. But in availability of time, it is a far more stupendous undertaking, for we have pledged ourselves to accomplish in less than a year what originally required four.

When Japan surrendered, we had overseas in excess of five million men. They were stationed in Europe and Africa, in Greenland and the South Atlantic islands and the Antilles, in the Middle East, throughout the Pacific from New Zealand to the Aleutians, on the frontier of Japan and in the heart of China.

Overnight, the War Department's primary personnel mission changed from redeployment to demobilization of those millions. Plans already prepared were immediately put in execution.

The World War I rate of returns to civil life has been far exceeded, although at that time the mass of our troops was located either at home or in a relatively limited European area. But an efficient and orderly thoroughness in demobilization procedures has not been sacrificed to save time. While we have cut the separation period from the World War I average of 18 days after arrival at the separation center to 48 hours, no soldier is released until his records are brought up to date, he has passed a rigid physical examination and is fully informed of his rights as a veteran. Demobilization is speedy, but it is not slipshod.

In order that the largest number of combat veterans may be released without cutting our total force below the minimum required to meet our military obligations, the War Department is now vigorously prosecuting a recruiting drive for volunteers.

However, voluntary enlistments alone are not likely to prove sufficient. If we are to fulfill our goal of more than 7 million discharges in the period between VE Day and 1 July 1946, Selective Service inductions must continue. Otherwise, men who have already risked their lives in combat will have to remain in the Army while those who have not served at all are exempted from any military duty.

The two tasks of occupation and demobilization are

(*Continued on page* 188)

The Most Powerful Navy in the World

by the Honorable James Forrestal

Secretary of the Navy

BY the time Japan signed the surrender documents aboard the USS Missouri, the United States had built the largest and the most powerful Navy in the history of the world.

Consider the immensity of what it means to say the biggest Navy in the history of the world:

By the summer of 1945, throughout seas and stations all over the earth, nearly three and a half million people were wearing the familiar U. S. Navy uniform. Millions of workers at home were backing them up with war goods.

During the war years the Navy used 62,000 tactical combat planes — fighters, dive bombers, torpedo bombers, patrol bombers and scout planes —against three major enemies.

The Navy had amassed a hundred thousand ships of all types by the time the Japanese officers aboard the Missouri inscribed their characters on the peace treaty. To gain some visual picture of a hundred thousand: if each letter on this page were one ship, to represent the number of ships in the United States fleets would require eight pages of this fine print. Those vessels ranged from the 36-foot nine-ton LCVP landing craft to the 45,000 ton battlewagons and carriers of the Iowa and Midway classes.

Secretary Forrestal with U. S. Marines on beachhead at Iwo Jima.

These figures indicate the weight behind the Navy's combat punches. Even for a nation accustomed to operating on a vast scale, the figures are part of an astounding record.

It was late in 1943 that our Pacific Naval forces began most effectively to reveal this growing might by dictating their own striking terms, rather than depending on fast surprise attacks upon the enemy. By the middle of 1944 the Pacific war was taking the aggressive form it was to follow and, half-way across the world, the European war was about to reach a climax. From there on, events moved rapidly:

June 6, 1944—American and British Fleets put our Armies ashore in France.

June 15, 1944—We land on Saipan, 12,000 miles from France.

June 19-20, 1944—The Fifth Fleet drives the Jap Imperial Fleet from the Philippine Sea.

June 25, 1944—Our Western Task Force in Europe bombards shore batteries commanding Cherbourg harbor.

July 21, 1944—Naval surface bombardment of Guam (beginning June 16) and coordinated air strikes are climaxed by amphibious invasion and reoccupation of the island.

July 24, 1944—We land on Tinian in the Marianas north of Guam.

August 15, 1944—The battle of Normandy is backed up by amphibious invasions along the coast of southern France.

September 9-10, 1944—Fast carrier force of the Third Fleet makes first strike upon Philippines at Mindanao.

September 15, 1944 — We land Marine forces on Peleliu in the Palaus and on Morotai several hundred miles to the southwest.

September 17, 1944 — Army troops are put ashore on Angaur Island, six miles south of Peleliu.

September 23, 1944 — We land on Ulithi, halfway between the Palaus and Guam.

September 28, 1944—We enlarge our hold on the Palaus with landings on Ngesebus.

October 20, 1944—Constant carrier attacks by the Third Fleet upon the Philippines, beginning September 9, are followed by an amphibious assault upon Leyte.

November 5-25, 1944—Third Fleet continues to soften the Japs' hold on the Philippines by air strikes on Luzon and Ormoc Bay, the west coast of Leyte.

December 7, 1944 — On the third anniversary of Pearl Harbor we land another fighting force on the shores of Ormoc Bay.

December 8-27, 1944—We continue air and surface attacks on Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands far to the northeast.

December 15, 1944—Third Fleet carrier attacks on Luzon during this period accompany an amphibious landing of U. S. forces on Philippine Mindoro.

January 3-4, 1945—Fast carrier force planes of the Third Fleet pound Formosa off the China mainland and Okinawa in the Nansei Shoto (or Ryukyu) Islands below Japan.

January 5, 1945—Our surface forces reach up near Paramushiru to bombard this northernmost Jap stronghold, while air and surface attacks continue against the Volcano and Bonin Islands south of Japan.

January 9, 1945 — We land on Luzon at Lingayen Gulf.

January 12-16, 1945 — Third Fleet carriers move west for a strike against the China coast, hitting Hong Kong, Canton, Hainan, Amoy and Swatow, and thrust 3800 miles in the South China Sea to hit the French

(*Continued on page* 192)

Signal Corps Photo

The Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting on the fourth day of the Big Three conference in the Berlin area. Clockwise, from the left, they are: Maj. Gen Lauris Norstad, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, General of the Army George C. Marshall, Brig. Gen. Andrew J. McFarland (back of head just visible), Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Vice Adm. C. M. Cooke, jr., (back of head just visible), General Brehon Somervell, Rear Adm. H. A. Flanigan, Capt. C. J. Moore, USN; Lt. Gen. Sir Gordon McCready, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Marshal of the RAF Sir Charles Portal, Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay, Gen. L. C. Hellis, Brig. A. T. Cornwall-Jones, Col. Thomas Haddon (back to camera) and Lt. Gen. John E. Hull (back to camera).

Joint Chiefs of Staff — U. S. High Command

by Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, USN

Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

ON 14 January 1942, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff—the organization which was to direct the war operations of all our armed forces—was set up by oral instruction of the Commander in Chief, President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

At first the organization consisted of the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces. A secretariat and a working staff were drawn from all the services. In July of 1942 the President added his personal Chief of Staff as the senior member of the organization.

Fleet Admiral Leahy

This was the American High Command, charged by the President with the formulation of strategy, supervision of troop deployment and equipment, and general direction of all operations against the enemy. From this body, acting as a unit, came the war orders for all the forces . . . the designation of objectives to be taken and the basic orders for the employment of armies, navies and air forces.

Theater commands were established and theater commanders were clothed with full authority over all the army, navy and air forces assigned to them for operations. Functioning as a General Staff responsible to the Commander in Chief, and acting with his approval, the Joint Chiefs assembled the forces, named the strategic objectives, and designated the commanders to carry out the broad missions.

On 23 January 1942, by agreement between the American and British governments, the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization — consisting of the military chiefs of the two powers — was called into being to direct operations of the allied forces in the same manner as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had theretofore planned and directed the operations of the American forces.

These were the staff organizations which provided overall naval and military leadership in the vast war effort.

Training for Victory and for Peace

by General of the Army George C. Marshall

Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, 1 September 1939 to 19 November 1945

THE most lasting monument of the global war brought to a close by Japan's surrender will always be to me the magnificent performance of our citizen soldier. The men who fought our battles from December 1941 to September 1945 were drawn from every walk of life. Except for members of the National Guard already in Federal service and the comparatively small number of inductees undergoing training when war came, these men had received no preparation for the terrible ordeal into which the nation was plunged by the Pearl Harbor attack. That the average American reacted so remarkably in battle, often rising to the heights of undiluted courage, is a tribute to the basic strength and adaptability of our peoples.



General of the Army Marshall

No amount of native courage, however, could have achieved the success won by our troops in battle without thorough training. Individual and team instruction gave our men not only the knowledge of how to perform the multitude of tasks incident to combat in the air or on the ground but the self-confidence to carry them out amidst the confusion and hazards of battle. The efficiency of our field forces was solidly founded on training doctrines learned in classroom, camp and maneuver area. Throughout the war the training technique was in process of being perfected, not only by Army personnel but by civilian specialists called in to speed up and intensify the process. In our service schools prior to the war and more recently under the stress of war there were developed expeditious methods and techniques in teaching which played an important part in the rapid development of our forces and will, I believe, have a definite effect on the general art of teaching in this country.

An Army today is a complicated structure, and instruction must be provided for a wide variety of jobs. Initially, all men should receive the same basic training. In the early weeks the individual aptitudes and skills would be measured as a basis for a suitable Army assignment. The soldier would then enter into the specialized duties of the branch of the Army to which he had been assigned. The first training phase in his new assignment would be concerned with individual instruction for the specific job he was expected to perform. After he had mastered his own part, he would engage in small-unit training, learning how to work as a member of a team. He would then move on to the next phase in which the small-unit activities would be fitted into the larger machine later to be combined with the functions of other arms. In the final phase, the unit would participate in extended field exercises under simulated campaign conditions.

The new weapons — atomic explosives, supersonic rockets —and those even more devastating that unquestionably will come in the years immediately ahead make the careful preparatory training of all personnel the more imperative.

The old frontiersman was skilled with the rifle, the tomahawk and the knife. Self-survival forced him to a state of constant training. The "minute-man" owned and knew his rifle intimately. But what he had of rifle skill and patriotism was frequently canceled by lack of discipline and ability or willingness to operate in a team. The development of artillery introduced a trifle of mathematics into the technique of battle. The telephone, the ground wireless, the airplane, and the machine weapons of the last war further complicated the business of developing a team. Along came the motor vehicle, the mechanized car and tank introducing an additional technique of immense importance in campaign. Air and anti-air equipment vastly complicated the requirements. Radar became a highly specialized factor in the efficiency of air, ground, and naval forces, and while the scientist labored with us, the individual officer or soldier had to be trained to handle elaborate and sensitive equipment. Cooperation between air and ground forces became a highly complicated and sensitive business. And now the atomic age has arrived.

It is clearly the lesson of history that the more complicated the techniques of war the more intensive must be the training. It also seems clear to me that the more sudden, far-reaching and devastating the weapon the greater the necessity for highly trained units ready to react with speed and power.

If Universal Military Training is approved by the people, for the first time in our existence this country

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Sailing to Tokyo's Door

by Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN

Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations during World War II

IN the early days of the war, waters almost 5,000 miles from Japan were dangerous to American shipping. The closing months of the war brought the seas under complete Allied control. Our ships could and did steam within a few miles of the Japanese home islands to shell shore installations, while the few remaining units of the enemy fleet hid in the recesses of the Inland Sea, waiting for certain destruction.

The first half of 1945 saw the reconquest of Luzon, the end of organized resistance on Okinawa and the securing of Iwo Island. The Okinawa and Iwo campaigns, together with the operations of the fast carrier task forces, carried the tactical war to Japan's home waters. In carrying the attack to the very portals of Japan, land, sea and air operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas took a number of "firsts" — all of which were significant milestones leading to the signing of surrender terms on the USS Missouri in early September.

In mid-February, Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's task force attacked installations in the Tokyo area — the first attack on Japan by our fast carrier task forces.

Fleet Admiral King

For the first time, our fleet was pitted against the main body of the land-based Jap air forces for three months off Okinawa. From 26 March for the 88 days following, fast carrier task forces operated continuously in enemy waters. The part played by the Navy's proximity fuse has since been announced. Shells with "radio brains" helped stop Japan's dying attempt to halt the advance of the fleet—the Kamikaze attacks.

By 13 July, the United States Fleet chalked up another stellar "first"—the first surface attack on Japan since 1863. United States and British Fleet units ranged along the coast of Japan practically unchallenged. Only a spattering of fire from shore batteries opposed the 16-inch guns of the fleet.

The remnants of the Jap fleet were sought out and destroyed in the Inland Sea earlier in the month of July, and massive sea and aerial fleets hammered the home islands from the Kuriles to Kyushu, pouring ton after ton of high explosive shells into Jap shore installations.

This strike climaxed an unprecedented six months in the Pacific war. From 1 January 1945, 5,747 Japanese aircraft were reported destroyed — a total in less than six months nearly as high as the entire number destroyed in all of 1944. Three hundred and eighty Jap ships were sunk by surface and air forces, and 212 additional Jap vessels sunk by submarines. Major carrier attacks on the Japanese empire took place in February, March, May and June, during which time there were 14 complete days of attack from aircraft of the fleet.

The blockade of Japan was extended to the supply routes between Japan and the Asiatic mainland—the last source of supply open to the Home Islands. These supply routes were vital to Japan. A steady flow of raw materials—coal, iron and cotton—had to be maintained from Manchuria, North China and Korea to the industrial cities of Japan. But the waters through which these sea routes passed were covered regularly by our patrolling aircraft of the Fleet Air Wing. The East China Sea and the waters of southwest Japan soon became a graveyard for Jap ships, and sea traffic moving through those areas was reduced to a trickle. Japan's factories became inoperative, not only from bombing alone, but also for lack of materials.

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Deutsche Gasolin plant at Dollbergen, Germany.

B-29's over Singapore base.

Bombed out factory in Japan.

The Army Air Forces in Global Air War

by General of the Army H. H. Arnold, USA
Commanding General Army Air Forces

IN the early months of World War II, the Luftwaffe loomed as the perfect instrument of modern aerial warfare. Certainly it provided the blitz for Hitler's spectacular series of blitzkriegs. But essentially, as we suspected from the beginning, the Luftwaffe was built along obsolete or obsolescent lines. Even while it was sweeping into control of the skies over Europe, its days were numbered. Its pilots were well-trained and courageous, its equipment well-engineered and constructed, its maintenance superb. Fortunately for us, it lagged behind in basic principles.

In its air doctrine, the German High Command had advanced well beyond World War I, but it never did catch up with World War II. The Luftwaffe was equipped merely to spearhead and to *support* the Wehrmacht. Its formidable striking power was frittered away in sporadic ground-gaining campaigns. Its strategic arm was too weak to exploit the advantage gained at Dunkerque. Its fighter command was never sufficiently centralized or independent to be effective in tactical operations. And we left them no time to correct their mistakes as they went along.

General of the Army Arnold

Our principles of strategic bombardment had been a long time in development. The first B-17 was airborne in 1935. We had long known that large fleets of heavily armed airplanes, equipped for precision bombing, would be needed to gain mastery of the skies, and when the time came, our own high command implemented this conviction. We knew that after we had shattered Germany's war economy, collapse of its military forces would be a matter only of time and of relentless pressure by the Allied ground forces. The virtually unanimous testimonies of German commanders, statesmen and industrialists have amply borne out this premise; actually, the devastation our armies found in Germany would have been convincing enough evidence.

In the employment of our tactical air power, we quickly arrived at an equally sound set of basic principles. First, we neutralized the enemy's air power by hitting his airdromes or taking out his planes in combat. Next, we isolated battle areas of our own choice by cutting enemy supply and communications lines, such as bridges and railroads; our trade name for this process is interdiction. Finally, our air forces cooperated in the closest possible ways with our advancing or defending ground troops.

This sounds almost neat enough to be a formula. But, as I cannot repeat too often, there are no formulas in modern warfare. Flexibly and resourcefully applied, however, the principles of our air war have proved their soundness not only in Europe but in the long drive of our forces from Australia to Japan and in the superb performance of our B-29's against that country.

The fanatical Japanese would never have offered to accept the crushing terms of the Potsdam ultimatum merely because the odds against them had rendered victory of any sort impossible. The Japanese Army, although it had been hurt, was still a powerful force capable of inflicting heavy casualties on an invading force. The Kamikaze Corps had shown its potentialities in the Philippines and Okinawa campaigns; it was preparing for an even greater effort against our amphibious invading forces. Yet the Japanese acknowledged defeat; they acknowledged it primarily because air attacks, both actual and potential, had destroyed their capabil-

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War and Postwar Fiscal Policy

by the Honorable Fred M. Vinson

Secretary of the Treasury

THE costliest war in history, both in money and in destruction of life and property, has at last been won. The tasks of demobilization and reconversion, which will also be costly, remain to be completed. That, in a nutshell, is the situation which, at the invitation of your Editor, I have to report on the activities of your Government in financing the war.

This war has cost incomparably more than any previous war. Nor is the expense yet at an end. Although war expenditures began to taper off before VJ-Day, expenditures connected with demobilization and reconversion, for veterans' benefits, and for interest on the debt incurred in the war, will keep the level of total expenditures high for some time to come.



Harris and Ewing

Secretary Vinson

You will get a good idea of the magnitude of the Government's financial operations during the war when I tell you that total expenditures for war and war-related activities from 30 June 1940—a date which may conveniently be taken as marking the beginning of the defense program—through the end of the current fiscal year on 30 June 1946, will amount to about $340 billion, and that expenditures for all purposes will amount to about $390 billion. About $170 billion, or 44 percent of total expenditures, we estimate, will have been met from taxes and other nonborrowing receipts. The balance will have been borrowed. When this issue of the ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL appears, the Victory Loan, the last large-scale borrowing appeal to the people, will be drawing to a close. By the end of the fiscal year next June, the public debt probably will stand at about $275 billion.

When my predecessor, Secretary Morgenthau, reported to you a year ago, he described the manner in which war finance policies had been directed towards maintaining economic stability during the war. The problem of stability is still with us; and it will continue with us in the years to come. However, instead of a problem of restraining the upward pressure on prices exerted by aggregate incomes approximately double the value of goods and services available for purchase, it may in the future become a problem of making full use of our productive power, including labor power.

For the time being, tax rates continue high; and we must appeal for continued bond purchases from the savings of individuals, both through the payroll savings plan and in the Victory Loan. As matters now stand, however, the Victory Loan promises to be the last such drive. I have recommended such tax reductions to Congress as seem compatible at this time with the budgetary situation and the maintenance of economic stability. We must bear in mind the fact that in fighting this war we have incurred obligations to our fighting men, and to those who have lent their money, which will necessitate a level of expenditures after the war higher than those of the prewar period. This will mean that taxes must be higher than before the war.

Although taxes must remain high, there will be improvements in our tax system, such as simplification and the elimination of inequities. Tax burdens must be equitably distributed among all the people in accordance with the taxpayer's ability to pay. Tax programs must be integrated, moreover, with an over-all fiscal policy designed to prevent inflation and deflation.

An important part of this over-all fiscal policy will be the management of the public debt. As I have said, this debt will amount, as we now see the situation, to about $275 billion next 30 June. The interest charge on this debt, at present average rates, will be about $5.5 billion. It will be desirable, in order to minimize the burden of this interest charge on the economy, to continue a policy of low interest rates. Such a policy will also stimulate private investment and thus help to promote the full utilization of our productive power, and that, in turn, will help to lighten the burden of the debt, for it is easier to pay our fixed charges out of a large income than out of a small one.

Another aspect of debt management which will help to maintain economic stability is the fact that most of the Government securities now outstanding have been tailored to meet the special needs of their holders. Those to whom liquidity is important hold securities payable on demand or within short periods of time.

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The Department Of Justice in World War II

by the Honorable Tom C. Clark

Attorney General of the United States

AT first blush one does not think of the activities of the Department of Justice as having any direct bearing on the prosecution of the war. This first impression is readily dissipated, however, by a consideration of the work of the Department. The functions of the Department of Justice have two aspects. In its first aspect, it is the chief law office of the Government. It handles all civil litigation to which the Government is a party, conducts all criminal prosecutions in the Federal courts and gives legal advice to Government officials. In its second aspect, the Department of Justice is a great administrative branch of the Government, comprising the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Prisons, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. It is necessary to consider these two phases separately in weighing the contribution of the Department of Justice to the prosecution of the war.

Attorney General Clark

Of all of the activities of the Department of Justice, those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had the closest and most direct connection with the victory over the Axis. It has been frequently and accurately observed that the outstanding work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has prevented all enemy inspired sabotage during World War II, and has maintained enemy espionage in this country under surveillance and control. The Bureau has in effect been the army on the home front, and John Edgar Hoover, the Director of the Bureau, has been its commanding officer.

Some time before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Bureau undertook a detailed survey of all war plants for the purpose of installing a proper plant protection system in each of them. This stupendous task was successfully accomplished and did much toward preventing any possible sabotage.

The history of the capture of the eight saboteurs who were surreptitiously and mysteriously landed on our shores from a German submarine, is too well known to justify recounting at length here. This exploit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation reads like a fantastic episode out of a novel of international intrigue, but it actually happened. Another achievement of a similar kind was the operation of a clandestine German shortwave radio station used as a means of communication between the German espionage ring in the United States and Germany. This station was operated by Bureau agents for almost two years. During all this time German agents reported to this station thinking that they were furnishing their information to representatives of the Fatherland. The operators at the station in turn transmitted the reports to Germany after suitably editing them.

These romantic accomplishments of the Bureau have a glamour that catches the eye and seem even more fanciful than the product of a writer of mystery stories. Many other things were done, however, that were less spectacular and attracted less attention, but were of vast importance in the prosecution of the war. Among them were the investigation of violations of the Selective Training and Service Act and of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the apprehension of deserters and escaped prisoners of war; and the investigation of claims for deferment on the part of conscientious objectors, as well as numerous other activities of less note.

With uncanny prescience Director Hoover prepared the Bureau for World War II long before the dastardly attack on Pearl Harbor. Under his masterly guidance the Federal Bureau of Investigation had compiled a list of dangerous enemy aliens in this country. Strangely enough, some persons who were still lacking in foresight criticized the Bureau for undertaking this activity. Its value, however, was demonstrated on 7 December 1941. On that evening within a few hours after the Japanese had struck, President Roosevelt issued oral direction to Mr. Hoover to round up all dangerous enemy aliens. By morning over 1200 of them were under arrest and within a few days several hundred more were apprehended. It should be noted that these arrests were not executed by means of dragnet raids. Each person taken into custody was arrested individually, because his name was on the list of dangerous aliens, and because he had been thoroughly investigated long previously and his record was well known.

Mr. Hoover as the Director of the Bureau is entitled

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Soldiers in Overalls

by the Honorable Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior

THOUGH relatively few men and women of the Interior Department wore the uniform during World War II, all were in the fight. They did an outstanding job.

Before sunset on Pearl Harbor day, the employees of the Interior Department were geared for action. All bureaus were instructed that very day to go on a war basis and they remained on duty till the last shot was fired. In fact, they are still on the job, working to conserve the resources of the Nation.

Here is part of the story; but only a part;

The Interior Department registers the heart-beat of America. For the better part of a century this important unit of Government has been custodian of the Nation's natural resources. Wherever they are, whatever they are—on or under the earth—the vast resources that belong to the people of the United States are cared for by experts in the Interior Department. This is true in peacetime as well as in war.

Secretary Ickes

As a global war, the late unlamented hostilities called for everything on the earth, under the earth, or above the earth — including helium gas for balloons and lighter-than-air fighter machines. To provide for the Nation's fighting machine, Interior Department employees played an active part in the mammoth program for winning the War.

Therefore, the Department of Interior went into action as it never did before. There was plenty to do and the Interior Department did all that it could.

Soldiers, Sailors and Marines, of course, did the shooting, supported by Waves, Wacs and Lady Leathernecks. But back of all of these brigades stood the Interior Department pitching all of the materials that go to make successful war possible — coal, iron ore, zinc, petroleum, magnesium, mercury, tungsten, manganese, bauxite, vanadium, food, and hydroelectric power—even maps to guide the fighting armies. In a literal sense, it was passing the ammunition.

First of all, the Army, the Navy and the Marine Corps had to have food. If they didn't eat they coudn't fight. From where would they get the food? The farms of America, of course; but there were shortages. So other acres had to be pressed into service. The Department of the Interior has charge of millions of acres that usually lie idle for lack of water. These were put into service. By improving the Federal Grazing Lands the meat production of America was stepped up—by millions of pounds. By planting beans and such vegetables the yield from other acres was increased. All went into the general armed food basket. Potatoes and beans, tomatoes and other foodstuffs were rushed to the front to fill the soldiers' stomachs. The vitamins came from foods grown on irrigated land supervised by experts of the Bureau of Reclamation.

Then there was the Bureau of Mines and its work. No man with a bayonet ever worked harder than some of the scientific experts hard put to it to produce those metals and minerals of which there was a dearth. America had come to depend upon outside sources for many of these materials. Tin was imported. In fact, there are no tin mines in America worthy of the name. Manganese was scarcer than Japanese silk in a nylon factory. As for alunite, beryllium, boron, lithium, mica, steatitic talc and vanadium, they were all on the scarcity list.

Not only were they on the scarcity list, some of them were so rare that their very names were not known to the average American. When anyone mentioned terms like alunite and boron it sounded like a high-school cheer. These, however, were the materials that had to be produced and passed along to the war workers. Whatever was done had to be done fast. These were the materials essential to winning the war. Essential? Without them the war would have been lost. So the Bureau of Mines went into action just as soldiers and sailors and marines dashed up beachheads or plunged into foxholes, so the scientists started out and kept on searching for minerals.

It took more than the Bureau of Mines. Experts there called for help from the Geological Survey. Between them they delivered the goods.

The first object, of course, was to find out what Uncle Sam had in the way of natural resources. This was generally known; but only generally. Now the specific hunt began—and the men with technological knowledge were not long in coming up with the answers. Their exploration was fast and to the point. They got what they wanted, though they had to search every State in the Union, Alaska—and even the South American republics; fortunately working with us under the

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Agriculture in the War Effort

by the Honorable Clinton P. Anderson

Secretary of Agriculture

AGRICULTURE'S task in the war effort, though perhaps less dramatic than that of many other war industries, required just as much science, skill, toil, and ingenuity. Most of the crops required were the familiar crops—the cereal, livestock, and dairy products and the well-known fruits and vegetables. Some farm enterprises, such as various oil crops, had to be expanded from small foundations; but in general the watchword was expansion rather than newness. Agriculture had no conversion to accomplish as total as that achieved by the auto industry. Nevertheless, it had a tremendous assignment—that of enabling the Nation to feed its fighters and its civilians at record levels and at the same time to provide huge quantities of food for its Allies. Agriculture had to do this with a farm working force reduced below the prewar level by 10 percent, and with a scarcity of machinery and other supplies.

Secretary Anderson

Food production in 1944 was 38 percent above the prewar level. But increases for the most needed foods far exceeded the averages. Hog production reached a peak 77 percent above pre-war. Production of chicken meat increased by more than 50 percent and egg production by more than 40 percent. When war in the Pacific cut off our source of imported oils, farmers went to work to make up this deficit by increased domestic production. For example, they increased the acreage of soybeans for oil production by 240 percent. Agriculture could easily have achieved these increases with unlimited supplies of labor, machinery, and other supplies. But labor and supplies were scarce and farmers had to overcome their handicaps by greater resourcefulness and longer hours and harder work.

In the war years weather conditions were generally favorable for crops; yet it was not primarily the weather that brought about the wartime increase. Not more than one-fourth of the increase can be attributed to better than average weather. The wartime increase in the farm output was largely the result of large feed reserves available at the beginning of the war, greater individual effort, and improvement in farm practices.

Technical advancement during the war brought further shifts from animal to tractor power, more planting of better crop varieties, greater use of lime and fertilizer, and better feeding of livestock. One item is typical: in 1944 the farmers used 85 percent more commercial fertilizer than in pre-war years, and would have used still more had more been available. Simultaneously, they expanded their acreage of winter cover crops, adopted other conservation practices, launched broad shifts from grass hay to legume hay, and advanced animal nutrition through scientific balancing of rations.

This tremendous farm production was for a market in which Government was by far the most important purchaser. Besides supplying the best fed army that ever marched and the best fed fleet that ever sailed, Government purchasing covered huge shipments for our allies. In 1945, lend-lease shipments ran into the billions of pounds in at least five categories — meats, dairy products, eggs, fats and oils, and grains and grain products. Moreover, Government buying of munitions influenced the domestic civilian food demand, through the extent to which its payments worked through to all groups in the community and showed up as consumer buying power. Of all foods and nonfood products together, the Government at the height of the war effort was taking more than half the Nation's output. Hence, directly and indirectly, it was the principal factor in the demand for agricultural commodities.

Government buying absorbed directly about 20 percent of the Nation's food supply during the war. All the rest went to United States civilians, whose supply of food per capita was higher than in pre-war years. In fact, it continues higher, in spite of the fact that earlier in 1945 we had acute shortages of a few commodities such as meat, sugar, and fats and oils. Throughout the war period and up to now, the civilian supply of essential nutrients has been adequate and indeed liberal. Civilians have not been able to buy all they would have liked and would have been able to buy; in fact with their enhanced buying power they could have purchased the entire food output and in the absence of rationing might have done so in most products. But national nutrition was better during the war years than before the war.

American agriculture came through the war strengthened for production. With weather no better

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The Department of Commerce in the War

by the Honorable Henry A. Wallace

Secretary of Commerce

VIRTUALLY all of the facilities of the Department of Commerce were employed during the war to aid the industrial and military drive towards victory. Many of the bureaus worked directly with the Armed Services, and more than 5,000 of the wartime employees of the Department were in uniform.

The Bureaus of the Department which aided the war effort include the National Bureau of Standards, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Weather Bureau, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Civil Aeronautics Administration, National Inventors Council, Bureau of the Census, the Inland Waterways Corporation, and the Patent Office.

Secretary Wallace

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS:

At the peak of its activities more than 90 per cent of the work of the greatly expanded staff of the National Bureau of Standards was devoted to projects assigned by the Army and Navy and other war agencies.

These projects were almost infinite in variety. They ranged from the development of the radio proximity fuse to special types of paper for military maps and for preserving goods in transit to the war zones all over the world.

While a large number of scientists assisted in the development of the atomic bomb, top flight members of the staff of the Bureau of Standards were engaged on this project from its inception. Some 60 members of the Bureau Staff participated in this work.

Among the many other war-essential research and development aids extended by the Bureau were:

Development of optimum fuel for aircraft
Development work on the famous bazooka
Improvements in aircraft lighting
Testing millions of quartz crystals for use in producing radio oscillators
Plating of metals to reduce wear
Making light storage batteries of aircraft effective at very low temperatures
Improving the corrosion resistance of various light metals, particularly magnesium
Mildew proofing of cloth, shoe soles and other military supplies
Development of heat-resisting ceramic coatings for high-temperature metal
Production of large quantities of optical glass of the highest quality

COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY:

The close relationship between the Coast and Geodetic Survey and the Nation's land, sea and air forces during the war is most striking. When our naval and military forces re-entered Philippine waters they had available excellent charts which were the results of surveys made by the Coast and Geodetic Survey over a period of 40 years. These charts—the only adequate ones available for the Southwest and Western Pacific at the outbreak of war—made possible the preparation of the special types of landing charts and related information needed in amphibious operations.

Millions of charts of coastal waters were prepared for the vast Pacific invasion fleets; millions of aeronautical charts were made available; tide and current information was assembled; and magnetic and seismologic studies of a confidential nature were made for the Navy Department and new instrumental equipment developed.

Tide predictions for certain Pacific island areas with a remarkable degree of accuracy were prepared for the armed services by using German records made at the time of their occupancy of the Mariana and Marshall Islands and data obtained from Japanese sources.

Predictions for 650 beaches along the Chinese and Japanese coast were prepared for the armed forces many months in advance of the surrender by Japan.

THE WEATHER BUREAU:

Many investigations in weather and climate, of primary importance to war plans and tactical operations, were completed by the Weather Bureau during the war.

In general, the activities of the Bureau contributed directly or indirectly to the war effort through services rendered to war industries, flight training schools, military air transport and a large number of other programs.

Specifically, the Weather Bureau furnished at the request of the armed services:

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War Functions of the Department of Labor

by the Honorable L. B. Schwellenbach

Secretary of Labor

THERE is an old story about a small boy who sat down to write a 500-word theme on "The World and Its Contents." In attempting to summarize the wartime functions of the Department of Labor I feel a little like that boy.

To begin with, these ramifying activities were mainly superimposed on the regular work of the Department. In some cases new personnel was added to do the job, in others existing staff budgeted their time to include the special studies, investigations and surveys that wartime needs developed.

Secretary Schwellenbach

Fundamentally this work fell into two distinct categories and called upon two different sets of facilities. One might be termed a fact finding function and developed largely upon the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The other was an extended and continuing job of inspection carried on in behalf of several war agencies by the Wage and Hour Division and other Department bureaus.

During its 60-year history the Bureau of Labor Statistics has become the Government's principal fact-finding agency in the field of labor economics. The data which BLS gathers are the vital statistics of our economy. Facts are the Bureau's stock-in-trade. Whether it is nationwide figures on factory employment and wage rates, the number of man-hours needed to build a battleship, or monthly data on retail prices, BLS has them.

The Bureau's figures on living costs are well known, but few people realize that these figures, together with BLS data on wholesale prices, were the foundation of the price controls set up by OPA. The Bureau's data on employment, wages, hours, and working conditions supplied many war agencies with essential current information and also revealed important trends that developed as our complex economy geared itself for an almost miraculous production of war materials.

Since the beginning of the defense program, a continuous analysis has been carried on with respect to labor requirements for war production and the changes in employment in all other components of the economy. This demanded new techniques of estimating future labor requirements based upon official war production schedules. BLS carried on this work in cooperation with and assisted by appropriate war agencies.

This thumb-nail account of the Bureau omits far more than it includes and the same can be said for the sketch of the Wage and Hour Division which follows. Having one of the largest peacetime inspection forces in the Government, this Division made a vital contribution by its inspection work for several war agencies. It was Wage-Hour men who made the original tire inspection for the OPA. For the War Production Board the Division carried out the Production Requirement Plan Audits and later inspections under the Controlled Materials Plan helped the WPB channel critical war stocks into vital production. Wage-Hour inspectors, for example, found a shipbuilding firm with enough of one type of steel for nearly ten years, and three and five year supplies of other critical items.

The Division also carried out an extensive inspection program for the War Manpower Commission to determine adherence to the regulations of that agency governing manpower utilization. But the largest and longest job was that performed for the War Labor Board.

As the first point of contact for employers and employees in maintaining compliance with the WLB stabilization policy, the Wage and Hour Division's participation is reflected by a few figures: From the start of the program in October 1942 through the fiscal year ending 30 June 1944, a total of 148,229 rulings were issued, more than 225,000 Form 10 applications were serviced and forwarded to the Board, and some 2,300,000 personnel interviews, telephone calls and letters were handled. In the last 12 months of this period Wage-Hour inspectors made 19,320 test checks and carried out 6,395 full investigations to determine compliance with the wage stabilization program.

Along with this special wartime activity, the Wage and Hour Division carried out its usual task of enforcement under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Despite a general belief that everybody got high wages, the war years brought an increase in the amount of restitution due under the Act's minimum wage and overtime provisions—with minimum wage violations affecting more than 100,000 workers last year.

The same Congress that created the Department of Labor, in 1913, authorized the Secretary to seek the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes. Last year

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Congress and the Navy

by the Honorable David I. Walsh

Chairman, Senate Naval Affairs Committee

MANY members of Congress did not subscribe to the belief held by many prior to the war that the United States could defeat Germany and Japan within a few months without exerting a tremendous effort, and without changing radically the relationship between the Congress and the Executive Branch of the Government.

In a report to the Senate in May 1940, the Committee on Naval Affairs stated that before we could carry on an effective war against Japan it would be necessary to increase our fleet and our merchant marine several fold and to establish additional Naval and Air bases in the Pacific. It pointed out that Japan was an insular nation, was vulnerable to attack from the sea, and predicted we could defeat Japan without actual military conquest. It asserted that in order to bring the war to a successful conclusion it would be necessary to vest almost dictatorial powers in the Executive Branch of the Government.

Senator Walsh

Throughout the war all requests made by the Navy for authorizations and funds were given prompt, serious, and sympathetic consideration. The Committees of Congress made an effort to scrutinize carefully all such requests in order to satisfy themselves that they were absolutely necessary for the prosecution of the war.

In many instances, however, the Committees gave the Department authority to proceed with such projects as it deemed necessary for the effective prosecution of the war. Looking back over this period it can now be seen that a considerable number of the authorizations granted were possibly desirable, but not actually essential.

That the Congress cooperated effectively with the Navy Department throughout the war is evidenced by the following excerpts from a letter dated 17 August 1945, which the Secretary of the Navy addressed to the Chairman of the Committee:

"The war against Japan has been brought to a successful conclusion; I wish to take this opportunity to say to you and the members of your committee that the Navy's great and memorable contribution to this result is due in no small part to the continuous cooperation, courtesy, understanding, and constructive criticism which we have had from your committee.

"I hold the belief that the cooperation of the Naval Affairs Committees in both House and Senate with the Navy Department constitutes one of the finest examples of teamwork between the Executive and Legislative departments of government in our history."

"Henceforth I shall carry with me, because of this experience, a renewed faith in the soundness and effectiveness of our institutions, even when they are exposed to such tremendous stresses and tensions as we have all been through in the last four years."

I feel quite sure the Congress will continue to support the Navy in the postwar period.

It will, however, have the time and the facilities to scrutinize more carefully the plans and the suggestions made by Naval officials than was possible during the war, and will be in a position to consider its own judgment as well as the judgment of Naval officials.

In war time some totalitarian, authoritative, and hasty procedures are essential. In the postwar period we must not make hasty decisions and must revert to our democratic procedures, in which the Congress, as representative of the people, is final authority.

Present plans for disposition of the Navy's post-war vessels are as follows:

Type or class	*Available (on hand, building, and authorized)*	*Postwar fleet*	*Surplus ships*
Combatants			
Battleships	24	18	6
Aircraft carriers (large)	3	3	0
Aircraft carriers	27	24	3
Aircraft carriers (light)	10	10	0
Aircraft carriers (escort)	80	79	1
Cruisers (large)	3	3	0
Cruisers (heavy)	33	31	2
Cruisers (light)	57	48	9
Destroyers	445	367	78
Destroyer escorts	363	300	63
Submarines	259	199	60
Total	1,304	1,082	222
Auxiliaries			
Mine vessels	595	405	190
Patrol vessels	1,179	401	778
Landing craft	3,331	1,220	2,111
Attack and high-speed transports and cargo vessels	439	256	183
Other auxiliaries	1,499	675	824
District craft	3,249	2,045	1,204
Total	10,292	5,002	5,290

Congress and Foreign Affairs

by the Honorable Sol Bloom

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives

MIGHTY events which marked a turning-point in the history of the world engaged the attention of Congress and the people in the year that is now closing. International problems of first importance thrust themselves upon the country. Empires collapsed, many nations were liberated, war criminals were placed on trial, fresh outbreaks and revolutions began; and to cap the climax, science discovered a force of nature so potent that, if wielded by murderous hands, it could obliterate humanity.

Representative Bloom

What a momentous year! Now the question is, what have we learned that will be useful in enforcing national policy? One of the most striking facts that emerges from our experience is the increased interest and participation by the people in so-called "foreign" affairs. The people realize more than ever before that "foreign" affairs are essentially "domestic" affairs also. Whatever affects the United States in its relations with other nations also affects every American citizen.

Because of this keener interest of the people in international affairs, Congress has been enabled to discharge its duties more effectively, and national policy has been more sharply defined. The people are more solidly behind their Government.

When the year opened, Congress was engrossed with plans for more intense war production. The Allied armies were thrusting into Germany, but victory was thought to be distant. MacArthur was fighting forward in the Philippines, Japan was beginning to feel the full weight of American bombs, and the nations were studying the peace proposals elaborated at Dumbarton Oaks. President Roosevelt was inaugurated for his fourth term and was preparing to meet Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin at Yalta. Although all allied nations foresaw the defeat of Germany and Japan, it was generally believed that the war would continue through 1946.

By April the situation had greatly changed. The masterly strategy of General Eisenhower and his Russian counterpart was hammering Germany to her knees, and by the end of the month the world's most execrated war criminal, Hitler, died by his own hand as he was trapped underground by the Russians surging into Berlin.

At that very moment the representatives of fifty nations were conferring in San Francisco on the formation of a new order for humanity, an order which would prevent wars and bring both security and prosperity to all nations. Germany was about to surrender; Iwo Jima had been taken, and Japan's downfall was plainly in sight. It was time to plan for world peace by international cooperation.

Looking both backward and forward, it is clear that the most momentous act of 1945 was the formation of the United Nations Charter. Not even the development of the atomic bomb was as important; for if this weapon is to serve and not destroy humanity, it must be through the agency of the United Nations Organization. Congress had provided means for developing the bomb, but it also had contemplated the creation of the new world order. At all times the national policy looking to international cooperation for peace and security was laid before Congress by President Roosevelt. Senators and Representatives participated as delegates to the San Francisco Conference. It is the crowning pride of my life that I was permitted to play a part, however modest, in the creation of the United Nations Charter. As to Congress, its most splendid action during 1945 was its approval of the Charter and its preparations for American participation in the new rule for world peace.

The confusion attending world reconstruction and rehabilitation obscures for the moment the majestic achievement of international union for peace. But as the years unroll it will be evident that this is the noblest manifestation of human solidarity that the world has ever seen. It will grow with the ages. No human power can now stop or divert the nations from accomplishing their will. They have acted; they have decided; the minds of men have met; and the Charter of Peace and Security is ordained and established.

Congress is now elaborating the legislation that will place American influence and armed force behind the United Nations Organization. This force will include the atomic bomb. Thus, in obedience to the people's command, the United States will share in the noble task of maintaining world peace. Through the clouds of current doubts and disturbances we can now clearly see a brighter future for humanity.

Congress and the Army

by the Honorable Andrew J. May

Chairman, Committee on Military Affairs, U. S. House of Representatives

WHEN a nation is engaged in war, it is the people of the country who must make the sacrifices which war entails. Their sons are sent to battle, their lives are dislocated, their purses foot the bills. When a free nation is faced with war, it is the people themselves who have a right to say whether war is to be entered upon and to approve of the sacrifices which are asked of them. For this reason our Constitution reposes in the Congress as representatives of the people the duty of deciding whether war shall be declared and of determining what burdens of manpower and of taxation shall be laid upon the shoulders of the nation. In the grave national emergency forced upon us by the aggressors of Germany and Japan, Congress resolutely faced its responsibility. Having authorized the declarations of war which the times demanded, it ungrudgingly provided the men and the money and other measures of support necessary to defense and victory.

Representative May

There have been instances in the previous history of the nation, in other wars, when Congress felt itself called upon to go further than this, and endeavored to take a hand in the immediate conduct of the war itself. The desire to do this is natural enough to some minds, and may seem to arise naturally out of the power of the purse. Its effect however was usually to cause confusion and create unnecessary difficulties for the trained military leaders who had first responsibility for the effective prosecution of the war. In this war, however, Congress never attempted to guide strategy or select military leaders. It demonstrated a commendable self-restraint in such matters thus encouraging confidence in the professional leadership of the armed forces. This negative action has itself been a great aid to the military leadership on the one hand and to the national morale on the other.

Congress was not unappreciative of the danger which threatened the United States as the European war deepened in intensity. On 16 September 1940, an act was passed "to provide for the common defense by increasing the personnel of the armed forces of the United States and providing for its training." This act laid the foundation of our military might in the struggle which was about to supervene. There was no precedent in our history for such an action when the nation was not actually at war. The act asserted that in a free society the obligation of military service should be shared generally in accordance with a fair system of selective compulsory military service. It commanded the registration of all male citizens of military age, and authorized the President to select and induct into the services such numbers of men as the national interest might require. This basic Selective Service Act was later modified to drop certain restrictions it had contained as to numbers, period of service, and the territory where inducted men might be required to serve. In all, the Congress passed seventeen laws between September 1940 and December 1944, looking toward the extension of its military forces and their improvement. Without these actions of Congress, sharply criticized by many at the time, we would have found ourselves engulfed in war without an army large enough to count in the struggle.

When the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, Congress acted with unhesitating celerity, in spite of the divisions which had up to that time made for national wavering of thought. On the next day, 8 December, the existence of a state of war with Japan was declared by an almost unanimous vote. Three days later, 11 December, a state of war with Germany and Italy was declared to exist, in response to their declarations of war on us, which had taken place in the meantime. Congress thus committed the American people to that full support of the war effort which was carried through to victory in 1945.

Wars are always costly not only in lives but in treasure; more so than ever in these days of "total war." Throughout the struggle, Congress never stinted the financial support which the military represented as necessary to victory, although the sums involved seemed astronomical compared with previous expenditures in our national history. Direct appropriations and contract authorizations for war activities totaled approximately $416,628,033,000, of which $222,624,420,000 was for the Army alone. These sums were voted by such overwhelming majorities as to be practically demonstrations of unanimous approval.

A singular instance of the trust with which the Congress left its responsibility for national expenditure in the hands of the military leaders, is the authorization of about $2,000,000,000 for an object which was not designated and of which few members of either

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Miracles Take Time

by Honorable Robert A. Lovett

Assistant Secretary of War for Air

WHAT has been termed "the miracle of American production" has obscured one of the most important lessons of the war. That lesson is, or should be, the importance of time. In no weapon is this more apparent than in aircraft, and in none is it more important.

Consider the following facts demonstrated in this war:

(a) There was no aircraft used in World War II by American Air Forces which was derived from designs later than 1940. In other words, our most modern aircraft at the end of the war arose out of designs, engineering, and scientific work performed at least 5 years previously. This is a fact of tremendous importance.

(b) There was no aircraft engine used in combat in this war, the design and engineering of which had not been started at least 5 years previously.

(c) In spite of sub-contracting and auxiliary suppliers, over 90% of airframes produced during the war came from the regular aircraft industry. It took between one and two years to get full production from auxiliary sources.

(d) The ability of our engineers and industry to maintain production while, at the same time, modifying the aircraft to incorporate "modern developments" gave us the needed edge for victory.

(e) The great developments in airframe and aircraft engine design made under the pressure of war necessity are still in the production stage and some are just about ready for combat use.

Assistant Secretary Lovett

The significance of these facts should be apparent. We are in the midst of a revolution in aircraft design, engineering and scientific developments. And while in the midst of this revolution we are faced with the monumental task of reconversion. No other industry faces anything like this problem in the same degree. Unless intelligent action is taken now the hundreds of millions of dollars of money and manhours poured into these developments will, in considerable part, be wasted as attention quite naturally shifts to the problem of restoring a peacetime economy.

It would seem, however, that a wise selection of these projects for continuation would improve and, perhaps, accelerate the necessary adjustment from a war to a peacetime production system. It would soften the shock of readjustment by permitting the retention of several thousand engineers and scientists on projects for which there is no normal peacetime substitute. More important, however, the national security would not suffer by postponing until a later time of crisis the completion of work which, even if it is not interrupted, will not bear fruit for from five to seven years hence.

If we bear in mind the well-established fact that it takes five years to design, build, test and produce a combat-worthy aircraft it stands to reason that our national safety in 1950 depends on what we do today. More important still, our national safety in 1965—when we are well into the period of diminishing safety and increasing likelihood of trouble — will depend on the instruments of national security authorized and started at least five years prior to that date and probably ten years previously.

This war was fought and won by two types of military power: one which used the conventional instruments of warfare known in the previous century — ground armies and surface navies—and the other the 20th Century weapon of airpower. Military experts and classicists were loud and positive in their statements that no firstclass power could be defeated except by the costly method of invasion and fighting one's way into the home territory. Yet Japan fell with her armies intact and without a hostile foot being set on her home islands. This was largely the result of the strategic use of airpower made possible by the superb teamwork of Army, Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard activities. Germany's collapse came as the result of several circumstances but, in the opinion of most of her leaders and of her industrialists, airpower was the decisive factor.

By the end of hostilities we had become the greatest air power in the world, yet the development and production cycle had been shortened very little even under the forced pressure of war. With the developments now in hand and not yet fully, or even partially, exploited in this war, it is apparent that, in the future, attack through the air is most to be feared. It can come with devastating suddenness. There is no known defense against such attack except the power of offense and immediate retaliation. The power to retaliate quickly enough depends on the existence at all

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Signal Corps Photos

Some of the many activities for which the Army Ground Forces prepared U. S. Army troops. Left—M36 tank destroyer fires its 90 mm gun pointblank at a Nazi pillbox to clear a path through a side street in Brest. Center—A rifleman fires from behind the debris of a bombed building. Right—An 8-inch howitzer battery emplaced on Leyte Island.

Army Ground Forces—World War II

by General Jacob L. Devers, USA

Commanding General, Army Ground Forces

THE atomic bombs of 6 and 9 August, with their world-shattering implications, initially cast doubt on any future function of the ground forces. Their sky-blasting devastation seemed to dwarf all ideas of earthly conflict.

Yet it is now suspected that Japan was already near the point of collapse through our sea, air and ground advances and that her capitulation was merely hurried by the new weapon.

And it appears that the atomic bomb may gradually be relegated to the ranks of others—that, delivered by a plane, it is as vulnerable as its carrier; that, furthermore, a counter-weapon may well be developed which will explode it at safe distance. And ground armies of the future may be largely immune to the breaking atom since they will be, presumably, deeply fortified in rugged terrain, deployed far from population centers, and much more highly mobile.

Gen. Devers

And, in the final analysis, such weapons cannot win wars. A country is not conquered until it is physically occupied by its enemy. If two major powers, equally equipped with atomic bombs, unloosed them in equal volume, one upon the other, that nation which, at the end, could muster the most ground troops to move in and occupy the other—that nation would be the victor. If past wars, including the one just concluded, are any example, there will always be a role for the ground fighter.

It is conceivable that his role, in the future, may include use of the atomic bomb itself for it seems entirely possible that the artillery could use this mighty missile as a type of artillery projectile.

As a final consideration, there is the likelihood that the atomic bomb may be successfully outlawed as a weapon of future wars, just as poison-gas was mutually barred from the one just past.

In any case, it seems probable that the ground army will be a continuing institution.

To look back for a moment, the end of World War II, 2 September 1945, found the ground forces scattered throughout the world in positions representing the high-water mark of a wave launched September, 1941, when on dispatching the second and final echelon of the Iceland Task Force, General Headquarters, United States Army, reported it "the first U. S. Expedition to depart with a complete plan and all the means necessary to implement it."

In almost exactly four years, Army Ground Forces had organized, trained and equipped 89 infantry divisions and supporting troops and sent them into combat overseas.

As the "atomic age" fell on Hiroshima and the world on 6 August, the ground troops were disposed approximately as follows:

Of the more than 2,000,000 overseas, about half were in the Pacific Theater. Of these, some 400,000 were poised in the Marianas, on Okinawa, in Saipan and on Guam — ready for the then-projected ground invasion of Japan proper. Another approximate 600,000 were firmly installed in Japan's outer empire: in the Philippines, New Guinea, and the Solomons. In Europe, there were some 1,000,000 ground soldiers, rapidly dwindling to the estimated 400,000 needed for eventual occupation of Germany. The Mediterranean Region was garrisoned, at this time, by some 160,000 American troops; there were about 25,000 scattered throughout the Caribbean Command and approximately 7,000 were stationed in Alaska and the Aleutians. Finally, there were minor detachments in North Africa, the Middle East, in the Persian Gulf Command, and in the various bases of the North and South Atlantic.

In four years of war, supported by the other forces, the ground troops had gone forth from the United States to the remotest corners of the earth. Their September, 1945 positions, more clearly than any other factor, proclaimed that World War II had been decisively won. Again, assisted by the other forces, they had taken ground and had held it and were now, by

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Okinawa

Iwo Jima

The Marine Corps and the War in the Pacific

by General Alexander A. Vandegrift, USMC

Commandant of the Marine Corps

FOR the Marine Corps, the War in the Pacific began not with Pearl Harbor but twenty years before, when, in 1921, the Corps evolved its own concept of a plan for operations and set about the development of the means necessary to carry it into effect. The concept was to seize, with and for the Navy, a chain of bases extending across the Pacific. The means was to be a mobile, highly trained and specially equipped amphibious striking force to spearhead the westward drive and crack open the hard armor of the enemy's permanent ocean defenses.

Gen. Vandegrift

It was not an easy task, but it was accomplished. It required the creation of doctrine and technique in a field where none existed; it required the painstaking development of amphibious equipment during a period of severely curtailed appropriations; it required the allocation of troops at a time when personnel resources were already strained to meet commitments to the Navy in a long series of small wars and tedious occupations.

Nevertheless, Pearl Harbor found the Marine Corps ready, able and willing to test in combat what it had devised during the peace. The trial came soon, and with the opening salvoes in the Solomons one fact stood out in bold and reassuring relief—what had been developed was sound. This small-scale seaborne thrust into the enemy's stronghold represented more than a brilliant and badly needed first success—it was the proving ground for amphibious warfare. Here was established the pattern and it would only remain for future operations to smooth off the rough edges of the mold.

Improved techniques and steadily growing means were reflected in the ensuing operations — Bougainville, the Gilberts and the Marshalls. Towering over them all looms Tarawa—imperishable monument to the quality of the troops that stormed its fire-swept beaches, and a demonstration, if one were needed, that hostile defensive strength was not to be the limiting determinant of amphibious action.

The oceanic phase of the war terminated in 1944 with the breakthrough in the Marianas and Palaus. Here the prize was the naval mastery of the Pacific, and it was won in a series of amphibious operations in which the Marine Corps played a leading and successful part — Saipan, Tinian, Guam and Peleliu, essential bases for the westward drive and effective barriers to deny access to the hostile bastions by-passed to the east and south.

Secure in its bases, the Navy carried the challenge to enemy home waters in 1945—the year of victory which found the Marine Corps at peak operational strength — six amphibious divisions with supporting troops for two Corps and four aircraft wings. Not large by the standards of some theatres, it nevertheless constituted the most powerful striking force of its kind in the Pacific with respect to combat experience and the uniformly high quality of its divisions.

The first blow was struck at Iwo Jima—fateful waystation on the route to Tokyo. This small and sulphurous volcanic island had been converted into a rocky fortress, its defenders established in a skillfully prepared system of underground defenses which covered every yard of landing beach and inland terrain with a withering fire. Despite the repeated hammering of air and naval forces during the pre-landing phase, Iwo's natural defenses reinforced by hostile cunning were proof against bombardment. Here was not only a fortress but one which must be taken by storm not by siege.

The Fourth and Fifth Division of the Fifth Corps landed abreast on Iwo's east coast and ground determinedly toward the island's axial ridge with both flanks and landing beach swept by incessant fire from the commanding ground. This crisis, however, passed on the fifth day when the dominating heights of Suribachi were carried by assault. There was now more room for maneuver and a semblance of depth for the

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Depth charge from a 327-foot Coast Guard Cutter sinks another German submarine.

A Coast Guard plane on scouting mission in the Arctic.

Pacific invaders go ashore from Coast Guard-manned landing craft.

Coast Guard at War—Final Phase

by Admiral R. R. Waesche

Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard

As the concentration of wartime activity turned from the European to Pacific theatre of war after V-E Day, the United States Coast Guard transferred the bulk of its fighting strength to cooperate with other military forces in taking the island-hopping steps that led to Japan.

Expanded to a wartime strength of approximately 13,000 officers and 159,000 enlisted men, the Coast Guard took part in the five amphibious European invasions — Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, and Southern France. Besides its own fleet, which had more than doubled since the start of the war to 755 cutters and 3,511 other craft, the Coast Guard manned almost 600 Army and Navy vessels, including LST's, LCI's, troop transports, destroyer escorts, frigates, tankers, tugs, freight ships, cargo transports, sub chasers. As Allied forces advanced into the European continent, Coast Guard-manned vessels helped to back the advancing front with a steady stream of supplies. Escort and anti-submarine ships protected the supply lines, for although the submarine menace had been reduced in European, North Atlantic, and Greenland waters, it had not been eliminated.

Adm. Waesche

Re-deployment to the Pacific war theatre began as early as the summer of 1944, when Coast Guard landing craft, having participated in the last amphibious European landing, Southern France, joined other Coast Guard vessels which had been on duty in the Pacific since the start of the war.

From the opening drive at Guadalcanal in August, 1942, to the final landing on the Japanese mainland in August, 1945, the Coast Guard joined in spearheading attacks to wrest island outposts from the enemy. During amphibious attacks in the Aleutians, Solomons, Gilbert Islands, New Britain, Marshall Islands, Admiralty Group, Emirau, New Guinea, Marianas, Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Ryukyus. Coast Guardsmen, manning the blunt-nosed landing craft or supply barges, became known as the "Invaders."

The greatest single loss for the Coast Guard in 1945 occurred early in the year, when the ammunition ship, USS Serpens, exploded off Guadalcanal, killing two hundred Coast Guardsmen. Only two survived.

Besides transporting and landing troops and supplies, the Coast Guard has had many specialized duties. As enemy islands were seized from the Japanese, Coast Guard buoy tenders set up channel buoys to mark the treacherous inter-island waterways. Loran, long range aids to navigation, stations were established at Pacific island outposts by Coast Guard CD's, construction detachments, who sometimes began to set up their small portable outfits even before the islands had been entirely secured. Lighthouses and other lighted aids which had been damaged or destroyed through enemy action were repaired and put into working order by Coast Guard crews.

The Coast Guard maintained a large port security division in the Hawaiian Islands; and many of the fireboats assigned to guard shipping there and at other island ports were Coast Guard-manned. Coast Guard Merchant Marine Hearing Units were established at newly-won Pacific islands to deal with the safety of merchant vessels and seamen. These Merchant Marine Hearing Units are now strung around the globe — in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, India, Australia, New Caledonia, and many of the Pacific islands, including New Hebrides, Solomons, and New Guinea.

While the Coast Guard was carrying on these specialized functions, directly connected with behind-the-lines support of combat operations, it continued most of its peacetime duties in home waters, maintain-

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The Army Service Forces Year

by General Brehon Somervell, USA

Commanding General, A. S. F.

A YEAR ago on the third anniversary of the beginning of the war our armies were on the offensive throughout the world. The long period of preparation and the defensive stage of the war were past. Victory was assured, but no man dared to predict how much fighting still lay ahead or what the cost would be. Supply lines had been extended, demands for men and materiel were rising everywhere. We were not yet producing enough heavy artillery ammunition, enough tanks or trucks, enough cotton duck, enough radar equipment, enough tires.

Just one year ago before the Ardennes counteroffensive, we were planning to force the Rhine, batter the Germans into surrender, and then invade Japan by sheer weight of equipment and men.

During this year the Army Service Forces boosted production of critical materials to all-time highs. On V-E Day we cut back on some production, stepped up on some, cancelled some contracts outright. We rerouted 60 ships from Europe directly to the Pacific, turned around 7,112 carloads of supplies headed for New York and sent them to San Francisco, put into operation our plans for redeploying troops and materiel to General MacArthur's command. At the same time we opened schools and universities organized sports tournaments and recreation areas in Europe to keep our men occupied while they awaited redeployment.



General Somervell

We were in the midst of creating and stocking a huge invasion base in the Philippines and shipping millions of men there for the attack on Japan when the war ended immediately after the atomic bombs were dropped. ASF had set up its "Manhattan Engineering District." Our engineers built cities, laboratories and plants on a top secret basis. The end product of the Manhattan Engineering District — the atom bomb, was a major factor in Japan's defeat.

Signal Corps Photo

Duck from the 451st Amphibian Truck Company being unloaded at the sorting area of ration dump on Bougainville.

The night Japan accepted our unconditional surrender terms, the Army Service Forces sent out more than 49,000 previously prepared telegrams cancelling war production contracts. More than 90 ships en-route or preparing to leave for the Pacific and 12,936 railway cars of combat supplies bound for San Francisco were turned around. Army Service Forces was moving into reverse gear, at top speed. Lend-lease was terminated, and we stopped shipments of war materials to our allies.

The Army Service Forces began to bring all men not engaged in occupation duties back to the United States for discharge or further Army service in the Zone of Interior. We began to repair, salvage or turn over to government surplus property disposal agencies the masses of material our Armies had accumulated overseas. Millions of tons of serviceable war equipment are being brought back to the United States to Army depots.

Thus in one year Army Service Forces switched from full speed forward to full speed in reverse. During the war ours was the business of producing and delivering a million separate items, two billion dollars worth a month, to fighting fronts and defense bases around the world. Besides designing, producing, storing and transporting weapons and equipment and supplies, we paid the men, kept their records, tried to solve their personal problems, entertained and informed them.

With the culmination of this, our greatest war effort, Army Service Forces takes on the job of cleaning up after the battle. In our determination to have enough at the right place at the right time we outfitted the mightiest Army in the world. Now we are transferring that might back to where it came from, and we are proving that we can operate as fast in reverse as we did in advance.

The two most im-

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Royal Navy in Pacific

by Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, G.C.B., K.B.E.

Commander-in-Chief of the British Pacific Fleet

Adm. Fraser

NO one is more thankful than I that the sudden end of the Japanese war made it unnecessary for us to deploy the full naval strength of the British Pacific Fleet. But, for the accuracy of naval histories which may be written in the future, I think it should be known that, had the invasion of Japan been necessary, we had the warships and logistic support to enable two British Carrier Task Groups to take part.

As events turned out, we had little more than the opportunity to prove that we could assemble, train, support and put into action, in the short space of four months, a formidable task force capable of operating at sea for long periods in conjunction with similar forces of the United States Pacific Fleet.

I arrived in Australia in December 1944, to set up my command. After the loss of Singapore and Hong Kong, Sydney was virtually the only suitable base left to us. It had many advantages—a magnificent harbour, a recently completed graving dock capable of taking our largest ships, ample food resources, and skilled dockyard labour, although in limited quantities. Its greatest disadvantage was its distance from what was to be the scene of operations. But there was no other choice.

One of my first tasks—and a very pleasant task as it turned out to be—was to confer with Fleet Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbor. It was from Admiral Nimitz that I learnt that not only was the British Pacific Fleet welcomed by him and his Command, but that there were many tasks awaiting it—tasks very different from those "minor roles" which political observers and others had been hinting at. I and my staff officers returned to Sydney, determined to have the Fleet ready, and have it ready in record time.

(*Continued on page* 208)

U. S. Signal Corps Photo

Left to right: Sir Alan Brooke, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery.

The Recapture of Burma

by Major General B. C. H. Kimmins, CBE

Assistant Chief of Staff to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten

EARLY in 1944, the Japanese had brought nearly 11 Divisions into Burma for the conquest of India; but they had been decisively stopped in Arakan, and again in the Imphal Plain and in the surrounding hills, and at Kohima. Fighting throughout the monsoon for the first time in history, the Allies had battered and disrupted the Japanese by unremitting attacks on the ground and from the air, and whereas the Allies were protected by the most up-to-date medical precautions, the Japanese were an easy prey to disease and exposure. All along the jungle trails leading to the Chindwin the Allied troops were to find the remains of five of the enemy's Divisions—rows of corpses which could only be disposed of by burning.

The closing months of the intensive campaign of 1944 saw the waning of Japanese offensive power in Burma, and disclosed the opening moves in the final Allied drive. The plans of operation for the winter of 1944 and the spring of 1945, which were to carry our troops more than 1,000 miles in 10 months, and to culminate in the capture of Rangoon and the conquest of Burma, envisaged the coordination of three major forces in the country, who were widely separated by natural barriers and by impenetrable jungle. Behind them lay the most impassable lines of communication on which a modern army had ever had to rely, stretching across the Brahmaputra and over hundreds of miles of jungle roads and rugged mountains.

The breakdown of the Force was approximately 340,000 Indian; 100,000 British; 70,000 African; 65,000 Chinese and 10,000 American, but these ground forces were supported by 47 American and British air squadrons. A system of air supply had been developed on a greater scale than in any

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The Canadian Army

by Lieutenant General Charles Foulkes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

Chief of the General Staff



Lt. Gen. Foulkes

DURING the year 1945 the Canadian Army continued to play its part in the closely integrated Allied effort which was finally rewarded by victory. The record of the activities of the Canadian Army is in fact but one chapter in the grand story of Allied teamwork and cooperation. In Northwest Europe the task of the First Canadian Army had been, since D Day, that of clearing the northern flank of the great Allied advance across Europe. The Canadian forces carried on with this role throughout the operations in 1945 which ended in the unconditional surrender of Germany.

The beginning of 1945 found the Canadian forces in the Nijmegan area of Holland engaged in warfare of an almost amhibious nature, due to the Germans having flooded a large art of that low-lying "polder" country. In the late winter the Canadians launched the attack through the Reichwald and Hochwald Forests, which proved to be the opening move in the subsequent operations which resulted in the Allies clearing the Germans from the west bank of the Rhine. Canadian forces also participated in the assault across the Rhine, crossing north of Wesel. Their next task was the clearing of the Germans from Holland and the investment of the Fortress pockets in the Emden-Wilhelmshaven area of Germany. This task was shared by the 1st Canadian Corps which had moved from Italy in March, having taken part from the beginning in both the Sicilian and Italian campaigns; thus all formations of the Canadian Army overseas were fighting together for the first time as the First Canadian Army.

This task was close to completion when on 5 May the German forces in Northwest Germany and Holland surrendered unconditionally. It was perhaps not unfitting that the surrender of the German forces in the Netherlands should be made to a Canadian Commander, since Canadian forces played so direct a part in the liberation of the territory of this gallant ally.

In the ten months of continuous fighting since D Day the Canadian Army encountered and defeated no fewer than fifty-nine German divisions. No account of the activities of the First Canadian Army during this period would be complete which omitted to mention the gallant part played by the British, United States, Polish, Belgian, Netherlands and Czechoslovak formations which came under its command.

Canadian participation in the occupation of Ger-

(*Continued on page* 194)

The Canadian Navy

by Vice Admiral G. C. Jones, C.B.

Canadian Chief of Naval Staff

I WELCOME this second opportunity of expressing through the "Journal" the warmest greetings of the personnel of Canada's Navy to our friends and neighbours in the United States. Since my last message a year ago, the close cooperation between the Armed Services of the United Nations has been rewarded by complete victory on all fronts.

During the war against Germany, the Canadian Navy played an ever-increasing part in the Atlantic campaign. At the beginning of this year the Service had grown to a strength of more than 95,000 personnel; and some 370 ships and 550 auxiliary vessels were in operation.

German U-boat warfare continued unabated until the very day of victory in Europe. While Allied arms were advancing into Germany, the Canadian Navy was operationally responsible for all trade convoys in the Northwest Atlantic, and provided escort for trade convoys between North America and Britain. American munitions sent in trade convoys to the European theatre were protected by Canadian ships with increasing success and a small proportion of losses. The frigate, a newer and larger type of escort which supplemented the escort destroyer and the corvette, proved a highly effective anti-submarine vessel.

Apart from Atlantic escort commitments, Canadian destroyers were employed in European waters, in offensive sweeps along the French channel and Bay of Biscay coasts and the Norwegian coasts; and were successful in destroying a number of enemy surface units and submarines. Canadian minesweepers were also employed on operational sweeps in European waters, and Canadian escorts protected local convoys in the same area. It might be mentioned that Canadian ships participated in the liberation of the French port of Bordeaux in April of this year.

Vice Adm. Jones

Shortly after V-E Day, when the danger from German submarines had been removed, North Atlantic convoys

(*Continued on page* 194)

Their Finest Hour

by Major General Lord Burnham, Cb, DSO, MC, TD, DL

Director of Public Relations, British War Office

THE people of Great Britain entered the war in 1939 not with enthusiasm nor with eagerness but with a feeling of resentment. Twenty-five years ago it had been necessary for their fathers to fight the Germans now it seemed that their sons had to do it again. Nobody in England wanted war, but to fight a war now was a better thing than to live in a state of perpetual danger. Wearily the British people began to roll up their sleeves. At that time there was little thought of "Victory" as such and none at all of defeat.

Great Britain went to war much as the plumber arrives with a bag of tools to deal with the leak on the landing. It was with an outraged shock that the plumber discovered that his tools were inadequate and that the water was flooding him out of the house. The mood of Great Britain after Dunkirk was a strange one. True it was that the British Expeditionary Force had come back from the sea with little more than small arms in their hands. True that the famous 51st Highland Division had been taken almost to a man. True that the enemy was poised flushed with victory and terrible with weapons across a few miles of water. Denmark and Norway were occupied. Holland and Belgium overrun. France had surrendered. Every other contestant had been eliminated.

Maj. Gen. Burnham

Then during those long Autumnal days the few fought and won the battle of Britain high over the English countries. Tension relaxed a little and the army began again to consider how soon they could go back and deal with that leak on the landing. It was to be a long and circuitous path. The news of Italy's declaration of war was received as a tiresome but not unexpected complication. In the Middle East General (now Field Marshal) Wavell started in on his gigantic mixture of gallantry and bluff. But there were more blows to come.

First British Somaliland was overrun. The British Army was painfully evacuated from Greece and the Germans —with prodigal expenditure of manpower—took Crete. At home the army trained savagely and determinedly and undertook the only offensive operations possible to her by raiding the enemy coast line with strange amphibious forces called Commandos while the Prime Minister—with brilliant and historic foresight—steadily reinforced the Middle East. It was a sombre picture that confronted us in 1941 but one which failed either to daunt or dismay.

In the desert the battle swung like a pendulum and though the sunburned

(*Continued on page* 194)

Royal Canadian Air Force

by Air Marshal Robert Leckie, C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C., D.F.C.

Chief of Air Staff

FROM a strength of 4,606 in September 1939 the Royal Canadian Air Force rose to a total of 206,350 in December 1943. By September 1945 this number had fallen to 139,652. During the six years of war the Force suffered casualties in killed and missing of 16,977 of whom 21 were members of the Women's Division.

The Royal Canadian Air Force overseas contingent comprised 48 squadrons, all under the operational control of the R.A.F. These units included fifteen heavy bomber squadrons, fourteen functioning as No. 6 (R.C.A.F.) Group of Bomber Command and one in the Pathfinder Force. Of the seventeen day fighter squadrons, fifteen were organized in four wings as part of the Second Tactical Air Force and operated on the western front. One, based in England, acted as escort on heavy bomber raids, while another was a component of the Desert Air Force working with the Allied armies in the plains of Lombardy. Two R.C.A.F. night fighter and two intruder squadrons flew Mosquitos from bases in England and Western Europe. In Coastal Command six R.C.A.F. squadrons worked in close cooperation with the Allied naval forces, while in Coastal Command there were three squadrons. There were also three Air Observation Post squadrons using Austers. In addition many thousands of R.C.A.F. personnel served in R.A.F. units.

Air Marshal Leckie

The night sorties of the Halifaxes and Lancasters of the Canadian Bomber Group complemented the daylight raids of the U.S.A.A.F. on industrial and communication targets in Germany until in the spring of 1945 the R.C.A.F. Group itself entered the daylight operational field. In addition to strategical bombing the Group on occasion made tactical forays in support of ground operations, such as a raid on Goch in preparation for a Canadian advance from Nijmegen to the Rhine and another on Dresden in di-

(*Continued on page* 190)

Soviet Collaboration With the Western Allies

by Major General John R. Deane, USA

Head of the United States Military Mission to USSR

DECEMBER 7th, 1944 found the Red Army engaged in a vigorous offensive in the Balkans with the spearhead of its attack pointed at Vienna. The bulk of the Red Army however, was north of the Carpathians, generally along the line of the Vistula, and extending north to the Baltic where it was threatening East Prussia. Along this entire front the Red Army had been regrouping and resupplying since the early fall of 1944, in preparation for an all-out offensive against Western Poland and Eastern Germany.



Marshal Stalin and President Truman at Potsdam

The Red Army launched its offensive north of the Carpathians on 14 January 1945. A few days later Air Chief Marshal Tedder, representing General Eisenhower, arrived in Moscow to confer with Marshal Stalin for the purpose of coordinating the activities of the Red Army with those of the western allies. Marshal Stalin informed Air Chief Marshal Tedder that the Soviet offensive, which had just started, was aimed at reaching the line of the Oder and that it would continue until the spring thaws made operations impracticable.

Maj. Gen. Deane

The chief concern of the western allies was Russia's ability to prevent the movement of German reserves to the western front once the Red Army's offensive had stopped. This was of extreme importance because we had planned our crossing of the Rhine to start in about mid March. Marshal Stalin assured Air Chief Marshal Tedder that even though the thaws had necessitated a halt in the Red Army's advance, sufficient pressure would be maintained on the German Armies to prevent reinforcements being sent from the east to the western front. This was a reassuring promise and it was more than lived up to. Actually the Red Army's offensive took it far beyond the Oder and its momentum was maintained until our forces gained contact which occurred shortly before Germany's surrender.

During the course of the Red Army's spring offensive Soviet operations on the Baltic front had a strategic importance which has been somewhat overlooked. With the capture of the Baltic States the Red Army was enabled to redeploy the troops that had been engaged on the Baltic front. This enabled them to strengthen their forces farther to the South which were pushing toward Berlin and it also allowed the diversion of a number of divisions to the Far East and thus complete the Red Army's build-up there for the war against Japan. In addition, the operations on the Baltic front were concluded with the capture of Gydnia and Danzig, which dealt a death blow to Germany's submarine activities. These two ports had been the nerve center of the German submarine establishment and were important because of the research and development carried on there.

The logistical factor constituted the Red Army's greatest difficulty in the war against Japan. Once Germany was defeated there was a profusion of troops and supplies in Western Russia. The problem was to transport them to the Far Eastern theater. The Soviet Union had always maintained sufficient forces in the Far East for defense of the area, but offensive operations against the Japanese required a considerable build-up. Two lines of communications were available for this purpose; one, the Trans-Siberian railroad, and the other, a Pacific supply route from the United States. Both of these lines of communications were tenuous and this influenced the strategy which the Red Army adopted in its Far East offensive. The Trans-Siberian railroad was fairly safe from Japanese attack as far east as Lake Baikal, but the Pacific supply route was subject to being stopped or seriously interrupted by Japanese air and naval actions once hostilities had begun.

No doubt largely because of transportation and supply problems, the Soviet authorities decided to make

(*Continued on page* 186)

Army Signal Corps Photo

The surrender at SHAEF headquarters in Rheims, France. Col. Gen. Gustaf Jodl, German Chief of Staff, signs the terms of unconditional surrender, as Maj. Wilhelm Oxenius, his aide, left, and Gen. Adm. Rans-George Von Friedeburg, right, Commander in Chief of the German Fleet, look on.

Order of Battle, European Theater of Operations (as of 7 May 1945)

[The order of battle of our Allies is not shown below Army level, except where American forces are under their operational control.]

From General of the Army Marshall's Report

Unit	Commander
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces	General of the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower
Northern Group of Armies (21st Army Group)	F/M Sir Bernard L. Montgomery
First Canadian Army	Gen. H. D. G. Crerar
Second British Army	Lt. Gen. Sir Miles C. Dempsey
XVIII Corps (Airborne)	Maj. Gen. M. B. Ridgway
5th Armored Div.	Maj. Gen. L. E. Oliver
7th Armored Div.	Maj. Gen. R. W. Hasbrouck
82d Airborne Div.	Maj. Gen. J. M. Gavin
8th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. B. E. Moore
Central Group of Armies (12th Army Group)	Gen. Omar N. Bradley
Ninth Army	Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson
XIII Corps	Maj. Gen. A. C. Gillem, Jr.
35th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Paul W. Baade
84th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. A. R. Bolling
102d Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. F. A. Keating
XVI Corps	Maj. Gen. J. B. Anderson
29th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. C. H. Gerhardt
75th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. R. E. Porter
79th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. I. T. Wyche
95th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. H. L. Twaddle
XIX Corps	Maj. Gen. R. S. McLain
2d Armored Div.	Maj. Gen. I. D. White
8th Armored Div.	Maj. Gen. J. M. Devine
30th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. L. S. Hobbs
83d Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. R. C. Macon
First Army	Gen. Courtney H. Hodges
78th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. E. P. Parker, Jr.
VII Corps	Lt. Gen. J. L. Collins
3d Armored Div.	Brig. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey
9th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. L. A. Craig
69th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Emil F. Reinhardt
104th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Terry Allen
VIII Corps	Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton
6th Armored Div.	Brig. Gen. George W. Read, Jr.
76th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. William R. Schmidt
87th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Frank L. Culin, Jr.
89th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Thomas D. Finley
Third Army	Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.
4th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Harold W. Blakeley
70th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. A. J. Barnett
III Corps	Maj. Gen. James A. Van Fleet
14th Armored Div.	Maj. Gen. Albert C. Smith
99th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Walter E. Lauer
V Corps	Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner
9th Armored Div.	Maj. Gen. John W. Leonard
16th Armored Div.	Brig. Gen. John L. Pierce
1st Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Clift Andrus
2d Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Walter M. Robertson
97th Inf. Div.	Brig. Gen. Milton B. Halsey
XII Corps	Maj. Gen. Stafford Leroy Irwin
4th Armored Div.	Maj. Gen. William M. Hoge
11th Armored Div.	Maj. Gen. Holmes E. Dager
5th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown
26th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Willard S. Paul
90th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Herbert L. Earnest
XX Corps	Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker
13th Armored Div.	Maj. Gen. John Milliken
65th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Stanley E. Reinhart
71st Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Willard G. Wyman
80th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Horace L. McBride
Fifteenth Army	Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow
66th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Herman F. Kramer
106th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Donald A. Stroh
XXII Corps	Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon
17th Airborne Div.	Maj. Gen. William M. Miley
94th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Harry J. Malony
XXIII Corps	Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey
28th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Norman D. Cota
Southern Group of Armies (6th Army Group)	Gen. Jacob L. Devers
Seventh Army	Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch
12th Armored Div.	Maj. Gen. Roderick R. Allen
63d Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Louis Hibbs
45th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Robert T. Frederick
100th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. W. A. Burress
XXI Corps	Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn
101st Airborne Div.	Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor
36th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. John E. Dahlquist
XV Corps	Lt. Gen. Wade H. Haislip
20th Armored Div.	Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward
3d Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. John W. O'Daniel
42d Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Harry J. Collins
86th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Harris M. Melasky
VI Corps	Maj. Gen. Edward H. Brooks
10th Armored Div.	Maj. Gen. Wm. H. H. Morris, Jr.
44th Inf. Div	Maj. Gen. William F. Dean
103rd Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe
First French Army	Gen. Jean J. de Lattre de Tassigny
SHAEF Reserve	
First Allied Airborne Army	Lt. Gen. Louis H. Brereton
13th Airborne Div.	Maj. Gen. Elbridge G. Chapman, Jr.
US Strategic Air Forces in Europe*	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz
Eighth Air Force	Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle
1st Air Div.	Maj. Gen. Howard McC. Turner
2d Air Div.	Maj. Gen. Wm. E. Kepner
3d Air Div.	Maj. Gen. Earle E. Partridge
Ninth Air Force	Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg
IX Bomb Division	Maj. Gen. Samuel E. Anderson
IX Tactical Air Command	Maj. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada
XIX Tactical Air Comm'd	Maj. Gen. Otto P. Weyland
XXIX Tactical Air Com'd	Brig. Gen. Richard E. Nugent
First Tactical Air Force (Prov.)	Maj. Gen. Robt. M. Webster
XII Tactical Air Command	Brig. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus
1st French Air Command	Gen. de Brig. Paul Gerardot
IX Troop Car. Command	Maj. Gen. Paul L. Williams

*Exercised operational control over Fifteenth Air Force shown under Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

Sixth Army Group—Victorious Allied Team

by General Jacob L. Devers, USA

Commanding General, Army Ground Forces; Formerly Commanding General, Sixth Army Group

SIXTH Army Group was uniquely a product of the War. It was born on the battlefields of France and reached its apex in the heart of the National Redoubt in Southern Germany, when it forced the unconditional surrender of the Nazi forces opposing it.

In less than nine months it had completed a great arc, starting from Italy, sweeping through southern and central France and Germany, and ending again triumphantly at the Italian border.

The genesis of 6th Army Group really began in the history-making conferences of Quebec, Cairo and Teheran, when "The Big Three" and the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed upon an invasion of southern France to support the earlier invasion of Normandy and to hasten the destruction of the Nazi war machine.

Initial planning began at Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers in December 1943; 7th Army was nominated to command the invasion force.* On the 15th of August 1944 the invasion struck a surprised enemy on the French Riviera, between Cannes and Toulon.

Powerful air and naval support combined to make the landings a model of precision and success. Spear-

(*Continued on page* 206)

*General Devers was then Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and Commanding General of North African Theater of Operations, U. S. Army; thus he materially influenced the planning and launching of the operation he was later to direct as Commanding General of 6th Army Group.



Signal Corps Photo

General Devers in Germany

The Battle of the Atlantic

by Admiral Jonas H. Ingram, USN

Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet

THE veil of secrecy has covered the operations of the Atlantic Fleet to such an extent that the country has known little of its composition or activities.

Yet, History will record the Battle of the Atlantic as one of the decisive campaigns of the war.

Admiral Ingram

To bring about victory in Europe millions of men and mountains of supplies had to be transported across thousands of miles of U-Boat infested waters.

Had that campaign been lost there would have been no invasions of Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy and Southern France. Had the U-Boat not been brought under control and finally defeated we might still be waiting for the unconditional surrender of the Nazis.

It was a gigantic undertaking that required the cooperation of science, industry, labor, agriculture and the armed forces.

Science in particular played a vital role, for the submarine campaign was to a large extent a battle royal between German and American scientists. The Germans came out with a succession of offensive weapons which had to be countered by our own forces before they made too much headway.

To my predecessors Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King and Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll should go full credit for the splendid organization of the Atlantic Fleet and for a great share in the magnificent record established in this bitter silent sea war.

We had a close call in the Atlantic in the early days of the war. The U-Boats were ready. We were not.

The anti-submarine campaign was so critical that Admiral King devised an innovation—The Tenth Fleet—directly under his command to coordinate measures to combat the submarine menace. Secret weapons, scientific development of anti-submarine measures, training of personnel, the strategy and dissemination of pertinent information all came under the cognizance of this newly established office in Washington directly under the eye of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. The collaboration of the Tenth Fleet and the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet was excellent.

The need for such an organization in this campaign was apparent as the Commander in Chief afloat was not in a position to coordinate all the activities. The complex communication problem alone presented one of the greatest handicaps. The Commander in Chief afloat did keep the operational control of the combat forces engaged in the campaign.

U. S. Navy Photo

A Nazi submarine, mortally wounded by a bomb from a Navy carrier plane, goes beneath the waves of the Atlantic.

Necessary secrecy has heretofore prevented public knowledge of the magnitude, urgency, and accomplishments of the anti-submarine campaign and its contribution to the final victory.

By January, 1943, the Germans were reported to have a Fleet of 400 U-Boats. Despite the destruction of hundreds of U-Boats the Nazis were able to keep up production and maintain their U-Boat Fleet at approximately this size for the duration of the war.

The turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic occurred in the Spring of 1943. At this time the escort carrier appeared in the Mid-Atlantic. Planes from these carriers sought out and destroyed or kept down the U-Boats. We shifted from the defensive to the offensive.

While the turning point of the anti-submarine campaign was in the Spring of 1943, this date by no means marked the end of the U-Boat menace.

Early in 1945 the Germans had developed and were operating submarines that could remain submerged for a period of several weeks. This innovation in submarine warfare neutralized the effects of allied air power. Prompt action was required to train surface groups in the expert use of all devices to detect the presence of submerged enemy craft. Along with this the technique of under-sea boat hunting was developed to a very great degree. Long and intensive training was necessary to coordinate the operations of several ships hunting in company as a "Killer Group." The successes obtained by these highly trained groups of destroyers and destroyer escorts were instrumental in crushing a last dramatic onslaught of German subs on our own coasts up until the very date of VE Day.

(*Continued on page* 206)

The Air War In Europe—Final Phase

by General Carl A. Spaatz

*Commanding General U. S. Strategic Air Force, Europe, January 1944 to June 1945; later Commanding General, U. S. Strategic Air Forces, Pacific**

BY the fall of 1944 the great strategic missions of the Army Air Forces in Europe had already been accomplished. Our primary enemy, the Luftwaffe, which included the German aircraft industry, had been so thoroughly vanquished that during the Normandy invasion it offered hardly more than nuisance opposition.

General Spaatz

German transport had been reduced to chaos. These attacks had a two-fold effect, not only was the movement of troops and supplies disturbed, but indirectly an acute dislocation was put upon all German industry.

The air campaign against German oil production, which was initiated in April, 1944, was continued throughout the year. By August, German gasoline production had been reduced to 20 per cent of the minimum enemy requirements.

At the close of the year, air power performed magnificently in the so-called Battle of the Bulge. On the first four days of Von Rundstedt's offensive the weather was literally unflyable. But on the 23rd of December, the skies suddenly cleared and the air force went all out in a gigantic effort of interdiction. In a week more than a hundred thousand tons of bombs were dropped by the heavies and mediums alone on German lines of communication and troop concentrations. On the 27th, the Germans began to move out of the bulge and the threat to our positions was past.

The Luftwaffe made one final effort to rise from its death bed, on New Year's day, 1945. They squandered their disappearing oil reserves to make 800 sorties against our airdromes and did, in fact, do us some damage—154 Allied planes were destroyed and 135 on the ground damaged. But about 290 of their aircraft and pilots were lost to fighters and flak, a number they could not afford.

What was left of their power was sent to the east, in the west the German Air Force was never again a factor. When, in March, 14,000 troops were carried by air across the Rhine, not one of our transports or gliders were lost to enemy air action.

The very startling success of our strategic oil campaign was apparent in April, 1945, when 3,000 German planes were destroyed on the ground. The Luftwaffe was literally out of gas. Our superiority was so great that at that time I was able to announce that USSTAF had run out of strategic targets.

Germany's final collapse in May was surprising only in that it had not happened sooner. The effort which the German nation expended in keeping its shattered economy in motion was—when the universal bomb damage was surveyed—enormous.

A nation must control the air about it to live. Dispersal, movement underground can be only temporary expedients. Total underground production, transportation and habitation is unthinkable.

Further, the entire economy of a nation need not be destroyed to bring it to defeat. Draw off from a modern complex its life blood and the individual members will wither. It will probably be found true that a fairly large percentage of the German industrial "skeleton" remains. But 93 per cent of the oil was destroyed and the transportation was virtually stopped. Selective destruction, on which we had placed our plans and hopes, paid off.

This synthetic oil plant at Zeitz, Germany, once could turn out 20 to 25 tons of oil products per month. In spite of mass use of slave labor to keep it in constant repair, it could never turn out more than 15 percent of its original output after AAF attacks upon it.

USSTAF Photo

*Subsequently General Spaatz was assigned to Headquarters, Army Air Forces.

Victory in Italy

by General Joseph T. McNarney, USA

Deputy Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, October 1944 *to September* 1945; *Subsequently Acting Supreme Commander, MTO; Effective* 19 *November* 1945, *Commanding General, U. S. Forces European Theater*

THE year just past witnessed the victorious conclusion of Allied operations in the Mediterranean Theater—operations begun over three years ago with the landings in North Africa to launch the great assaults on the Axis fortress area. By the end of the autumn of 1944, the two major campaigns of the Theater had attained striking success. In Italy the American Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army had followed their capture of Rome by fighting their way up the peninsula, across the Arno and through the heart of the Germans' powerful Gothic Line, northwithstanding the removal of seven veteran divisions from the Fifth Army for the invasion of Southern France. In France, the American Seventh Army, commanding our VI Corps and the French Expeditionary Corps (later French Army B), had made assault landings, freed Marseilles and Toulon, and driven rapidly up the Rhone Valley and through to the line of the Vosges, before passing from the control of AFHQ to that of SHAEF. By sea and air we were supplying and directing the steadily mounting Partisan activity behind the enemy lines in Northern Italy and Southern France and across the Adriatic in Jugoslavia.

Gen. McNarney

At the end of November 1944, the Fifth Army, having breached the Gothic Line, came to a halt on the last ridge line south of the Po River and paused to regroup while the Eighth Army continued the offensive on the right, turning the German eastern flank and attacking the river lines covering the Po. Our intention then was to launch an all-out offensive by 15th Army Group during the winter in order to take Bologna and exploit into the Po Valley. But the enemy at the end of December made a strong threat toward our port of Leghorn, which forced the Fifth Army to shift reserves westward, and the attack on Bologna had to be postponed. The weather steadily worsened, making roads impassable in that rugged terrain and limiting air support. Moreover, the enemy was reinforced while our troops were tired, our ammunition supply had to be husbanded, and our planned offensive was delayed until our munition stocks had built up and our units could be rested and regrouped. From January through March, the situation remained generally static except for local attacks by which we improved our positions, notably by the striking actions of the 10th Mountain Division, our freshest unit.

The April offensive of 1945 proved to be the final blow to break the German power in Italy. Our plan for the spring attack from our positions in the Northern Apennines had three phases: (1) the reduction of Bologna; (2) an advance to the Po Valley, followed by the crossing of the Po; (3) the seizure of the Alpine approaches, involving the capture of Verona to cut the Brenner Pass route and to flank the strong Adige positions, the breaking of the Adige Line and clearing of Venezia Giulia to the northeast, and the clearing of Northwest Italy to the French frontier. Opposing us were 23 German divisions and 6 neo-Fascist Italian divisions.

Following diversionary thrusts on 5 April, the main attack of our spring offensive was launched on the 14th. Fifth Army struck in the center against heavy opposition while Eighth Army drove up Highway 9 and northward to the Po. Bologna fell on 21 April; entered the same day by our II Corps and by the Polish Corps from Eighth Army. This breakthrough brought on a widespread collapse of German organized resistance and the enemy retreated hastily across the Po, carrying out such demolitions as their precipitous withdrawal permitted. Our advance swept over the Po; IV Corps moved rapidly up Highway 9, occupying Milan and Turin by 30 April; II Corps took Verona on 26 April and won the Bolzano approach to the Brenner. After forcing the Adige, the Eighth Army occupied Venice and made contact with the advancing Jugoslavs at Monfalcone, in Venezia Giulia, on 1 May.

Signal Corps Photo

Gun crew of 57 *mm anti-tank gun of* 351*st Infantry Regiment,* 88*th Division, setting up cover fire for the crossing of the Po River by* 88*th Division Rangers,* 24 *April* 1945.

Throughout the year the air and naval forces had contributed heavily to the spring victory. The Royal

(*Continued on page* 206)

The 15th Army Group in Italy

by General Mark W. Clark

Commanding General, Fifteenth Army Group, December 1944 *to June* 1945;
Subsequently Commander in Chief U. S. Occupational Forces in Austria

THE smartly clad German general stood stiffly at attention, saluted, spoke:

"General Clark, as the representative of the German Commander-in-Chief, Southwest, I report to you as the commander of the Fifteenth Army Group for your orders for the surrendered German Land Forces."

The speaker represented the German Commander-in-Chief, Southwest, General von Vietinghoff. The words he spoke were those which the armies that had fought from El Alamein and Salerno up the rugged Italian peninsula to the Alps had longed to hear for many weary months of gruelling combat. Those words meant that the remaining 230,000 Germans would join the already captured 800,000 in prisoner of war enclosures, and were the first of the German armies to accept Allied demands of unconditional surrender. Those words also recreated a mental picture of events of the Italian campaign and of the fast-moving Fifteenth Army Group Po Valley offensive which had so overwhelmed and destroyed the three enemy armies in Italy, that their commander-in-chief had been left with no recourse other than unconditional surrender.

Such a great victory had been accomplished as a result of careful planning, efficient execution, and cooperation between nationalities and services seldom, if ever, equalled in the annals of military history. Divergent nationalities,—Americans, white, black, and of Japanese ancestry; British; British Indian; New Zealand; South African; Polish; Jewish; Brazilian; and Italian—in accomplishing their war mission, had set before the world a splendid example.

The Italian campaign had not been easy. Tortuous terrain and extreme weather conditions had ever joined forces with a determined enemy to make the Italian front the most difficult of any in the European or Mediterranean Theaters of Operations.

Gen. Clark

Following the capture of Rome—the first Axis - dominated European capital to be liberated — the victory-flushed Allied armies streaked northwards in pursuit of the routed Germans. The Italian campaign might well have ended soon afterwards had great numbers of troops and quantities of equipment not been withdrawn at this time for the invasion of southern France. As it was, the American Fifth and British Eighth Armies drew up before the enemy's formidable Gothic Line with greatly reduced forces.

Nonetheless, great progress was made through this line until the end of October, 1944, when a serious shortage of replacements, of certain types of ammunition, and the onset of bitter winter conditions combined to make impracticable further operations until the unrelieved troops, whose non-battle casualties were beginning to outnumber battle casualties, had paused for a period of rest and return to a higher degree of combat efficiency.

During the winter of 1944-1945 Fifteenth Army Group manned an active defense across its front with a minimum number of troops necessary to maintain the integrity of the front. When weather permitted, the overwhelming Allied air forces struck at the German lines of communication. At the same time, the ground forces, in frequent patrols and raids, contained the enemy, kept him apprehensive as to future intentions, and gathered much valuable information while planning was in progress for a powerful offensive to be launched as early in the spring as weather conditions would permit.

Signal Corps Photo

A tank of the Fifth Army moves through battle-scarred Pianoro, Italy.

There were indications that the Germans were

(*Continued on page* 202)

VE—the Contribution of the Navy

by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN

Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in Europe

WITH the end of operations in Europe has come the announcement of the Allied Naval Operations in the Battle of the Atlantic. Until the German submarine campaign had been defeated the men and supplies necessary for a successful offensive against the German-held "Fortress of Europe" could not be landed on French shores.

Recent statements issued by the Navy Department and the Admiralty show that the German submarines were winning in the Atlantic when the United States entered the war at the end of 1941, just as they had been winning when Admiral Sims assumed command of U. S. Naval Forces in Europe in April 1917. It was not until a year after the American Navy joined the Royal Navy in anti-submarine and convoy operations that the tide was finally turned.

In the first three years of the war (1939-42) nearly twenty million tons of allied shipping had been destroyed, representing a net loss of more than seven million tons over new construction. More submarines were being built than were being destroyed (Submarines sunk: 1939, nine; 1940, 22; 1941, 35; 1942, 85).

Adm. Hewitt

Large increases in U. S. naval units and aircraft combined with improved anti-submarine weapons and tactics assured the defeat of the submarine campaign early in 1943. Coordinated operations in the Bay of Biscay area resulted in the sinking of more than a hundred submarines in three months. From January 1943 on an average of twelve submarines a month were sunk.

From January 1943 also the amazing effort of American shipyards launched into the Atlantic an average of nearly a million tons of new ships each month. In 1943 allied shipping constructed totalled nearly fifteen million gross tons as compared with three and a half million tons sunk. In 1944 new construction totalled thirteen and a half million tons while sinkings were reduced to one and a half million tons.

Victory in the Battle of the Atlantic thus made possible victory in Europe. From June 1944 to June 1945, 135 convoys arrived in the U. K., composed of 7,157 ships of nearly fifty million gross tons. The allied navies were thus able to report early in 1943 that their successful anti-submarine and convoy operations would permit the transport to Europe and across the Channel of the millions of men and tens of millions of tons of supplies that were later required for the Allied Expeditionary Forces under the Supreme Command of General Eisenhower.

U. S. Navy Photo

Their bow ramps down, U. S. Navy LCMs (Landing Craft, Mechanized) take aboard U. S. armored units, then ferry them across the Rhine to new bridgehead on Ninth Army front. This is the farthest inland the U. S. Navy has participated in an operation.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Quebec Conference, August 1943, had approved the plans for cross-Channel operations to assault the German-held "Fortress of Europe." In the Normandy landings in June 1944, 2,493 U. S. Naval vessels, including the landing craft and transports, had taken part. Approximately 124,000 officers and men of the U. S. Navy participated directly or indirectly in the operation.

The original operational plans had assumed that the Germans might be able to establish temporarily a strong defense line, extending southward from the Normandy Coast along the Seine River. The United States Navy was to be charged with the seizure of ports in Brittany, from the Loire Estuary north, as bases for landing American reenforcements. The break-through at St. Lo, at the end of July 1944, General Patton's successful armored drive eastward across France, and the inability of the Germans to make a stand short of the German frontier, made unnecessary these supplementary operations planned by the U. S. Navy in Europe. German garrisons of the Western French ports were by-passed until forces were available to liquidate them.

The rapidity of the advance of the Allied forces in August and September 1944 accentuated problems of naval and logistics support for the offensive. The capture of Cherbourg at the end of June had secured one port to supplement landing operations on the Normandy beaches. The drive of the British Armies through Belgium in September led to the capture of Antwerp with its port facilities undamaged. Antwerp could not be used, however, to support the invasion of Germany until December, when the mouth of the Scheldt was cleared. The absence of adequate port facilities had thus slowed General Eisenhower's drive and made necessary a delay until March 1945 of the attack through the Seigfried Line and across the Rhine.

After the successful landings in Normandy, U. S. Naval forces were regrouped. The assault forces were

(*Continued on page* 202)

Mediterranean Allied Air Forces' Final Blow

by Lieutenant General John K. Cannon, USA

Commanding General 12th Air Force, December 1943 to April 1945; Subsequently Commanding General, U. S. Air Forces in Europe

ON 7 November 1944 the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces began a five-month assault on transportation in the Brenner Pass and Tarvisio routes. The Brenner Pass was the main supply route for the German forces in Italy under Kesselring, and Nature had protected it from air attack with a shield of high mountains and a cloak of incredibly bad flying weather. The Germans added elaborate smoke screens and a terrific concentration of flak. Under attack they used every device of camouflage and deception, including bridges that apparently were destroyed by day but could be slid into place for night traffic. They double-tracked vulnerable stretches, eliminated viaducts wherever possible, made diversion routes for river crossings, and gave a blank check to labor and materials.

Kesselring's armies dug in for the winter after the Allied drive of October had bogged down in the mountains a dozen miles from Bologna and the flat plains of the Po Valley. For supply and reinforcement it was imperative that Kesselring keep the Brenner Pass open. From our viewpoint it was imperative that we keep it closed. We did, 82% of the time; and meanwhile our tactical air power kept down the Po bridges which had been destroyed by the B-25s and B-26s of the Twelfth Air Force in July during the air operation called "Mallory Major."

12th Air Force Photo

Lt. Gen. Cannon

The battle lines were static during the winter. At Yalta it was decided a large-scale ground offensive would not be required on the Italian Front. But it wasn't to work out that way.

Meanwhile the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces—called MAAF—continued operations as varied as its physical make-up. MAAF was composed of elements of the United States AAF, the Royal Air Force and components of the British Dominions, and units from France, Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, Poland and Brazil. The top strategic target remained oil. Ploesti had been captured by the Russians in August, after our bombing had reduced its production 62% over the period since the attack of 5 April. Ploesti refineries had finished 55% of all Axis crude oil. There were still 21 oil targets in MAAF territory, both crude and synthetic, after Ploesti's fall, and these were the particular province of the Fifteenth AAF heavies. By mid-March, 1945, only six were operating and by April production of Axis oil was only 10% of what it had been at the opening of the campaign begun exactly a year previously.

Other important MAAF tasks included the protection of shipping and harbors. The RAF 205 Group effectively mined the Danube and attacked enemy harbors and shipping. Cooperation with the Partisans in the Balkans required attack on enemy battle lines, supplies and communications, and the dropping of needed supplies to the Partisans who in turn tied up important German forces and cooperated with Air Crew Rescue Units in the daring escape of Allied airmen who had been forced down behind enemy lines. There were 2,350 AAF crewmen returned from Jugoslavia before the war's end.

The Russian armies had driven the Germans within effective range of our Foggia bases, and the Fifteenth AAF often bombed targets in direct support of the

(*Continued on page* 198)

Ora railroad bridge on the Brenner Pass route during a dive-bombing attack by P-47 Thunderbolts. This target was struck repeatedly by 12th Air Force B-25 medium bombers and P-47s in the "Battle of the Brenner." 12th Air Force action successfully kept the route closed to through traffic in spite of determined anti-aircraft defenses and repair efforts by the Germans.

North Apennines — Po Valley Campaigns

by Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, jr., USA

Commanding General Third Army; Commanding General, Fifth Army, December 1944 *to October* 1945; *Subsequently Commanding General Third Army in Germany*

LATE October 1944 found the most advanced elements of the Fifth Army facing the enemy in the rugged Italian mountains eight miles south of the key city of Bologna. The push to the north, which six months earlier had begun south of Rome, had continued without interruption for nearly two hundred and fifty miles. But in the mud and cold of the northernmost Appennines it had ground slowly to a stop with the Army still confronted by an enemy determined to take full advantage of the difficult terrain and abominable weather.

Lt. Gen. Truscott

The six-months offensive had involved hard steady fighting with little rest. Losses in battle-experienced officers and men had been high and, in July, three seasoned infantry divisions (the 3rd, 36th and 45th) together with many Army and Corps units were withdrawn from the Fifth Army for the invasion of southern France. Supply routes were poor, long and strained. A winter which brought much snow and rain had arrived—the enemy was again in strongly prepared defensive positions on dominating terrain—the Fifth appeared destined to spend another winter in the mountains.

In spite of the natural desire of the individual to hibernate and await the coming of Spring, it was essential that the troops be kept alert. This was accomplished through the constant probing of enemy lines, raids on his positions, training, rehabilitation of equipment, build up reserves of supplies, ammunition, and the recuperation of individuals at rest camps where they found much needed rest and relaxation. Through all each man was imbued with the one idea "preparation for the Spring Offensive which would end the war in Italy."

On 19 February the 10th Mountain Division, recently arrived in Italy, attacked and captured Monte Belvedere, a critical height in the western sector. The advance continued and succeeded in clearing an area in its sector about five miles in front of the previously held line. After 16 days of successful advance a halt was called as the time was not yet ripe for a full-scale assault.

The Spring offensive was planned in four general phases: (1) A diversionary attack up the west shore toward La Spezia; (2) Capture and consolidation of a position around Bologna; (3) Development of the Po River positions; (4) Crossing of the Po and sealing off of the Brenner route, main enemy exit from Italy, and the development of the Adige River positions.

On 1 April, Fifth Army's Operations Instruction for the Spring Offensive was issued. The Army would attack with Corps abreast—IV Corps on the left—II Corps on the right. IV Corps, commanded by Lt. General Willis D. Crittenberger (then Major General), consisted of the 92nd Infantry Division, 442d and 473d Infantry Regiments, Brazilian Expeditionary Force (BEF), 10th Mountain Division, 1st Armored Division, and attached units. The II Corps, commanded by Lt. General Geoffrey Keyes (then Major General), consisted of the 6th South African Armored Division, 88th Infantry Division, 91st Infantry Division, 34th Infantry Division and the Italian Legnano Gruppo. The 85th Infantry Division was to be in Army reserve.

For the operations on the west flank of the Army the 92d Division was augmented by the 442d and 473d separate regiments.

At first light on the 5th of April the Japanese Americans of the 442d attacked in the hills just east of the Ligurian coastal plain. Late that afternoon the 370th Infantry Regiment, an organic unit of the 92d Division, was committed. Their combined mission was to keep the enemy occupied in the west while preparations proceeded for the major attack to the east.

(*Continued on page* 198)



Tactical Air Operations in Europe

by Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USA

Commanding General Ninth Air Force, August 1944 to July 1945; Subsequently Assistant Chief of Air Staff, AAF

THE Ninth Air Force was the tactical air force which in association with American ground forces invaded Europe and successfully carried the war into the heart of Germany. Its own headquarters planned over-all tactical air operations with that of Twelfth Army Group. Each of its Tactical Air Commands functioned in intimate association with an American Army —IX TAC with the First, XIX TAC with the Third, and XXIX TAC with the Ninth — and each of these commands used its fighter - bombers in close cooperation with its opposite number on the air-ground team.

Lt. Gen. Vandenberg

Air-ground teamwork had been planned before D-day. It had been perfected in the course of the assault on the beaches, the breakthrought at St. Lo, and the subsequent drive across France. It was to exhibit its full vigor and its full effectiveness in the period from November 1944 to VE-day (8 May 1945). But from the beginning to the end of its career the Ninth Air Force based its operations upon the fundamental principles laid down for the observance of a tactical air force by Field Manual 100-20. It was always mindful of its three-fold mission: (1) to attain and maintain air superiority, (2) to isolate the battlefield, and (3) to provide close air cooperation with ground units in combat.

Adverse weather limited operations at the beginning of the period, but nevertheless the Ninth Air Force coordinated its efforts with those of the American armies which enveloped Metz and advanced to the Siegfried Line in the south, and, in the north, drove across the Aachen plain to the Roer river. Its bombers and fighter-bombers harried enemy lines of communications and bombed railway yards and depots, thereby reducing the enemy capacity to reinforce and supply his front line troops. They also assisted in opening the way for the ground assault. On all operational days fighter-bombers were at hand to cover advancing columns and responded to ground's requests for attacks on enemy installations. Their success in smashing enemy counterattacks was notable. So, too, were their attacks on the many towns within the battle area which sheltered enemy concentrations, depots, and facilities and often served as fortified centers of resistance.

In December the central points of the Ninth Air Force's operations was the reduction of the salient produced by the Germans' Ardennes offensive, launched on the night of 16-17 December. Foul weather all but eliminated air operations until the 23d, but thereafter it allowed air power to exhibit its full prowess as a member of the American air-ground team. In defense the Ninth provided cover so effective as to permit major American movements on traffic-jammed highways in broad daylight without serious air interference. By offensive action it created rail and road blocks which limited the enemy's support of his initial success, and rendered the appearance of any support extremely uncertain in respect to time. Moreover, the necessarily heavy concentrations of enemy traffic on roads and railways were effectively dealt with. So great did the role of air in the "Battle of the Bulge" become, that the GAF sought to counter in force, but the damage done to American planes in the air and on the ground was more than offset by the losses which it experienced.

In the later phases of the war against Germany the Ninth Air Force continued its characteristic activities at the highest possible tempo. Its fighter-bombers cooperated directly with the advancing ground troops

(*Continued on page* 198)

AAF Photo

The Bad Munster rail bridge after an attack by B-26 Marauders of the 9th Bombardment Division. The structure, supporting the main line tracks between Kaiserlautern and Bad Krueznach, served supply and reinforcement movements to troops opposing the U. S. Third and Seventh Army units.

The Seventh Army From the Vosges to the Alps

by Lieutenant General A. M. Patch, Jr., USA

*Commanding General, Seventh Army, March 1944 to June 1945; Subsequently Commanding General Fourth Army**

AUTUMN of 1944 found the Seventh Army facing the Vosges Mountains over which lay the Alsace Plain, the Rhine River, and Southern Germany. Previously, the Army had fought its way from the beaches of Southern France to the foothills of the Vosges, about five hundred miles.

It had linked up with the Third Army during the middle of September, assumed command of the XV Corps, turned over command of the 1st French Army to the Sixth Army Group, and was making preparations for an attack designed to liberate Strasbourg, and clear the Alsace Plain, and to make possible a crossing of the Rhine River.

For approximately a month prior to the attack through the Saverne Gap, the supply situation had been critical due to the extremely long supply line. Time was required to build up stocks.

Signal Corps Photo

Lt. Gen. Patch, (right) talks with Field Marshal Von Rundstedt through an interpreter. Colonel Quinn, G-2, (left), looks on.

The Germans were on the slopes and in the forests of the Vosges foothills and for the month of October, except for the bitter fighting in the Forest of Parroy, enjoyed the luxury of a breathing spell for the reorganization of its routed elements. As the Nineteenth Army had linked up with the main German Army in Northern France, the Germans intended to hold on the Vosges, rather than to fall back to the Siegfried Line and the Rhine; and to that end their divisional structures were regularized along with feverish defensive organization and construction.

Attack of 13 November 1944 breached Vosges mountain defensives, liberated Strasbourg and cleared northern Alsace Plain.

After numerous localized actions by the VI and XV Corps, the Army was in position to launch a large scale maneuver, and on 13 November began the attack which resulted in the breach of the Vosges positions and the surrender of Strasbourg.

At this point the tactical plan under which the Seventh Army had been operating was ordered changed. Instead of crossing the Rhine north of Strasbourg, for which preparations had been made, the Army was ordered to change direction and advance north astride the Low Vosges and generally parallel to the river.

This change in direction, which forfeited taking a chance on a short cut to the heart of Southern Germany, gave the Germans much needed time; for the breakthrough to Strasbourg had split the German First and Nineteenth Armies and only weak forces were east of the river to contest a crossing.

Before the Seventh Army could launch a coordinated drive to the northeast it had to shift both corps and reduce

German offensive "Northwind" begun on New Year's Day. Germans employed 16 Divisions against 8 reinforced U.S. Divisions.



Attack of 15 March 1945 drove through Siegfried Line in Sarr Palatinate to Rhine River in ten days.

*After a brilliant military career, Gen. Patch died 21 Nov. 1945 at Ft. Sam Houston, Tex.

(*Continued on page 194*)

The Battle Of The Brenner

by Major General B. W. Chidlaw, USA

*Deputy Commanding General, Engr. T-3, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio**

Maj. Gen. Chidlaw

OLD man Winter descending on northern Italy in late 1944 found the tired and depleted Allied Armies facing a determined enemy, firmly entrenched on the northern fringe of the Apennines. Our armies had heroically breached the formidable Gothic Line; however, the Germans were making a determined last stand south and east of Bologna to defend and keep the Valley of the Po, Italy's principal industrial and agricultural region, moreover, an important source of supplies and foodstuffs to the Reich homeland.

To maintain her Armies with oil and munitions and to exploit the Po Valley region, Germany depended on two principal rail and road networks—the Brenner Pass and the routes through northeastern Italy. Of these, the Brenner was of far greater importance.

The Brenner Pass Line, extending south from Innsbruck, Austria snakes its way 168 miles through the Alps to its southern terminus at Verona, Italy. By virtue of this position, Verona became the hub of the largest concentration of enemy depots, food dumps and other military installations. From this point supplies were fanned out in every direction, by rail, motor and even horse drawn vehicles. The Brenner funnel was thus the very life-line of the German forces in Italy.

As winter's rain, snow and mud joined with the impossible terrain of the Appennines to bring the Allied advance to a standstill, a decision was reached to minimize the air effort immediately in front of the armies and to throw our full weight into a long range interdiction program leading toward the isolation of the Po Valley and setting the stage for an Allied spring offensive. The soundness of this decision was conclusively proven by our later successes. Thus began the Battle of the Brenner.

Prior to November 1944, the 15th Air Force heavies, as well as our own medium bombers, had made successful, although isolated, attacks against communications centers on the Brenner Line. With "Operation Bingo" on 6 November 1944, an all-out attack against the electrical installations of the Brenner Line, our program was begun. This effort was supplemented by repeated fighter-bomber attacks against bridges, cuts, tunnels, marshalling yards—in fact no likely target was left untouched.

The first principle of tactical air operation—control of the skies—had been insured by fighters and fighter-bombers of the 12th Air Force and the British Desert Air Force. Unceasing counter air force operations had rendered the Luftwaffe impotent. Our night fighters and A-20 light-bombers, pioneering the role of night intruders in the Mediterranean Theater of Operation, made enemy air operations and movement of their troops and supplies nearly as hazardous at night as it was in daylight.

As our operations intensified, the German flak density increased. Stripping many forward positions, the enemy threw everything he had into his efforts to protect the vital Brenner artery. This did not stop us.

(*Continued on page* 186)



*Commanding General, 22nd Tactical Air Command September 1944 to March 1945; Commanding General, 12th Air Force, April 1945 to May 1945.

Ninth Army's Operations In Germany

by Lieutenant General William H. Simpson, USA

Commanding General, Ninth Army, May 1944 to September 1945; Subsequently Assigned to Second Army

ONE of the marked developments of World War II was the extreme flexibility shown in the grouping and regrouping of tactical units of all sizes from Battalion to Army in strength. This constant shifting was made necessary by the speed and fluidity with which the war progressed. In accordance with this principle, the Ninth Army, which had initially entered action in a secondary role in the Brittany Peninsula, was shifted to the Western Front in Belgium and Luxembourg in early October 1944. After less than a month in this relatively quiet sector the Army Headquarters was suddenly moved to Southern Holland, at the same time giving up its sole Corps, the VIII, in exchange for the XIX.

Lt. Gen. Simpson

This shift placed the Ninth Army on the Northern flank of the 12th Army Group and immediately south of the Second British Army (in 21st Army Group). The Ninth Army now found itself with a limited zone of action in the area where the Siegfried Line had been pierced the preceding month. Here the Army waited, confining itself to patrol action and limited objective attacks, while strength was gathered for the offensive which was to commence 16 November 1944.

The objective of this offensive was the capture of Cologne and the west bank of the Rhine north of Bonn. Main effort was to be made by the First Army. The Ninth Army was to protect the left flank of the First, clear the West bank of the Rhine in its limited zone, then be prepared to regroup and with additional forces, advance to the North to eliminate the remaining German resistance west of the Rhine. The start of this offensive was delayed to wait the favorable weather necessary for staging the heavy "carpet bombing" which was to precede the attack. The terrain on which the operation took place was flat, open ground stretching toward the Roer river. The area was studded with numerous fortified villages and mine fields. The road net between larger villages was good, but minor roads were poor. Rainy weather reduced trafficability and soon even the surfaced roads were covered with mud. Traction off the roads was extremely poor. Towns and villages were used by the Germans for strong defensive positions. Many of the towns were mutually supporting in their defenses. By the time the attack took place the Ninth Army had increased its strength to two Corps of six Divisions, but due to limited maneuver room the XIX Corps with one Armored and two Infantry Divisions carried the bulk of the offensive for the first few days. The assault of the First and Ninth Armies was preceded by a heavy and medium bomber attack by over 3,000 planes. A mile or two was made the first afternoon. Thereafter each town was taken only after a bitter fight. Early in December all resistance west of the Roer was overcome. It was a battle of attrition particularly in tank fighting. Two crack German Divisions—9 Panzer and 15 Panzer Grenadier, viciously counter-attacked time after time. These divisions were severely mauled and never regained their former fighting power. The bitter delaying action which the Germans fought to gain time cost them heavy casualties which they could ill afford. Two points on the November offensive should be noted. First the exceptionally strong system of mutually supporting defensive works which the Germans had organized by use of small villages and natural and artificial strong points between villages. And second, the disadvantage our armor suffered when forced to fight tank-to-tank battles against the more heavily armored German

Signal Corps Photo

"Alligators" line loading docks in Germany, ready for cargoes of Ninth Army Infantrymen and a trip across the Roer River. Initial crossing was made by the U. S. Ninth Army.

(*Continued on page* 190)

Fifteenth Air Force

by Lieutenant General N. F. Twining, USA

Commanding General Twentieth Air Force, Pacific; formerly Commanding General Fifteenth Air Force, Italy

THE United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe were established for the purpose of completing the strategic air encirclement of Germany and her satellites, and to this command was assigned two air forces, the Eighth and Fifteenth.

Thus when the 15th A.F. began operations from Italian bases in 1 November 1943 and coordinating with the 8th A.F. operating from England the encirclement was complete. To accomplish this task were twenty-one heavy bomb groups, seven fighter groups, weather and photo reconnaissance units and various service units representing 90,000 officers and men.

Lt. Gen. Twining

The primary objective for the 15th A.F. was the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance would be fatally weakened. The first step towards the accomplishment of this objective was the destruction of the German Luftwaffe. Continued attacks on his fighter aircraft in the air and on the ground, together with the destruction of his aircraft factories was the order of the day.

Attainment of this goal was attested to by the ability of our formations to roam at will over continental Europe, with negligible air opposition, during the last eight months of the war.

When the German Luftwaffe ceased to be a real threat to air operations the main weight of the attacks was brought to bear relentlessly against all axis oil refineries and oil supply installations within our striking radius. Beginning with our first attack against the great oil producing and refining center at Ploesti 4 April 1944 the oil bombing program was pushed with an ever-increasing tempo. At the end of a year's operation against oil targets in March of 1945 I was proud of what the 15th A.F. had accomplished, as at this time the enemy was producing no gasoline within the range of our bombers.

The Battle of Oil to deprive the Germans of the life blood for their war machine was bitterly contested by the enemy. The defense of his refineries was continually strengthened with numbers of anti-aircraft guns being doubled and trebled, making these the most heavily defended targets in Europe. Heavy smoke screens were employed covering the entire target area thus requiring instrument bombing, a new technique at that time. As a result of these determined defenses our loss rate against oil targets was three times higher than attacks against communication targets.

Such names as Ploesti, Brux, Blechhammer, Moosbierbaum and others will never be forgotten by the brave and courageous flyers who repeatedly rode through the "flak alleys" in these furious air battles to make these names famous.

In the words of Marshal Goering: "The attacks on synthetic oil works were the most effective of all strategic bombing and the most decisive in Germany's defeat. Without fuel nobody can win a war." The Fifteenth's air campaign against oil deprived Hitler of 52% of the total gasoline initially available to him.

Concurrently with the bombing of oil targets attacks were constantly maintained on the enemy communication and supply lines. More than 50% of the bombs dropped by the force was aimed at these targets. In the Balkans the big marshalling yards at Bucharest and Ploesti loaded with war materials were destroyed at a critical time in the war. Communications centers serving the German divisions and holding up the Russians in their drive towards Budapest and Vienna were bombed frequently. These attacks struck military traffic parked in yards, located in some cases, only a few miles from the Russian lines and were carried out in response to requests from the Russian high command.

Before the invasion of South France our job was to destroy the communications, both land and sea, in that area. This was accomplished by attacks on the great ports of Marseille and Toulon, and by destroying bridges over the Rhone River. The success of these attacks, together with those made prior to the allied landings against sea coast defenses was apparent as only light opposition was encountered during the landing by the invasion forces.

The Brenner Pass communication system extending 130 miles through the Alps became a vitally important target and it was our task to keep this line closed. It was a difficult one due to the height of the mountains, with the targets in extremely narrow defiles, and with prevailing bad weather. We doubted the degree of our successes but they were more fruitful than we knew as evidenced by the smashing success of allied armies in North Italy in April of 1945. To a considerable degree the lack of mobility and isolation of the Germans south of the Alps was caused by these attacks on the Brenner route.

Attacks against communication targets continued up to the last day of the war. All marshalling yards of any importance in North Italy, Austria and southern Germany were

(*Continued on page* 186)

Operations of Fifteenth U. S. Army

by Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow, USA

Commanding General, Fifteenth Army, January, 1945 to October, 1945; subsequently, Commandant Command and General Staff School

HEADQUARTERS Fifteenth Army, having been activated at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, in September 1944, embarked from the New York Port of Embarkation on 15 November 1944. Shipment was through the United Kingdom. The headquarters landed on the European continent on 29 December 1944, and set up its initial command post at Suippes, France, later moving to Dinant, Belgium, and Bad Neuenahr, Germany. The Army was assigned to Twelfth Army Group.

Lt. Gen. Gerow, photographed just prior to assuming command of the 15th Army, 15 Jan. 1945.

The initial mission given the Army was that of receiving, processing and moving to forward Army areas field force units arriving on the continent from the United States and from the United Kingdom. This mission entailed the coordination of the unloading, equipping, and otherwise processing field force units arriving at the port of Le Havre. During the first three months of 1945, 300,000 troops were thus processed and sent to destinations in the First, Third, and Ninth Army areas. Other early missions assigned were the rehabilitation, re-equipping and reinforcing of various units that had suffered heavy losses in the Ardennes Campaign; command of units in SHAEF reserve; and the organization and direction of an integrated British and American staff charged with the preparation of plans for the occupation and administration of the British and United States Sectors in Berlin.

On 30 March 1945, the Army assumed its first operational role. This mission was the defense of a stretch of 62 miles of the west bank of the Rhine River, extending from Hamburg, Germany, south to Bonn, Germany. The Army continued to hold this Rhine River line until the reduction of the Ruhr Pocket on 18 April 1945.

On 31 March 1945, the Army in addition to its other missions took over the task of containing the German pockets of resistance in the Twelfth Army Group Coastal Sector in Western France. These were known as the St. Nazaire and Lorient Pockets with German garrisons aggregating approximately 50,000 troops. The 66th US Infantry Division (Reinforced) and attached French troops were assigned this duty. The German garrisons surrendered unconditionally on 8 May 1945.

Coincident with the assumption of the first operational mission the Army was given the further mission of occupying that portion of Germany from the Rhine River to the western border within the Twelfth Army Group Zone. The occupational area continued to expand and, by 27 April 1945, the Army had organized and was controlling the Rhine Province, Saar-

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

German Reaction to Allied Conduct of the War

by Colonel Francis V. Fitzgerald, USA

Director Public Relations Division, Hq., U. S. Forces European Theater

GERMANY'S top military leaders after their defeat look back through the war years to report that the African landings came as a surprise, that they knew of the coming of the Normandy invasion and that Allied air power was the largest factor in their downfall.

Fritz Bayerlien, Lieutenant General of Panzertruppen, Chief of Staff to Rommel in Africa, and later a commander on the Western front, set Germany's defeat back in 1940. It was then that Hitler turned his armor south leaving the annihilation of the British at Dunkirk to the unsuccessful Luftwaffe.

"We had only one chance to win the war—only one. This was at Dunkirk," he told interpreters. "We should have attacked and destroyed the British army. We were told that the Luftwaffe would take care of the British and our Panzerkorps was ordered to wheel to the left, but the Luftwaffe failed. Dunkirk was Germany's only chance to finish the war victoriously."

Col. Gen. Alfred Jodl, Chief of Staff in the German High Command, was asked what consideration was given to an invasion of England prior to complete conquest of France. The conquest of France was undertaken as the alternate to invasion of England inasmuch as the German High Command did not believe England would continue to fight, he explained. However, on 2 July 1940, orders for the invasion were given. These were abandoned in October but a pretense of plans for such an invasion was maintained for morale purposes, he said.

For a successful invasion of England Jodl believed that 10 divisions would have to be landed in the first 10 days while the Luftwaffe dealt with both the RAF and the Royal Navy. When invasion plans were dropped it had been decided to defeat England by way of Italy and the Middle East. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Commander in Chief in Italy, said he strongly urged invasion of England after Dunkirk. It was generally realized in Germany that England was in a critical condition, he added.

Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the German High Command, said existence of the British fleet was the greatest risk to the proposed invasion. The German army was ready. He reported the navy was dubious, shipping was lacking, and the Air Corps was limited always by weather. Hitler, therefore made the final decision against an attempted invasion.

Jodl and Keitel both reported

(*Continued on page* 188)

Continental Way Station

by Major General B. F. Giles, USA

Commanding, Africa-Middle East Theater

ON March the first, 1945, USAFIME ceased to exist and AMET, (Africa-Middle East Theater) took its place. This change in designation reflected the enlarged territory of the theater resulting from the absorption of all the territory in north west Africa formerly controlled by MTOUSA, and extension of activities into Turkey.

Work in AMET does not suffer from any sense of claustrophobia. From Casablanca and Dakar on the Atlantic to the Euphrates River in ancient Mesopotamia, running east; and from Istanbul on the Bosphorus to Cape Town at the southern tip of Africa, the theater includes many diverse countries and peoples, presenting by their very complexity a never-ending series of problems requiring solution.

The theater is now organized with general headquarters at Cairo, Egypt, and three service commands; the Middle East Service Command, with headquarters at Camp Russell B. Huckstep, Egypt; the Eritrea Base Command, with headquarters at Asmara, Eritrea; and the North African Service Command, with headquarters at Casablanca, French Morocco. With the cessation of activities on the Central African Division, ATC, the West Africa Service Command, with headquarters at Accra, was deactivated and its liquidation entrusted to North African Service Command.

The main mission of the theater is, of course, the supply and servicing of Air Transport Command activities within its boundaries. With the progress of the war in Europe the string of airports forming the Central African route of ATC became unessential, and was abandoned. This route, starting at Accra on the Gold Coast of British West Africa, and crossing the Dark Continent through Lagos, Maiduguri, El Geneina, El Fasher, and Khartoum on the Nile to Aden, and thence up the south Arabian Coast to the Persian Gulf, had played its essential part in the early days of the war when it was the only protected air route to India and China. Its establishment and the service performed by the troops assigned to the

Maj. Gen. Giles

(*Continued on page* 213)

III Corps Operations

by Major General James A. Van Fleet, USA

Commanding General III Corps

ON 7 March 1945 the world was electrified by a sensational communique from the Western Front. A railway bridge—the Ludendorff spanning the haughty Rhine River at Remagen—had been seized by Major General John Millikin's III Corps, operating under the control of General Courtney Hodges' First Army.

Maj. Gen. Van Fleet

The III Corps, which had exploited speed and surprise to make the greatest bridge "grab" of the European war, had come a long way since first experiencing baptismal fire under General Patton's Third Army. At Fortress Metz, early in December, Corps had crushed the last of the mighty strongholds — Fort Jeanne D'Arc.

At the height of Von Rundstedt's drive into the Ardennes, Corps was told by General Patton to move to Luxembourg prepared to attack. With specific orders "to relieve Bastogne and strike toward St. Vith," this "Phantom" Corps moved to Arlon and on 22 December attacked with the 4th Armored Division and the 80th and 26th Infantry Divisions. (The 6th Armored and 35th Infantry Divisions later replaced the 4th and Eightieth.) On 26 December contact was made with the 101st Airborne and elements of the 9th and

Ludendorff bridge at Remagen.

10th Armored Divisions which had been surrounded in the Bastogne area. The enemy's strong counter-attack near Lutrebois on the 30th to reisolate Bastogne was crushed with the Germans losing 30 tanks in a single day. On 9 January, the Corps, reinforced and spearheaded by the 90th Infantry Division, made a fierce attack against the shoulder of resistance centering in Harlange. The attacking infantry and armor kept driving relentlessly during what will go down in history as our severest winter fighting. By January's end, III Corps held the ridge between the Clerf and Our Rivers with the 6th Armored Division, 17th Airborne Division and the 6th Cavalry Group. The "Sky Line Drive" again dominated the Siegfried Line.

On 10 February Corps was ordered from Third to First Army, and within three days the "Phantom" was

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

Up the Italian Shin Bone

by Lieutenant General Willis D. Crittenberger

Commanding General IV Corps, March 1944 to October 1945;
Subsequently Commanding General Caribbean Defense Command

ON 15 July 1945, the IV Corps ended 401-days of continuous operations in Italy. It had pursued the Wehrmacht up the shin bone of the Italian boot north of Rome and a series of quick and powerfully implemented maneuvers had brought it to the Arno River, thereby completing its share of the Fifth Army operations that are known as the Rome-Arno Campaign.

Lt. Gen. Crittenberger

Pausing for a time along the Arno while the Fifth Army regrouped and moved up its supply installations, IV Corps began the North Apennines Campaign by attacking the German so-called "Gothic Line," built on dominating terrain, made stronger still by concrete and wire emplacements, along the southern slopes of the western part of the Apennine Mountains. With the other Allied troops, IV Corps breached the "Gothic Line" and by 1 November 1944, had reached the northern fringe of the Apennines.

The IV Corps then found itself faced with the prospects of a winter campaign in tortuous mountains along a continuous front of approximately seventy-three miles from the Tyrrhenian Sea south of La Spezia east through the backbone of the Apennines and along its northern fringes to a point about twenty miles southwest of Bologna. Comparatively few troops were available for our long corps front and every possible use was made of the means at hand. Anti-aircraft personnel converted into infantry held their share of the line along with regular infantry and armor from American colored and white troops, Brazilians, British, South Africans and Italians. It may be doubted whether in any other instances allied cooperation and determination were more clearly evident.

The North Apennines Campaign was a typical example of mountain operations in the winter and offered many difficult problems in this specialized type of combat. Supply and tactics in cold and deep snow were mastered by troops relatively inexperienced in this type of warfare with an ingenuity and determination worthy of the highest commendation.

The IV Corps Apennines front was divided by terrain features into several natural routes of approach and down one of these, the Serchio River Valley, the enemy attempted a limited objective offensive on a relatively small scale on Christmas Day. He was thwarted in this attempt, the only offensive he was able to muster against IV Corps during the entire campaign. On the other hand, IV Corps maintained a continuous series of limited objective thrusts designed to secured dominating terrain and keep the enemy in a constant state of alert.

In December, specially trained mountain troops began to arrive in Italy which greatly strengthened the position of IV Corps and gave it the added power necessary for its important role in the coming Spring offensive.

Toward the close of the campaign, the German Field Commander, Kesselring, was transferred to the Western Front and was thus personally saved from the devastating defeat due his forces in Italy. The close of the North Apennine campaign found the IV Corps facing the enemy with experienced, rested troops. Positions had been improved, supplies built up and plans for the final offensive completed. The long winter had left IV Corps richer by much experience, poised for the last blow, and had robbed the enemy of the essential reserves and materials, the lack of which were to cost him Italy.

On 14 April 1945, IV Corps opened its Po Valley Campaign, which was its last and which ended on 2 May 1945 with the surrender to the Corps of all German and Italian Republican forces in Northwest Italy. From the jump-off positions in the Apennines the IV Corps debouched into the Po Valley just to the west of Bologna, thereby turning the city's defenses and by speed of maneuver and sheer power rendered the German defenses in our front untenable. The enemy, dazed, retreated in hopeless confusion to the north. IV Corps raced to the Po River, forced a crossing and continued to the Alps, breaching the enemy Adige Line north of Verona and at the same time changing the direction of the entire corps attack from the north to northwest. By rapid thrusts of powerful armored columns directed to the northwest along the northern fringes of the Po Valley all escape routes in the Alps were denied the now completely routed Wehrmacht and the great cities of Milan and Turin were captured. Simultaneously, infantry debouching from the Apennines to the west sliced the enemy to ribbons, surrounding and capturing whole units. Methodically the cleaning up of all enemy forces in Northwest Italy was begun.

On 29 April the Ligurian Army surrendered to IV Corps and on 2 May the surrender of the LXXV German Corps accounted for the destruction or surrender of all German and Italian Republican armies in Northwest Italy. Remnants of twenty-three German Divisions were captured, and 170,000 prisoners-of-war, including twenty-one general officers, the latter in a two-day period, passed through IV Corps prisoner-of-war cages.

During the 401-days of continuous operations, 246,366 Allied troops, including American, British, South African, Indian, Brazilian and Italian troops, served

(*Continued on page* 186)

V Corps From Belgium to Czechoslovakia

by Major General C. R. Huebner, USA

Commanding General V Corps, January 1945 to June 1945;
Subsequently Assistant Chief of Staff AGF

V CORPS, with the First United States Army, found itself, on 1 November 1944, in the Siegfried Line, occupying a sector forty miles in length, running from a point just South of Hurtgen, through Lammersdorf and Monschau, to a point just South of Udenbreth where it made contact with VIII Corps. VII Corps was operating on the North flank East of Aachen.



Major General Huebner came to the Corps in December from the 1st Infantry Division which he had commanded during all its operations on the continent. He assumed command of the Corps in January 1945, relieving Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow who then assumed command of the Fifteenth United States Army.

It had become apparent that possession of the large reservoirs on the Roer and Urft Rivers was essential in order that the Allied forces to the North might cross the Roer River and advance to the Rhine, since floods in the Roer River below these reservoirs would seriously handicap large-scale operations East of that stream. The Corps carried out operations during November and the early part of December designed to capture or neutralize these reservoirs. While the reservoirs themselves were not captured during these operations, the bank of the Roer River was reached and key terrain consisting of the Hurtgen Forest and the towns therein was taken.

Maj. Gen. Huebner

On 13 December the Corps launched an attack with the 2nd and 99th Infantry Divisions attacking from the vicinity of Krinkelt to the Northeast towards the Urft Reservoir. The 78th Infantry Division attacked from the vicinity of Lammersdorf toward Simmerath and Kesternich.

On 16 December, the German attack, opening the Ardennes Campaign, was heralded by shelling of the Corps Command Post at Eupen. By nightfall, prongs of this attack, coming from the direction of Prum and Schleiden, had cut across the flank and rear of the 2nd and 99th Infantry Divisions. In the early morning of the 17th, the Germans dropped some 500 parachutists about two miles South of Eupen on the Höhe Fenn. The 1st, 9th, and 30th Infantry Divisions, the 82nd Airborne Division, the 5th Armored Division, and elements of the 3rd Armored Division, were assigned to the Corps and moved in rapidly, extending the front of the Corps from Butgenbach through Malmedy, Stavelot, and LeGlaise, to the vicinity of Werbomont. The 30th Infantry Division and the 82nd Airborne Division were subsequently taken over by the XVIII Airborne Corps when the latter arrived. The 102nd Cavalry Group, elements of the 395th Infantry, 99th Infantry Division, and elements of the 9th Infantry Division, sustained heavy attacks in the vicinity of Monschau on 17 and 18 December without loss of ground. The 1st Infantry Division sustained extremely heavy attacks in the vicinity of Butgenbach and, extending West to Weismes, beat off and destroyed parts of the 12th SS Panzer "Hitler Jugend," and the 3rd Parachute Division, together with elements of other divisions of the Wehrmacht, which succeeded these elite fighting divisions. The parachute drop failed completely. Its leader was captured and the remnants killed or captured. The 2nd and 99th Infantry Divisions were extricated and, while suffering heavy losses, held the corner at Elsenborn throughout the battle.

Late in January, the Corps pushed South from the Weismes area and captured Ambleve. The

(*Continued on page* 196)

Operations of the VII Corps

by Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins, USA

Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces; Commanding General VII Corps

14 *February* 1944 *to* 24 *August* 1945

THE teamwork and fighting spirit of the fine divisions and corps troops of VII Corps created a splendid record during the first four months of the European campaign. The most notable achievements during this period were the assault of Utah Beach on D-Day; the sealing-off and capture of the important port of Cherbourg; the decisive breakthrough of German Hedgerow defenses in the vicinity of Marigny, France; the defeat of the enemy's concentrated offensive which intended to separate Allied Forces near Mortain, France; the pursuit across France; the annihilation of strong German forces withdrawing near Mons, Belgium; the piercing of the strong Siegfried Line and the capture of the large German city of Aachen.

Lt. Gen. Collins

Renewing the offensive on 16 November, VII Corps, supported by a bombardment of 4,000 heavy, medium and fighter bombers, launched a powerful drive from the east and southeast of Aachen to the Roer River. This action swiftly cleared the Stolberg-Eschweiler industrial area. Bitter fighting progressed slowly in the dense Hurtgen forest against determined enemy, minefields and pillboxes. Combat in the dark, damp and cold forest presented extreme hardships. By 10 December, the Corps, through its unceasing fighting, had cleared its sector to the Roer River except a small portion of the Hurtgen Forest where the enemy was still stubbornly defending the Roer River dams.

On 16 December, Von Rundstedt initiated his offensive into Belgium and a shift of American troops was necessary. As the offensive progressed the VII Corps was selected as a counter-attacking force from the north to drive the Germans out of the gap. The Corps moved on 21 December to an assembly area near Marche, Belgium, and was committed immediately in very unfavorable weather and difficult combat conditions. All German attempts to breakthrough to the north and west were disastrously beaten back along the entire Corps front. On Christmas Day, the stemming of the German drive was climaxed by the decisive annihilation of the elite German 2d Panzer Division by the U. S. 2d Armored Division near Ciney, Belgium.

With the German thrust decisively stopped, the VII Corps side-slipped to the east and launched a strong attack on 3 January to eliminate the German bulge from the north in Belgium. The 2d and 3d Armored Divisions with the 83d and 84th Infantry Divisions smashed south against fanatical resistance in extremely rugged terrain. Tanks were confined to limited

(*Continued on page* 158)

Rhine River Area, south of Bonn, Germany.





180 Days

by Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.

Commanding General, XIII Corps

COMBAT in Europe necessitated the application of both time-proven and unorthodox principles and methods to overcome problems set up not only by the enemy, but by unexpected factors which affected tactics and supply that arose in the battles and breakthroughs. The unusual was frequently in order, with such things as: abnormal sector widths, simultaneous combat on two or more distinct fronts, corps command posts in operation with bitter fighting 50 miles ahead and 100 miles to the rear, deep spearheading into hostile areas with lines of communication harassed by bypassed enemy. Thousands of prisoners of war, refugees, and displaced persons complicated both tactics and logistics.

Lt. Gen. Gillem

It was found that our teachings and training were sound. In general we were prepared for unusual and unexpected situations for it soon became apparent that all SOP's should include the provisions that all plans must be flexible and variants thereto must be concurrently considered. However, as commander of a United States Corps in action for 180 days in the line, my staff and I learned by experience certain major considerations of war. In formulating plans we stressed the principle of simplicity in anticipation of possible rapid changes. We emphasized the requirement that plans which could be modified without major shifts in troop dispositions and which were not dependent upon complex maneuver were desired. The importance of the maintenance of international relations arose early, as our Corps was in contact with the British on our left flank, during most of our operations. This relationship was enhanced by the knowledge that a tactical blunder affected not only the Corps, but reflected likewise adversely on the American Army. Excellent coordination with the British was achieved after initial mutual lack of familiarity with methods and nomenclature was straightened out. Notable was the extremely effective exchange of support artillery, flamethrowing tanks, and air support.

The XIII Corps was assigned to Ninth United States Army in England in July, 1944. It became operational in Holland on 8 November 1944, not quite two years after activation. In the States it had been a separate corps and had activated, trained, and shipped troops that participated in the African, Sicilian, Italian and French landings and operations in Germany as well as in the Pacific. It had operated the West Virginia Maneuver Area for mountain training; likewise it coordinated amphibious and airborne training. Its troops had been stationed from Vermont to Florida.

Throughout operations in Europe, the 84th and 102d Infantry and 5th Armored Divisions were normally attached to this Corps. Other divisions were attached at various times as operations warranted. Additional troops such as corps artillery, engineer, cavalry, signal, quartermaster, ordnance, anti-aircraft, and other units made up the team which totaled at times more than 75,000 men of all ranks.

The winter months of 1944-45 were spent in smashing through fortified areas of the Siegfried line and limited objective attacks which carried the Corps up to the Roer River. This position was consolidated and held defensively until 23 February 1945. Only a participant can appreciate the epic hardships of this campaign as our men fought mud, snow and ice with resultant trench foot while defeating the best the German army had to offer.

During the Battle of the Bulge (which occurred a few miles to our south) we held what had been previously a two corps sector with two divisions, the 102d

(*Continued on page* 170)

The XV Corps in World War II

by Lieutenant General Wade H. Haislip, USA

Commanding General XV Corps, February 1943 *to June* 1945;
Subsequently President, Secretary of War's Personnel Board

THE XV Corps landed in France on 10 July 1944 and became operational on 31 July. Initially attached to the Third US Army for operations, the Corps exploited the breakthrough at Avranches leading the Third Army in an attack to the East in rear of the German forces. The Corps forced crossings over the Mayenne River, capturing Laval and Mayenne on 6 August and Le Mans on 8 August, an advance of approximately one hundred miles in eight days. Then, changing direction to the north, the Corps advanced to capture Alencon and to reach Argentan, thus forming the southern front of the Falaise Gap. With this operation an assured success, the Corps with two of its four divisions on 15 August advanced east to capture Dreux, changed direction again to the north to reach the Seine River, where it crossed elements at Mantes-Gassicourt on 19 August, to establish the first Allied bridgehead across the Seine. Part of the Corps meanwhile swung north along the Seine reaching the bend directly east of Louviers on 24 August, thus completing the operation which cut off and sealed the fate of the German Seventh Army west of the Seine. From 24 August to 29 August, the Corps was attached to First US Army, during which time it attacked and enlarged its bridgehead.

Lt. Gen. Haislip

Reverting to Third Army control on 29 August, the Corps advanced across France on the right flank of that Army during September, crossing successively the Marne, the Meuse, and the Moselle Rivers, and changing direction to the northeast toward Luneville. On 10 September, contact was made at Sombernon, west of Dijon by right flank elements of the Corps with the Seventh US Army advancing from the South. On 28 September, the XV Corps passed from control of the Third US Army to the Seventh US Army in the Luneville area and remained a part of that Army until the end of hostilities.

The following letter was received from the commanding General, Third Army:

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED
STATES ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
APO 403
29 September 1944

My dear General
Haislip:

My regret at losing you and your command is only equalled by my profound appreciation for and admiration of your magnificent achievements and the superior manner in which, often with inadequate means, you have invariably defeated the enemy.

Please communicate these sentiments to all officers and men of your command and especially to Generals Wyche and LeClerc and to Colonel Vennard Wilson.

May the success you have so richly merited continue to attend you, and may the 7th Army profit as much from your valorous deeds as we have.

Most sincerely,
/s/ G. S. PATTON, JR.
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

In November the Corps smashed through the Vosges Mountains in the vicinity of the Saverne Gap and was the first American or Allied Corps to reach the Rhine River when it captured Strasbourg on 23 November. This was the first time in history that a military force had been able to break through the line of the Vosges.

In December, the Corps was ordered on the defensive west of the Vosges Mountains in order to release many divisions for operations against the German Ardennes Offensive. In early January, the Corps successfully repulsed the strong German thrust west of the Vosges without losing ground.

In the center of the Seventh Army, the Corps attacked on 15 March 1945 and broke through the Siegfried Line, captured Zweibrucken, turned east through the Palatinate and crossed the Rhine on the 26th of March. Then began a succession of river crossings—the Main (four times), the Danube on the 26th of April, the Isar, the Inn, and finally the Salzach, where the Corps crossed into Austria. East of the Rhine, the Corps had captured the important cities of Mannheim, Aschaffenburg, Bamberg, Nurnberg, Munich, and Salzburg, as well as the village of Berchtesgaden.

Any plans the enemy may have entertained for holding out in the Redoubt were quickly erased when the XV Corps struck south and southeast from Munich, quickly exploiting the Inn River Valley and terminating its advance at Salzburg and Berchtesgaden, Austria — 1200 miles from Avranches.

During its more than nine months of combat, the XV Corps at one time or another had in it a total of twenty-six divisions, nearly half of the American divisions in the theater. Of these, fifteen were infantry, eight were armored (including the 2d French Armored Division) and one was airborne.

Although it is difficult to classify casualties as light, regardless of the total, the XV Corps, by careful planning and by the sound and economical employment of troops was able to keep casualties at a minimum throughout its operational period. In fact, even disregarding the many thousands of Germans killed and wounded by the XV Corps, the total battle losses of the Corps (28,710) remain less than one-twelfth of the total number of German prisoners taken by the Corps (352,536).

The XV Corps was able to compile a total of 1066 enemy tanks or self-propelled guns destroyed or captured. Against enemy air attacks, XV Corps Antiaircraft units increased in effectiveness as the campaigns progressed, 197 hostile airplanes being destroyed or damaged.

(*Continued on page* 196)

Eastern Sea Frontier vs. U-Boats

by Vice Admiral H. F. Leary, USN

Commander Eastern Sea Frontier

THE period from 1 November 1944 to V-E Day was marked by an increase in enemy submarine activity in the Eastern Sea Frontier to the highest point reached since 1942. After being badly defeated in all Atlantic areas by surface and air forces during 1943 and early 1944, the German submarine fleet returned to the attack with new equipment designed to reduce greatly the effectiveness of aircraft detection and attack and also to permit coastal operations in focal shipping areas.

Loss of the Biscay bases in the summer of 1944 after the invasion of the continent by Allied forces limited enemy operations to United Kingdom waters in the eastern Atlantic and the coastal areas from Cape Hatteras to Newfoundland in the western Atlantic. Mid-Atlantic operations against convoys lost their attraction to the enemy in view of increased air and surface escort. With attention in the Western Atlantic directed to the heavy traffic area from Cape Hatteras northward, the task of Commander Eastern Sea Frontier became of increasing importance.

During the six months from 1 November 1944 to 1 May 1945 a total of 27,597 merchant ships and transports sailed from or arrived at Eastern Sea Frontier ports. Almost 10,000 of these were in a total of 419 convoys while more than 17,000 sailed independently. Since an average of almost 150 ships per day were arriving or departing at ports in the Frontier, the target area presented to the enemy was an attractive one. That his success was so small is a tribute to the men who manned the ships, planes and blimps which by their constant patrols kept the submarines on the defensive and gave them few opportunities to deliver attacks on shipping.

U. S. Navy Photo

The U-858, first German submarine to surrender to the United States Navy in American waters, gives up 10 May 1945 700 miles off the New England coast.

Vice Adm. Leary

Late in November an enemy submarine made a short patrol in the Gulf of Maine during which two enemy agents were landed at Frenchman's Bay and one small merchant vessel was torpedoed and sunk. Aside from this one action the enemy concentrated his initial Western Atlantic efforts in Canadian waters, principally the approaches to Halifax where several ships were torpedoed and sunk. While there was some evidence of patrol activities by submarines in the New York to Nantucket area during the early months of 1945 no successful attacks were made by either side.



However, recognizing that the shipping concentrations from Cape Hatteras to Cape Sable would not long be neglected by the enemy, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier had a carefully devised plan prepared of coordinated air and surface patrols to make enemy attacks on shipping difficult and at the same time provide the best opportunities for sinking submarines. This plan was the most extensive and all-inclusive ever effected in Western Atlantic waters. It comprised surface forces of destroyer escorts, frigates, corvettes, cutters and PCs on constant patrol of the most vulnerable shipping areas in the seaward approaches to the major ports. Recognizing that submarines would now probably operate submerged both day and night, full use was made of the Coast Guard sailing pickets

(*Continued on page* 200)

Operations of U. S. Naval Forces, France

by Vice Admiral A. G. Kirk, USN

Commander Naval Forces, France

AFTER we forced the landings for the American Armies on the Normandy Beaches and opened the ports of Northwestern France, early December 1944 found the U. S. Naval Forces France distributed and employed over all parts of Northern Europe which at that time had been liberated and occupied by the Armies of the Allies. The Command continued to operate under General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, with its immediate superior the Allied Naval Commander in Chief, first, Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, KCB, etc., until his death in January 1945, and then Admiral Sir H. R. Burrough, KCB.

The ports we occupied stretched from Brest in the west to Antwerp in the East. The main ports for supplying the Armies were Cherbourg, Le Havre and Antwerp; with minor activities continuing at the British "Mulberry" and at Ghent. Rouen on the Seine was opened for some traffic by water and was the principal port for petroleum. Small harbors, such as Morlaix, St. Malo, Granville, were used for local support of our units in the neighborhood, coal being the principal import at Granville. The Channel Islands were still full of Germans and remained in enemy hands until capitulation in May. On the west coast of France, the great ports of L'Orient, St. Nazaire, LaRochelle and Bordeaux were still in the hands of the Germans. The ports at the south of France did not belong to this Command. There was also the headquarters in the Paris area, consisting of operational headquarters in the village of Louveciennes, near St. Germain; the main administrative office in Paris; and the radio station at Trappes.

In addition to the above coastal operations, a Task Group had been organized to assist the Armies in forcing the passage of the Rhine. This Task Group (T.G 122.5) was divided into three Units, each consisting of 24 LCVPs, about 15 LCMs, with attached E-9s (mobile repair); and one such Unit was assigned to each of the three American Armies: Ninth, First, and Third. The landing craft were brought by Tank Recovery Units, from the Seine and from the vicinity of Antwerp, to their deployment positions. Because of their size, special routing over the roads, bridges, and through villages had been necessary, and the Army earmarked this particular equipment for the trip to the front. While the German mid-winter drive against the front of the American First Army was in progress, the activities of the Task Units were considerably restricted. Training had commenced in some of the rivers behind the front, and the German attack was sufficiently powerful to require certain precautionary measures. Fortunately, the operations of the Armies during late December and early January were so successful, first in stopping the German advance, and then hurling back the defeated enemy forces, that the naval equipment was never really in jeopardy.

U. S. Navy Photo

U. S. Navy LCVPs carrying Army men and vehicles cross the Rhine River near Remagen railway bridge. This LCVP is carrying a jeep.

U. S. Navy Photo

Vice Admiral Alan G. Kirk (left), USN, ComNav for France, and Admiral Lemmonier, Chief of French General Staff, are shown in the courtyard of the French Naval ministry in Paris.

During the second week in March our Armies forced the Rhine, commencing with the seizure of the Remagen Bridge on 8 March by elements of the First Army. This was followed by the Ninth Army's assault in the Wesel area; and the Third Army crossed in the vicinity of Weisbaden and other Upper Rhine localities. The Remagen Bridge, the only bridge standing on the Rhine from Strassbourg to the sea, lasted but four or five days, collapsing from enemy damage and stress of traffic. So water-borne transport was essential on all fronts until pontoon bridges could be thrown across. Strong enemy opposition was experienced on the fronts of the Ninth and Third Armies, but the in-

(*Continued on page* 156)

Naval Aviation in the Battle of the Atlantic

by Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, USN

Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet

ONE way of measuring naval aviation's part in the Battle of the Atlantic is to say that U. S. Navy planes sank more than half of the U-Boats sunk by Navy during the war. Another is to describe some of the notable actions: the first time a supposedly vulnerable CVE ploughed into a Nazi wolf-pack and broke up what the Germans thought was an unbeatable mid-ocean blockade; the occasion when two planes from another baby flat-top caught sight of a U-boat and sank it with the first airborne rockets used against the enemy by our armed forces; or, the USS Guadalcanal's capture of the U-505 before her Nazi crew could save her secrets by scuttling.

These actions could be called typical of the dozens which were fought, but the fairest way to tell the story is to treat the action as the final deadly product of a coordinated organization. Thousands of men, months of training and immeasurable effort and ingenuity made it possible for pilots to fly their heavily loaded planes from the rolling and pitching decks of escort carriers in stormy north Atlantic winter weather. Teamwork gave us the power to seek out and destroy the U-Boats when the Nazis thought they were safe.

Vice Adm. Bellinger

The Germans knew they must win the Battle of the Atlantic or lose the war; they strove by every means to keep our convoys from getting through. But more than 17,000 Allied ships did go through and a year before the end of the war the Nazis were

(*Continued on page* 174)



XVI Corps Operations in Europe

by Major General John B. Anderson, USA

Commanding General XVI Corps

THE XVI Corps arrived in the European Theater of Operations from the United States on 25 September 1944, at which time it was assigned to Lieutenant General William H. Simpson's Ninth United States Army. The Corps was engaged in an administrative mission until such time as the Ninth Army was prepared to launch its offensive operation involving a crossing of the Roer River by three Corps and the subsequent advance of these elements to the Rhine River.

Maj. Gen. Anderson

Preparing for this offensive, the XVI Corps became operational on 6 February 1945, as it relieved British units on a sixteen mile front from the vicinity of Roermond, Holland, southeast to Randerath, Germany, on the Ninth Army's northern flank. Opposing the Corps was an intensely fortified section of the Siegfried Line, manned by elements of a German parachute division and two volksgrenadier divisions. Following a 45-minute artillery preparation, the XVI Corps attacked on 23 February 1945, staging a feint crossing of the Roer River with elements of the 79th Infantry Division and making an assault crossing with the 35th Infantry Division. Initial successes were exploited and the bridgehead was expanded rapidly to protect the Ninth Army's northern flank. Utilizing highly mobile task forces composed of reinforced regimental combat teams from the 35th Infantry Division and supporting them with an attack by the 8th Armored Division which was committed east of the Roer River, the Corps swung its attack north through Venlo, Holland, and then east against resistance which increased as its elements approached the Rhine River. The 15th Cavalry Group, protecting the Corps' left flank, contacted First Canadian Army forces approaching from the north. After seizing Lintfort and Rheinberg, Corps forces moved north to assist British troops in driving the enemy from a tenaciously held bridgehead at Wesel. This operation was successfully completed on 11 March 1945, at which time the Corps held a 23,500-yard front along the Rhine after having advanced 45 miles in 16 days.

The XVI Corps was then selected to spearhead the Ninth Army's assault across the Rhine River between Orsoy and Rheinberg and to establish a large bridgehead east of the Rhine and north of the Ruhr industrial area in a meticulously planned offensive involving the entire 21st Army Group (British). Over 120,000 troops and great quantities of engineer equipment were employed in this inland amphibious operation. The assault opened on 24 March 1945 with an artillery preparation in which 54 field artillery battalions participated. While the 75th Infantry Division defended the Corps sector on the Rhine's west bank, the 30th Infantry Division crossed

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

The Drive to the Roer

by Lieutenant General Ray McLain, USA

Commanding General XIX Corps, October 1944 to May 1945

ON 16 November 1944, the XIX Corps was in position extending N. E. from the town of Wurselen, Germany (just east of Aachen), on a front of some 15 miles facing the Roer. Its mission, without quoting it exactly, was to drive to the Roer protecting the left of the First Army whose VII Corps was to make the main effort toward Duren. This was to be a preliminary effort to a final crossing of the Roer and drive to the Rhine.

The situation presented a very interesting tactical problem for the XIX Corps.

The attack was to be preceded by carpet bombing, the bulk of which was to be placed in front of the VII Corps. In the final plan the towns of Aldenhoven, Julich and Linnich and points further in were bombed in lieu of a carpet pattern in the XIX Corps zone. This required an H-hour for the ground troops after midday and left little time to get the attack under way.



The right of the line extended well back toward Aachen, resting on Wurselen where the advance of the 30th Division had been halted because the town was occupied by German engineers who had booby trapped and mined it to perfection. The key to the maneuver in the zone of the 30th Division was a large slag pile on their left which threatened Wurselen. It also pulled the German forces, and caused them to face, north at right angles to the front of the VII Corps, thereby giving immediate effect to protecting their flank and assisting their advance. Original plan was to pinch out the 30th Division by this swing with its left and put it in corps reserve. The slag pile and village near it was taken by smothering it with artillery and rushing it.

Lt. Gen. McLain

The XIII Corps coming in on the north was preparing to take over the Linnich area and crossing, originally planned for the 30th Division when it was pinched out.

In original planning the 29th and 30th Infantry Divisions and the 2nd Armored Division were available for the attack with adequate corps troops. The first question was where to employ the armor? The terrain was quite muddy and it rained constantly. In the center and on the south the villages were quite thick. The armored commander made a thorough reconnaissance before the corps decision was made. He chose the north to avoid the bulk of villages and because his troops were more familiar with it, and the terrain equally as favorable.

Although the corps advance was to the east the general scheme of maneuver was to swing the bulk of it southeast with the 29th in the center making the main effort toward Julich, pinching out the 30th Division on its right. This general turning movement gave further effect to the plan in front of the 30th Division of causing the Germans to face north to meet the threat to their flank as the VII Corps advanced against them from the west.

There were three successive ridges facing the 2nd Armored Division on the north; each containing a segment of the Seigfried line works, in the way of tank ditches, entrenchments, and other works. As the 2nd Armored advanced, its flank was to be taken over by the XIII Corps. Four additional battalions of infantry were attached to it to facilitate this. While its general advance was to the east, its detailed scheme of maneuver was a series of "left hooks" up each of these ridges from the south. After one "left hook" it would deposit an infantry battalion from the XIII Corps and make another "left hook" on the succeeding ridges and repeat the performance. This continued until they reached the Roer, and it was very simple then

(*Continued on page* 196)

The XX Corps' Final Campaigns

by Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, USA

Commanding General, IV Armored Corps, August 1942 *to October* 1943; *XX Corps to May* 1945

WHEN hostilities ended in Europe, the XX Corps was on the Enns River in Austria some 700 miles from the Normandy beaches where it had landed some 11 months before. It had more than 1,200 combat miles behind it.

After the campaign in November 1944 which reduced the Fortress of Metz for the first time since 451 A.D., the XX Corps pushed through the Saar-Moselle triangle to capture Trier 2 March. This was the first of four distinct drives and could be considered completed by 9 March.

The Corps then pressed with four infantry divisions against the Siegfried Line, shattering that line and capturing the Palatinate between 10 and 27 March, the assault on the Rhine and sweep into central Germany followed. The fourth and final phase of the XX Corps' campaign in Europe was the drive from Germany into Austria and the juncture with the Russians on the Enns.

Headquarters XX Corps landed in France shortly after D-Day and by the end of August had driven across six rivers—the Loire, Seine, Vesle, Marne, Aisne, and Meuse to the Moselle. Towns liberated by the armor and infantry of the Corps included Chartres, Melun, Montreau, Fontainebleu, Chateau-Thierry, Epernay, Reims and Verdun.

This campaign across France led the Germans to name the XX Corps the Ghost Corps. The Ghost Corps phase of our operations ended when the XX Corps reached the Moselle in front of Metz early in September, out of gasoline and in bad weather that curtailed air support.

By November General George S. Patton, Jr., commanding the Third Army, had decided to crush resistance in Metz, instead of by-passing the stronghold. The XX Corps attacked on a front of some 40 miles which included Metz as the final objective.

Lt. Gen. Walker

Despite mud and snow aground and weather overhead that prevented air support, armor and infantry forced crossings over the swollen Moselle to attack the forts on the east bank, where a minority of the 43 inter-communicating fortresses were located. One division struck from the north, one from the south and one from the west. The powerful pincer movement resulted in the capture of the stronghold on 19 November, after 14 days of fierce fighting. Several days later the enemy, which refused to surrender, had been dug out man by man, and acceptance of the surrender of the last garrison effected prior to turning over the city to the French.



While pursuing the enemy east of the Saar River it became evident that the Saar-Moselle triangle was a threat to the left flank of the XX Corps and of considerable danger to the Third Army. The German breakthrough in the Ardennes brought the triangle into the strategic picture as the area through which the enemy might thrust to encircle Third Army divisions attacking Field Marshal Von Rundstedt's forces from the South.

On 14 January the 94th Infantry Division initiated limited objective attacks against the enemy's switch position in the Siegfried Line anchored on the Moselle at Thorn.

(*Continued on page* 156)

Combat History of XXI Corps

by Major General F. W. Milburn, USA

Commanding General XXI Corps, December 1943 *to September* 1945

THE reduction of the "Colmar Pocket," the cracking of one of the strongest and most vital portions of the Siegfried Line, the first American crossing of the Danube River followed by a swift penetration into the "National Redoubt" area of Germany and Austria were among the major accomplishments of the XXI Corps which contributed to the final surrender of the German Army on V-E Day.

General Milburn

The XXI Corps sailed overseas from New York aboard the Queen Mary on 3 November 1944, landing at Firth of Clyde, Scotland, on 9 November 1944. During November and early December, the Corps was stationed at Breamore, England, where it handled the processing of all the non-divisional American Field Force units in the United Kingdom.

On Christmas Day 1944, the XXI Corps landed at Rouen, France, and was soon placed in a relatively quiet defensive sector of the Seventh U. S. Army front, in the Saarbrucken area. Elements of the 36th, the 70th and the 103d Infantry Divisions, the 10th Armored Division and the 106th Cavalry Group operated under XXI Corps during this period.

Sudden changes in strategy by higher headquarters in late January brought a new and difficult mission for the XXI Corps. For several months following the rapid autumn advances of the Seventh U. S. and the First French Armies from the invasion beaches of Southern France, the enemy had stubbornly held a strong defensive position on the West bank of the Rhine South of Strasbourg—the famous "Colmar Pocket." This enemy salient posed a constant threat to the security of the entire Sixth Army Group.

Signal Corps Photo

Tanks and vehicles pour over treadway bridge across the Neckar River in the City of Mannheim, Germany.

Operating under the First French Army, the XXI Corps assumed control of a vital sector West and North of Colmar on 29 January. Four stalwart U. S. Divisions, the 3d, "Rock of the Marne," the 28th, the 75th, and the 12th Armored; and two French Armored Divisions, the 2d and 5th, unleashed an avalanche of power against the enemy under the bitterest of winter weather conditions, and over difficult terrain. Within a period of eleven days the fortress city of Neuf-Brisach and metropolitan Colmar had been liberated by these hard-hitting American and French troops. The battered remnants of the Nineteenth German Army fled across the Rhine, after suffering an estimated 19,000 casualties.

Lieut. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, Commanding General of the Sixth Army Group, in a letter of commendation to the XXI Corps on the Colmar operation, stated:

"Your swift advance was an inspiration to the entire Allied Expeditionary Force, and a striking tribute to the superior leadership of your officers and non-commissioned officers, and to the resolute courage of your troops.

"The doggedness and skill with which you pressed home your attack, and in eleven days overcame seemingly insurmountable obstacles, is worthy of the highest praise."

Following the successful reduction of the "Colmar Pocket" in mid-February the Corps returned to its original sector in the Saarland under Seventh Army to play an important part in the Seventh Army offensive of mid-March. In that operation XXI Corps troops smashed a hole in the Siegfried Line permitting the armored might of the 6th Armored Division to crash on into Germany and join forces with other armored spearheads from the Third Army to the North. In this rapidly developing operation the great industrial city of Saarbrucken was captured, the Saarland and Pfalz cleared, and the enemy's forces West of the Rhine put to rout. The 63d, 70th, 71st and 100th Infantry Divisions and the 101 Cav Gp operated under XXI Corps during this period, and elements of the 6th, 10th and 12th Armored Divisions provided slashing armored spearheads which played havoc with the disorganized enemy forces.

The XXI Corps crossed the Rhine on 29 March, employing the 4th, 42d, 44th and 63d Infantry Divisions, along with the 10th and 12th Armored Divisions in rapid advances against the retreating Germans. There was bitter fighting at many points as troops of the Corps crossed the Main River and cleared the bomb-shattered city of Wurzburg by 6 April, and the ball-bearing center of Schweinfurt by 12 April.

(*Continued on page* 170)

Caribbean

by Lieutenant General G. H. Brett, USA-Ret.

Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, November 1942 to October 1945

DEFENSE operations of the vital Caribbean Defense Command during the fourth year of the war were accomplished with a troop strength that had been reduced 17 percent by 1 January 1945 and which was further decreased by another 30 percent before 1 July.



Lt. Gen. Brett

Tactical missions prescribed by the Category of Defense were carried out efficiently and effectively by the Command and its two main components, the Panama Canal Department and the Antilles Department. Overall operations with naval units of the Panama Sea Frontier were coordinated through the Joint Command Post.

In fulfilling its primary mission of defending the strategic Panama Canal, the Panama Canal Department combined the activities of its three major commands—the Sixth Air Force, Panama Coast Artillery Command and the Panama Mobile Force and Security Command.

Patrols of the Sixth Air Force continually traversed an area circling the Isthmus with a radius of approximately 1,000 miles from its home base, Albrook Field. With the end of the war in Europe, the patrols were concentrated against the always present threat of a hostile attack on the Canal from the west.

Aerial missions made thorough observation flights daily throughout the sector having its terminals at Guatemala City, the Galapagos Islands, Talara, Peru and Albrook Field. This territory of approximately 1,500,000 square miles is equivalent to about half of the land area of the Continental United States.

Tactical maneuvers employing all installations in the defended zone were possible on numerous occasions when aircraft carrier forces transiting the Panama Canal executed simulated attacks. These maneuvers, in addition to giving the Navy fliers valuable experience, gave the permanent defense forces interesting and highly instructive deviations from their ordinary routine of constant vigilance and training.

Troops of the Mobile Force and Security Command, in addition to guarding the locks, powerhouses and appurtenances of the Canal, were kept in a high state of efficiency with specialized training in anticipation of the possibility of being called upon to fulfill their principal mission of facing any invading enemy.

While their major activities were confined to the Canal Zone—10 miles wide and 50 miles long—much of their training was accomplished in remote jungle combat maneuver areas. The 295th Regimental Com-

(*Continued on page* 158)

Persian Gulf

by Brigadier General Donald P. Booth, USA

Commanding General, Persian Gulf Command, January 1945 to August 1945; subsequently assigned to Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.

WITH the victory of the armies of the United Nations probably the typical tribute to Major General Donald H. Connolly's Persian Gulf Command is one which appeared in a New York daily newspaper under a date line the Elbe River, Germany, April 28, 1945. After describing the meeting of the U. S. and USSR armies the war correspondent ends the article "And if we don't talk the same tongue, the fact that both sides are using much the same equipment gives common ground for rudimentary conversation. THAT PERSIAN GULF SUPPLY LINE PAID OUT DIVIDENDS HERE."

Brig. Gen. Booth

The PGC with its operation of 600 miles of the Iranian State Railway from Teheran South by the 3rd Military Railway Service, with its Motor Transport Service operating over 650 miles of rugged country, with its airplane assembly plant, its two large truck assembly plants, its efficient port service operated by the 9th Port and 4 port battalions, did indeed pay out dividends to the U. S. Army in so successfully providing a sure line of communications to the Red Army for needed supplies of war.

With the opening of the fourth and last year of the war since Pearl Harbor, the major portion of the work of the Persian Gulf Command was completed. During the preceding two years of its existence there had been delivered to the Russian Army through the Persian Corridor in excess of four and one-half million long tons of munitions and war supplies. The preceding summer had seen the peak of operations when in one month alone—July, 1944—288,644 long tons had been delivered.

This last year has seen each operating service develop and refine its operations and procedures and then finally after V-E, close up shop and disband.

In the latter half of 1944, it became apparent to the War Department that the ability of PGC to deliver cargo to the Russians was in excess of probable future requirements, even allowing for a margin of safety, and in early November the command was ordered to close down Motor Transport Operations and ship the troops elsewhere. Some MTS units with vehicles were transferred to China and shipped to Calcutta, thence via the Ledo Road as soon as it opened. Other units supporting Ordnance and hospital units were sent to ETO and MTO, while some few were returned to the U. S.

Shortly thereafter General Connolly was recalled

(*Continued on page* 200)

The War in the South Atlantic

by Vice Admiral W. R. Munroe, USN

Commander Fourth Fleet and South Atlantic Force

REDUCTION and final withdrawal of U. S. Navy personnel and units, with transfer of activities and necessary equipment to our Brazilian allies was accomplished by the U. S. Navy's South Atlantic Forces during the final stage of the war in Europe and the roll-up that followed.

Vice Adm. Munroe

Our objective naturally was to free as many of our ships, planes and men as possible from the South Atlantic where the campaign against enemy submarines and blockade runners had been won. To send our forces to the Pacific, it was necessary for our cooperative and willing Brazilian friends to take over the responsibility for the area as rapidly as possible.

Thusly, when the day of final victory in Europe came, we were in a position to roll-up our activities in short order. We were ready with a program to evacuate our men and to turn over our facilities in Brazil as fast as the Brazilians and the U. S. Army were able to receive them.

In November, 1944, the start of the period dealt with in this chronicle, German submarines were conspicuous by their absence from the South Atlantic area. Two had been sunk in September by planes of Fleet Airwing Sixteen and the pilots and crews decorated by the commander of the Fourth Fleet. The submarines never again returned in force, but searches later were made for German cargo U-Boats reported to be passing through the slot between South America and Africa.

The only ship torpedoing that occurred from November, 1944, to the end of the war, was that of the British merchantman "Baron Jedburg" on 10 March, 1945, in the vicinity of Ascension Island. Fortunately all hands were rescued and brought to Brazilian ports. Apparently, one of the German cargo subs which had been reported, had contacted the freighter on its way to South Africa and torpedoed her.

(*Continued on page* 154)

Atlantic Training For Naval Victory

by Rear Admiral C. F. Bryant, USN

Commander, Fleet Operational Training Command, U. S. Atlantic Fleet

ONE of the secret weapons of the American Navy that must certainly have surprised the Axis enemies was not only the speed with which we built the ships but also the efficiency with which we produced the crews to man them. It was not enough in the global war just ended for the Navy to train officers and men in their particular specialties. That was only the beginning. After that came the welding of trained men into crews and crews, in turn, into effective fighting units of the fleet.

Rear Adm. Bryant

With enemy submarines lurking in our own coastal waters, ships had to be prepared to deal successfully with the foe from the time they first put to sea. In another theatre, kamikaze planes allowed no practice shots—only the fighting units with practical training had a chance of survival.

Considering the preponderance of ships built or converted and given major repairs on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, the Operational Training Command for the Atlantic had a grave responsibility in furnishing the fleet with ships and men which were fully prepared to meet and subdue the enemy.

The period covered by this special edition of the ARMY AND NAVY JORNAL coincides with my duty as Commander, Fleet Operational Training Command, U. S. Atlantic Fleet. On 31 October 1944, I relieved Rear Admiral D. B. Beary, USN, who had organized and headed this organization since its establishment in February, 1943. COTCLant's mission remained the same.

As outlined by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, this command had three basic functions: (1) To direct, command and supervise operational training of officers and men during assembling of crews for new construction for all seagoing ships 100 feet or more in length, including PT boats but not in-

(*Continued on page* 154)

Iceland Base

by Brigadier General Martinus Stenseth,

Commanding

SINCE 7 July 1941 American armed forces have had the responsibility of protecting Iceland, one of the vital links in the arteries of supply, located in the North Atlantic. Approximately one year previously, on 9 May 1940, the German Consul had gone to the docks at Reykjavik to welcome what he thought was the arrival of the first units of the German invasion forces; but the foresighted British had beaten the Germans to this necessary base by a scant two weeks.

Brig. Gen. Stenseth

In the spring of 1941 the British began to see that their troops would be needed in other critical areas. The entry of British troops into Iceland had made Iceland a theater of operations and the Icelandic Government decided to ask neutral United States to assume the responsibility of defending their country. Both Iceland and Great Britain welcomed the agreement between the Icelandic Government and President Roosevelt whereby we agreed to relieve the British and assume responsibility. On 7 July 1941 a token force of American Marines landed at Reykjavik. Troops continued to pour in and among the early arrivals was the 5th Division to which must go much of the credit for the primary development of this base. On 16 September 1941 Major General Bonesteel assumed command of Iceland and from that time Iceland has been actively under the protection of the United States.

The geographical location of Iceland made her a focal point and an essential base for the successful fighting of the war. The many fjords along the coast of Iceland provided excellent natural harbors for warships and merchant vessels. It was at Iceland that warships refueled and swept out to attack enemy shipping and submarines. It was from Iceland that warships joined convoys headed for Great Britain to provide added protection through the submarine infested British waters. Other warships joined convoys headed for Russia. It was at Iceland that ships took refuge when attacked and damaged on the long sea trips to and from Murmansk.

It was not for sea bases alone the Iceland was essential, for it was across Iceland that much of the air traffic to Europe was flown. While thousands of airplanes used Iceland as a stepping stone; many

(*Continued on page* 160)

Newfoundland

by Brigadier General S. M. Connell, USA

Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command

TURN back your calendar to 3 September 1940. France had fallen and with her all vestige of opposition appeared to have vanished on the European continent. Britain had been beaten bloodily to her knees. There was indeed blood and tears falling to the good English soil. All through Americans ran the sharp fear that the Germans reinforced by captured French and British fleets would land in Canada or the United States. These were certainly black days for democracy.

Brig. Gen. Connell

At this fateful moment Lord Lothian, British Ambassador to the United States and Secretary of State Cordell Hull negotiated the famous "Destroyer Trade" and the British gave as a gesture of goodwill, rights to bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda.

If Britain should fall European Democracy would flee to the New World. We looked to our hemispheric defenses and found them fearfully weak.

On 29 January 1941, the first American troops to go overseas to new bases in World War II landed at St. John's, Newfoundland. Army bases were established in the St. John's Area and Argentia Area and a network of outpost defenses set up covering the island.

A glance at a map will immediately establish the wisdom of this choice for a defensive base. Newfoundland is only 400 miles north of the United States, but it is 800 miles east or about one third of the way to England. Planes and ships travelling the "great circle" course (the shortest route) pass over or beside Newfoundland.

Newfoundland had three vital tactical missions in this war for the United States and Canada. First it was the front line of American defense in depth. Planes and ships based on this island could meet the enemy closer to their own shores than to ours. This was the clenched fist shaken at our enemy across the North Atlantic.

The second mission of the Newfoundland Base was to serve as a port of refuge for submarine hounded convoys on their way to Europe. As the convoys ploughed past Cape Race many crippled ships dropped out and limped into St. John's or Argentia literally from under the torpedo tubes of lurking submarines. Ships and survivors of ships will long remember the American Bases in Newfoundland as their last glimpse of safety

(*Continued on page* 164)

Signal Corps Photo

Surrender ceremonies aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay. General Yoshira Umeza signs on behalf of the Japanese General Headquarters while General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (left) and Lt. Gen. R. K. Sutherland, his Chief of Staff, look on.

Order of Battle, Army Forces in Pacific, (as of 14 August 1945)

From General of the Army Marshall's Report

U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC

Unit	Commander
General Hqs., U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific	General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
Sixth Army	Gen. Walter Krueger
40th Inf. Div.	Brig. Gen. D. J. Myers
11th Airborne Div.	Maj. Gen. J. M. Swing
I Corps	Maj. Gen. I. P. Swift
25th Inf. Div	Maj. Gen. C. L. Mullins
33d Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. P. W. Clarkson
41st Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. J. A. Doe
IX Corps	Maj. Gen. C. W. Ryder
77th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. A. D. Bruce
81st Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. P. J. Mueller
XI Corps	Lt. Gen. C. P. Hall
43d Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. L. F. Wing
Americal Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. W. H. Arnold
1st Cav. Div.	Maj. Gen. W. C. Chase
Eighth Army	Lt. Gen. R. L. Eichelberger
93d Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. H. H. Johnson
96th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. James L. Bradley
X Corps	Maj. Gen. F. C. Sibert
24th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. R. B. Woodruff
31st Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. C. A. Martin
XIV Corps	Lt. Gen. O. W. Griswold
6th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. C. E. Hurdis
32d Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. W. H. Gill
37th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. R. S. Beightler
38th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. F. A. Irving
Tenth Army	Gen. J. W. Stilwell
XXIV Corps	Lt. Gen. J. R. Hodge
7th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. A. V. Arnold
27th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. G. W. Griner, Jr.
U. S. Army Forces, Mid. Pac.	Lt. Gen. R. C. Richardson, Jr.
98th Inf. Div.	Maj. Gen. A. M. Harper
U. S. A. Forces, West. Pac.	Lt. Gen. W. D. Styer
Far East Air Forces	Gen. G. C. Kenney
Fifth Air Force	Lt. Gen. E. C. Whitehead
Seventh Air Force	Brig. Gen. T. D. White
Thirteenth Air Force	Maj. Gen. P. B. Wurtsmith

U. S. ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES

Headquarters, U. S. Army Strategic Air Forces, Guam, Marianas Islands:

Commanding General ..... Gen. Carl Spaatz.
Deputy Commander ..... Lt. Gen. B. McK. Giles.
Chief of Staff ..... Maj. Gen. C. E. LeMay.

Eighth Air Force, Okinawa, Ryukyus Islands:
Commanding General ..... Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle.

Twentieth Air Force, Guam, Marianas Islands:
Commanding General ..... Lt. Gen. Nathan F. Twining.


OPERATIONS
OF
SIXTH U.S. ARMY
17 OCTOBER 1944 – 30 JUNE 1945
FUGA ISLAND
CAMIGUIN ISLAND
BABUYAN CHANNEL
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PHILIPPINE SEA
SIBUYAN SEA
SULU SEA
VISAYAN SEA
MINDANAO SEA
SAMAR SEA
SIXTH
9 Jan 45
Army Reserve
I
XIV
XI
II
X
XXIV
BREAKTHROUGH AT BALETE PASS 13 MAY 45
CLARK AIR CENTER SECURED 28 JAN 45
MANILA CAPTURED 24 FEB 45
23 Jan 45
15 Feb 45
16 Feb 45
31 Jan 45
1 Apr 45
7 Dec 44
17 Oct 44
20 Oct 44
17 Oct 44
Floating Reserve
LINGAYEN GULF
DAGUPAN
SAN FERNANDO
CLARK AIR CENTER
MANILA BAY
LAMON BAY
BALER BAY
DINGALAN BAY
LAGONOY GULF
ALBAY GULF
TAYABAS BAY
MINDORO
MASBATE
PANAY
NEGROS
CEBU
BOHOL
LEYTE
SAMAR
PALAWAN
CUYO ISLANDS
CUYO EAST PASS
TABLAS STRAIT
SAN ILDEFONSO PENINSULA
POLILLO ISLANDS
CATANDUANES I.
MARINDUQUE I.
BURIAS
TICAO I.
SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT
CALAMIAN GROUP
DINAGAT I.
SURIGAO STRAIT

Sixth U. S. Army — Pacific Veteran

by General Walter Krueger, USA

Commanding General, Sixth Army

BY mid-October 1944, Sixth Army had cleared Western New Britain of enemy forces, had reconquered the Admiralties, had completed its operations on the north coast of New Guinea, had seized and secured southeastern Morotai in the Halmaheras, and was enroute to Leyte Island to begin the liberation of the Philippines. In order to appreciate the operations which followed, it is necessary to understand General MacArthur's over-all plan for the Philippine Campaign. First, the Leyte Operation was to be undertaken to obtain naval, air and supply bases from which to provide support for future Philippine campaigns; next, the plan called for a hop from Leyte across the Visayas to seize southwestern Mindoro so as to establish airfields within 125 miles of Manila Bay; and third, a landing was to be made in the Lingayen Gulf area of Luzon, followed by a rapid drive southward to seize the Central Plain-Manila area, to open Manila Bay to our shipping, and subsequently, to destroy hostile forces remaining on Luzon. All of these operations were assigned to Sixth Army and plans for their accomplishment were well under way by the time Sixth Army was enroute to Leyte.

The Leyte Operation was divided into three tactical phases. Phase One consisted of an amphibious operation to secure the entrances to Leyte Gulf. Phase Two comprised major amphibious assaults: to seize the coastal strip of eastern Leyte from Tacloban to Dulag, including the airdromes and base sites in the area; to open San Juanico Strait and Panaon Strait; and to secure the central valley of Leyte including the Carigara Bay area on the north central coast. Phase Three called for the destruction of hostile forces remaining on Leyte and the clearing of hostile forces from southern Samar. Phase One of this operation lasted from 17-19 October 1944, during which time the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion occupied Dinagat, Homonhon and Suluan Islands, thus securing the entrance to Leyte Gulf. Phase Two was initiated on 20 October 1944 when X Corps and XXIV Corps landed on the east coast of Leyte in a powerful amphibious assault. These landings followed by one hour the landing of the 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th Infantry Division on Panaon Island, where this regiment rapidly established control over Panaon Strait.

General Krueger

Sixth Army quickly exploited its initial successes. In the X Corps zone of action the 1st Cavalry Division on 20 October seized Tacloban Airfield and on the following day captured Tacloban. Five days later elements of this division were moving northwestward along San Juanico Strait toward Carigara. The 24th Infantry Division secured Palo on 21 October, then advanced rapidly into the Leyte Valley, and on 29 October succeeded in gaining contact with elements of the 1st Cavalry Division south of Carigara. In a coordinated attack by units of these two divisions Carigara was captured 2 November.

Meanwhile, in the XXIV Corps zone of action, the 7th Infantry Division captured Dulag airstrip on 21 October, advanced rapidly westward to seize the three airfields in the Burauen area by 25 October, and captured Dagami on 29 October against heavy enemy resistance. Other elements of this division pushed southward, secured Abuyog and then advanced westward across the mountains to occupy Baybay on the Camotes Sea. The 96th Infantry Division, which had landed on the right of the 7th Infantry Division, initially by-passed enemy positions on Catmon Hill and seized the southern portion of the Leyte Valley within its zone of action. This division attacked Catmon Hill on 28 October and by 31 October had completely eliminated all enemy resistance there. Following this action, the 96th Infantry Division began the relief of the 7th Infantry Division in the Dulag-Burauen-Dagami-Tanauan area.

By 2 November 1944, Sixth Army had gained control of the broad Leyte Valley and its airfields, had opened Panaon and San Juanico Straits, and had secured Carigara on the north central coast and Baybay on the west coast, thus successfully completing the second phase of the operation. It soon developed, however, that General Yamashita, the Japanese commander in the Philippines, intended to hold Leyte at all costs. The Japanese High Command had already committed its navy in a bold and desperate attempt to defeat our naval forces in Philippine waters and de-

(*Continued on page* 180)

Signal Corps Photo

Rocket ship opens up on beach defenses as first assault wave prepares to invade Morotai Island. Rockets are released in showers so smoke from their discharge billows over the side to shroud the vessel.

Covered by riflemen, a Marine flamethrower cleans out a cave on northern Iwo.

A Marine crossing "Death Valley" on Okinawa under heavy Jap machine gun fire.

U. S. Marine Corps Photos

Driving inland against Jap positions at the base of Mount Suribachi.

Stepping Stones to Victory

by Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, USMC

Commanding General Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

OPERATIONS of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, during the past year included participation in two of the bitterest operations of all military history—the seizures of Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

Accounts of the historic battle for Iwo Jima are too well known to need repeating here. Let it suffice to say that the men of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Marine Divisions, constituting the V Amphibious Corps, successfully waged there what Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson described as "one of the most brilliant and decisive campaigns in the entire history of the Marine Corps."

There, on a tiny volcanic island only eight square miles in area, our Marine forces in 27 days of fighting—from 19 February to 17 March, 1945—killed more than 21,000 Japanese and took 1,259 prisoners. Our own casualties numbered 4,189 killed and 15,749 wounded.

Lt. Gen. Geiger

The cost was not light, but the prize was an important one. Our occupation of Iwo effectively neutralized Jap naval and air bases at Chichi Jima and Haha Jima in the Bonins, whence the enemy had been sending bombers against our B-29 bases in the Marianas, and from where he could have dispatched naval aid to his troops on by-passed islands in the Marshalls and Carolines and on Wake and Marcus. Iwo's airfields enabled our Army fighter planes to accompany the "Superforts" on their missions over Japan, and provided emergency repair and refueling facilities for the B-29's half-way between their bases and their targets. In addition, rocket-firing fighters and medium bombers went aloft from Iwo to raid important industrial targets at Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya, Yokohama and Tokyo.

With the capture and occupation of Iwo Jima the way was cleared for our assault on the last great group of island stepping stones to Japan—the Ryukyus. By this time the three-pronged drive which had been shaping up since the beginning of the Pacific war had brought us almost to Japan's very door. To the south, our advance had rolled up through the Solomons, New Guinea, the Admiralties and the Palaus to the Philippines. To the north, we had acquired a string of bases from Dutch Harbor through the Aleutians to Adak. Between these two, the main advance, beginning at Pearl Harbor, had pushed westward across the Central Pacific through the Marshalls and Gilbert Islands, the Marianas, and the volcanic islands. It was necessary only to take Okinawa and other smaller islands in the Ryukyus in order to launch the final push against the Japanese homeland.

Thus it was with good cause that Japanese home spokesmen told the island's defenders that it was "the battle for Japan itself" when on 1 April 1945, units of the U. S. Pacific Fleet and the U. S. Tenth Army began the invasion of Okinawa.

The III Marine Amphibious Corps operated as an integral part of the U. S. Tenth Army throughout the Okinawa campaign. Under the command of the late Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner, the Tenth Army also embraced, initially, the XXIV Army Corps (consisting of the 7th, 27th and 96th Infantry Divisions) and the 77th Infantry Division, with the 2nd Marine Division and the 81st Infantry Division as floating and area reserve, respectively. Although made up initially of only the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions, to which later was added one Regimental Combat Team of the 2nd Marine Division, the III Amphibious Corps participated in a large share of the bitter fighting on Okinawa, accounted for 42,000 Japanese dead and for 4,000 of the approximately 10,000 prisoners of war taken, and seized about four-fifths of the total land area of the island (see map).

The capture of Okinawa, effected after a gruelling eighty-day campaign, gave us needed bomber and fighter strips within easy range of Japan, a major base from which to launch a full-scale invasion of the enemy's home islands, and a staging area for possible landings on the China coast. It also completed the isolation of Formosa, opened a sea route of supply to

(*Continued on page* 170)

U. S. Navy photo

Warships of the U. S. Third Fleet point the barrels of their 16-inch rifles toward the Japanese coast and hurl a thunderous salvo of steel and explosives into the iron works at Kamaishi, 14 July 1945.

Third Fleet Operations

by Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, USN

Commander Third U. S. Fleet

DURING the period 24-26 October 1944, the Japanese Navy was decisively defeated, its major carrier strength destroyed, and many major fleet units sunk or extensively damaged. Land operations of General MacArthur's forces in the Leyte-Samar area were progressing well, and the strategic support of the Leyte-Samar operations by the Third Fleet appeared almost completed. On 29 October 1944, Commander Third Fleet was authorized to withdraw all task groups from supporting positions on the premise that urgent need for further support of the Leyte-Samar operations no longer existed.



Fleet Adm. Halsey

However, some factors required re-examination. The Japanese, in spite of their staggering naval losses, refused to consider their Leyte positions untenable, and were definitely conscious of the threat to the entire Southern Empire posed by the Leyte-Samar landings. Airfields on Leyte seized by Southwest Pacific forces were more difficult of development than had been planned. There still existed many airfields in the Visayas, Luzon and even Mindanao capable of supporting land-based air attacks on our Leyte-Samar positions and convoys. The Japanese had an inland waterway for reinforcement convoys (Verde Island Passage—Sybuyan Sea—Visayan Sea—Samar or Camotes Sea) to Leyte, easily protected by air and difficult for our surface forces to reach.

Plans had been long prepared for a heavy carrier air strike on the Tokyo area during November; these plans were postponed indefinitely as it became more clear daily that the Leyte campaign still demanded the maximum support efforts of the carrier forces. This support was given the ground forces by heavy air strikes on Luzon the 5th, 6th, 13th, 14th, 19th and 25th of November; a "Tokyo Express" on the Luzon-Leyte run was destroyed by air strikes 11 November; Iwo Jima airfield was bombarded the night of 11-12 November to hinder enemy aircraft staging. After each Luzon strike, the Leyte air situation improved markedly; substantiating our belief that wherever possible the carrier forces were better employed strategically than in a direct support role; better to destroy the enemy air force before it could reach the land battlefield than to fight it with direct support measures.

After replenishment at Ulithi, the fast carrier force sortied on 10 December to support General MacArthur's bold move into Mindoro, scheduled for 15 December. Enemy suicide planes had damaged four of our ships in the 25 November air strikes; new measures of self-protection were needed. Fighter strength on the carriers was increased; for 14, 15 and 16 December a smothering day-and-night fighter blanket was spread over Luzon, employing continuous fighter patrols over all Japanese airfields; the Japanese air force was unable to rally, and opposed the Mindoro landings only weekly and sporadically.

Retiring eastward from the Luzon area after the three-day period of successful strikes, the Third Fleet was overtaken by a disastrous typhoon on 18 December. Despite attempts of the Fleet to evade its path, the typhoon, following an erratic course, different from the estimated course and contrary to available history of December typhoons, struck the Fleet a devastating blow. Three destroyers capsized and were lost with the majority of their crews; fires broke out aboard many ships caused by shorted wiring and shifting planes.

(*Continued on page* 150)


EIGHTH ARMY
OPERATIONS in the PHILIPPINES
1945
LEGEND
MAIN EIGHTH ARMY LANDINGS
OTHER EIGHTH ARMY LANDINGS
OVERLAND OPERATIONS
LUZON
MANILA
NICHOLS FIELD
CLARK FIELD
MASBATE
SAMAR
VISAYAN SEA
LEYTE
PANAY
ILOILO
NEGROS
CEBU
CEBU CITY
BOHOL
DUMAGUETE
MINDANAO SEA
PALAWAN
PUERTO PRINCESA
ILIGAN BAY
MINDANAO
ZAMBOANGA PENN.
MALABANG
COTABATO
DAVAO CITY
ZAMBOANGA CITY
DAVAO GULF
BASILAN I.
JOLO I.
BORNEO
SULU ARCHIPELAGO
China Sea
Sulu Sea
North Celebes Sea

Crawl'ng ashore under fire are the first wave troops (3d Bn., 132d Inf., Americal Div.) during surprise landing on Cebu Island in March 1945.

Men of Co. A, 1st Bn., 185th Inf., 40th Div., take cover behind tanks on Panay. The photographer, T5 Howard Klawitter, was wounded shortly after taking this picture.

The Amphibious Eighth

by Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, USA

Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army

THE history of Eighth Army Headquarters since it started its career in the Southwest Pacific in September of 1944, has been a full one. In our first year, we participated in three major campaigns and directed over fifty amphibious landings. At various times, our activities, tactical and administrative, have encompassed all New Guinea and the Philippines; now we are undertaking the occupation of Japan from the Tokyo area to the north. To General Douglas MacArthur whose magnificent leadership has always paced our efforts and to the brave officers and men of the six corps,* twenty divisions,* and hundreds of other units, who have labored, fought, and died under our banner, I wish to extend a full measure of credit for whatever may be recorded in history as Eighth Army accomplishments.

Lieutenant General Eichelberger, left, and his Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Clovis E. Byers, in General Eichelberger's office, Custom Building, Yokohama.

When General MacArthur designated me as Commanding General of the new Eighth Army, I found myself fortunate in having inherited, almost intact, the experienced Second Army staff built up by Lieutenant General Ben Lear and Lieutenant General Lloyd R. Fredendall during three years of training troops in the States. With me from my old command, I Corps, I brought my Chief of Staff, Major General Clovis E. Byers, and my G-3, Brigadier General Frank S. Bowen, Jr., who had served under me in the battles of Buna, Sanananda, Hollandia, and Biak. My Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Arthur P. Thayer; G-1, Colonel August E. Schanze; G-2, Colonel George A. A. Jones; and G-4, Colonel Henry C. Burgess, remained in the positions they held in Second Army. When the staff was assembled in Hollandia in September, it was already a well tempered unit, ready for action.

Eighth Army's first mission involved assuming control of all operational areas in New Guinea, New Britain, the Admiralties, and Morotai and taking command of about 200,000 troops dispersed in 20 localities extending from Australia to Morotai. These first four months prior to initiation of major Eighth Army amphibious operations furnished an excellent opportunity for reorganizing and training the staff to meet the peculiar administrative, logistical, and tactical conditions of the Southwest Pacific. On November 15th and 19th, Eighth Army launched its first amphibious blows, two minor landings on Asia and Mapia Atolls off the coast of northern New Guinea, for the purpose of establishing light naval facilities at those points. The battalion landing on Mapia Atoll killed over 150 Japs in the few days that it took to secure the islands. The Asia landing was unopposed.

In the fall of 1944, General MacArthur described to me his brilliant scheme for the liberation of the Philippines and his proposed employment of Eighth Army. As the plan finally crystallized, Sixth Army was to take Leyte, establish a beachhead on Mindoro, and

(*Continued on page* 176)

*NOTE: I, IX, X, XI, XIV, and XXIV Corps: 1st Cav., 6th, 7th, 11th A/B, 24th, 27th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 37th, 38th, 40th, 41st, 43rd, 77th, 81st, 93rd, 96th, 97th, and Americal Divisions.

India Burma—Lifeline to China

by Lieutenant General R. A. Wheeler, USA

Chief of Engineers; formerly Commanding General U. S. Forces India-Burma Theater

WHEN the vast geographical area comprising the CBI Theater was split into two theaters of operation on 24 October, 1944, the mission of the new India Burma Theater was to support the China Theatre in the conduct of military operations against the Japanese (including training and logistical support of Chinese forces), and to participate in and support the operations of South East Asia Command.



In October, 1944 American ground, air, and service troops were confident that a job once considered hopeless could actually be accomplished. Airmen lifted 35,131 tons of cargo over the treacherous Himalaya Hump during that month. The great Stilwell Road, then known as the Ledo Road, had been pushed through the tough Patkai mountains to Mile 192.2 south of Warazup, Burma. Engineer petroleum distribution companies had laid a pipeline to Warazup and another on to Myitkyina—pipeline which would in 1945 carry aviation gasoline across Burma to China's back door city of Kunming. Signal troops were building a telephone line to support combat operations and control supply, an overland telephone and telegraph connection from Calcutta to Kunming which in mid-1945 would link India to China for the first time in history.

Lt. Gen. Wheeler

However, in October, 1944, the forbidding terrain of Burma presented what many believed was an insurmountable obstacle. And despite the advances made by American, Chinese and British troops, the Jap was still very much in evidence in Burma. Three enemy divisions, the 18th, 53rd, and 56th, were defending the area through which the three-pronged supply operation-road, pipeline, and telephone line—had to advance. The overall plan called for a coordinated, completely integrated attack by the British 11th Army Group (composed of the British 14th Army and XV Corps) and the Northern Combat Area Command. NCAC, as it was known, was a truly allied organization. It included the American trained and equipped Chinese New 1st Army (composed of the New 30th and New 38th Divisions), Chinese New 6th Army composed of the 14th, 22nd (also American trained), and 50th Divisions, the British 36th Division, and the American Mars Task Force (which initially included the Chinese 1st Infantry Regiment, Separate). In the famed Mars Task Force were the 475th Infantry and the 124th Cavalry (Special) Regiments. Air support for the operation was furnished by the flyers of the U. S. 10th Air Force.

This force attacked in three columns — the British 36th Division on the west, the Chinese 1st Army on the east down the Ledo Road trace, and the Chinese 6th Army with the Marsmen down the center.

NCAC owed its mobility to air supply and support on a grand scale. Supply by air commenced in April, 1943, and the peak was reached in December, 1944, with 24,155 tons of supplies delivered by air to support troops fighting in Burma under NCAC command. (As of 31 August of this year, 209,116 tons had been delivered for all U. S.-controlled operations in North Burma—107,155 tons air landed; 36,314 tons free dropped, and 29,500 tons parachuted). The 10th Air Force dropped 2,628 tons of bombs in November, 1944. Wounded were flown out to hospitals in the rear, notably the 20th General Hospital in Ledo. The initial advance was preceded by intensive attacks by the 10th Air Force and SEAC's Eastern Air Command. Jap lines of communication were virtually paralyzed. On the heels of the combat troops, the road builders, pipeline crews, and telephone men forged ahead through the jungle.

The British 36th Division reached the Katha-Indaw area on 10 December and made contact with the British 14th Army a few days later. The Chinese 22nd Division had advanced to within 70 miles of Lashio. The Chinese 38th Division had struck toward the Jap stronghold of Bhamo, second largest city in North Burma. They encircled the enemy and hacked away at the city's edges. By 15 December, the last Jap had been ousted.

Under cover of secrecy provided by the dense Burma jungle, the men of Mars marched 200 miles in 25 days to contact and decisively defeat the Jap at Tonkwa. Their next surprise move was a 150-mile trek across the mountains toward the Burma Road. When they reached a point 18 miles from the Road, they pushed off on a 35-mile forced march across country, caught the

(*Continued on page* 166)

Activities in the China Theater

by Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA

Commanding General United States Forces, China Theater

THE story of the activities of U. S. forces in China Theater depicts the highest attainment of Allied team work.

The primary missions of the U. S. forces in China Theater since its organization on 24 October 1944 were:

a. To conduct air operations against the Japanese land communications and off-shore shipping, and

b. To support the Chinese war effort through the media of training, equipping and supporting selected Chinese ground and air units.

The India Burma Theater and the "Hump" air line subsequently augmented by the pipeline and Stilwell road served as the sole route for support of the military operations.

In the fall of 1944 the Japanese strategy in China had changed from coastal holding operations to a series of powerful offensives in order to:

a. Develop an island communications corridor from Manchuria to Indo-China.

b. Provide depth in their positions and thus prepare for possible Allied attacks against the Asiatic mainland, and

c. Force China completely out of the war.

Everywhere the Japanese offensives had been successful. By late November 1944, the Japanese forces secured the important strategic centers of Kweilin, Luichow and Nanning. Forward airfields were captured and the Chinese and American forces both air and ground were compelled to deploy further inland. The enemy had completed the establishment and security of the important inland communications corridor from Manchuria to Indo-China.

The Japanese were now poised to continue their advance on Sian, Chungking and Kunming. All of these objectives were critical to the continued Chinese war effort. If Kunming were captured, the gateway to American supplies arriving in ever increasing quantities over the "Hump" would be closed and China's military effort rendered impotent. The capture of Chungking, the seat of the Chinese government would strongly militate against effective war effort psychologically, politically and economically. If the Japs occupied Sian the Luchow-Sian corridor would be blocked and air operations from that area restricted to a prohibited degree.

(*Continued on page* 166)

Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer with Col. Pee Tsong-Kan, of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters, at the temple of The Five Springs, in Lanchow, Kansu province, during one of General Wedemeyer's inspection tours of installations in Northern China.



Naval Aviation and Japan's Defeat

by Rear Admiral A. E. Montgomery, USN

Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet

NAVAL Aviation's principal contributions to Japan's defeat were:

1. It halted Japan's advance in the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway.

2. Navy and Marine pilots helped provide air cover and close support for ground forces in the two great drives against the Empire — the Nimitz drive from the Solomons through the Gilberts, Marshalls, Carolines, Marianas and Bonins to Okinawa, and the MacArthur drive from New Guinea through the Admiralties and Morotai to the Philippines.



Rear Adm. Montgomery

3. Fast Carrier Task Forces, spearheading the liberation of a stolen empire, destroyed the Imperial Fleet; shot down the cream of Japan's pilots and thousands of its airplanes; sank a large part of the enemy's merchant fleet; and precision-bombed strategic military targets.

4. Land and seaplane patrol bombers searched enemy waters; helped clamp the effective blockade on merchant shipping by sinking many thousand ships and mining harbors; and aided in neutralizing hundreds of by-passed Jap islands.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944 eliminated the Imperial Fleet as a major threat. In the nine and a half months after that decisive battle Naval Aviation's major achievements were:

Remnants of the enemy fleet were finished off by sinking the Yamato at Okinawa and attacking warships in their home ports.

Air cover and close support were supplied for the Leyte, Mindoro, Lingayen, Iwo Jima, Okinawa and Borneo invasions. The escort carriers provided close support. The fast carriers supported Leyte until Army and Marine land planes, long delayed by excessive rains, were ready to operate. The Marine night fighters did a particularly outstanding job. In January the big carriers made a daring dash into the South China Sea. Beginning with the first carrier strike at Tokyo in February, the fast carriers operated almost continuously off Iwo, Okinawa and the home islands.

Carrier planes destroyed especially vital targets in the Philippines, Okinawa and the Empire. Aircraft and electronics factories, power plants, transportation facilities, airfield installations, fuel and supply dumps, and gun positions were among the carefully selected targets destroyed by precise, low-level bombing.

Land and seaplanes of the fleet air wings daily covered enemy waters from the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore in the South to northern Korea and the home islands.

The following statistics illustrate Naval Aviation's power and achievements. Fast carrier Navy and Marine pilots, from 1 September 1944 to the war's end, flew 63,000 attack sorties; shot down 3400 Jap planes, and destroyed another 2500 on the ground; and used 24,000 tons of bombs and 66,000 five-inch rockets.

Naval aviators aboard combat escort carriers, in the same period, flew 33,500 attack sorties; expended 6,000 tons of bombs; fired 78,000 five-inch rockets; and shot

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

U. S. Navy Photo

Carrier-based planes of the Third Fleet pass Mount Fujiyama on their way to hammer at Nippon's military and industrial centers.

Seventh Air Force—Hawaii to Japan

by Brigadier General Thomas D. White, USA

Commanding General Seventh Air Force

THE Seventh Air Force, which was stationed at Hickam and Wheeler fields in the Hawaiian Islands when the Japs attacked on 7 December 1941, was in the Ryukyus delivering some of the final blows against the enemy when the war ended. During the last ten months of the conflict, Seventh Air Force bombers and fighters protected our bases in the Marianas, helped soften Iwo Jima and the Philippines for invasion, and from Okinawa, pounded airfields, harbors, factories and other strategic targets in the Japanese home islands and occupied China.

Iwo Jima continued to be the major target for Liberators based on Saipan and Guam during the first three months. Their assignment was to protect bases of the Seventh and Twentieth Air Forces in the Marianas by attacking the Iwo airstrips, and to help prepare the island for invasion. Iwo Jima became the most heavily bombed island in the Pacific when Seventh Air Force Liberators hit it for 72 consecutive days ending 17 February. During this period, the heavy bombers flew 1,251 sorties and dropped 2,565 tons of bombs.

In December, the B-24's took part in combined air and naval attacks against Iwo in coordination with a cruiser task force. After the bombing run, six Liberators carrying Navy artillery observers remained behind for target spotting.

Other objectives of the Marianas-based bombers included Marcus, island air base southeast of Japan, Truk and Yap in the Carolines and shipping and dock installations at Chichi Jima and Haha Jima in the Bonins. In November, Liberators began mining the harbors of Chiche and Haha in addition to their scheduled bombing strikes, while other Seventh Air Force B-24's began operations from Angaur in the Palaus, hitting airfields and installations on Mindanao and on other islands in the Philippines.

Thunderbolts P-47s of the VII Fighter Command, based on Saipan, continued their air defense of the Saipan-Tinian area and made fire bomb, rocket and strafing attacks against Pagan, northern island of the Marianas and staging base for enemy air attacks on Saipan.

Lightning P-38's joined the Thunderbolts in November and began escorting Liberators, Superfortresses and photographic planes to Iwo Jima and Truk, and made low-level strafing attacks against these bases.

When Iwo was invaded 18 February, heavy bombers in the Marianas lost their major target, but planes of the VII Fighter Command landed on the island on 7 March and began supporting ground operations.

Troop carrier planes based on Saipan flew mail, supplies and passengers between the Marianas and the

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Brig. Gen. White





Pacific Fleet Amphibious Operations

by Admiral R. K. Turner, USN

Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet

THE capture of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam during the summer of 1944 was the turning point of our war against Japan. Here the long drive of the Amphibious Forces across the Central Pacific began to pay dividends, for from these bases we were able at once to send planes throughout the Philippine Sea and the Volcano Islands; to base troops closer to our next objectives; and to fuel ships and fill their other logistic requirements. From here we could also support the capture of Peleliu and Ulithi and support General MacArthur's invasion of the Philippines. Furthermore, the islands soon became bases for B-29's for striking heavy and sustained blows against the Japanese Empire itself; blows which soon had a telling effect on Japanese production and civil organization.

There were several choices for objectives of the next amphibious step: Formosa, Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto (the Bonin or Volcano Islands or both). There were advantages and disadvantages for the choice of any. We were close enough to the Philippines for direct cooperation and coordination to begin between General MacArthur's and Admiral Nimitz's forces. As we now had more ships, troops and planes, we could carry on simultaneous operations in both areas on a moderate scale, and in one area on a big scale.

The decision was made to by-pass Formosa, and in the next large operation to go closer to Japan by capturing Okinawa. To guard our flanks; to eliminate hostile air attacks on the Marianas; to open the way for our fleet to make direct attacks on Japan; and to provide an air base that would furnish fighter cover for our B-29's, the decision was made to capture Iwo Jima.

Admiral Spruance, as Commander Fifth Fleet, was designated as officer in command of both operations; Vice Admiral Turner, as Commander of the Pacific Amphibious Force was placed in charge of the two expeditionary forces; Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force was designated troop commander for the Iwo Jima Operation; and Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner, Commanding General Tenth Army was made troop commander for Okinawa. Planning for the two operations was carried on concurrently in Oahu, as the target dates, 19 February for Iwo Jima and 1 April for Okinawa would not permit much planning to be done between the two operations. Logistic materials and troops started forward to Hawaii, the Marianas and the Philippines. The months of October, November, December and January were spent in formulating plans, and assembling and training troops and ships. Late in January our armada sailed from the Hawaiian Islands for Iwo Jima which was to have so large an effect in the future of the war. During the same period all preparations were made for the capture of Okinawa.

Although the invasion of Iwo Jima became one of the most severe battles in Marine Corps history, from

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



U. S. Navy Photo

On the deck of Admiral Turner's flagship, USS Eldorado at Okinawa, left to right, Admiral John N. Hoover, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, and Adm. Turner.

Tenth Army Operations in the Ryukyus

by General Joseph W. Stilwell, USA

Commanding General Tenth Army

THE Ryukyus are a chain of islands extending south from the main island of Japan to Formosa. To the east lies the Pacific Ocean and to the west 350 miles distant the coast of China. Composing this chain of islands are three principal island groups. To the north and closest to Kyushu is the Amami Gunto. To the south and just northeast of Formosa is the Sakishima Gunto. In the center is the Okinawa Gunto. Okinawa, the principal island of the latter group is 65 miles long and from 2-10 miles wide. It lies on the approaches to southern Japan and was the nerve center of Japanese communications in the Ryukyus.

The Tenth United States Army was composed of Army, Navy and Marine personnel. It operated under the overall direction of Admiral of the Fleet, Chester W. Nimitz, exercised through the Commander of the Fifth Fleet, Admiral Spruance, and under the direct command of Admiral R. K. Turner, USN, Amphibious Forces, Pacific. The XXIV Army Corps and the III Amphibious Marine Corps were the principal components making up the Army. For the Ryukyus campaign the 7th, 27th, 77th and 96th Infantry Divisions (Army), and the 1st, 2d and 6th Marine Divisions were assigned. This total force approximated 200,000 fighting men.

Planning for the Ryukyus campaign was carried out under the direction of the Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Areas and jointly with the Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific, Admiral R. K. Turner. Basic studies and estimated naval requirements were presented to the Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific in November, 1944, and during the following months all phases of the planning were carefully coordinated with the United States Naval forces assigned for the operation.

Gen. Stilwell

What prerequisites were essential

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

The Great Circle: Pathway of the Pacific

by Major General John B. Brooks, USA

Commanding General, Eleventh Air Force, June 1945 to October 1945

THE rapid and steady advances of the United Nations forces in the South and Central Pacific in the last half of 1944 and in 1945 relegated the mission of the Eleventh Air Force to that of waging a war of attrition against the northern home islands of the Japanese Empire.

Maj. Gen. Brooks

While the Japanese strengthened their already formidable fortifications at Kataoka Naval Base on Shimushu, at Kashiwabara Bay and Kurabu Cape on Paramushiru and at Tagan Point on Matsuwa, Eleventh Air Force Mitchells and Liberators flew the frigid over-water route to the Kurile Islands and back, cratering their runways, blowing up their hangars, warehouses and barracks, sinking their supply ships and killing their troops. Through the winter of 1944 and into mid-summer of 1945, air operations in the North Pacific increased steadily, reaching a peak in missions flown and bombs dropped in June of this year, little over a month before the Japanese surrender.

Except to oppose our attacks with heavy anti-aircraft fire and fighter interception, the Japanese did not attempt retaliation. The last attack on any of our North Pacific bases was executed unsuccessfully in October of 1943. But the Japanese were forced to send aircraft, men and supplies to the Kurile Islands where they were destroyed by our attacks.

This war of attrition had its effect on the Japanese General Staff as reflected in the words of Radio Tokyo. Intercepted broadcasts frequently mentioned the "strong forces in the North Pacific against which we shall defend ourselves bravely." The Japanese were well aware of the threat from the North.

Noting the rising scale of attacks against the Kurile Islands, old-timers in the Aleutians said, "The weather's getting better all the time. It's different now from when it was 'rough'." But the weather wasn't getting any better, Eleventh Air Force combat crews and transport pilots were simply learning how to handle it better. Forecasters were becoming more accurate. There were many more and greatly improved aids to navigation. Planes were rarely out of touch with their ground stations. But above all, pilots were steadily gaining in confidence and in skill at using all the technical advantages that aeronautical research was putting at their disposal.

Liberator inspects the strongly fortified Paramushiru Strait, northern Kurile entrance to the Sea of Okhotsk. In the center foreground is the strong Japanese Kataoka Naval Base on Shimushu Island, while across the Strait is the Kashawabara army staging area. Both targets have been hit repeatedly the past year by Army and Navy bombers.

Probably in no other theatre has radio, radar, weather forecasting and training in instrument flying played so important a part, not only in getting missions over the target and back, but also in the routine intra-Aleutian flying—the business of supplying many isolated island bases. The C-47's of the 54th Troop Carrier Squadron and the ATC plied daily schedules up and down the "Chain." Their pilots, formerly considered daring airmen became skilled "airplane drivers" as they proudly called themselves. Hangars, runways, workshops and barracks had been improved, too, so that a plane could get quick service at almost any station along the line, while the crew slept between sheets in clean transient quarters.

This increase in knowledge and skill and confidence of the aircrews and improvement of services was reflected in the steady increase in the weight of bombs which reached Kurile Island targets.

(*Continued on page* 204)

Submarines in Support of the Fleet

by Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, USN

Commander Submarine Force U. S. Pacific Fleet

BY November of 1944, submarines had progressed through the first two phases of the war. In the first phase, they were striving desperately with their small numbers to cover the enemy's shipping lanes in a valiant attempt to whittle down his Navy and Merchant Marine, to prevent his spoils of conquest from reaching the Empire and to destroy troop convoys and supplies sent to consolidate his forward positions. The new equipment, which played so prominent a part in the later days of the war, had not yet come into being and we were finding many serious defects in weapons on whose infallibility we had counted so heavily. Those were the days when weary submariners returned to port beaten down by fifty or sixty days of submerged patrol in tropical waters to the accompaniment of depth charging and severe enemy counter-measures to find little relief in the line of recuperation or even adequate repair facilities. Pretty desperate days those were, and the marvel is that our losses were no heavier.

Vice Adm. Lockwood

The second phase began with the rapid increase in our Submarine Force produced by almost unbelievable shortening of the building period of ships. As numerical strength was built up, it was found possible to send our submarines out in coordinated attack groups, the better to combat the increased size of Japanese convoys and the increased number and effectiveness of their escorts and anti-submarine measures. Unlike the losing battle which the German submarines were fighting against American destroyers and planes in the Atlantic, our enemy in the Pacific was evidentally unable to keep pace with the improvements in equipment, in training and in tactics which our submarines were able to throw into the fight; and despite heavy losses in American submarines, which at one time amounted to eight ships in two months, the Japanese convoys took a terrific beating as well as their escort vessels. It was not unusual for a wolf pack of three or four submarines to wipe out an entire convoy, less, possibly, one or two small escorts. Those were tremendously productive days in which a submarine not unfrequently returned to base with a bag of forty to sixty thousand tons, and during which were performed some of the most daring and successful attacks of the war.

Jap carrier Unryo, with only her stern out of the water, as seen through the periscope of her assailant, the submarine USS Redfish. Two Jap destroyers were bearing down on the Redfish as this photographic proof of the kill was being taken.

During this second phase, an overlapping third phase began in which our Fleet with its splendid amphibious and air forces began its advance across the Pacific. Immediately, submarines had to alter their operations from those of almost independent units to cooperate with the plans so ably executed by the Commanders of our Third and Fifth Fleets. Such cooperation required photographic reconnaissance of the islands on which landings were expected to be made, blocking of exits from enemy man-of-war harbors, offensive screening against enemy lines of approach to contemplated theaters of action, intensified blockade against enemy merchant shipping attempting to run reinforcements and munitions into areas threatened by our advance, and, last but not least, it required a new type of duty which was called "lifeguarding" and was designed to effect the rescue of Allied aviators shot down in the vicinity of enemy bases.

To a lesser extent this support to the Fleet had been given after Guadalcanal and in the Gilberts and Marshall landings.

(*Continued on page 162*)

USS Intrepid, four times battered into flames by Jap air action, she returned each time. She sank more than 80 enemy ships and destroyed more than 650 airplanes.

Its battle mission completed, a Navy Helldiver heads back to its carrier.

USS Ticonderoga, once hit by two suicide planes within a half hour, she was soon returned to action. Here a Kamikaze hits the water close aboard.

Carrier Warfare

by Vice Admiral Frederick C. Sherman, USN

Commander First Carrier Task Force

WHILE popular opinion is fully cognizant of the exploits of Task Forces 58 and 38 during this war, relatively few appreciate the fact that a new method of warfare has been developed and perfected which is as radical a change in methods as was the evolution from sail to steam. And the keystone of this new method is the aircraft carrier.

Vice Adm. Sherman

Up to the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor our strategy placed the carrier as an adjunct of the fleet. It was an appendage—a unit which trailed far behind the fleet, to give it the protection of inaccessibility and of the guns of the battleship between it and the objective. The modern concept of a Fast Carrier Task Force was a long way off. However, on 7 December 1941, the Japs showed the possibilities of this form of warfare in their attack on Pearl Harbor. Our battleships, as everyone knows, absorbed the major portion of the damage and were not ready for use for a long period thereafter. But our own carriers, the few that we had, were fortunately unharmed through their being elsewhere.

So we performed a major operation on the carcass of our naval strategy. We removed the "backbone" (the battleship), and provided carriers for offensive flexibility and speed; we relocated the tail-wagging appendage — the carriers — and made them the stout fighting heart of the new animal. The result was something like a United States Air Navy. We called it a Fast Carrier Task Force.

These Fast Carrier Task Groups and Forces can, and did, go anywhere and everywhere. They were never stopped by surface forces, land-based aircraft, shore defenses, submarines or Kamikazes. They are powerful enough to absorb a lot of punishment and fast enough to avoid a lot more. And their offensive power is apparent to anyone who follows the trail they blazed into Tokyo Bay.

The power and endurance of such a task group when operating in conjunction with one or more similar groups can best be illustrated by a few figures. On the morning of 14 March my task group sortied from Ulithi Lagoon for what turned out to be the longest combat cruise of any Fast Carrier Task Group.

It was not until the eightieth day after the sortie that the group anchored. During this time we steamed 33,865 miles, launched strikes or support missions 48 days, and encountered 357 enemy raids. Every major airfield in Kyushu and every island from Kyushu to Formosa felt the blows of carrier aircraft, a distance of over 700 miles. The enemy's fleet hideout at Kure was visited and the remnant of her fleet was further whittled down. We received damage also, most frequently from the short-lived "Kamikaze." Eleven ships of the task group were damaged, only one carrier remaining with the task group the entire cruise (the Essex). In combat 89 planes, 50 pilots and 18 crewmen were lost. But these were small compared to the losses the Nips suffered from our aircraft. 1,168 enemy planes were destroyed or damaged and 102 enemy ships, not counting small craft, were either sunk or damaged.

In the days to come there will be many opinions and claims made as to the relative importance of the many components which contributed to the winning of the war. The aircraft carrier is a likely candidate for the winner's circle in any such discussion. The team as a whole won the war and all components did their respective jobs and did them exceptionally well. But the prime mover was the carrier.

Longer ranged shore-based aircraft did a magnificent job in the Pacific. But the bases from which they attacked the heart of Japan could never have been won but for the work of the Fast Carrier Task Forces. In Europe the story was different but again, the gasoline, munitions, food and other supplies could never have been transported to England, Africa and Italy had not the Fast Carrier Task Groups younger brothers, the "Jeep" Carrier Units, cleared the Atlantic of Nazi submarines.

(Continued on page 174)

The Air War in Eastern Asia

by Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, USA

Commanding General, Army Air Forces—China Theater

LAST August, at the time of the Japanese surrender, the Army Air Forces in the China Theater were in the process of a full-scale augmentation and redeployment which would have been completed approximately 1 December 1945.

Lt. Gen. Stratemeyer

The Tenth Air Force was in the process of transferring its units from the India Burma Theater, where, under Maj. Gen. Howard C. Davidson, it had compiled a distinguished record. The principal mission of the Tenth and the Fourteenth, under the supervision of my AAF Headquarters, was to cooperate with the recently revitalized Chinese armies which had been trained by Americans and supplied with modern American equipment by Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer's China Theater Headquarters. Our immediate goal was to open a port on the China coast through which supplies and materiel could be brought by sea. The importance of such an operation is obvious, since it would virtually eliminate the long, hazardous and expensive line of communication across the Hump from India, upon which we have had to rely for all our supplies.

Immediately after the surrender, our primary function became the transport of four Chinese armies, totalling approximately 140,000 men, into territory previously occupied by the Japanese. This was a huge task, particularly since distances over which they were to be transported were so great, and I believe that it represents the largest, and logistically the most complex, mass movement of troops by air in history.

As this is written, in late September, the job is well under way. C-46s of the Tenth Air Force, now commanded by Brigadier General A. F. Hegenberger, have moved more than 22,000 men with their equipment, from Chihkiang, in central China, to Nanking. Simultaneously, Bengal-based C-54s of the India-China Division of the Air Transport Command, commanded by Brigadier General W. H. Tunner, have moved more than 18,000 troops of the Chinese 94th Army from Liuchow into Shanghai.

When we complete these moves, the target date for which is 15 October, we shall begin the lift of two additional armies, one from Hankow to Peiping and the other from Shanghai into Tientsin.

The importance of these movements, which are under the control of my Headquarters, cannot be overestimated, since they are making possible the rehabilitation and repatriation of millions of Chinese citizens. Without the air, this job would have taken many months. By making the maximum use of our air transport facilities, we have shortened the period to a matter of weeks.

The Tenth Air Force is now engaged solely with the execution of this massive troop movement. The Fourteenth, now headed by Major General Charles B. Stone III, who distinguished himself in the India Burma Theater as my Chief of Air Staff of the Eastern Air Command and Headquarters Army Air Forces there, has as its principal missions the patrolling of occupied territory and the processing of AAF units and personnel in the China Theater for their speedy return to the United States.

Too much credit cannot be given to the fighting Fourteenth Air Force, commanded for so long and so ably by Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, for the success of their operations in China. The territory over which they operated was vast, road and rail communications were poor and often nonexistent. Every pound of food, every machine gun bullet, every bomb and every other item of equipment had to be flown to China over the Hump from India, or carried over the Stilwell Road. The most pressing problem of all was that of aviation gasoline, which had to be flown from India. This was superbly done by the India-China Division of the Air Transport Command.

In spite of all these obstacles, the Fourteenth took a terrific toll of Japanese communications targets, rolling stock, locomotives, bridges, motor transport and shipping. It served as a perpetual thorn in the side of Japanese ground commanders, killing thousands of troops and continually obstructing their movement. Most important of all, the Fourteenth, although greatly outnumbered, was able to drive the Japanese Air Force from the skies of China.

At this time, I should also like briefly to review the air operations which played such an important part in winning the battle of Burma. These operations were directed by Eastern Air Command, which I had the privilege of commanding from its activation in December 1943, until June 1945, when it was disbanded. It was the principal operational element of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten's air arm in the South East Asia

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

Unloading supplies from a C-47 at Wangship Airfield in southwest China.

Behind the Lines in China

by Rear Admiral Milton E. Miles, USN

Commander, Naval Group China, Deputy Director, Sino-American Cooperative Organization

U. S. Navy men were sent into China to kill Japs, both by direct and indirect methods of attack. China's strategic location in the war, the friendly spirit of China's people, and the cooperation of the Central Government made it possible for this program of destruction to be carried on in a variety of undertakings.

Rear Adm. Miles

The primary mission of the original Friendship Project, which later came to be known as Naval Group China — the American side of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) — was to obtain mainland weather data urgently needed by Fleet air and surface units in the Western Pacific. Since the most significant weather phenomena in that part of the world move from Asia out across Japan and Formosa into the Pacific, China reports were indispensable to forces attacking Japan from bases to the east.

As part of the job necessary to accomplish this mission, Navy aerologists and communications men trained hundreds of Chinese in the techniques of gathering and reporting weather data. These SACO Chinese then worked with Americans, using American equipment, at weather stations spotted from Indo-China on the south to the Gobi Desert in the north, with a concentration of activity along the coast behind Jap lines. Information from these stations, flashed directly to Fleet units or relayed through SACO headquarters at Chungking, is officially reported to have been of considerable tactical value in the assaults on Japanese strongholds.

U. S. Navy men were able to move freely not only in Free China but over a large part of Jap-occupied China by the protection and assistance of guerrilla troops under the leadership of General Tai Li, Chief of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, who was chosen by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to head Chinese liaison with the Navy and to serve as the director of SACO.

Upon the request of the Chinese Government, Naval Group China brought in specially qualified personnel of the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard who gave arms, and instruction in modern combat methods, to more than 25,000 of the poorly trained and ill-equipped Chinese guerrilla troops. This use of arms and personnel proved to be a sound military investment.

In the early years of the war, Chinese guerrillas had lost in combat approximately three men for every Jap killed. SACO-trained and equipped guerrillas promptly increased the toll of Jap losses in casualties, equipment and supplies and in 1945 reversed the ratio and killed more than 2,000 Japs a month at a cost of less than one Chinese for three Japs.

In SACO's cooperative war against Japan, Chinese guerrillas guarded Americans so well that not one was ever killed by the enemy even though much activity was behind Japanese lines. General Tai Li's men also made it possible for two major Navy reconnaissance parties, preparing for possible U. S. landing operations, to survey and photograph the Southeast China Coast for hundreds of miles literally under the Japanese guns.

SACO guerrillas were far more than a screening force, however—they harried occupation forces con-

(*Continued on page* 154)

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (center, first row) reviews troops of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization, composed of Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard personnel. With him are, left to right, first row, Chinese General Chien, Capt. I. F. Beyerly, USN, Chief of Staff to Rear Adm. Milton E. Miles, USN; second row, Capt. M. S. Scott, USNR; Capt. G. M. Bowman, USNR; Capt. G. B. Tayloe, (MC), USN, head of the U. S. Naval Medical Unit in SACO, and Comdr. C. S. Johnston, USNR.

Pacific Powerhouse

by Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr.

Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific

THE last months of 1944 and the spring of 1945 found the campaign in the Central Pacific moving forward with accelerated speed. Heavy pressure was brought to bear against the Japanese enemy, constituting a major contribution to the decisive defeat of that nation, which culminated in September in formal surrender aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay. During this period the mission of the U. S. Army Forces in the Middle Pacific was to supply the men and materials required to insure the success of the ambitious campaign projected by CinCPOA for the capture of the islands closest to the Japanese homeland. The energy behind the fulfillment of the land phase of this campaign can be said to have been generated in the powerhouse of the Pacific—the headquarters of the U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas (now known as the Middle Pacific). From that powerhouse came the impressive means by which Army forces, in cooperation with the Marines and the Navy, would bring to the Japanese a realization of the futility of further continuing a war which could only result in the utter destruction of their nation, already weakened by two years of consecutive defeats on the land, on the sea, and in the air.

Lt. Gen. Richardson

As early as October, 1944, the capture of Leyte in the Philippine Islands by General MacArthur had been made possible by the diversion of MidPac's XXIV Corps from its original target—Yap. On that occasion General MacArthur had said, "The splendid efficiency of the XXIV Corps reflects the careful training it has received from your able command. The Corps performed most gallantly." This corps, at the conquest of Leyte, was initially composed of the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions, and was later reinforced by the 77th. All of these units had undergone rigorous training in the maneuver areas and combat ranges of the Hawaiian group, the home base of this command. Several of the divisions had also participated in the earlier campaigns in the Marshalls and in the Marianas. Similarly trained had been other divisions, one of which subsequently would participate in the Ryukyus campaign. This was the 27th, which had previously been engaged at Saipan. MidPac trained, too, was the 81st, which shared with the Marines the honor of the capture of the Palau Islands.

In the air, the major offensive against Japan was inaugurated on 24 November with the first attack on Japan by land-based Superforts from the Central Pacific. Engineered by MidPac forces, the bases from which this air offensive was launched rapidly expanded to include not only Saipan, the original base, but also Tinian and Guam, from which the mighty armada of aerial power embarked on the missions which resulted in the almost complete destruction of Japan's industrial heart. Cooperating with the assault divisions was the Seventh Air Force, whose responsibilities in the Middle Pacific have embraced the air defense of many of our captured bases, as well as strikes by medium and heavy bombardment aircraft in direct support of amphibious landings against such targets as Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

When the Marines assaulted Iwo Jima on 18 February, they were supported by many Army units, including amphibian tractor battalions and amphibian truck and port companies. However, when the island was declared secure on 16 March, development of the island was assigned to Middle Pacific forces. Station, field and general hospitals were set up, and airfields to include runways for VLR bombers came into being, as Iwo Jima was to become a way station on the aerial highway from the



(*Continued on page* 168)

Marine Airmen in the Final Drive On Japan

by Major General James T. Moore, USMC

Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

As long as there is a United States, there will be a United States Marine Corps. This is axiomatic; and it is inconceivable that the American People will permit this symbol of the finest spirit of American Arms, which has served so honorably through the entire history of America, to be eradicated. The resulting damage would be irreparable.

The surrender of the Japanese was a fitting conclusion to the mounting crescendo of historic achievements of Marine Corps aviation in the Pacific war. From Pearl Harbor to the Solomons, from the Marshalls and Gilberts to the Western Carolines, from the Philippines to Okinawa, Marine aviation, its fighters, bombers, and transports had made, and were poised to make more aviation history. Marine aviation had traveled a long and tortuous road from the long, dark days of "too little and too late" when, with only a quartet of planes, the Leathernecks took to the air against an overwhelming Japanese attack on Wake Island. It gained but slight momentum through the hard-pressed Guadalcanal campaign, but, as always against great odds, it increased its stride, and from the Northern Solomons to the Marshalls, Gilberts, Marianas, and Carolines, it spread a devastating fan of destruction against a determined enemy.



U. S. Marine Corps Photo

Standing under the nose of a Curtiss Commando at a Pacific Base are, left to right: Brig. Gen. William O. Brice, Maj. Gen. James T. Moore. Maj. Gen. Louis E. Woods, and Brig. Gen. Ivan W. Miller—all aviation generals, U. S. Marine Corps.

Palau, the stepping stone to the Philippines, is but an example. Adequately equipped, and with an ever-mounting esprit de corps, it succeeded in accomplishing new and unusual deeds. Landing on Peleliu soon after D-Day in September 1944, Marine pilots again supported their own infantry. It was here that the Second Marine Aircraft Wing made a unique contribution in the matter of supporting ground troops by operating from a field scarcely fourteen hundred yards from the actual firing line. Here again Marine transport squadrons earned their salt, as they had so gallantly done at Guadalcanal and Bougainville. High winds and stormy seas, which prevented the employment of surface craft, did not deter Marine Transport Squadron Nine Fifty-Two, under the able leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm S. Mackay, from delivering sorely-needed rations, and evacuating wounded of the First Marine Division and Eighty-First Army Division a thousand miles to clean beds and efficient medical care. Only the men who received this grand service can really appreciate its true value.

Meanwhile, Marine airpower was carrying the brunt of the neutralization campaign, cowering the Japs on scores of by-passed atolls and islands in the South and Mid-Pacific as far north as the Bonins and from the Marshalls to the Palaus. Fighters and bombers of the Fourth Marine Aircraft Wing under command of Major General Louis E. Woods flew round-the-clock saturation attacks.

"The islands cannot be considered as secured until every Jap is dead," was the injunction from General Woods. The Marines, as usual, delivered.

From cubs to giant transports, from fighters to four-engine photographic planes—(the latter being the first aircraft to photograph Truk) — practically anything available to them with wings and engines, were employed by them against the enemy. In the beginning, the Fourth Wing's sphere of operations covered an area nearly ten times larger than the State of Texas, but it was soon extended to the north toward Japan when the pilots of the Fourth Wing carried supplies to Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and our fighters and bombers struck at shipping in Tokyo harbor.

This process of strangulation, this ceaseless pounding of Wake, Ponape, Mille, Jaluit, Bablethaup and other enemy-held bastions by Second and Fourth Wing flyers paid large dividends. An estimated 75,000 to 100,000 Japs were pinned down, their attempts to strike throttled, and having been forced underground they were doomed to slow starvation and death from disease.

Thus, the enemy's power of resistance in the Central and Western Pacific was nullified, obviating the necessity of numerous amphibious operations, and freeing our troops for new areas of conquest. It was then that the Philippines were invaded, and Marine airmen, well seasoned and spoiling for action, moved back into the big leagues.

Marine aviation assumed an active role in the Philippines campaign almost from its inception. In December, General Douglas MacArthur called for one of the Second Wing's night fighter squadrons, then based on Peleliu. On forty-eight hour notice, the unit moved up, and in a month of subsequent action shot down more than a score of Jap planes. Assigned to the unusual task of protecting shipping from dawn to dusk raids, the squadron left Leyte with the record of not having lost a single ship from any convoy they covered.

Fast Marine Corsairs, flying from Philippine bases, gave their usual account of themselves in every major

(*Continued on page* 143)

Pre-invasion Assaults—Iwo Jima and Okinawa

by Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, USN

IN the operations for the capture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, it was my privilege to command the pre-invasion assault force whose main task was the reduction of enemy defenses, to facilitate the landings. The operations included bombardment and bombing of defense installations ashore, minesweeping, and destruction of underwater obstacles off the landing beaches. At Okinawa we also had to capture the Kerama Retto, a group of outlying islands, for a logistics anchorage and seaplane base.

Rear Adm. Blandy

The forces assigned included battleships, cruisers, escort type aircraft carriers (CVE's), fleet destroyers, escort destroyers (DE's), LCI gunboats, minesweepers, destroyer-type transports (APD's) carrying Underwater Demolition Teams, my amphibious flagship, the ESTES, and for capturing the Kerama Retto, an infantry division and the necessary transports and LST's.

IWO JIMA

At IWO only two mines were found and there were no other underwater obstacles. But in supporting the underwater reconnaissance, the little LCI gunboats fought one of the bravest actions in our naval history, receiving many hits from the Japanese shore batteries and suffering many casualties. Their personnel and the Underwater Demolition Teams deserve and have received the highest praise.

The big job here was to destroy the numerous fixed defenses ashore. Photographs showed about 700 such positions on IWO — coast defense guns, antiaircraft guns, covered artillery emplacements, blockhouses, pillboxes, etc.—and many more were suspected and later found. They were well dispersed and heavily constructed, usually of reinforced concrete. Hardly any had been destroyed or damaged by daily high altitude bombing and several "area" bombardments, over the previous three months, while frequent photographing disclosed many new defenses built by the Japs during this same period. The heavy naval gun at short range, with its great accuracy and penetrative powers and large ammunition supply, was the weapon needed for this job.

How well it did the job is shown by the following quotations from the action report of the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force:

"The four coast defense guns at the base of Mt. Suribachi were destroyed . . . as were the seven coast defense guns at the top of the quarry. . . . Two additional guns to the east of the quarry were also destroyed. As far as is now known no high velocity gun remained capable of delivering direct fire on boats or the landing beaches on D-Day. . . .

"Of the 37 blockhouses on the main landing beaches, it is reasonably established that almost all of them were destroyed or damaged.

". . . In the 4th Mardiv zone up to 400 yards inland 70% of the pillboxes were destroyed or damaged . . . In the 5th Mardiv zone the majority of pillboxes were destroyed."

The data above were obtained from air photographs taken intermittently during the operation (developed, printed, and interpreted on board ESTES) plus inspection ashore after the landing.

While more could have been accomplished, had more time been available (which strategic considerations would not permit), enough had now been done to permit a report to Vice Admiral Turner on the night of 18 February that the landing could be accomplished next day on schedule.

Thanks to Task Force 58's operations against Japan and to Rear Admiral Durgin's escort carrier plane strikes on nearby Chichi Jima, the Jap planes during this period gave us little trouble. Only a few night attacks were made against us, and only two succeeded. An APD and a DMS (destroyer type minesweeper) were hit by bombs, but not until after they had completed their missions. Neither was sunk.

OKINAWA

At Okinawa the areas involved, the forces assigned, and the time allowed (seven days) were all greater than at IWO. About 400 ships, as many planes, and a division of infantry, comprised the advance assault force. Three thousand square miles of sea had to be swept for mines by Rear Admiral Sharp's efficient and valiant Mine Force. Hundreds of mines were found,

(*Continued on page* 143)

Remains of a pillbox on Iwo Jima destroyed by naval gun fire.

Naval Gunfire Support

by Vice Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, USN

Commander Battleship Squadron One

THROUGHOUT the long and bitterly-fought series of amphibious campaigns which brought American and Allied forces across the Pacific to the Japanese home islands and victory, gunfire from all classes of ships was increasingly used for the support of troop landings and post landing advances. The development of this once neglected amphibious technique was rapid and embraced both old and new control devices and weapons, large guns, small ones and rockets. Long before the end of the war Naval gunfire support had become widely recognized as one of the essentials of a successful landing on a well defended shore.

Effect of Naval gunfire—inside view of a Japanese blockhouse and its 5-inch gun position on Iwo Jima.

Many were the lessons learned through the years from Guadalcanal to Okinawa. Logistics became a science; the need for continuing air cover for such operations was realized as a major necessity; and gunfire support from naval ships emerged as a potent casualty preventive and prime requisite to successful landings on hostile shores.

The tonnage expenditure of Naval bombardment ammunition increased steadily as the war progressed. Each new landing witnessed a new high in tonnage of projectiles fired against selected shore targets. Call fire from heavy vessels became a thing upon which troop commanders depended with increasing frequency, as better and better enemy defenses were encountered.

Vice Adm. Oldendorf

The accuracy of this Naval support gunfire is a tribute to the skill of the officers and men who manned the ships, to the air arm which spotted for this fire, and to the Shore Fire Control parties who worked as the link between supporting forces afloat and troops ashore.

Since the last anniversary issue of the ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL the landings at Lingayen Gulf, Iwo Jima and Okinawa have taken place. In each of these campaigns gunfire support played a vital dual role: first in preparational bombardment, and, later, as the fighting moved inland, in reduction by call fire of selected objectives too formidable for mobile land artillery.

The operation in Lingayen Gulf was chosen by the Japanese as the initial occasion for loosing in great force the suicide plane attack. In spite of this form of opposition the outcome was a virtually unopposed landing of great numbers of Army troops which reflects directly the effectiveness and determination of the ships of the gunfire support group.

The Kamikaze was not an entirely new weapon, but never before had so many highly skilful Japanese pilots attempted to crash our ships. It was here that it became an established weapon of Japanese defense, for it cost us one escort carrier and three vessels of miscellaneous smaller types sunk, and severe damage to four of our older battleships, five cruisers, eight destroyers and five vessels of miscellaneous types.

This damage, almost wholly inflicted by suicide planes, was critical, but despite these attacks the gunfire support group carried out its mission. More than 11,000 rounds of ammunition, ranging from 16-inch down to 5-inch, were poured into enemy beach positions, with the result that over 150,000 troops were landed without a single casualty.

Armored vessels thus proved they could stand up to the Kamikaze, and remain in the fight, fulfilling their mission even though sustaining heavy damage from direct plane hits.

The Naval Gunfire and Covering Force at Iwo Jima in February, 1945, consisted of six older battleships of Battleship Squadron One, four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, 15 destroyers and other auxiliaries. This force was under the command of Rear Admiral B. J. Rodgers, U. S. Navy.

It was obvious from the outset that the defenses at Iwo Jima were the strongest yet encountered in the Pacific. Blockhouses, caves, and other defensive positions were designed not only to meet a land attack, but also to withstand bombing and Naval gunfire. Three days prior to D-day were allotted at Iwo for heavy bombardment. More had been requested, but the availability of vessels and ammunition were limiting factors.

As Commander Task Force 54 (Rear Admiral Rodgers) stated:

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

U. S. Navy Photo

Units of the Fleet approached almost up to rifle range of Japan's shore in July, 1945, and blasted steel plants and other key installations.

The Battleships Bombard Japan

by Rear Admiral John F. Shafroth, USN

Commander Battleship Squadron Two

THE "battleship" must bear a charmed life, for during the last twenty years we have often heard that the battleship was finished, but when the final showdown came in this greatest of all wars we find that the battleships were spearheading the attack against Japan, aiding and supporting every landing force with their powerful surface and anti-aircraft batteries, providing artillery fire for our troops as they advanced against the enemy while others at sea were rendering invaluable support and protection to the fast carrier task forces, and were in turn themselves given much protection by the carrier planes.

Rear Adm. Shafroth

On 7 December the strength of our battle fleet was seriously impaired by the treacherous attack the Japanese delivered at Pearl Harbor, but fortunately, due to the farsightedness of President Roosevelt, we had two new battleships shaking down in the Atlantic and eight others building and in various stages of completion. Eventually they moved to the Pacific and played a very vital role in the defeat of Japan.

The movement of our forces across the vast expanse of the Pacific is the oft repeated story of the seizure of an enemy held island, the development on it of airfields, supply bases and staging areas for the bivouacing of our troops and anchorages for our ships and boats. But the seizure of enemy held bases is not as simple an operation as it sounds. The most careful planning is necessary. Thousands of tons of bombs were dropped by our aircraft on such bases and while they caused great damage they did not succeed in the capture of a base. It was the foot soldier who had to land on the beach and, with rifle, grenade and flame thrower, wrest the land from a tenacious and fanatical enemy.

Those foot soldiers, marines and infantrymen were moved to the vital combat areas by naval ships, were escorted and protected by naval ships and by naval air power from our carriers. Their attack was preceded by devastating bombardment by the heavy guns of the battleships, their landing was supported by the heavy and light guns of the battleships and lighter units and those ships provided the initial anti-aircraft protection against those enemy planes that broke through the air patrols over the area. Again and again was that story repeated and everywhere the battleship was the indispensable support unit for such landings. The reason is clear, for the battleship is that ship which embodies in itself the greatest offensive gun power combined with the greatest defensive power, and is capable of more concentrated anti-aircraft fire than any other type of ship. For these reasons our battleships were kept in close support of our carriers as we moved nearer and nearer to Japan.

On 14 July 1945 there took place the first bombardment of the Japanese mainland in history. On that day a task unit under the command of Rear Admiral Shafroth and composed of the battleships South Dakota, Indiana and Massachusetts, with the heavy cruisers Quincy and Chicago and nine screening destroyers, moved to within a few thousand yards of the Japanese mainland and conducted a devastating bombardment on the Imperial Iron and Steel Works and other industrial targets at Kamaishi. For two hours the ships streamed back and forth before the harbor entrance, firing salvo after salvo of sixteen and eight-inch high capacity projectiles into that unfortunate city. So completely surprised were the Japanese that they were unable to organize and launch any air attack against the bombardment force.

Other bombardments followed in rapid succession, and within a month Rear Admiral Badger led a task unit that bombarded Muroran and Hitachi and Rear Admiral Shafroth a task unit that bombarded Hamamatsu and again Kamaishi.

The war once more demonstrated the toughness of the battleship. While they have repeatedly been hit

(*Continued on page* 172)

The Third Amphibious Corps in the Pacific

by Major General K. E. Rockey, USMC

Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps

DURING the calendar year 1945 the III Amphibious Corps engaged in but one major operation—the Ryukyus (Okinawa) campaign. The Corps, or major elements thereof, had previously participated in the fighting at Guadalcanal, Bougainville, Cape Gloucester, Guam and Palau. The Palau campaign was successfully terminated during October 1944, and units of the Corps were returned to the Solomon Islands for rest and rehabilitation. Casualties at Guam and Palau had been heavy and extensive reorganization, reequipment and training were indicated, but a large percentage of all units were veteran troops and were prepared for operations on schedule.

Maj. Gen. Rockey

Planning for the Okinawa operation was initiated shortly after arrival in the Solomons from the Palaus operation. The composition of the Corps as set up for the operation was; Corps Troops, Corps Artillery (three medium battalions and three heavy battalions), three Marine Divisions and a considerable number of Army, Navy and Marine Corps special and service units, totaling in all some 92,530 officers and men. The First Marine Division men were veterans of Guadalcanal, Cape Gloucester and Palau; the Second of Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Saipan and Tinian. The Sixth was a newly constituted division, but formed largely from the First Provisional Marine Brigade, which had combined the former Marine Raider and the 22nd Marine Regiments, all of which units were composed of veteran troops.

On 1 April 1945, units of the U. S. Pacific Fleet and the U. S. Tenth Army launched the invasion of Okinawa. The III Amphibious Corps served, with the XXIV Army Corps, as part of the Tenth Army under Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner, and for the first time directly under Army Command, although in previous operations Army Divisions had been employed with the Corps.

All details of the operation had been worked out in successive staff conferences among all services involved. The landing itself was perfectly executed by experienced Army, Navy and Marine Personnel. In the zone of this Corps, resistance was initially light and both the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions, landing abreast, rapidly reached their initial objectives. Driving on across the islands, the 6th Marine Division turned north and the 1st Marine Division secured Katchin Peninsula. The Corps CP was established ashore early in the operation and the drive to the north continued until the entire northern part of the island was covered. Only on the Motobu Peninsula in northern Okinawa did the 6th Marine Division meet heavy resistance. The campaign in the north brought many difficult problems. Supply and evacuation, over the long distances and mountainous terrain which characterized this part of the island, became a problem of major importance. These were met by the opening of new supply ports, use of amphibious vehicles, continuous building and maintenance of roads, air drop of supplies, and the cooperation of all services involved. Not the least of the problems to be solved was the large number of civilians who were hiding in the northern hills. In the first month of the operation over 95,000 civilians were taken into custody in this sector. Housing, food and medical care for this number of people were the concern of Military Government personnel operating with the Divisions and the Corps. Fortunately the Okinawans were, in the main passive in their attitude and grateful for assistance.

Meanwhile, the main enemy strength had been developed in the south where the XXIV Corps was engaged. On 30 April the 1st Marine Division was committed against the enemy lines north of Shuri. On 7 May the 6th Marine Division was brought south and the III Amphibious Corps took over a sector of the line where it fought alongside the XXIV Corps in the seizure of the remainder of Southern Okinawa.

Here a determined enemy was met in force. He employed tactics, the terrain, and his weapons in such a

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

Eight Square Miles of Hell—Only five miles long and two-and-one-half wide at the widest point—the tiny island of Iwo Jima.

Uncommon Valor A Common Virtue

by Major General Harry Schmidt, USMC

Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps

ON completion of the capture of Saipan and Tinian and after a short time in Guam during the mopping up period, the V Amphibious Corps Headquarters returned to Pearl Harbor in October, 1944, to prepare for the assault on Iwo Jima.

The Corps, including the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions and numerous Army, Navy, and Marine supporting units, was designated as the Landing Force, working with Rear Admiral H. W. Hill, now Vice Admiral, as Naval Attack Force Commander. The operation was under the overall command of Admiral R. A. Spruance, with Vice Admiral (now Admiral) R. K. Turner in command of amphibious operations, and Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith as Expeditionary Troops Commander; with the 3rd Marine Division initially in reserve.

Maj. Gen. Schmidt

After intensive planning, training and rehearsals the force arrived at Iwo Jima on the early morning of 19 February, 1945. Some 80,000 troops were available in addition to the Naval and Air Forces which had been pounding the island in preparation for the landing. All units arrived on schedule to the accompaniment of an intensive bombardment by battleships, cruisers, destroyers and gunboats, and bombing and strafing by carrier aircraft with some land based support from Saipan. Preparations for landing commenced immediately.

At 0830 the waves of amphibious tractors carrying Marines headed for the beach 4,000 yards away. The gunfire support ships doubled their rate of fire placing a rolling barrage on and around the 3,000 yard long landing beach. As the leading waves neared the beach the gunboats fired a hail of rockets, mortars and 40mm shells at the defenders in the immediate landing area.

At 0900 the first waves landed, the 25th and 23d Marines of the 4th Marine Division on the right; the 27th and 28th Marines of the 5th Marine Division on the left. Thirty minutes later tanks began to land behind the tractor waves.

We were ashore, in volcanic sand up to the shoe tops of men and nearly up to the hubs of vehicles, facing a steep slope up to airfield number one. Enemy defenses inland were largely intact, and, as the intensive ships' gunfire slackened, heavy fire began to fall on the beaches from Mt. Suribachi on the south and the high ground on the right flank. It was a tough spot but tough leathernecks inched forward. Navy and Coast Guard coxswains nosed a continuous stream of boats into the beaches bringing more men, more equipment, ammunition and water.

Men were killed, boats were wrecked, ammunition dumps blown up, but the stream continued and by nightfall we had some 30,000 men ashore. We held positions encircling the southern airfield, with famous Mt. Suribachi isolated from the garrison to the north. Success was reasonably certain.

The expected and hoped for counter attack that night did not develop. The Japs had learned their lesson at Saipan and Tinian. They waited for us in their caves, pillboxes and blockhouses in strong interlocking defensive positions, with the idea of exacting the heaviest toll possible before retiring to new positions.

The Japanese on Iwo indicated that they were impressed by the flexibility of the American attack as well as by the fact that it was unhurried and supported by all available strength. Our numerical superiority permitted us to engage the enemy on the longest possible lines, making full use of all their guns difficult, rendering many defensive strong points helpless, and making it difficult for them to change dispositions to

(*Continued on page* 142)

Japanese Reaction to Our Conduct of War

by Major General Charles A. Willoughby, USA

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on the Staff of General of the Army MacArthur

WITHIN the period 1942-1944, the Japanese General Staff poured tremendous amounts of troops, weapons, equipment, shipping and planes into the Southwest Pacific area. It can be said, without exaggeration, that on this particular front the Japanese war machine received not only its first definitive set-back, at Milne Bay and on the Kokoda Trail, but bled itself white continuously thereafter. Of the masses of troops and matériel committed to that area — the critical area upon which Japan pinned its hopes of an integrated Asiatic Empire—none was either returned or effectively salvaged; in fact, none was ever successfully evacuated or withdrawn to fight elsewhere than in the defeated or bypassed sectors of their initial historical advance.

". . . The failure of the Japanese Kokoda Trail-Buna campaign caused the Japanese Army to give up the idea of capturing Port Moresby and lost to it the initiative in the New Guinea campaign. The loss of eastern New Guinea caused disruptions of the supply of Japanese forces in the Solomons and New Britain. With respect to Hollandia, this campaign caused the Japanese collapse in the islands north of Australia and forced the Japanese to plan a stand in the Philippines. Some small units were withdrawn to the Philippines but few succeeded . . ."[1]

It is axiomatic that Japan could wage neither successful hemispheric war nor effective occupation without the matériel contributions of its South Pacific conquests; they were acquired initially for that very reason.

". . . The fall of the Philippines and Saipan was the turning point in the Pacific war. While the Imperial General Staff never considered that the war had reached a point where continuation was 'impossible,' the loss of the Philippines made the continuation of the war 'by modern means' difficult . . ."[2]

From statements made by top-ranking Japanese officers, it is now evident that General MacArthur's terrestial campaigns, culminating in the recapture of the Philippines, represent the single decisive element in the Japanese Empire's early collapse in August.

". . . The loss of Leyte meant the collapse of the Japanese in the Philippine Islands. The supplies needed by Japanese industries could no longer be brought from the Netherlands East Indies. Troops to the south were cut off from supplies. The loss of Leyte was a prelude to the end of Japan's ability to conduct war by modern methods. The loss of Luzon was a prologue to the end of Japan's conduct of warfare by modern methods. That is, Japan's power to conduct technical warfare was reduced greatly by the loss of these two campaigns. . . . The Imperial General Headquarters and the responsibility for making Leyte a decisive battle. A decisive stand had to be made in the Philippines, or between there and Japan. The land forces would have preferred to have the decisive battle fought in the Philippines (Luzon); the air and navy were ready for it to be fought in Leyte. A shortage of transportation and Allied bombing kept the land forces from being thrown into Leyte . . . because of the speed of the U. S. advance after the Leyte campaign, the Japanese on Luzon didn't have enough time to organize Luzon defenses, or to put real fighting troops into the Clark Field area from where major counterattacks were to be launched . . ."[3]

Japanese military strategists are unanimous in that the early loss of Leyte spelled immediate doom to Imperial domination southward; Yamashita, against his own strategic judgment, was ordered to shoot his decisive bolt at Leyte, the first threat against the Philippines. The Philippines, strategically as well as geographically, thus emerge as the *sine qua non* of Japan's conquistadorial dream, their unexpectedly sudden loss, and our accelerated exploitation of those islands as advance bases against the Empire itself, rendered military collapse and surrender imminently inevitable.

". . . The Japanese disaster in the Philippines culminating in the loss of Luzon, was officially viewed by Japanese strategists as necessitating immediate steps to defend the home islands themselves . . ."[4]

Japan's potential defense of her home islands against invasion was, in every major respect, fatally crippled by her total and rapid loss of the Southwest Pacific area and the Philippines. The bulk of over twenty Corps in the South Pacific was completely lost.

Maj. Gen. Willoughby

". . . Japan suffered great losses of fighting strength in the Philippines and Southwest Pacific. Communications with the south were disrupted. The loss of the Philippines was fatal. The loss of Okinawa and accelerated bombing increased the deterioration of the fighting spirit in the Japanese people. Air and naval bases were acquired by the Allied forces by use of ground forces. Without victories by assault, even B-29's could not have operated . . ."[5]

Her motor transport and air force were soon to be paralyzed by the loss of East Indies' petroleum. Supply lines and important communications of any sort were severed south of Kyushu. The Philippine battlefields, converted to major air bases, put Japan's heartland within fighter range, particularly the fortified inner perimeter from Korea through Formosa to the Ryukyus.

". . . Regarding the salient factors entering into the defeat of Japan, (he) was very emphatic in expressing that after the Philippines were taken and the supply lines to the East Indies cut, it was impossible to continue fighting except with manpower alone and substitute fuels. Due to fuel shortages any offensive or large scale defensive action had to be curtailed and the use of fuel in training practically eliminated. Many substitutes were tried, even to distillation of pine roots, none of which proved successful. Operations were becoming exceedingly difficult and with bombings by aircraft becoming heavier every day and production

(*Continued on page* 168)

[1] Lt. General Arisue, Seizo, G-2 Imperial General Staff.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Lt. General Yamashita, Tomoyuki, CG 14th Area Army.
[4] Lt. General Arisue, Seizo, G-2 Imperial General Staff.
[5] Lt. General Kawabe, Masakazu, CG Air General Army.

Operations of I Corps in Northern Luzon

by Major General Innis P. Swift, USA

Commanding General I Corps

THE Luzon campaign involved no new principles of warfare; it did however introduce a phase of Pacific warfare whereby the doctrine of fire and movement was employable.

Heretofore our forces had been denied freedom of manuever owing to conditions imposed by nature of the terrain. On the plains of central Luzon our fighting forces, under direction of I Corps, for the first time in the Pacific were able to employ fire and movement on a large scale. I Corps troops ran rough shod over the Japanese fighting machine, destroying an armored division and inflicting terrific casualties in men and materials, forcing the enemy to the shelter of the mountains in the north and east of Luzon.

Maj. Gen. Swift

Thus, the way was clear for the drive which resulted in the capture of Manila. General Yamashita, commander of the Philippines, was driven into the mountainous terrain of northern Luzon where avenues of approach were few, easily defended and ideal for the Japs' particular type of warfare. Here Yamashita made his bid for victory and suffered his major defeats.

On 9 January 1945, I Corps, reinforced, landed on the southeastern shores of Lingayen Gulf with 6th and 43rd Divisions abreast with the mission of destroying all hostile forces encountered, seizing and securing the Army beachhead within the I Corps zone of action, and being prepared to advance north and east.

By the evening of D plus 5 all initial objectives had been seized, supplies and reinforcements landed and the stage set for the annihilation of the Japanese forces in northern Luzon. These forces included the Supreme Headquarters of all the Philippines, two thirds of the mobile combat strength in Luzon and thousands of air force and service troops which had withdrawn to the relative security of Cagayan Valley beyond the mountainous rampart bordering the Central Plains on the north.

The action of the I Corps from 9th January until the first of July may be briefly summarized in three phases:

1. The drive across the Central Plain from Lingayen Gulf to the east coast which completely severed the Japanese forces and bottled up the main Japanese combat strength in the north.

2. The costly fight to gain the approaches to Baguio and the city itself, where General Yamashita's Headquarters and the nerve center of all Japanese forces in the Philippine Archipelago were located.

3. The battle for the mountainous passes, leading into the Japanese bread basket — the strategic Cagayan Valley and the Valley itself, with its air fields and the only port suitable for Japanese reinforcement or evacuation, Aparri.



In the first phase of the drive across Luzon forcing the Japanese from the Central Plain into the mountains to the north it was necessary to employ three reinforced Infantry Divisions, the 6th, 25th and 32nd. The 25th Division skirting the northern edge of the Plain drove southwest pushing Japanese infantry and armor before them until they reached San Manuel, where elements of a tank brigade reinforced with armored infantry and artillery made a suicidal stand.

After several days of fanatic fighting the garrison was reduced and the 25th Division secured the

(*Continued on page* 164)

X Corps—Leyte, Samar and Mindanao

by Major General F. C. Sibert, USA

Commanding General X Corps

X CORPS, under Sixth Army, in its first operation landed on Leyte on 20 October 1944 in the first and decisive battle of the Philippines.

Its initial objectives, the seizure of Tacloban, Tacloban Airstrip, Palo, juncture with the XXIV Corps, and the opening of the San Juanico Strait, were accomplished in five bloody days in the midst of thousands of friendly filipinos and one typhoon.

By the twelfth day, the final Corps objective was taken when the 24th Infantry Division, driving up Leyte Valley, coordinated with the 1st Cavalry Division in a combined attack on Carigara. Elements of the 16th Japanese Division had been badly mauled and remnants driven into the hills between Ormoc Valley and Leyte Valley. The first of the Japanese reinforcements were met in the center of the valley at Jaro where elements of the Japanese 30th Division from Mindanao and elements of the 102d Japanese Division from Cebu were kicked aside by the 24th Infantry Division.

Maj. Gen. Sibert

Japanese reinforcements were now pouring into Ormoc and the Corps was given the mission of advancing to secure that Port. The 24th Infantry Division advanced west along Carigara Bay and turned south on the highway towards Limon and Ormoc. The 1st Cavalry Division moved into the hills between the two valleys to prevent any hostile attempt to cross into Leyte Valley.

On turning south towards Limon, the 24th Infantry Division had a meeting engagement with the crack Japanese 1st Division and a gruelling fight ensued before the 24th Infantry Division finally overran the Japanese main position (Breakneck Ridge). The veteran 32d Infantry Division of New Guinea fame relieved the 24th Infantry Division at this point and continued a slow tedious advance south along the road against fanatical resistance by the 1st Japanese Division.

In the meantime the 1st Cavalry Division overcoming torrential rains and steep heavily forrested mountains and operating on a twenty mile front eliminated the hodge-podge 102d Japanese Division made up of the 41st Infantry remnants, 169th, 171st, 364th and Tempei Battalions.

Two months from the start of the campaign, the X Corps made contact with the 77th Infantry Division of the XXIV Corps from the south and the decisive battle of the Philippines was won. Mopping up continued for sometime thereafter.

After some minor operations by the Americal Division in cleaning up Leyte, Samar, and the eastern part of San Bernadino Strait, the X Corps was assigned a new mission — the invasion of Jap-held mountainous Mindanao.

The initial landing was made by the 24th Infantry Division at Malabang and Parang on the west coast. The division initiated a rapid advance by road and river to Fort Pikit, seizing it in five days, and then continued on to capture Davao on the sixteenth day. For the next two months, it systematically drove the Japanese 100th Division, Naval personnel, and Air and Service troops out of the coastal area and its heavily fortified positions back into the inhospitable mountains, where the remnants were ordered to break up into small bands to live as best they could.

The 31st Infantry Division landed five days behind the 24th Infantry Division and moved by road and river to Kabacan and started north along Highway 3 to destroy the Japanese 30th Division in Bukidnon.

Its advance was rapid in spite of destroyed bridges and heavy rains. By 24 May, juncture was made with the 108th RCT (40th U. S. Division) which had landed in Macajalar Bay on 10 May, and all highways were now in U. S. possession. The Japanese 30th Division, Air, and Service Forces caught between these two columns had suffered heavy losses and retreated east towards Agusan Valley.

The 31st Infantry Division took to the water again and LCM'ed a reinforced battalion eighty miles east along the coast to the Agusan River and eighty miles south along the river to the exit of the trail being used by the Japanese; and was waiting for the 30th Japanese Division when its remnants came out. The 30th Division had had a gruelling time. It took forty days to make the forty-five air-line miles, and only a small fraction made it in time to greet the end of the war.

V-J day found about 10,000 of the original Japanese force of 34,000 still alive, most of them half starved and sick, their weapons practically useless from rust, and roaming in the hills in small bands trying to eke out an existence.

"We must, if we are to realize the hopes we may now dare have for lasting peace, enforce our will for peace with strength. We must make it clear to the potential gangsters of the world that if they dare break our peace they will do so at their great peril.

"This Nation's destiny clearly lies in a sound permanent security policy."

—*From the report of* GENERAL OF THE ARMY GEORGE C. MARSHALL

To Yokohama With the XI Corps

by Lieutenant General C. P. Hall, USA

Commanding General, XI Corps

THE end of 1944 found the XI Corps on Morotai Island which it had captured on 15 September 1944, and developed in record time as a first class air base. Headquarters was moved to Leyte where orders for the invasion of Luzon were received about the middle of January. These orders directed a landing on the west coast of that island, in Zambales Province, on 29 January 1945. Troops included the 38th Division, the 34th RCT and other Corps troops. The mission of the Corps was to seize the naval base of Olongapo, open Subic Bay, cut off Bataan Peninsula and join with troops of the XIV Corps which had landed in Lingayen Gulf on 9 January.

The landing was made at San Antonio, Zambales, without opposition on the early morning of 29 January. The 34th RCT made a rapid march to the east and its advance elements reached Subic by nightfall. Troops of the 38th Division followed closely. One battalion of the 38th Division was reimbarked in LSM's under orders to make an amphibious landing on the morning of 30 January and capture Grande Island commanding the entrance of Subic Bay. This operation was in conjunction with an attack on Olongapo on the same day by the 34th RCT. The success of these two operations would open Subic Bay and provide a much needed base for the Navy. No resistance was met on Grande Island and very little prior to reaching Olongapo. Subic Bay was opened to shipping on the day after the initial landing.

It soon developed that the Japanese had elected to place their main defenses on the tortuous terrain connecting Olongapo and the Central Luzon Plain, known as the Zig Zag Pass. It was necessary to eliminate the enemy in the pass in order to accomplish the Corps mission. The attack was begun at once on this completely organized, strongly held position. It was not until 14 February and after 2,000 Japs had been killed that the pass was finally cleared for motor vehicles.

Operations were next set up to recapture Bataan and Corregidor on the 15th of February.

Lt. Gen. Hall



The plan was for an advance down the east coast of Bataan by elements of the 38th Division reinforced by the 1st RCT of the 6th Division, in conjunction with a landing by major elements of the 38th Division and a combat team from the 34th RCT at Mariveles on 14 February, to be followed the next day by the attack on Corregidor. These preliminary operations were successful and on the night of the 14th of February preparations for the attack on Corregidor were complete. The plan called for a parachute landing by the 503d Parachute Infantry on the topside of Corregidor under the most hazardous conditions ever attempted and a simultaneous amphibious landing by a reinforced battalion of the 34th Infantry

(*Continued on page* 141)

Luzon Operations of the XIV Corps

by Lieutenant General Oscar W. Griswold

Commanding General XIV Corps

THE XIV Corps with its principal combat units the 37th (Buckeye) and the 40th (Sunshine) Infantry Divisions landed on the shores of Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, Philippines on S-Day which was 9 Jan. 1945.

The landing was made without ground opposition as the enemy garrison, completely surprised, fled three days before the start of an intensive naval and aerial bombardment. However, the invasion forces were attacked savagely by Japanese fighter and bomber planes.

Meeting spasmodic ground resistance the corps drove rapidly south towards Manila capturing successively Binmaley, San Carlos, Malasiqui, Paniqui and Tarlac, the Philippines' second city.

First major resistance was at Bamban where the Japanese were strongly entrenched in the 40th's sector in the foothills of the Zambales Mountains. The 37th was pivoted to the west and attacked abreast of the 40th. The resistance was sufficiently reduced to allow the 37th to resume its march on Manila. The 40th was left to contain and exterminate the stubborn Japanese defenders.

Lt. Gen. Griswold

The 1st (Dismounted) Cavalry Division joined the corps and from Guimba began a drive to Manila, quickly overrunning the towns of Cabanatuan, Santa Rosa and Gapan and by 1 Feb., the 37th and the 1st Cavalry were poised north of Manila ready for the bitter battle for the Philippines' capital city.

The 11th Airborne Division made a paratroop, amphibious invasion of Nasugbu on the west coast of Batangas Province, 32 miles southwest of the former American naval base of Cavite, 2 February.

This move was to seal off the Japanese forces south of Manila. The 11th, passing to corps control, began a push towards a junction with columns of the 37th and 1st Cavalry.

The 1st Cavalry entered Manila 3 February liberating 3,700 American internees at the University of Santo Tomas and the next day doughboys of the 37th marched into Bilibid Prison freeing 800 American civilians and soldiers captured on Bataan and Corregidor.

Resistance was quickly reduced north of the Pasig River but the Japanese fought violently in southern Manila. Forces of the 37th, 1st Cavalry and the 11th Airborne joined up in Manila 13 February. The Japanese Manila garrison was rapidly being compressed into a small pocket from which there was to be no escape.

Meanwhile the 6th (Red Star) Infantry Division joined the XIV Corps 17 February and attacked well fortified enemy forces in the Shimbu Line, east of Manila. In a brilliantly executed amphibious, air, para-troop, ground assault troops of the 11th Airborne Division aided by elements of XIV Corps special troops, freed 2,100 American internees from the Los Banos Prison camp, 23 February.

Main enemy resistance collapsed with the taking of the ancient walled city (Intramuros) 24 February by the 37th Division.



Mopping up was completed in three public buildings which had been converted into strong defenses by the enemy and in Manila Bay where the Japanese had set up desperation defences in hulks of sunken ships.

Pushing southward the XIV Corps with the 1st Cavalry and 11th Airborne Divisions, and for a time the 158th Regimental Combat Team, liberated Cavite Province to clear the southern shore of Manila Bay and drove into the provinces of Batangas, Laguna and Tayabas. Enemy organized resistance was then

(*Continued on page* 168)

Operations of the XXIV Corps 1944-45

by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge

Commanding General XXIV Corps

THE XXIV Corps, activated 8 April 1944 at Schofield Barracks, T. H., was first assigned the capture of Babelthaup in the Palau Islands. This mission was changed in mid-July to the capture of Yap. A second change on 15 September after the Corps was loaded on ships for the assault on Yap made Leyte the objective, with the Corps operating under Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army, to consist initially of Corps Troops, the 7th Division, veterans of Attu and Kwajalein, and the 96th Division, newly out of United States.

The Leyte Campaign

The two divisions landed abreast on the east coast of Leyte on 20 October, and driving rapidly inland carved out a beachhead ten miles deep by twenty miles wide by the end of the month. The 96th pushed west and swung northward while the 7th after seizing the initial beachhead in its zone, covered southern Leyte with patrols and started a loop south to Abuyog, west across the mountains to Baybay, which it reached on 5 November, then north up the west coast. Enemy resistance increased as heavy Japanese reinforcements began reaching western Leyte by water. Early in November the 11th Airborne Division was assigned to the Corps. Late in November the Corps received the 77th Division, battlewise after its fight on Guam.

Lt. Gen. Hodge

The Corps was then able to move on the important Ormoc area, using the 7th from the south, the 11th Airborne and 96th from the east across the mountains, and the 77th in amphibious assault. The 77th landed at Deposito on 7 December, after moving by water from the east coast, and captured Ormoc three days later. Meanwhile the 7th Division drove northward joining with and taking over from the 77th, while troops in the east coast beachhead area continued their advance westward across the mountains and beat off major enemy counterattacks, one of which was airborne.

The 77th continued north as the 7th took over, and captured Valencia on 18 December then headed west toward Palompon. Simultaneously one of the battalions of the 77th moved by amphibian tractor on a forty-mile water voyage to land in the rear of Palompon. By 25 December, organized resistance was ended and on 26 December Leyte was declared secure. The 11th Airborne Division was released in January for the Luzon Campaign.

The Corps continued mopping up, including the 7th Division cleaning off the Camotes Islands, and was relieved near mid-February 1945 by elements of the X Corps. During the mopping up the XXIV Corps killed 14,000 enemy in addition to the 31,000 already killed, bringing the total of its enemy killed in the Leyte Campaign to 45,000.

The Okinawa Operation

Beginning in February, the 7th, 77th and 96th Divisions and Corps Troops were assembled from all over Leyte, refurbished, re-equipped and mounted out for Okinawa. On 27 March the main convoy sailed north from Leyte Gulf as a part of the Tenth Army. The 77th Division had preceded the rest of the Corps and on 26 March had seized islands in the Kerama Retto

(*Continued on page* 144)

U. S. Armed Forces in the North Pacific

by Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons, USA

Commanding General, Alaskan Department

IN order to provide an appropriate background for an account of the activities of the Alaskan Department during the last eight months of the war against Japan, it is necessary to review briefly the events up to November, 1944.

Lt. Gen. Emmons

Any discussion, no matter how limited, of this Department's activities, should include a generous tribute to the North Pacific Naval air and surface units and the Eleventh Air Force. These forces carried the brunt of the offensive action in the Theater, after the recapture of Attu and Kiska, and at all times co-operated to the highest degree.

From the beginning of hostilities with Japan the Alaskan Defense Command and its successor, the Alaskan Department, had the mission of defending the northern Pacific territories of the United States. These included the Southeastern Alaska panhandle, the Alaskan mainland, the Alaskan peninsula and the Aleutian Islands. When the success of this mission was assured, the Department was assigned the additional mission of preparing for, and keeping the Japanese in fear of, an invasion of their exposed northern flank.

Hopeful of tremendous rewards if they could pierce our continental defenses, the Japanese developed the Kurile Islands of Shimushu, Paramushiro, and Matsuwa as key bases, from which they launched two carrier-supported attacks on Dutch Harbor in June, 1942. These attacks, however, met hastily prepared defenses, and the Japanese suffered considerable damage from our fighter planes which took off from two emergency airfields, the existence of which was unknown to the enemy.

Failing to attain their primary goal, the Japanese accepted lesser rewards and occupied the undefended Aleutian Islands of Attu and Kiska. In May, 1943, our forces annihilated them on Attu in the first recapture of American soil seized by the enemy. Kiska was retaken without opposition in August, 1943, after the Japanese had successfully withdrawn because of the pressure of our rapidly mounting strength in the Aleutians. Thus, before the close of 1943, the Japanese had been tossed bodily out of the Aleutians, where they had sacrificed a great deal in an attempt to gain

(*Continued on page* 142)

by Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, USN

Commander, North Pacific Force and Area

THE strategic position of the Aleutian Islands which lie on the Great Circle Course from the west coast of the United States to the Japanese Empire, has throughout the war in the Pacific presented the promise of a short invasion route to enemy territory; first to the Japanese and then to the Allies. The difficulties presented by the rugged and treacherous terrain, the ever severe and changeable weather, extremely high winds and mountainous seas, ruled out the possibility of mounting large scale amphibious operations against the main islands of the Japanese Empire from this area.

Vice Adm. Fletcher

The period from November 1944 to the end of the war, in August 1945, however, witnessed a continuous increase in our offensive operations against the Japanese bases in the Kuriles. During these ten months our surface forces frequently sailed into the Okhotsk Sea in search of enemy shipping which must of necessity supply the enemy garrisons on Paramushiro, Shimushu and Matsuwa. Whereas only three sorties were made by our surface units against the enemy's Kurile bases in the previous months of 1944, nine highly successful bombardments and anti-shipping sweeps were made during this period. The culmination of these strikes was the final one of the war made on 11 August 1945, in which two of our cruisers and twelve destroyers sank eleven Japanese vessels and then bombarded Matsuwa, Kurabu Zaki and Suribachi airfields and adjacent installations simultaneously.

These operations were unusual among others in the Pacific in that no air cover was provided for our surface forces. Of necessity they were in general hit and run attacks although occasionally units searched the Okhotsk Sea for Japanese shipping for periods up to three days.

The Japanese maintained considerable numbers of planes in the Northern Kuriles area which were always a potential and dangerous threat to our forces operating in enemy controlled waters, far from their own bases with no probability of being afforded fighter protection by our land based planes in case of attack. Although our surface units received return fire from coastal guns and were attacked by enemy airplanes on several occasions they received no damage and suffered no casualties as a result of enemy action.

(*Continued on page* 142)

Army Service Command—Olympic

by Major General Frederick Gilbreath, USA

Commanding General ASCOMO

ASCOMO, as the name indicates, is a Service Command organized to support the invasion of Japan. However, it was not a new organization because it had developed and grown up in the South Pacific where it was known as SOPACBACOM (South Pacific Base Command).

Maj. Gen. Gilbreath

By the middle of spring of 1944 the war in the Pacific had moved forward so rapidly it was evident that a tactical headquarters would soon be out of place in the South Pacific. This, coupled with the need for an Air Force commander located in Hawaii to direct Army bombing operations in the Pacific, brought about the elimination of the headquarters in the South Pacific known as USAFISPA (United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area) and the transfer of all remaining duties and responsibilities to the commander of the Central Pacific. The date of this change was set at 1 August 1944. By that time the commander of USAFISPA and most of his senior assistants were on their way to Honolulu and/or the United States leaving the senior island commander in command of all Army activities in the South Pacific.

Effective on the date set, USAFISPA passed out of the picture and in its place there was established SOPACBACOM, a subordinate to the Central Pacific, which on the same date took on the larger responsibilities of the Army in the Pacific Ocean Area (POA).

There still remained much to be done in the South Pacific in the way of logistical support of advanced operations for both Army and Navy—receiving and caring for hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies for which cancellation could not be ordered because of possible need and providing rest areas and rehabilitating several divisions worn down by continuous fighting in the jungle islands of the South Pacific. Added to this was the usual wartime problem of closing out unneeded areas and disposing of surplus supplies.

On 10 August 1944 Major General Frederick Gilbreath was assigned, by direction of the President, to command SOPACBACOM.

(*Continued on page* 141)

Logistic Support for the Combat Marines

by Brigadier General Merritt A. Edson, USMC

Commanding General, Service Command, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

THE Service Command, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific was engendered through necessity after the present war began; its growth paralleled, but always lagged behind, the growth of the ground units of the Fleet Marine Force; and the end of the war found it still in the process of development, expansion, and reorganization.

The basic concept of the Fleet Marine Force prior to December 1941 was to employ it in conjunction with the Fleet to seize, occupy, and defend advance bases. Reinforced divisions were designed to be self-sufficient. They encompassed within their organic structures all supply and maintenance units normally associated with the various services. In addition to initial equipment, they carried with them a ninety day replenishment including spare parts and major items. Resupply, theoretically, would be direct from continental depots to the advance bases which they seized and defended. All service elements within the division and the resupply thereof were, generally speaking, the responsibility of the division quartermaster.

As the war in the Pacific developed, the basic concept for the employment of the Fleet Marine Force underwent a major metamorphosis. Instead of remaining indefinitely to defend the bases which they seized, the major elements of the Fleet Marine Force were withdrawn to rear areas to reorganize and re-equip, to be employed again and again as the assault elements for our amphibious operations. The Force itself expanded from one Marine division to two and ultimately to six, formed into two corps with all the supporting corps elements. Its field of activities eventually extended from the South Pacific through the Gilberts, Marshalls, Marianas, Bonins, and the Ryukus. It became apparent that the original concept of supply and service was insufficient to meet the needs of the expanded Fleet Marine Force and that a strong supporting logistic organization within the Pacific Ocean Area was an absolute necessity.

Brig. Gen. Edson

(*Continued on page* 141)

Service to the Fleet — A "Secret Weapon"

by Vice Admiral William Ward Smith

Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet

THE start of 1945 definitely marked the beginning of the end for Japan. There were several reasons for this.



Vice Adm. Smith

One in particular concerned the perfection attained in providing what is generally referred to as "service to the fleet."

Summed up briefly, this means: The United States Navy was able this year to achieve unlimited range of operations throughout the Pacific without having to return to bases for refueling, re-provisioning and repairs.

To those unfamiliar with naval logistics that achievement may seem colorless and perhaps even mundane, but it marked a turning point in the history of naval warfare.

From the days of the ancient Phoenecians, who roamed the Levantine coast in their thin wooden vessels, right up to the beginning of World War II, every fleet was able to fight only as long as its fuel, food and other provisions, ammunition, men and ships lasted.

Even when one of these was exhausted the fleet was forced to return to home port or a base for replenishment and repairs.

But the Navy developed a "secret weapon," one which the Japs never quite fathomed. That weapon proved that a fleet could strike and strike and then strike again, move

(*Continued on page* 144)

Advance Base Sectional Dock (USS ABSD-3) undocking eleven craft.

Remember Pearl Harbor

by Vice Admiral Sherwoode A. Taffinder, USN

Commandant 14th Naval District and Hawaiian Sea Frontier

SOME of the most important pages of World War II's history may deal with the strategic part taken by the Fourteenth Naval District, the Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and most particularly the vast, efficient services provided by the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard.

Within the last few months of the war the tempo of activity at the Navy Yard was geared to a streamlined speed that kept Uncle Sam's fighting ships in repair, ready for assault in enemy waters. And as flares and searchlights from hundreds of ships in the harbor lighted the Hawaiian sky the night of V-J Day, they called attention to the contribution the men of Pearl Harbor had made to final victory.

In addition to the work done at the yard, the Fourteenth Naval District was the point from which thousands of fighting men were channeled to the fleet; it was the major supply base for the entire Pacific area, and an advanced training base for scores of naval and marine units.

As the Navy drove the Japanese fleet into virtual oblivion the menace of submarines in the Hawaiian Sea Frontier greatly diminished, but patrols never were relaxed. Stratospheric balloons were sighted and reported, but they did no damage whatsoever in this area. Air-sea rescue work deserves particular mention inasmuch as scores of lives were saved after planes had made forced landings at sea.

Pearl Harbor Navy Yard workers' contribution included the amazing record of repairing more than 7,000 large and small fighting ships and returning them to action against Japan.

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, paid an outstanding tribute to the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard employees a few months before Japan surrendered when he declared that at no time did the workers fail to restore a damaged ship to the fighting line on schedule.

Vice Adm. Taffinder

With a peak load of almost 30,000 workers, the yard maintained three shifts which struggled through many tiring months of overtime

(*Continued on page* 143)

Pacific's Times Square

by Major General Henry L. Larsen, USMC

Island Commander, Guam

WHEN Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal stepped off a plane at Guam last Spring he described the island by a succinct appellation which has been applied many times since.



Maj. Gen. Larsen

"Guam," said Secretary Forrestal, "is, indeed, 'The Times Square of the Pacific'."

The description is not only colorful, it is accurate. Guam's strategic location as the hub of the Pacific, and its area of 228 square miles — the largest land mass in 10,000,000 square miles of ocean—were accidents of nature. But Guam's development, in little more than a year, into the springboard from which the Pacific war was plunged to a successful conclusion is a saga of courage, determination and skilled craftsmanship.

On 21 July 1944 (East Longitude Date), Marines swarmed ashore on the beaches of Guam—our final objective in the Marianas—followed by soldiers of the 77th Division. Plans for base development were made jointly with plans for the assault phase.

Despite the military requirements of the battle, the huge job of reconstruction was tackled simultaneously with the fighting.

Almost immediately, the Seabees went to work on the harbor, constructing pontoon piers for temporary use. Even a near-typhoon in October that smashed most of the newly-built harbor facilities didn't deter the hardworking Seabees from meeting their schedule. Building Guam's harbor involved the largest dredging project in the Pacific—the moving of 11,000,000 cubic yards of bottom to date. The breakwater causeway has been completed to 3,900 feet, and the main breakwater already extends 3,265 feet beyond, making a total of 7,165 feet finished so far.

In recent months Apra Harbor has handled the largest tonnage of any forward area port in the world.

From D-Day to 31 August 1945, the volume handled was 3,104,891 short tons, or 8,379,204 measurement tons, and in August alone, 472,067 short tons, or 1,143,955 measurement tons of cargo passed through Guam's harbor. Some 800 merchant and warships dock each month. The harbor's drydocks can accommodate any ship afloat.

Without the seemingly miraculous completion in a minimum of time of necessary piers to expedite handling of vital supplies and equipment, and adequate

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The Navy Returns

by Commodore Mark L. Hersey, Jr., USN

Commandant, U. S. Naval Operating Base, Manila-Subic

THE enemy ousted us from the Philippines once but —it won't happen again. When the Navy began its return to the Manila area during the early part of February, it came in force and it came to stay.

The full scale battle raging in Manila prevented the early return of shore based units to the ruined city. On 4 March 1945, Captain, W. J. Lorenz, USN, (Ret.), arrived in Manila as prospective commanding officer of Naval Base. Negotiations were begun with the Army for land sites. The eight-story Wilson Building on Juan Luna Avenue, which required a new roof but was comparatively undamaged otherwise, was obtained as headquarters. By the twenty-third of the month, Naval Base Manila was established, Captain Lorenz commanding, and construction of shore installations begun.

Commo. Hersey, Jr.

Commodore O. O. Kessing, USN, arrived 28 May as both CNOB Manila-Subic and CNB, turning over his command to me on 28 July. On the same date, Captain H. G. Drake, USNR, who had been captain of the yard under Commodore Kessing, assumed command of Naval Base Manila.

The most immediate problem, naturally, was to get Manila Harbor into operation. Shore facilities were a jumbled part of the general ruin; the harbor was choked with the result of our bombings—over 500 Japs wrecks of all types. North Harbor could be entered carefully by vessels of shallow draft but South Harbor was completely inoperative with block ships across both the main and auxiliary entrances. The harbor was rapidly cleared by Naval salvage units while the piers were being made serviceable by the Army Engineers.

On 12 March, the port director unit arrived under command of Lt. Comdr. Harry H. Baulch, USNR. The same unit, grown to one of the largest in the area, is now commanded by Commander Keith C. Middleton, USNR.

For two weeks, this unit operated from an LST in the stream before it moved ashore to the Elizaldes Building and from there to its present location in the Customs House.

Thanks to the efforts of Navy salvage crews and the Army Engineers, dockage increased from one ship to six within the first ten days. Present berthing capacity is 28 large and 15 smaller ships. 15,000 tons of military cargo is handled daily. Despite decidedly adverse conditions, the port director turned around 507

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Central Pacific

by Major General H. T. Burgin, USA

Commanding General, Central Pacific Base Command

THE Central Pacific Base Command has been a "triple threat" player on the Allied team in the Pacific's BIG LEAGUE. Its assignment has been: to hold the line, pass the supplies, and, like the quarterback, to spark the plays.

Maj. Gen. Burgin

This command was established 1 July 1944, to relieve Lt. General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (now, U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific) of the tasks of defending the Hawaiian Islands and adjacent bases in the central Pacific, of providing logistic support to all Army forces in this area and maintaining supply levels at advanced bases, and of training and inspecting all troops of this command before departure to combat areas. All this was done along with the usual administration and personnel work, including that of civilian employees for other organizations in the middle Pacific. In this way CPBC has combined the activities of a forward area command with those of an overseas communication zone.

Central Pacific Base Command has a score of major echelons in addition to the usual General and Special Staff. Echelons for defense are: seacoast artillery command, antiaircraft artillery command, air defense command, ground defenses of Oahu, military police, and garrison forces on the outer islands. Combat Training Command operates schools. The remainder of the major echelons are service forces, the commanding officer of each also acting as a special staff officer on the staff of the Commanding General.

Defense. Successful prosecution of the war against Japan, isolating some of the enemy on remote islands and carrying the fight to the threshold of their "Home Islands," did not permit any relaxation in the vigil of defense in CPBC. True, likelihood of an enemy attack in force diminished with the progress of the war, but always threatening were commando-type raids or landings of enemy agents from submarines at some point of the Territory's 876 miles of coastline. Protection against such activities is as difficult to maintain as defense against attacks in force, for there are relatively few beaches suitable for large amphibious landings. Further, as our Air Forces intensified its bombing of Japanese cities, the likelihood increased that some fanatical resident of Japanese ancestry might attempt an act of sabotage. That no such activ-

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Western Pacific

by Lieutenant General W. D. Styer, USA

Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Western Pacific

THE United States Army Forces, Western Pacific (AFWESPAC), was organized on 7 June 1945, with the mission of providing and operating the administrative and service facilities and establishments for the logistic support of designated forces in the Western Pacific amounting by August 1945 to more than a million and a quarter men. In addition, this Command was charged with the defense of certain specific areas within the Philippine Islands. Another important responsibility was the preparation of service units, not attached to tactical organizations, for combat. The great area served by AFWESPAC included over 10,000 islands and extended from Australia to Japan on a route of advance more than six thousand miles long. Along this invasion road there had been constructed eleven major bases of which five were located in the Philippines.

Lt. Gen. Styer

During the early days of the Southwest Pacific theater, in fact right up to the closing of the European war, the United States Army Services of Supply, short titled USASOS (transferred to AFWESPAC at the time of its formation) had ably provided for the logistic support of all troops in this theater under the leadership of Major General James L. Frink. A mobile and highly flexible system of supply had been developed which had supported every operation within this theater from Milne Bay to Aparri. Also transferred to AFWESPAC upon its formation were certain units of the United States Army Forces in the Far East. Included among these were the Replacement Command, the Military Police Command, the 14th Antiaircraft Command and numerous service agencies such as the offices of Enemy Property Custodian, Claims Service, and Disposition of Surplus Property. The combining of USASOS and these commands and agencies of USAFFE into AFWESPAC was a major step taken by General MacArthur to complete the regroupment of his invasion forces for the final defeat of Japan and gave him an effective administrative and supply organization to administer the tremendous rear areas wrested from Japanese control.

As rapidly as islands in the Philippine area were secured a planned base development construction program was initiated. During the period 1 January 1945 to 31 July 1945, more than 6,600,000 measurement tons of supplies were received in the Southwest Pa-

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Command of the Forward Areas

by Vice Admiral George D. Murray, USN

Commander Marianas

THE command of the Forward Area, Central Pacific, redesignated the Marianas Area on 1 June 1945, was a combined administrative and operational command. This command, known also as Task Force 94, included the Western Carolines, the Palaus, the Marianas and, at the end of the war, the Volcano and Bonin Islands. Iwo Jima was the only major addition to the command after November of 1944. Broadly speaking, the responsibilities of Commander Task Force 94 were to develop and administer the captured islands for the support of further operations against the Japanese Empire; to provide for the defense of our bases and shipping within the area; to keep by-passed enemy positions in the area under observation and to assure their neutralization; and to support the Third and Fifth Fleets when ordered. These responsibilities were assumed by my predecessor, Vice Admiral John H. Hoover, U. S. Navy, whom I relieved on 24 July 1945.

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U. S. Navy Photo

Japanese surrender on board USS Portland, Truk Atoll, 2 Sept. 1945. Vice Adm. Chuichi Hara signing surrender documents. (Left to right): Lt. S. E. Thompson, USNR, Flag Lieutenant; Capt. O. F. Naquin, USN, Acting Chief of Staff; Vice Adm. George D. Murray, USN, Commander Marianas, accepting surrender on behalf of Commander in Chief of Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas; Capt. D. N. Cone, USN, representing Commander Marshalls and Gilberts; Capt. L. A. Thackrey, USN, Commanding Officer, USS Portland; Lt. L. L. Thompson, USN, Flag Secretary; and Lt. A. M. Soden, USNR, interpreter.

Rolling Up the South Pacific

by Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun, USN

Commander South Pacific Area and Force

Vice Adm. Calhoun

FROM a cluster of teeming bases engaged in active logistic support of forward and combat areas to a diminishing group whose prime function became that of cutting down to the minimum and redeploying forward all practicable personnel and equipment is the story of the South Pacific Area and Force during the past year.

This once bitterly contested combat area fulfilled its last important staging operation with the mounting of large combat and service units for the Okinawa assault. This was fittingly the largest staging ever performed in the South Pacific. Preceding this there was the staging for Philippines operations during the last quarter of 1944.

After these two stagings, the progress of the war across the Pacific had left the South Pacific Area too far to the rear to be of economical value in further mounting and rehabilitation. Hence plans were put in effect for the reduction of activities and facilities as they became surplus under the altered mission.

Reassessments of personnel needs permitted a big cut in the total number of officers and men required in the Area. As surpluses developed in both Army and Navy personnel, they were redeployed.

Among the top commands there were changes during the past year. Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun, USN, relieved Vice Admiral J. H. Newton, USN, as Commander South Pacific Area and Force on 13 March 1945. General Maxwell Murray became Commanding General South Pacific Base Command. Rear Admiral E. L. Gunther, USN, was relieved in February as Commander Aircraft South Pacific by Rear Admiral M. R. Greer, USN, who in turn departed with the dissolving of COMAIRSOPAC in May. There was no change in the other flag, Commander Service Squadron South Pacific, Rear Admiral Paul Hendren, USN.

On completion of the gigantic task of maintaining some 400 vessels staging for Okinawa, Force Maintenance curtailed its function, and the abundant facili-

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The Atomic Bomb

by Major General Leslie R. Groves, USA

Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer District

THE Story of the Atomic Bomb is a story of organized cooperation and teamwork on a scale greater than ever before even imagined in history. For the scientific discoveries, the designing and building of many large plants, the production of vital materials and the making of bombs, there had to be and was the fullest cooperation between Government, Science, Universities, Engineering, Industry and Labor. All did their share and all are entitled to their full measure of credit and gratitude from their country for doing the job successfully and on time—for doing the job the Germans were unable to do.

Maj. Gen. Groves

Our job was started on faith, carried through all its strenuous months on faith and won out in the end on faith—faith of our leaders in American capacity to do the impossible and to do it in time.

When the theories of the scientists revealed the possibility that atomic fission might be usable in a military weapon, we then had an immediate and important decision. Was it sensible to strive to use an atomic bomb in World War II: Could we succeed in time? Advice and opinion were multiple and raised a legion of underlying questions.

After weighing all the possibilities, a recommendation was made that we undertake the task provided that it be given, for its duration, top priority in personnel, equipment and materials. General Marshall, Secretary Stimson and President Roosevelt approved the recommendation and accepted the challenge. The die was cast. Their faith, confidence and support was never withdrawn. They were fully warned of the more than negligible chances of failure. They knew the consequences of such a failure.

We have received the same strong aid, support and confidence from President Truman as was given by President Roosevelt. During the final phases of our struggle against the many handicaps, including the all-important one of time, the President maintained for us that first call on American resources so essential to success.

Secretary of War Patterson, who was Under Secretary during the development of the bomb, had authority over the War Department's industrial effort and resources. Time and again I went to him for help in critical situations and never came away empty-handed. He knew full well the importance of the effort on which we were engaged and he knew how little would be needed to change success into failure. Knowing that, he supported at all times, our top priority in personnel, materials and equipment so fundamental in getting the job done at all, let alone getting it done on time. His expressed attitude was "Just let me know what is needed, I'll see that you get it."

While Secretary Stimson is not here today, it is meet and just to pay tribute here to his continuous, stalwart, unwavering support of the Atomic Bomb Program.

General Marshall ably seconded Secretary Stimson in giving the project his full support. There was never any question that the War Department was 100% behind the job. He knew well the value of success and the penalty for failure.

Admiral King and the Navy Department gave us their full cooperation in carrying out the Atomic Bomb project. I do not recall a single request to the Navy for Naval personnel, critical equipment or materials which was not met promptly and completely and without complaint.

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Hiroshima after the dropping of the first Atomic Bomb 6 August 1945.

Pacific Spearhead

by Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, USN

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air)

CARRIER supremacy was the decisive factor which made Pacific victory possible.

No one service and no one part of any service can claim exclusive credit for Japan's defeat, for Pacific victory came as the product of the joint effort of many brave men, wearing different uniforms and trained in the use of different weapons. But it is wholly possible to outline the distinctive contributions made by each arm and each service within the larger framework of the joint effort. And on the Pacific battle record of Naval Aviation are these accomplishments:

Vice Adm. Mitscher

1. *The Destruction of Japanese Airpower.* Wherever and whenever the carrier task forces encountered Japanese airpower, they crushed it, from the Solomons to Tokyo. During the closing phases of the war, the death struggle between Naval Aviation and Japan's army and navy air forces had resulted in the exhaustion of enemy airpower. The enemy had planes and pilots left for Kamikaze ventures on a large scale. But as an offensive force capable of interfering with our military progress, his airpower was broken, and his homeland was thus exposed to bombardment by air and by sea—and to an invasion which, fortunately, was not required.

2. *The Destruction of the Japanese Fleet.* The greater number of the heavy units of Japan's Fleet fell victim to Naval Aviation. With his fleet destroyed, the enemy was unable to extend, support or retain the areas which were under his control.

U. S. Navy Photo

Hitting the Pacific with a splash, a Japanese suicide-dive plane goes to a watery grave close aboard an Essex-class carrier in May, 1945.

3. *Re-Entry into the Philippines Ahead of Schedule.* This was made possible when, at the time of the Palau and Morotai operations, the planes of the carrier task forces began to sweep organized Japanese airpower out of the Philippines. Because of the strength Naval Aviation demonstrated against the enemy's airpower in the Philippines, it was possible to liberate those islands ahead of schedule, and it was also possible to begin the operations at Leyte, which was beyond the effective reach of our land-based planes. The saving in time represented by the accelerated Philippines program also was a saving in lives.

4. *The Destruction of a Large Part of the Japanese Merchant Fleet.* Together with the United States submarines, United States Naval Aviation drove Japanese shipping from the sea. At war's end, the land-based search planes were throwing a blockade against the home ports of Japan itself. In losing her merchant marine, Japan also lost her life, for she was predominantly a maritime power. Without her cargo ships, her economy starved. Theoretically rich in oil, for example, by virtue of her conquered territories, she actually suffered from an oil shortage—because she was deprived of the means to carry oil where it was needed.

5. *The March Westward and Drive Northward Across the Pacific.* The sustained drive across the Pacific was made possible by the ability of the Fast Carriers to control the air wherever they went—and was facilitated by the teamwork tactics of the support carriers in providing direct, close air support to the troops ashore.

6. *The Establishment of Bases from Which the Final Attacks, Including the Atomic Bombs, Could Be Launched Against Japan.* By itself alone, aviation could not take and hold the needed bases. But in campaign after campaign, Naval Aviation, by breaking

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The Merchant Marine Finishes the Job

by Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, USN (Ret.)

Chairman, United States Maritime Commission and War Shipping Administrator

AN appraisal of the role of the United States Merchant Marine in the victory achieved by the United Nations compels us to go back 10 years in our maritime history. The soil in which there grew the huge merchant fleet that translated the industrial power of America into military might began to be cultivated after passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. The United States possessed the resources and talent to build such a fleet, but without their mobilization into a coherent shipbuilding effort in the few years before Pearl Harbor, the course of history might well have been changed because of a lack of ships.



WSA Photo

Liberty Ship James Madison discharging cargo at Manila.

As of 1 September 1945, there had been built in United States shipyards, under direction of the Maritime Commission, 5,558 oceangoing vessels, whose aggregate cargo carrying capacity was 54,630,106 deadweight tons. Not all of them were dry cargo ships or tankers. There were harbor and oceangoing tugs; wooden, steel, and concrete barges; ore carriers and floating derricks. There were also vessels built directly for, or converted to military service, including aircraft carriers, frigates, transports, hospital ships, tank carriers, oilers and tenders and special combat transport and attack ships completed by the Navy on Maritime Commission hulls.

Vice Adm. Land

The story of the American Merchant Marine in the war may be divided roughly into four phases. The first is the period between passage of the Act of 1936 and Pearl Harbor. The second phase is the race for tonnage in 1942 and 1943. When that was accomplished by construction of 27 million deadweight tons of shipping in those years, we entered the third phase, distinguished by the closeness with which the Commission worked with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to produce essential military vessels. The fourth phase came with the end of hostilities in the Pacific. We are still in that phase, which will come to an end when international controls over shipping are relinquished in the near future and the fleets of the United States and other nations are free to pursue their destinies in the manner best suited to them.

The primary object of the Maritime Commission on its establishment in 1936 became rejuvenation of an ailing merchant fleet that was overage and obsolete. It set out to build 500 ships in ten years. Its C-designs were developed, and by the time the first of these were delivered in the summer of 1939, war in Europe was close and the Commission doubled its schedules. Again in 1940 the Commission doubled its program. In 1941 the Commission was preparing to build ships at the rate of 400 a year and, in addition, the emergency Liberty program had been put into operation.

Thus, when the United States was finally drawn into the war, the Commission's shipbuilding program was on a base that allowed for the enormous expansion required for global war. A short table will illustrate how the activities of the Maritime Commission grew from the initial deliveries in the long-range program through the first years of the war, and then followed developments and the requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Year	*Liberty* Ships*	*Other Vessels*	*Total Vessels*	*DWT Tonnage*
1939	0	28	28	341,219
1940	0	54	54	638,037
1941	2	101	103	1,159,765
1942	542	218	760	8,091,833
1943	1,232	717	1,949	19,270,746
1944	720	1,066	1,786	16,447,366
1945 (to Sept.)	104	774	878	8,681,140
	2,600	2,958	5,558	54,630,106

* Does not include 60 built for Great Britain, or any Liberty ship conversions or modifications from the original dry cargo types.

Science in Democracy

by Brigadier General David Sarnoff, ORC

AMERICA, to be first in Peace and first in War, must be first in Science.

To achieve this, we must have democracy in science as well as science in democracy.

The essence of science is freedom to question and to experiment, with an opportunity to draw conclusions, unrestricted by any forces that would hamper liberty in thinking. The realm of study, investigation and development, must be free. Whether in politics or in science, it is the keynote of democracy that people must be free to think, free to discuss, and free to try their ideas in practice. To impose the opposite is tyranny.

Brig. Gen. Sarnoff

That is one of the great lessons of World War II. We should not embrace victory merely as a triumph and let it rest as such in history books. We should study its lessons to cultivate progress and to safeguard the future. With peace comes the vivid truth that to be strong in this modern world a nation must have science ever ready to march with its Army, to sail with its Navy, and to fly with its Air Force. Indeed, some products of science, such as an atomically-powered missile, must be ready to fly through the air instantly, unattended by sailor, soldier, or pilot; guided to its target by push-buttons in a control room far away.

Such an alliance of science and military power can be achieved most effectively under the democratic form of government. The fate of Germany and Japan is evidence enough. Despite an earlier start by Germany in the creation and development of scientific weapons of war, the democracies were able to out-distance the enemy in this domain. If there be any doubt, let the doubter look to radar and atomic power. Developed and harnessed by democracy, they searched out the enemy and wiped out despotism. Our scientists gave their best voluntarily, while those of the Axis powers worked under duress.

It is imperative, therefore, that the United States maintain a vigorous national policy for the promotion of science. Statesmen, philosophers and religious leaders have led in the past—now scientists must join them in the vanguard of civilization. In the future, freedom and science must walk together, hand-in-hand as the spearheads of peace.

Science that saved democratic civilization in World War II must now be used for peace. This calls for training young Americans with an aptitude and an interest in science and invention. Therefore, Democracy must promote scientific education, not only for the development of weapons, but for the creation of employment, for the production of more abundant crops, for increasing national health, and for developing new wonders in atomic energy, electronics, chemistry and physics that will make for good living and eliminate poverty and disease throughout the world. America must cultivate its reservoir of youthful scientific talent along with development of its natural resources.

Science, under the direction of evil aggressors on the one hand and in the hands of freedom's defenders on the other, has developed the twin forces of speed and explosive power to a point where a short step will make it possible to demolish whole cities in a single stroke. A third world war a generation hence would be so horrible in its power of destruction as to constitute a threat to our national security and to civilization itself!

With the command of such terrifying velocity and such overwhelming explosive force, war could be over almost before it started. There would be no time for a nation to mobilize its armies and navies, to draft men and to train them, and—in due course—to marshall science and industry to defend itself against aggression.

So terrifying in fact are the prospects of these new weapons that should some aggressively minded nation be the first to develop them, it might be tempted to use them immediately; to wait might mean its own eventual destruction. There may be no second chance!

Since the war ended, General H. H. Arnold, commanding the U. S. Army Air Forces, has revealed that flying rockets which can be directed to targets far beyond the horizon are a definite possibility; no longer a dream. Television gives them an eye. From a distance, radio controls them in flight. So deft, so all-seeing in this control, that from the launching site, the operator can guide the winged missile as if he were inside its shell. If he sees that it is not going to hit the target, he can turn it quickly; he can even make it loop-the-loop! The very thought of thousands of these television-eyed monsters of destruction coming up over the horizon of the sea as a storm cloud may well cause us to shudder. They might be loaded with warheads of atomic power, some to strike and wipe New York off the map while others guided westward, to turn Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago and other cities into death and dust. No longer is the suicide flier needed; television can do his task—and more.

Atomic energy, radar, electronics, television, jet propulsion, plastics and airplanes are the craftsmanship of scientists. They are the architects of our future. It is not war alone but also science that transformed the world within the past six years. The chief

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Research and the War

by Vannevar Bush

Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development



Dr. Bush

TO catalog and discuss in detail the products of scientific research which the military men of the free peoples used in winning this war is unnecessary here. Many of the readers of this JOURNAL have been familiar with them throughout their course; to many others they are becoming familiar as the removal of security restrictions permits general publication. Itemized discussion, moreover, would at this time be belated; the war, fortunately, is past, and already the inexorable processes of obsolescence are working on the weapons with which it was fought. The great central achievements of military utilization of the powers of research will stand, but the specific implements embodying them must, as all soldiers know, undergo growth and adaptation to be ready if, counter to all our hopes and plans, we are ever faced again by warfare imposed by deceit and aggression.

Both the great divisions of warfare—massing might against the enemy and preserving the lives of one's own people—drew upon science in the war. The great central achievements hence fall into two groups. The one includes machines, instruments, munitions, weapons, ranging from specialized landing craft and specialized bombing and fighting planes through the delicate intricacies of radar and proximity fuses to new ordnance and explosives, and culminating in the release of cataclysmic forces by atomic bombs. The other comprises preventives of disaster and disease, medicaments and techniques for curing the sick and healing the injured, from inflatable boats for downed airmen and DDT for the extermination of disease-carriers through the superbly co-ordinated use of plasma and of whole blood and the impressively swift and effective development of penicillin to the perfection of advanced surgical techniques, the whole resulting in slashing the mortality rate in war to a record low.

From each of these groups of achievement many useful things will be saved for the peaceful years

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The NACA—Its Contribution to Victory

by Dr. Jerome C. Hunsaker

Chairman, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics

IT is probably true that any organization which contributed to our victory started making that contribution upon its inception. Certainly this is true of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, because out of NACA research, conducted in its thirty years of existence, has come the engineering basis for our strength in the air.

Dr. Hunsaker

The NACA was established by the Congress in 1915 "to supervise and direct the scientific study of the problems of flight with a view to their practical solution." It operates its own research laboratories at Langley Field, Virginia, Moffett Field, California, and Cleveland, Ohio, and sponsors research projects at other Government laboratories and at universities where talent and facilities are available. It neither designs nor builds airplanes, as its output takes the form of research reports containing engineering data, new concepts of aeronautical science with instructions for practical application, and, in general, the basic information needed by designers to create better airplanes, and by their operators to utilize them effectively.

The NACA contribution to victory is represented by thousands of technical reports which constitute the scientific foundation for a rapidly advancing technology and our most important industry. I say most important because I believe the aircraft industry was the key to winning this war. Without the overwhelming superiority in both quality and quantity of American airplanes we might well have lost our civilization as we know it and wish it to be.

The research activities of the NACA are as broad as aeronautical science in scope, but they can be grouped roughly into four main fields. The first is aerodynamics, in which we are concerned with the fundamental mechanics of air flow and the most efficient aerodynamic shapes for utilization of the laws discovered by research.

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Naval Ordnance at its Peak

by Rear Admiral George F. Hussey, Jr., USN

Chief, Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department

Rear Adm. Hussey

U. S. warships massed in the Pacific repeatedly struck the Japanese during the summer of 1945 with the greatest display of naval firepower the world has ever known. The U. S. Fleet virtually eliminated the Jap Navy, and by the time the Japs surrendered in August, the Fleet was pounding the enemy mainland.

In sheer numbers, the Navy's ships were an imposing sight. The ships of the Fleet bristled with 85,600 guns, ranging in size from 20mm to 16-inch weighing from 100 pounds to 100 tons each. A slender pedestal of 300 pounds mounted the smaller guns, and the armored three-gun 16-inch turrets weighed as much as a whole destroyer.

New developments in ordnance, many of them still well-kept secrets at the end of the war, played a major role in the Navy's striking power, too. Foremost among such developments is the VT-fuze, a radio proximity fuze that explodes a projectile as soon as it comes close enough to a target to inflict damage. Only clue to its existence was what appeared to be a higher degree of accuracy of gunfire.

The Navy's chief use of the VT-fuze was in 5-inch gun projectiles that shot down Japanese suicide planes in the Pacific. The fuze proved highly successful in breaking Jap air power, in the British neutralization of the Nazi buzz bomb attack on London in the Summer of 1944, and in the Army's throwing back the Germans in the Battle of the Bulge in the Winter of 1944.

For two and a half years of war the proximity device inflicted heavy damage on the enemy. It was developed by scientists of the Office of Scientific Research and Development at the request of the Navy Bureau of Ordnance. And by September 1942, 400 fuzes a day were coming off production lines. By the end of 1944

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Civilian Science in the War Effort

by Rear Admiral Julius A. Furer, USN (Retired)

Coordinator of Research and Development, Navy Department, during World War II

NEVER before has science in four short years so influenced human events as in the years from the summer of 1941 to the summer of 1945. The beginning of this period saw the mobilization of American scientists for World War II and the end of the period saw the most spectacular achievement resulting from this mobilization in the production and use of the first atomic bomb. Even a brief summary of the specific accomplishments of scientific research in these four years would be too long for this article. A short review of the policies, organization and procedures which made scientific research a decisive factor in winning the war can, however, be given and should be valuable for the historical record. In speaking of scientific research during the war, it is well to realize that the work that was done was not scientific research in the usual sense of the word, it was rather the application of existing scientific knowledge to the development of new weapons, devices and processes for making war more deadly to our enemies and less deadly to our own forces. It was the exploitation of fundamental knowledge, skills, techniques and even of human relations between scientists which had accumulated and had been cultivated in the days of peace, rather than thinking directed at making new discoveries.

Rear Adm. Furer

When the war clouds began to gather, much attention was given by the War Department, the Navy Department and a group of scientists of the National Academy of Sciences, who had worked with the Armed Services during World War I as to how best to bring American science into the forthcoming struggle. All agreed that military research would have to be intensified and expanded very greatly beyond the small attention it had received during the years following World War I. There were a number of ways in which civilian science could

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The Inspector General's Department

by Lieutenant General Dan I. Sultan, USA

The Inspector General

THE Inspector General's Department was a small organization of approximately 60 officers in 1939. This number was established by law. The mission of the Department was to inquire into and report upon all matters affecting the efficiency and economy of the Army.

The Office of The Inspector General was and is an instrumentality placed at the disposal of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff to conduct such inspections, inquiries and investigations as might become necessary on a War Department level. In 1940, all subordinate commanders, down to and including Divisions, were each allotted an inspector general to conduct inquiries and investigations as needed within their own respective commands. However, contrary to widespread and erroneous opinion, such in-

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Lieutenant General Sultan, The Inspector General, seated at his desk. At his left is Maj. Gen. Philip E. Brown, Deputy The Inspector General, while the first officer on General Sultan's right is Maj. Gen. Howard McC. Snyder, Assistant The Inspector General, and on General Snyder's right, is Brig. Gen. Elliot D. Cooke, Chief, Overseas Inspections Division.

War Work of the OPMG

by Major General Archer L. Lerch, USA

The Provost Marshal General

ONE evening last September the inmates of a German prisoner of war camp in the South were startled by the whirring sound of a tractor-drawn lawn mower, cutting grass inside the barbed wire of their compound.

They poured from their barracks and what they saw didn't particularly surprise them, but undoubtedly it would have surprised you, had you happened to look across the barbed wire that warm Southern summer night. Stretched taunt along the sides of the tractor was a huge banner. Red letters on white background shouted: "Vote the Democratic Ticket—And Enjoy Improvements Like This!"

Maj. Gen. Lerch

Although closely confined physically, Hitler's former "supermen" paradoxically found freedom in America — the freedom of the mind, the freedom to read books and newspapers of their own choosing, the freedom to worship God in any manner they chose. And in that Southern camp they were finding another freedom that they never had known—the freedom to choose their own leaders by secret ballot.

The next day the enterprising prisoner who rode the tractor was elected camp spokesman, defeating two other candidates, one who leaned toward the fascist, the other representing political views more closely akin to the old German Center Party.

These men were the products of a prisoner of war reeducation program, inaugurated by the War Department more than two years ago, and assigned to The Provost Marshal General as one of his staff responsibilities in connection with prisoners of war. We believe that from the long-range viewpoint—from the viewpoint of what we are doing to secure the peace we have just won—this reeducation program has been one of the most important functions of our office during the past year.

When we received the German soldiers, fresh from

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U. S. Engineers 'Round the Globe

by Lieutenant General R. A. Wheeler, USA

Chief of Engineers

IN the last three years of the War, while the strength of the Army was being increased almost six-fold, the strength of the Corps of Engineers was undergoing a ten-fold increase which, in the face of statistics alone, seems disproportionately high.

The seeming inconsistency of the Engineer increase, however, fails to be inconsistent at all when considered with the greatly enlarged mission of the Corps in World War II. Armor, air power, and highly motorized warfare added enormously to the normal and traditional duties of Engineers in support of armies in the field. These increased functions absorbed a large part of the personnel increase of the Corps.

But more important, the U. S. Corps of Engineers was called upon in the War just ended to provide an engineer service for all our Allies; and throughout the world, whether other arms and services of the U. S. Forces were present or whether Allied arms were represented by the forces of other countries, U. S. Army Engineers could be found at work.

In 1941, at the time of the Louisiana maneuvers, we were busy activating and training those types of Engineer units required by the expanding Army to provide support for the new Army divisions and corps being readied for the field. The emphasis upon service type of units was secondary. Although it was already apparent that the United States would be the Arsenal of Democracy and the supplier of our Allies, the full connotation of this role—and the fact that we would have to open and maintain supply lines girdling the globe to

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Engineers disassembling leader end of Bailey Bridge which is completely across Taho River at Monkey Bridge China on the Tengchung-Myitkyina cut-off.

The Army and Navy Staff College

by Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt, USA-Ret.

Commandant, Army and Navy Staff College

THIS has been a war of innovations, of new weapons, of new methods. The Army and Navy Staff College—ANSCOL, as it has been called—has been one of these innovations to fill an important global war need.

That all operations are essentially combined in nature was not too clearly recognized or accepted by the armed forces prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the realization of the interdependence of all arms was somewhat slow in development even after that date.

As the months went by it became clear to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there was a pressing need for education of the various forces in the field in the problems, the capabilities and the limitations of the other members of the military team. The utilization of that youngest member of the team, the air forces—both carrier and land-based—with ground and sea forces in joint and combined operations was of particular importance. Landings on hostile shores promised to be of increasing frequency and these demanded the greatest intimacy of employment among the three forces involved. There had also grown a realization that officers of the armed forces lacked the requisite appreciation of their dependence upon logistical support and of the special consideration which that very substantial member of the military triad demanded in concerted effort of dissimilar arms.

A directive in April 1943 created the Army and Navy Staff College: "To prepare student officers for the exercise of command and the performance of staff duty in unified or coordinated Army and Navy commands," and requiring the stressing of the above-mentioned subjects.

The subjects of Joint Intelligence and Joint Communications fell naturally into the course. To equip prospective commanders and staff officers with properly "rounded" back-grounds of information, cooperation was sought and freely given by various civilian war agencies

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Lt. Gen. DeWitt

The National Guard

by Major General John F. Williams

Acting Chief, National Guard Bureau

THE National Guard is justly proud of its record in the war.

During the mobilization and training period of 1940-41, it turned over to the Federal service approximately one-quarter of a million troops, in formed units, to meet the requirements of the National Emergency. These were strengthened by the addition of Selective Service personnel which the Guard trained. Some of these units went promptly overseas to defend island bases then in great danger. A few were altered and redesignated. A high proportion of the personnel was transferred and promoted to war tasks with other outfits. But through a multitude of changes in organization, personnel, and armament, the National Guard has clung to its entity and traditions. The National Guard as a formed force, with unit esprit, splendidly justified its role as a reserve component ready for service. Some of its units were among the first reinforcements to reach the Philippines and Hawaii, and others were early into heavily threatened Australia. One of its divisions was the first to land in England.

Maj. Gen. Williams

Ours was no second line force. In the course of the war all divisions of the National Guard and many separate units employed as task forces engaged the enemy, some for longer periods than others, but all brilliantly. Space does not allow a complete documentation of the record of National Guard organizations. Operation reports available to the National Guard Bureau at this writing are incomplete. However, it would be amiss not to mention some of the outstanding achievements of some of our organizations.

26th Inf Div (Yankee). France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany. Relief of beleaguered American forces at Bastogne, the prominent part it played in spearheading the drive of the Third Army, and its assistance in the capture of the fortress city of Metz are among the highlights in the 26th Division's combat record.

27th Inf Div (New York). Gilberts, Marshalls, Marianas, Ryukyus, Japan. Embarked for Hawaii in April 1942 and sent its units island hopping across the Pacific. They annihilated Japs on Makin and Eniwetok. In June of 1944, they assaulted Saipan and the next year fought on Okinawa and captured Kune.

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The ORC and ROTC

by Brigadier General Edward W. Smith

Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs

A LARGER and better trained Organized Reserve Corps and Reserve Officers' Training Corps for the post-war period are twin objectives which the War Department is striving to reach at the present time.

Brig Gen. Smith

Tentative War Department plans call for an Officers' Reserve Corps of approximately 350,000, an Enlisted Reserve Corps the size of which has not been determined, and a ROTC system which will produce in excess of 25,000 officers annually.

Appointment of officers in the post-war Organized Reserves is being made from more than 750,000 Reserve and Army of the United States officers who have served their country during the war. As these officers revert to an inactive status, they are being offered Reserve commissions in the highest grade attained while on active duty.

Reports from the various separation centers indicate that about 65 per cent of the Reserve and AUS officers are applying for Reserve commissions. At this rate, the goal of 350,000 officers for the Organized Reserves will be well exceeded.

Under the post-war plans for the Organized Reserves, some units will be completely organized, equipped, and trained to enter combat on M-day. Other units will have full officer strength and cadres of enlisted men. These units would be ready for combat within 60, 90, and 180 days, depending on priority and the speed and efficiency of mobilization and training.

Still other units will be staffed only by officers, whose units will be ready for combat before M 365.

In addition, officers not assigned to designated units will be placed in a reserve pool, which will include specialists and others, who, for various reasons, are not trained to serve with combat or service units.

Qualified officers will, as far as possible, be permitted to choose the type of unit to which they desire assignment. Those who wish to serve in fully organized units must be in a position to devote more time to training than those who elect to serve in partially organized units. Likewise, those assigned to partially organized units must devote more time in training than those who are not assigned to units.

The Reserve units completely or partially organized are expected to receive considerably more active-duty training than Reserve units received in the pre-war

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Medical Care of the Armed Forces

by Vice Admiral Ross T. McIntire, (MC) USN

The Surgeon General of the Navy

ALTHOUGH the fourth year of war witnessed the climax, it did not end but only reduced by a limited degree the myriad duties of the Navy's Medical Department. For this reason, a complete inventory of the role which naval medicine played would be premature. Far from terminating obligations in hospitalization and medical care, the surreder of Japan only spawned new problems: Evacuation and proper care of our prisoners of war, reassessment of hospital facilities in the light of new conditions and the conducting of thousands of physical examinations incidental to demobilization, to mention but a few.

Vice Adm. McIntire

Quite paradoxically, the same victory year which saw America's heaviest war casualties also was the year in which the health of the Navy and the Marine Corps was at highest ebb. The tropical and communicable diseases which interfered so greatly, almost disastrously, with our earlier campaign in the Solomons were minor characters throughout 1945. There were no major epidemics among our forces, within or without the continental limits. From the standpoint of casualties suffered, although the number was large the proportions of lives saved and men returned to active duty remained at a high level. Institution of an efficient, systematic plan of air evacuation, the availability of larger quantities of penicillin and increased knowledge of the drug's uses, wider and more intensive application of DDT in insect control and steady shipment of whole blood into combat areas were among the major factors contributing to the bright side of the war picture.

Through careful planning, six new hospital ships containing the most up-to-date equipment available were constructed and commissioned in time for their use to maximum advantage in the Western Pacific during the closing months. Through careful planning, also, a naval medical research unit was established on Guam, with field investigators deployed far from the island base, in time for the knowledge gained in prevention and control of exotic diseases to be applied in the occupation of captured islands and the enemy homeland itself. Similarly, an untold number of aids and devices resulting from naval medical research at home and abroad were brought to a stage of development permitting their utilization — to excellent advantage—in helping seal Japan's doom. Pearl Harbor,

(*Continued on page* 138)

by Major General Norman T. Kirk USA

The Surgeon General, U. S. Army

FROM the dawn of history up until World War II every general who ever took an army into battle could be certain that his casualties from disease would be greater than those caused by the implements of war. World War II is a different story.

Maj. Gen. Kirk

Now that the war is over it is time to make an appraisal of what has been done not only in the matter of disease prevention and treatment but also in the care of the Nation's wounded soldiers.

Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson in a recent statement — he was then Under Secretary of War—said:

"The war in which we are engaged has produced many seemingly unsurmountable problems, problems without precedent in the development of new weapons, new methods of training and new tactics. But none of these problems has been more difficult than the problems faced by our Medical Department in caring for the largest American Army in History, fighting in virtually all parts of the world, from the Arctic to the Tropics, from the desert to the beaches and mountains. And yet, despite these problems no Army at any time in history has achieved a record of recovery from wounds and freedom from disease comparable to that of the American Army in this war."

That is high tribute but those of us who have watched the progress of this work know that it is a tribute richly deserved by the thousands of doctors, nurses, medical aid men and other members of the Medical Department who have fought so valiantly under most adverse conditions to assuage the suffering and guard the health of our troops.

I am glad to see this word of recognition come to the members of the Medical Department who have been performing daily deeds of heroism as part of their routine duty.

It is in no small measure due to the valorous performance of duty on the part of these loyal and courageous doctors, nurses and aid men that the Army has made such a record in the care of the sick and wounded in this war.

The public by now knows that the wounded soldier received first aid from the "medics" within a matter of minutes after he became a casualty. Immediately the injured man was put through the chain of evacuation, the most efficient system of its kind yet devised

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Navy Procurement During World War II

by Admiral S. M. Robinson, USN

Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Material Division)

THE unprecedented material requirements of World War II quickly brought home to all those responsible for supply the fact that the previous relatively simple procedure of letting contracts, overseeing inspection and awaiting deliveries would not by itself assure the physical arrival of the needed war products on time and in the required quantities to serve strategic needs.

Admiral Robinson

Complex problems involving the availability of adequate production facilities, raw materials, manpower, priorities, transportation, housing, and a host of others, all having a direct bearing on the completed delivery dates of required quantities of desired end products, had to be met and solved on the basis of the relative urgency of the logistic needs of strategic plans.

Inherent in the procurement problem and basic to its proper conception is the fact that while war is always dynamic and a pattern of vicissitudes, World War II has been characterized by quickness; the tempo of events was fast once movement began. "Hitler went through France on a motorcycle" and the French armies, then considered the world's best, melted away. Germans and Italians streamed out of the hills around Bizerte and Tunis like rats following a Pied Piper and surrendered in droves. A night naval engagement in Kula Gulf was over in fifteen minutes and ten Jap ships were sunk.

As perhaps never before in the history of procurement we were shooting at rapidly moving targets and were required to shift the aim constantly to keep the targets covered. Obviously, there could not be too much rigidity in our programs.

Magnitude of the Problem

To understand the size and complexity of the Navy procurement program during World War II, let me cite a few figures.

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The Final Phase Of Naval Supply

by Rear Admiral W. J. Carter, (SC) USN

Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts

THE end of the war in Europe, the build-up for the final amphibious assaults against Japan and the necessity of preparing for rapid reconversion caused a major change in logistics emphasis during the last year of the war in the Pacific. For the Navy Supply Corps, as well as for the entire Navy, it was a period of economy-mindedness amidst the largest spending of the war to the end that the Fleet be fully supported without creating unwarranted surpluses.

Rear Adm. Carter

Since the ultimate success of our naval effort stemmed largely from earlier planning, and since the supply phase owes its success in so great a measure to the efforts of the men who comprised the Navy Supply Corps, it seems appropriate at this time to cite some of their major accomplishments.

At war's end 20,000 Navy Supply Corps Officers and Pay Clerks were on duty afloat, overseas, and inside the United States. With the indispensable aid of 76,000 storekeepers and 82,000 cooks and bakers, these officers had successfully managed the largest supply line in naval history.

They had fed, clothed and paid more than three million naval personnel around the world and supplied the naval establishment with its general stores. They had disbursed more than $86,000,000,000. They had coordinated the procurement of 48,000,000,000 gallons of petroleum products. They had handled more than 15,000,000,000 pounds of food and considerably in excess of 3,000,000,000 board feet of lumber.

They had purchased, shipped and issued astronomical quantities of naval clothing, including 30 million pair of shoes, 47 million pairs of dungaree trousers, and 53,000,000 blue chambray shirts.

They had operated some 2,300 Ship's Stores throughout the world. They had routed 2,500,000 freight

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The Judge Advocate General's Department

by Major General Thomas H. Green

The Judge Advocate General of the U. S. Army

Maj. Gen. Green

THE Judge Advocate General's Department enters the year 1946 with the largest complement of officers and the heaviest work-load in its 170 years of existence.

As now constituted, the Department is the largest law firm in the world under one managament, having expanded from a commissioned strength of approximately 100 in June, 1940, to its present complement of approximately 2800 officers.

In addition to the headquarters office in Washington, where The Judge Advocate General serves as the chief legal adviser to the Secretary of War and the Army, branch offices have been established in Paris, Casserta, Manila and Chungking, each in charge of an Assistant Judge Advocate General. Judge advocates are also assigned to every Army division, every large combat unit, and every sizeable post and command throughout the world.

All legal activities in regard to procurement and related matters, such as renegotiation and contracts termination, have recently been placed under the direction of a member of the Department, with the title of Procurement Judge Advocate.

Legal matters handled by the Department embrace all phases of law. They include claims by and against the Government; contracts, bonds, copyrights and patents; purchases, sales, leases, and grants of land; state and Federal taxation and all litigation involving the War Department; the organization of the War Department and the Army; the rights and obligations of military personnel; international law and the rules of land warfare; the Geneva Conventions and treatment of prisoners of war; military government, martial law, and the administration of military justice.

Owing to the magnitude of Army operations in the war now ending, the volume of business transacted by the Department has eclipsed all prior records. Since the beginning of hostilities more than 60,000 records of general courts-martial have been reviewed in the Washington office, more than 50,000 claims have been settled in foreign countries, more than 76,000 claims.

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Fiscal Activities After V-J Day

by Major General A. H. Carter, GSC

Fiscal Director, Hq., Army Service Forces

IT would be impossible in the short compass of this article to describe in detail or even with any degree of completeness the nature and variety of the fiscal operations arising from V-J Day and the plans and programs then initiated or expedited. V-J Day was merely a milestone. It was not, as far as the Office of the Fiscal Director is concerned, the end of the road or even the beginning of a tapering-off process. After five years of the most intense financial activity arising from the prosecution of the war, equally intense financial activity is continuing in discharging the fiscal functions incident to its cessation. In certain operations actual expansion is indicated. Mention will be made of only four characteristic activities; namely, provision for contract termination; disbursing functions connected with separated personnel, with financial services for soldiers and their dependents, with the discharge of War Department obligations, and with the repatriation of liberated United States prisoners of war; implementation of the foreign fiscal program; and after appropriate investigation of disputed amounts, payment to military personnel of amounts found due and authorized to be paid in the field and collection of amounts found due the Government.

It is elementary to say that one of the most important factors in speeding reconversion is the prompt termination and settlement of war contracts, but it is well to repeat the statement for the sake of emphasis, and while it is not the responsibility of the Office of the Fiscal Director actually to audit termination accounts, it has been charged with the staff responsibility of devising and promulgating procedures for auditing claims of contractors on termination of contracts. It has also assisted in drafting legislation permitting the prompt payment of termination claims on the certificate of the contracting or other settling officer, a most important device for speeding reconversion. Fortunately, much of the preparatory work had been done well in advance of V-J Day. Manuals were already available and a trained instructional staff was functioning.

Maj. Gen. Carter

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The Navy and U. S. Industry

by Rear Admiral F. G. Crisp, USN
Chief, Office of Industrial Relations, Navy Department

by Rear Admiral C. H. Woodward, USN
Chief of the Industrial Incentive Division

IN war or in peace a Naval unit's strength and utility is measured by the ability of shore installations to provide that unit the tools it needs — ammunition, guns, quick repair facilities, to mention a few.

Rear Adm. Crisp

To man the Industrial Navy a civilian labor force of more than 750,000 workers was necessary. Three out of every four of these workers were "blue collar" workers — those who worked with their hands. Some were skilled, some unskilled. They worked in ammunition depots, air stations, Navy yards, supply depots, and in every kind of Naval Shore Establishment where it was necessary and preferable to have civilian rather than military personnel. One fourth were clerical workers in the Navy Department and in the industrial establishments.

To administer this gigantic labor force was the function of the Division of Shore Establishment and Civilian Personnel, which on 14 September 1945 was renamed the Office of Industrial Relations because it was felt that the new name more accurately described its function.

It was the chief purpose and the everlasting aim to get and keep the best possible workers on the jobs where they were needed, at the time they were needed.

This was, of course, a most difficult task. In time of war, the labor market is an ever changing and nebulous commodity with instability the chief characteristic. In the last two years of the war it was necessary to hire ten civilian employees to gain a net of one new worker. Of the ten, seven quit, one entered military service, voluntarily or was drafted, one had to be fired and one stayed on the job.

While this condition was prevalent, the Navy was suffering its greatest ship losses and damage from Japanese suicide planes. These ships needed quick repair for they were badly needed back with the fleet. To do the job, a greater number of skilled ship repair workers were needed, particularly in the West Coast yards. Just as urgently needed were foremen and supervisors to direct these new workers, many of whom were labeled "skilled" but actually did not measure up to standards. A vast nationwide recruiting campaign, carried on through the press, radio and other mediums was undertaken by 250 Navy recruiters who coordinated their efforts with civilian agencies such as Civil Service Commission and the War Manpower Commission.

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"TO Enemy—we have fortified this place for a year, but we cannot win with just the Yamato spirit. We cannot match your quantity. There is no other course for us to follow but to die."

So read a painstakingly hand-written note found beside the bodies of four Japanese soldiers, which Marines came upon while mopping up during one of the final island campaigns in early summer of 1945.

Rear Adm. Woodward

It is a plain tribute to the magnificent advantage American industry-management and labor working together — had given the finest fighting forces the world had ever known.

Those four Jap soldiers, who took their own lives when they realized they could not "match your quantity" were prophets. It was only a matter of weeks before their Emperor and his advisors became as realistic. It was, as Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz pointed out upon his return to Washington, the ever-mounting power of our Pacific forces which caused them to sue for peace before the introduction of the atomic bomb and before Russia's entry into the war.

That we did not always have that degree of power in the Pacific is only too well known. We did not have it there at the end of 1944.

As we entered what turned out to be the final year of the war, it still appeared that an extremely difficult, long-drawn-out struggle lay ahead. Certainly, calculations could be made on no other premise.

The Japanese home islands were virtually untouched. The Philippines had been invaded but not subjugated. Iwo Jima and Okinawa were in the future. So was the full impact of suicide planes and bombs. The industries of Manchuria and Japan itself continued to increase their output. The Imperial Army of some 5,000,000 men—and their equipment—were intact.

And what was the situation on the home front as we entered 1945?

A wave of optimism was rolling up, which gave indications of getting out of hand. The feeling of success in Europe, following the Normandy and Southern France invasions, was a principal factor in the optimistic trend, despite the rude awakening brought about at year's end by the Battle of the Bulge.

Reconversion was a leading topic of conversation and newspaper discussion.

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"Best 'Covered' War" Telling Navy's Story

by Major General A. D. Surles, USA
Director of Information, War Department

NEVER in the long history of wars have the people of any country been so well informed as the American public has been during World War II. It might be said, literally as well as figuratively, that they had a ringside seat from which they watched this great global conflict develop in all its many phases.

Maj. Gen. Surles

The voluminous flow of information from the far-flung battlefronts to to the people here at home was not an accident. It was the result of long and careful preparation, based upon the premise that in a democracy an informed public is essential to the successful prosecution of war.

Even before the first bomb fell on Pearl Harbor, it was the established policy of the War Department to do everything possible to keep the public fully informed about its Army—how the soldiers trained, how they lived, what they ate, what kind of medical care they were getting, what kind of weapons they were using. Reporters and photographers were present when the first man was inducted into the Army. They visited our installations throughout the country to see first-hand what was going on. They went with our forces on maneuvers. Wherever there were troops, there were representatives of the press, radio, newsreels and other media.

It was our policy to make it as easy as possible for the reporters and photographers and magazine writers to get the information they wanted. We assigned public relations officers at posts, camps and stations, at hospitals and ports, at headquarters of units in the field, at the various Service Command headquarters and in Washington to assist them. We arranged press conferences to explain new policies. We issued press releases covering various phases of our plans and operations. Insofar as was possible without endangering our security, we took the press and the public into our confidence.

By the time the United States entered the war, our program for keeping the public informed was well established. The backbone of this program was to facilitate first-hand reporting to the greatest practical extent. We arranged for the accrediting of war correspondents and for their transportation wherever our troops went. We saw that they were provided with communications facilities. We gave them any assistance they needed.

In addition to the hundreds of reporters, photographers and radio commentators who covered various

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by Rear Admiral H. B. Miller, USN
Director, Office of Information, Navy Department

BOTH in peacetime and during war, the job of the Navy's Office of Public Information is to tell the story of the Navy to the people of the United States. It is essentially a reporting job, one of transmitting news of the Navy's activities to the people at home, who want — and deserve—to know what their friends and relatives in the Service are doing.

Rear Adm. Miller

Our policy has always been to get the news out as quickly and accurately as possible, just like any good newspaper.

One of the major problems confronting the organization charged with telling the Navy's story is to get that story in all its rich detail from an organization of such size and complexity, operating throughout the world. One of the toughest problems we had to overcome during the war in getting the Navy's story told was that of time consumed in getting the news through.

A second problem was security. After the Pearl Harbor disaster, when the Japs controlled the seas almost to the doors of Hawaii, it was impossible to reveal too much about any actions that had already taken place, let alone those under way. We had to delay the announcement of losses or damage, that would reveal our weakness to an enemy ready to strike with forces far greater than ours.

As the fleet began to be augmented with the might of U. S. production it could abandon some of the security restrictions. More information could be released.

Security, the main bogey in getting the news through in the early days of the war, was overcome only to be replaced by another problem: that of setting up news gathering and news transmission systems to cover the vast distances over which our fleet was operating. The ships off Okinawa, for example, were 5,000 miles from Pearl Harbor.

The problem was solved, however. As a matter of fact, an on-the-spot news broadcast was carried from Okinawa into homes throughout the United States. Reporters aboard planes over the area of action wherever it might be, and accompanied by a censor, broadcast their accounts directly to Guam. From there they were relayed to San Francisco, where they were distributed over the major U. S. networks.

When direct broadcast could not be employed, the Navy used light-weight wire, disc or film recorders for

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Seabees Set the Final Stage

by Vice Admiral Ben Moreell, (CEC) USN

Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, December 1937 *to December* 1945

MORE than 200,000 enlisted men of the Naval Construction Battalions — 83 per cent of their total number — were at work in Pacific war zones when the Japanese capitulated.

The picked Seabee units which landed in Japan as part of the occupying force reached the end of a road which, in three and a half years, they had helped stretch across almost 7,000 miles.

Vice Adm. Moreell

From the early stepping stone islands of Efate and Espiritu Santo, the Seabees (in some instances, in conjunction with Army and Marine Engineers) cleared the way for American bombers through the Solomons, the Admiralties, the Gilberts and the Marshalls. The networks of Seabee-constructed fields in the Marianas, the Philippines, and on Iwo Jima and Okinawa were prerequisites for the final offensives. Even the use of the atomic bomb was dependent upon the availability of aviation facilities of this type. The carrying bombers operating against Japan's home islands might never have been able to approach the target area if they had not been able to take off from landing fields in the Marianas.

The full scope of the Seabee assignment encompassed the completion of the greatest construction job in history; the establishment of a chain of fully equipped naval bases across the largest ocean area in the world.

The last and the greatest projected base was Okinawa. There alone, 60,000 Seabees and their Civil Engineer Corps officers were at work readying roads, supply areas, airfields, and fuel and fleet facilities for what would have been a gigantic staging area for twin thrusts against the Japanese home islands.

Okinawa represented the biggest single wartime construction job ever planned anywhere. If the war had continued, the completed project would have been

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War Production: The Record

by J. A. Krug

Chairman, War Production Board

WHEN peace came once again to the world, and fighting men laid down their arms, the United States of America could look back on a munitions production record that reached the astronomical figure of 186 billion dollars.

The production accounted for by this stupendous number of dollars covered a period of five years and one month, from 1 July 1940 through 31 July 1945. When it is remembered that for the year 1941, this nation's expenditure for munitions was $8,320,000,000, and that over half of the $186,000,000,000 was expended in the years 1943 and 1944, the production record achieved by this nation is really one of which every American can be exceedingly proud.

A tremendous challenge was placed before this nation, and the nation gave an equally tremendous answer to it. American industry rose to that challenge, accepted it, and did the job even while 12,000,000 of the nation's most able-bodied men were being withdrawn from the labor force to take their places among the armed forces.

Having watched industry work for the military, I am in a position to know that this magnificent record could not have seen accomplishment had not industry worked *with*, as well as *for* the military. The cooperative attitude of the Army and the Navy, their understanding of, and sympathy to the problems of industry at a time when of necessity the military wanted speed, speed and more speed, was a contributing factor toward the success of the production program which must not be under estimated.

For the record, then, this was America's war production:

Aircraft—some $44,442,000,000.
Ships, both Naval and Maritime—$40,694,000,000.
Guns and fire control—$10,801,000,000.
Ammunition—$19,734,000,000.
Combat and motor vehicles—$21,529,000,000.
Communication and electronic equipment—$10,659,000,000.
Other equipment and supplies—$38,148,000,000.

Aviation production alone during the war period represents a fleet of 297,000 military airplanes and special purpose aircraft, of which 97,000 were bombers, including super-fortresses, heavy four-engine medium-range bombers, and those of the patrol, medium, and light bomber types; 99,000 fighters of all types; 3,760

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The Quartermaster Corps and 1945

by Lieutenant General Edmund B. Gregory, USA

The Quartermaster General

THE year 1945 brought the long-expected Allied victory over the Axis. It saw our supremacy in manpower and firepower crush the Germans; it saw the atomic bomb knock the will to fight out of the Japanese.

Yet, combat alone did not bring about the end. If the records of this war prove anything, they show that the efficient establishment and operation of supply lines had an equally vital role in victory. Those lines were longer, more numerous, and more vulnerable than ever before. It was a long road and without Quartermaster support of the campaigns from Oran to the Po, from Normandy to Berlin, from Port Moresby to Okinawa, the enemy would not have asked surrender.

Lt. Gen. Gregory

During the three years and eight months in which the Nation has been engaged in actual warfare, the Quartermaster Corps procured, stored and distributed more than 20 billion dollars worth of supplies . . . exclusive of fuels and lubricants—of which approximately half was in food products alone. During the year immediately preceding D-Day in Europe, the Quartermaster Corps shipped 10 million tons of cargo to the United Kingdom in preparation for the continental campaign. That much and more was slated for Philippine, Okinawa and other Pacific bsaes for the opening of the final Asiatic campaign. Had the actual invasion of Japan proper been necessary, the Quartermaster Corps would have been ready to land on Nipponese soil its share of the six tons of initial equipment per man and to follow up with its share of the one ton per man per month necessary for maintenance.

Not only on VJ-Day but for the last several months of the war, the Quartermaster Corps was buying, storing and issuing approximately 41,000,000 pounds of foodstuffs a day for the Army alone or 7½ million tons a year. Additional purchases were being made for other military and governmental services.

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Communications

by Major General H. C. Ingles, USA

Chief Signal Officer

THE paramount and increasing importance of superior signal communications in modern warfare was unanimously acknowledged by our military leaders during the war that now is history.

Maj. Gen. Ingles

Commanders in every theater repeatedly emphasized that success in battle depended on the prompt transmittal of orders and the immediate translation of those orders into coordinated action.

The instrument by which military coordination was achieved, both in the field and at home, was a system of fixed and tactical communications that radiated from the War Department in Washington down through the chain of command to every spot where American troops were in action.

It was the responsibility of the Signal Corps to establish this global network which required a procurement program aggregating more than six billion dollars and a training program under which thousands of officers and enlisted men were technically schooled in the operation and maintenance of diverse specialized equipment.

In research and development Signal Corps engineers, working with outstanding civilian scientists,

(*Continued on page* 129)

Sgt. Paul Buckley, wire chief, uses German poles to string communications wire in Hurtgen, Germany.

The Chaplaincy of the Armed Forces

by Chaplain Luther D. Miller

Brigadier General, Chief of Chaplains, USA

THE termination of hostilities has not meant the completion of the work of the Chaplain Corps. Although many of our ministers in uniform are returning to civilian life the same as other officers, many more will continue to serve with our men wherever troops are stationed. Only as the army is decreased in size will the Chaplain Corps grow smaller, for occupational forces, and men awaiting discharge or redeployment, continue to offer the challenge of serving God and Country,—and there will be ministers, priests, and rabbis who will answer that challenge.

Chaplain Miller

Throughout the conflict chaplains went with our troops even unto the uttermost parts of the earth. Into every danger and through every trial men faced, the Soldiers of God have gone. Our men early learned that they did not march alone. Whether it was parachuting from the skies, or landing on strange beaches,—whether it was crouching in slit-trenches or going forward in the attack,—chaplains were always to be found with their men. They encouraged them in the day of battle, stood beside them in the hospital wards, and tenderly closed the graves on lonely hillsides. At no time were men without the companionship of a chaplain.

High on the nation's Roll of Honor will forever stand the names of the seventy-seven chaplains who gave their lives while serving their men on the field of battle. Beside them are some sixty-eight others who died from other than battle causes while on active duty. More than two hundred chaplains were wounded in action, and fifty-four were detained by the enemy, seventeen of whom died before freedom had come. Of the more than 8,000 chaplains who were on duty during the war, 1,189 of them have received 1,564 decorations for meritorious and heroic service.

Out of the world conflict through which we have passed, must come a durable peace with its better day for all men. Religion has always held this hope for the world, and proclaimed it as the destiny designed by God for the nations of the world. It is not a hope that can be achieved by easy optimism, but by faith refined by sacrifice, hardship and suffering. We know from grim experience that a hard road has been travelled and that rough ways still lie ahead. But we also know that, for the realization of our hopes, divine resources

(*Continued on page* 129)

by Chaplain W. N. Thomas

Rear Admiral (ChC) USN, Chief of Chaplains of the Navy

FOR men serving in the Corps of Chaplains, the last and final phase of the war proved one of the most difficult periods of the entire struggle. By December, 1944, the Corps had grown until a total of 2,379 Chaplains were on active duty. While "Kamikazes" loosed terror and destruction on our fleet in Leyte Gulf, ship Chaplains were called upon to give of their utmost in physical, moral, and spiritual strength to meet the challenge of their spiritual duties. Thousands of miles away, in bustling, crowded ports of the Mediterranean, other Navy Chaplains were helping with Christmas plans for the starving, the sick, and the orphaned children of Sicily and Italy and North Africa.

Chaplain Thomas

In that same month, as the maimed, the sick, and the battle-weary were returned to shore-based hospitals and rest camps, Chaplains found work that called for all the energy and consecration they could muster. Not less challenging and trying were the duties of Chaplains stationed thousands of miles from the theaters of action, for theirs was often a job of keeping up the faith and spirit of many who all too often regarded themselves as "the forgotten men."

As the war progressed, more and more calls reached the Division in Washington for Chaplains—to serve in the forward areas, at rest areas, at rehabilitation areas, at hospitals, and aboard newly commissioned ships.

Throughout the war, the "supply" of Navy Chaplains never caught up with the "demand" despite the fact that more than 500 new Chaplains were commissioned in 1944 and almost an equal number entered the Corps in the first seven months of 1945. The long, strenuous months of self-sacrificing duty began to be evidenced in the physical well-being of our Chaplains and scores were hospitalized, making further inroads into the available supply.

In the forward areas Chaplains had scarcely completed the heart-breaking task of burials and memorials for the dead of the Philippine actions when the Iwo Jima and Okinawa assaults began. Once again the ships were subjected to the maniacal fury of the Kamikaze and scores of Chaplains stormed bloody beaches with Marines who invaded those two island bastions.

The measure of their heroism and devotion to duty

(*Continued on page* 129)

Military Transportation in World War II

by Major General Charles P. Gross, USA

Chief of Transportation, Army Service Forces

THE story of military trnasportation in World War II has never been told in communiques. It's not a story of "planes shot down" or "prisoners captured." Instead it's a story of numbers and tons and passengers and miles. It's a story of trains and cargo ships and trucks and troop transports.

The story of military transportation is the story of a can of C rations getting from Pittsburgh to Bastogne; of a 155 mm howitzer being shipped from New Guinea to Leyte; of a soldier traveling from Camp Shelby to China.

It's the story of the job assigned to the 400,000 soldiers and civilians of the Army Transportation Corps.

From that dark Sunday in December 1941 through the period that ended with the Japanese capitulation last August, the Transportation Corps embarked 7,132,000 troops and other passengers from the United States for overseas destinations. Within the Zone of the Interior alone, the Corps moved 31,706,715 soldiers by rail and 765,541 by bus—in groups of 40 or more. An additional five million individual or small group military travel requests were handled by the Transportation Corps' Military Reservation Bureaus during the same period.

Overseas Army cargo shipments in the war against our European and Pacific enemies totaled 123,820,000 measurement tons, while more than 317,264,000 short tons of Army freight were hauled by rail, highway and water within the United States.

Transportation Corps personnel in overseas theaters operated 65 ports of embarkation and debarkation, more than 30,000 miles of military railways and 46,500 trucks. In the European Theater alone, the Transportation Corps discharged 44,718,174 measurement tons of cargo from 9,571 ships; operated 1,874 U. S. Army locomotives and 34,283 Army railway cars and handled 3,348,000,000 ton miles of military rail traffic.

Maj. Gen. Gross

Activities of the Corps' Military Railway Service extended through North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Conti-

(*Continued on page* 129)

World War II *Was* A Chemical War!

by Major General William N. Porter, USA

Chief, Chemical Warfare Service

IN case there is any lurking idea that the Chemical Warfare Service went through the late conflict just as a standby outfit in event of gas warfare, let's take a look at the record:

Maj. Gen. Porter

While gas combat did not materialize, chemical agents were employed on an unprecedented scale. This Service furnished the various flame and smoke items which hastened the victory and saved many American lives.

The most active chemical agents in the closing days of the war were air and ground incendiaries. This was because fire was a "natural" against Japanese targets.

All incendiary bombs used by the Air Forces were developed and supplied by CWS, besides being handled at depots and loaded on planes by CWS personnel. These fire missiles ranged in size from four-pound magnesium "firesticks" to 1100-pound jettisonable tanks filled with jellied gasoline and capable of fire-splashing an area the size of a football field.

Outstanding incendiary mixtures were Napalm (thickened gasoline) and Pyrogel (gel gasoline combined with other ingredients). By the end of the war CWS had produced some 300,000,000 aerial fire bombs, of which number 66,000,000 went to the British. Nearly 50,000,000 CWS bombs were dropped by American airmen in all theaters—28,000,000 in Europe and 19,000,000 in the Pacific. However, the fire cargoes which fell on Japanese targets amounted to more than 122,000 tons as compared with a 120,000 tonnage for the other side of the world. The smaller bombs were released in clusters, also furnished by CWS. Nearly 650,000 clusters were dropped. Figures show that the amount of building area destroyed by fire bombs, per ton, was far in excess of that destroyed by traditional demolition bombs.

Another important fire item was the flamethrower. This "dud" of World War I became one of the most effective weapons in World War II. The success of the portable flamegun gave birth to tank-mounted models, and for Pacific operations there was developed a 500-foot extension hose which carried liquid

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The Women's Army Corps

by Colonel Wistray Battle Boyce

Director, Women's Army Corps

IN the year that brought Allied victory over Germany and Japan, the Women's Army Corps completed its third year of service and reached its maximum strength of 100,000. Its members were serving in every major theater of operations and, after victory, remained to serve in the Armies of Occupation in both Germany and Japan.

Col. Boyce

Having completed its major objective, the Women's Army Corps, like all other branches of the service, is now in the process of demobilization. Women are being returned to civilian life on the same proportionate basis as men, by virtue of points or by consideration of age. In addition, those married to men already honorably discharged from any military service, may apply for discharge, themselves.

Recruiting for the Corps was stopped after V-J Day, as was the shipment of women to overseas stations. Under present plans, all women now serving outside the continental limits of the United States will be returned by 1 April 1946. In the meantime, effort will be concentrated on the assignment of low-point Wacs to separation centers where they can assist with the tremendous clerical task of separating men from the service.

During the fourth year of conflict, Wacs continued to broaden their area of service and to increase their usefulness to the Army. At the conclusion of hostilities, it was announced that Wacs had participated in the super-secret operations which involved the development of the atomic bomb and that many had been engaged in other types of confidential work which necessitated a knowledge of cryptography.

Overseas, members of the Women's Army Corps had become more and more essential to the offices to which they were assigned. This was evidenced by the short time which elapsed before they were moved forward with the headquarters unit. In the Philippines, for example, the vanguard arrived just thirty-six days after the landings.

Enlisted Wacs invaded a new theater when they were assigned to Army Air Forces Headquarters in China. The first detachment arrived from Calcutta, India, shortly before Japan's capitulation. Officers had previously served in the China Theater as early as 15 November 1944. The A.T.C. Wacs similarly pioneered Alaska and Bermuda.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of the Corps during the past year was its highly successful recruitment of more than 8,000 women for service as medical technicians in the Army's general hospitals in answer to a call issued by General of the Armies George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff. These women were enlisted from every state in the Union to serve the returning wounded. Their job is not yet done. In the months to come, Wacs will remain in the Army's hospitals at work on the jobs for which they were especially trained.

Duty Completed

by Colonel Ruth Cheney Streeter

Director, Marine Corps Women's Reserve

AS the year 1945 closed its history-packed pages, the final chapters were also written into the record of the Marine Corps Women's Reserve.

The last three months of the year saw the establishment of four large separation centers and the steady demobilization of the women who had served their country with loyalty and efficiency. As a tribute to the capabilities of the women Marines, and in recognition of their value as trained service personnel, a permanent Women's Reserve was suggested for Congressional approval. This reserve would number 500 officers and 4,500 enlisted women, ten percent of whom would be on active duty.

Since the full power of the Marine Corps was directed at Pacific combat, the victory in Europe did not affect the strength or status of the women Marines. Well into their third year of service, they paused only briefly in the pursuit of their duties to offer thanks for victory half won.

The abrupt surrender of Japan, however, had several immediate effects. The Women's Recruit Depot, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, was ordered disbanded after serving as an indoctrination center since July, 1943. A credit system of discharge, with eligibility beginning with 25 months of active service, was announced by Headquarters. Separation centers were ordered established at Henderson Hall, Arlington, Virginia, and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, on the east coast, and at the Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, and the

Col. Streeter

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The Women's Reserve, USNR

by Captain Mildred McAfee Horton, USNR

Director, Women's Reserve, U. S. Naval Reserve

WHEN Japan surrendered in August, there were 86,000 women wearing the Navy uniform. They had just observed their third year of service in the Navy and in that time had proved that American women may be depended on to fulfill the emergency need of a nation at war and to adapt themselves to many different types of duty in a military organization. Women filled many billets in the offices of shore stations which were not unlike those which they had left behind in civilian life. Others, however, became experts in such unfamiliar duties as repairing planes, directing air traffic, teaching gunnery and handling Navy supplies. WAVES were serving at 900 shore stations in this country and in Hawaii and they composed 18% of the shore-based Naval personnel in the Continental United States.

This past year was marked by the assignment of WAVES to overseas duty. The first WAVE officers went overseas to the Fourteenth Naval District in October 1944, less than a month after Congress had passed a bill permitting volunteers to be assigned to stations outside the Continental United States in the American Area and the territories of Hawaii and Alaska. The first large group of enlisted WAVES marched down the gangplank in Pearl Harbor 6 January 1945 and by August 1945, when the assignments of WAVES overseas were discontinued, there were 4000 WAVES in Hawaii. Other WAVES had been on duty temporarily in such places as Alaska, the Aleutians, Puerto Rico, and Bermuda. The types of duties which WAVES perform overseas are typical of those of WAVES in the United States. They represent a variety of jobs in supply, aviation, communications, and hospital and administrative activities.

Capt. Horton

The training program for members of the Women's Reserve, which at its peak was carried on at more than 40 activities, came to a close in early December 1945 with the graduation of the last classes of WAVES from Hospital Corps Schools. WAVES who were in schools when the war ended completed their training and were assigned to duty. The last class graduated from the recruit school in New York City in October 1945, bringing to a close a unique phase in the training of members of the Women's Reserve.

WAVES leaving the service go to one of five separation units which have been established for members of the Women's Reserve or to one of eight supplementary activities. There their records are closed out, they receive their final medical examination and their final pay, and the services of the civil readjustment program. Each day WAVES are being separated from the Naval service and are resuming their places as civilians in a world which will continue to demand the vision and the adaptability which American women have displayed as officers and enlisted women in the Navy.

Women in the Coast Guard

by Captain Dorothy C. Stratton

Director, Women's Reserve, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve

THE final chapter is being written in the history of the Women's Reserve of the United States Coast Guard. The progress of this organization since its authorization by Congress on 23 November, 1942, has been marked by steady growth, expansion and almost complete integration with the many activities of the Coast Guard. Now that the cause for which the Spars served with millions of other men and women in uniform has been won, they, along with other military Reserves, are in the process of demobilization.

Capt. Stratton

The purpose for which the Women's Reserve was organized—to release men for sea duty by providing Spars to take over thousands of shore jobs—was successfully accomplished. During the war, well over half of all Coast Guard men were at sea. Replacing them at Coast Guard shore establishments all over the United States, approximately 10,000 Spars performed an ever-widening variety of duties. The fact that commanding officers requested Spars in increasing numbers is a practical measuring stick of how effectively they fitted into the wartime setup of the service.

Spars went on duty outside the continental United States for the first time in 1945. As the result of the passage of the bill authorizing women to volunteer for duty in the American Area, Hawaii and Alaska, Spars were assigned overseas—approximately 200 to Honolulu and 200 to Ketchikan.

Among other outstanding developments of the Women's Reserve during the past year was the estab-

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Army Ordnance in World War II

by Lieutenant General L. H. Campbell, Jr.

Chief of Ordnance, U. S. Army

EARLY this year General Eisenhower wrote in terms of the highest praise concerning the "splendid quality" of Ordnance weapons and ammunition.

"The enemy's battle losses have been far greater than ours," Gen. Eisenhower declared. "In pieces of artillery, the enemy has lost eight to our one. We have knocked out twice as many tanks as we have lost. We have a general superiority in quality and quantity of our ordnance, a superiority that must always be maintained."

Lt. Gen. Campbell

Equally laudatory battlefield reports were received from every front in the Far East. Until V-J Day, our great Industry-Ordnance team produced vast quantities of materiel that enabled our gallant ground and air forces to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy with minimum American losses.

Now that hostilities have terminated in the world we of Ordnance with the help of American industry intend to carry on a long-range program of scientific research and development so that our weapons' superiority will always be maintained. During the past year the Industry-Ordnance Team brought about the development and mass production of recoilless guns, concrete-piercing and radio proximity fuzes, new types of self-propelled big guns, hyper-velocity ammunition, jet propulsion units, and many other revolutionary advances, in weapons. This skill and foresight must be perpetuated in the years ahead. In this new, fast-moving atomic age we simply cannot afford to endanger our national security by either technological or industrial unpreparedness. For this reason, as a typical post-war project, Ordnance looks with great expectation to such organizations as the new electronics laboratory at the National Bureau of Standards in Washington, and will work in closest cooperation with educational, scientific and industrial research institutions throughout the land.

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Wake of Battle

by Major General J. H. Hilldring, USA

Director, Civil Affairs Division

THE end of our wars in Europe and the Pacific in 1945 focused attention on one of the newest and least publicized branches of our military establishment — Civil Affairs, Military Government, sometimes also called "G-5."

Civil Affairs officers and men operated in Africa and throughout Europe as countries were liberated from Hitler's grasp. In Germany itself a carefully planned military government, reinforced by civilian technicians, was established beginning as early as September, 1944, when our troops began to take over bits of the Reich.

Across the world, other civil affairs-military government units accompanied General MacArthur into liberated and conquered areas. Recently they have joined General MacArthur by the hundreds to assist in the occupation of Japan and the control of Korea.

Maj. Gen. Hilldring

Early in 1942 the War Department established the policy that planning and administration of civil affairs are an integral part of military operations and cannot be separated. Every war in which our country has participated has produced civil affairs problems. World War II is unique in that it is our first war in which an ample supply of carefully chosen, specifically trained civil affairs officers was available when

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Naval Personnel

by Vice Admiral Louis Denfeld, USN

Chief of Naval Personnel

THE Navy's personnel plans reversed within 46 days from the task of building the largest Navy in history to the task of demobilizing it. On 30 June the Navy's personnel logistics continued to be concerned with providing the trained manpower needed for the assault upon Japan. On 15 August with Japanese surrender, demobilization became the primary responsibility of the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Vice Adm. Denfeld

The Navy attained its maximum authorized personnel strength of 3,389,000 officers and enlisted men and women through a vast wartime program of expansion. This expansion was made possible only by the inherent adaptability of American men and women to turn from a peaceful way of life to wartime responsibilities in the greatest and most effective Navy in history.

On 30 June the Navy had the following persons in service:

Officers (male)	311,030
Enlisted (male)	2,984,655
WAVE officers	8,415
WAVE enlisted	73,900
Nurses	11,000
	3,389,000

Two-thirds of all Naval personnel or 2,232,400 officers and enlisted men, were then on duty outside this country and the remaining one-third were distributed in the country as follows:

Training Establishments	15.5%
Ships Companies at U. S. Continental Shore Establishments	12.1%
In transit	4.3%
Patients at Naval Hospitals	1.8%
General Courts-Martial Prisoners	.4%
	34.1%

War experience has demonstrated that the training of Naval personnel is the cornerstone of an effective Navy. Training kept pace with the growth of the service and leveled off as the manpower ceiling was approached. During the past year training was refined

(*Continued on next page*)

The Adjutant General

by Major General Edward F. Witsell, USA

The Adjutant General of the Army

THE past year has presented unique and complex problems to The Adjutant General in the administration of America's greatest fighting force. The period has seen the end of hostilities and the beginning of large scale demobilization. Until the surrender of Germany the United States was at war on many fronts over the world. From May to August redeployment in the Pacific was in full swing accompanied by partial demobilization and the organization of occupational forces for Europe.

Maj. Gen. Witsell

Since the collapse of Japan, demobilization has been greatly accelerated and, at the same time, it has been complicated by the necessity of maintaining adequate occupational forces in enemy countries and readjusting forces in this country required for replacements and maintenance of necessary services and installations. During the period readjustment and demobilization of the Army have been operating concurrently, and The Adjutant General is intimately concerned with both.

Complications are obvious when any organization is forced to build up with one hand and dismantle with the other. Such has been the position of The Adjutant General in common with the entire military establishment. The basic role of The Adjutant General has remained the same, however, in spite of the fact that we have been confronted both with problems of readjustment and redeployment on the one hand and demobilization on the other.

The adjutant general of any command has always acted as the executive for administrative affairs for the commander. He is the official and constant personal representative and advisor of the commanding officer on all administrative matters and the performance of staff functions not specifically assigned or delegated to other agencies. Military administration, like all other elements of the military establishment, has the primary object in time of war of contributing to success in battle and, in the aftermath of war, to the orderly return to a normal and efficient permanent basis.

Administration is, therefore, a function of command, an essential to the integration of the various parts of the military machine. Any lack of coordination tends to slow up operations and is conducive to

(*Continued on next page*)

Army Ordnance

(*Continued from page* 126)

One of the major problems confronting Ordnance today is the economical long-term storage of the weapons, ammunition and tank-automotive equipment, employed in World War II. This priceless equipment must be kept ready in such a way that yearly maintenance costs will be only a fraction of the cost of the original material. At the same time, this equipment must be ready for instant use should the atomic age bring another Pearl Harbor. In all our peacetime operations, Ordnance will continue its war-time policy of rigid economy and maximum savings to the taxpayer.

Here is an accounting of our stewardship for the historic period 1940-1945. More than 38 billion dollars were spent since early 1940 directly in the production of tools of war, such as guns, tanks, small arms, trucks, ammunition, and accessories. About 3 billion dollars went into the construction of facilities; nearly a billion dollars were expended for Lend-Lease machine tools shipped to foreign countries; another billion dollars were spent on operational costs. Seven billion dollars will be returned to the Treasury, representing unliquidated contracts resulting from the terminating of the war.

During World War II, Ordnance produced more than 750,000 artillery pieces, including antiaircraft guns, antitank guns, and rocket launchers, at a cost of $3,600,000,000.

Nearly 20 billion dollars were spent in tank-automotive production. Eighty-eight thousand tanks were produced, while 133,571 miscellaneous types of other combat vehicles came off the assembly lines. Fifty thousand self-propelled weapons and more than 2½ million trucks of all types were manufactured.

More than 5 billion dollars went into the production of small arms, including rifles and carbines, bazookas, pistols, small arms ammunition of all types, bayonets, helmets, grenade launchers, projectors, ammunition belts, spare parts, tools, and accessories.

Nearly 10 billion dollars were spent in the production of approximately 18 million tons of artillery ammunition, bombs, rockets, grenades and other explosives.

This tremendous production job could not have been accomplished without the untiring efforts and unselfish cooperation of American industry, and I should like to pay hearty tribute to American manufacturers, both large and small. They are a priceless national asset. No wonder they are looked upon with anxious eyes! The Industry-Ordnance team demonstrated to the world the dangers inherent in the fallacious theory that America was soft and ripe for picking.

Through Industry-Ordnance cooperation, the cost of producing Ordnance materiel was substantially reduced. The overall reduction averaged about 9 per cent.

To carry out the global Ordnance mission, approximately half a million persons were trained in Ordnance duties. More than 50 per cent of this number, or 278,373 officers and enlisted men, received advanced technical training in Ordnance schools.

It is a great pleasure to me as Chief of Ordnance to commend all those, in Industry and in Ordnance, who assisted in our vital task of supplying arms and ammunition to our fighting men of the Army, the Navy and the Air Forces. Their response to the call for help from our theatres of operation was meritorious in the extreme. It was a tough job all around—on the battlefield and in the factory. May we never again be so complacent about guns as we were before World War II. From now on we must be ready with great strength instantly for the tempo of modern war is instantaneous!

Naval Personnel

(*Continued from preceding page*)

in accordance with the latest developments in training aids and teaching techniques. Further standardization of training provided more officers and men in less time to meet the then increasing needs of the fleets and shore establishments. Training will continue to be of primary importance in the peacetime Navy and will incorporate battle tested lessons in the most comprehensive program in our history.

When V-J Day came the Navy had 60 per cent of its personnel out fighting the war in the Pacific. These and the relatively small number of officers and men deployed in the Atlantic area and elsewhere outside the United States require transportation back to this country for demobilization. To date the flow of returning officers and men has been steady and uninterrupted with the result that demobilization of the Navy is on schedule.

The postwar Navy will likely be the largest in terms of personnel of any peacetime Navy in the nation's history. Its personnel administration will be directed to assuring maximum efficiency and personal consideration for the officers and men who will share in guaranteeing the domain and interests of the nation.

Wake of Battle

(*Continued from page* 126)

needed.

Long before our invasion forces dropped their weight on the beaches of North Africa, our School of Military Government in Charlottesville, Virginia, had produced graduate officers who accompanied General Eisenhower and his commanders to our first beachhead.

Additional trained military government officers accompanied our assault forces into Sicily and Italy, while in special training centers at home hundreds of officers were being readied for D-Day entrance into France almost a year later.

Likewise, long before the establishment of Omaha and Utah beaches, officers who are now with General MacArthur had begun their specialized training for civil affairs-military government duties.

Prior to the Italian campaign, the usefulness of civil affairs planning and personnel had not been demonstrated to tactical commanders. However, after the early phases of the Italian campaign all doubt on the part of commanders was dissipated. When, in December 1943, General Eisenhower organized his staff for the Normandy invasion, civil affairs in the new SHAEF was raised to General Staff level, and designated as G-5.

Military Government, wherever it operated, restored orderly civil administration in the wake of the fighting. Vital utilities, transport lines and sources of supply were restored. Food and relief and medical supplies were imported to liberated countries to the extent permitted by available transport and the needs of war.

In the early fall of 1944 our troops penetrated Germany itself. Military Government staffs and detachments accompanied our forces so they could reorganize, at once in the wake of battle, local German civil administration. Unlike Japan, where we took over the existing governmental machinery, there was no government in Germany we could use. Military Government created one from the bottom up.

Following the surrender of Germany's armies, military government was set up throughout four zones occupied by American, British, Soviet and French armies. General Eisenhower was military governor of the American zone and also Council in Berlin. His able deputy is Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay.

The aim of our military government officers in Germany is to ensure that never again will German militarism be a threat to the world peace. Their colleagues, now joining General MacArthur in increasing numbers, are assisting him to accomplish the same end against Japanese militarism. The tasks of military government surpass in difficulty any occupation problems ever faced in the past by victorious armies. History will record favorably, I believe, the final result of the War Department's wise and early planning for the attainment of these important objectives.

Spars

(*Continued from page* 125)

lishment of a school for Spar boatswain's mates, coxswains and strikers at the Manhattan Beach Training Station, Brooklyn, New York.

The Spars have contributed to the winning of the victory. They are now faced with the challenge of contributing to the building of a lasting peace.

The Adjutant General

(*Continued from preceding page*)

disaster in war and the inefficiency of the machine at all times.

During the past year The Adjutant General has continued to operate the world's largest classification system designed both for mobilization and demobilization; he has been responsible for the conducting of the Army's world-wide postal service; to his lot has fallen the maintenance, preservation and disposition of the stupendous mass of records accumulated during the war and, in addition, he has been charged with the care and rehabilitation of military prisoners; the operation of the world's largest publishing establishment; the launching of the Regular Army recruiting program, and the answering of thousands of inquiries on a wide variety of subjects for the general public and for the public through their elected representatives. In addition, too, he has carried on the routine administrative operations which are normal functions of his office.

Duty Completed

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Marine Base, San Diego, California, on the west coast.

Emphasis swung sharply from the prosecution of the war to the heavy administrative demands of demobilization. The importance of stenographers, file clerks, mimeograph operators, and messengers was underlined by the constant and growing flow of discharge orders.

Thus, the scene shifted to the administration of peace as 1945 came to a close—shifted from the stepped-up business of war that characterized the early months of the year.

In January, 1945, the first contingent of women Marines landed on the Territory of Hawaii.

Eventually, almost one thousand women Marines were stationed on Oahu, enabling combat specialists to move into war zones or to return home for furloughs.

Communications

(*Continued from page* 121)

made many notable advances in the production of precision equipment of a highly technical character. The research and development budget increased from $704,000 in 1940 to $65,000,000 for the fiscal year 1944.

To meet the needs of the Army for radio and radar equipment it was necessary to utilize virtually the entire capacity of the electronics industry. Working in conjunction with the Signal Corps, this industry was expanded from a pre-war productive capacity of 250 million dollars per year to maximum production in excess of three billion dollars annually. To provide necessary manfuacturing capacity more than 200 plant expansions were financed. These projects involved 84 separate contractors, located in 20 states, and cost approximately $95,000,000.

Development of much new equipment requiring a high degree of frequency stability led to the early adoption of crystal controlled radio. This called for a tremendous expansion in facilities for producing quartz crystals. By working with industry in establishing new manufacturing techniques, the Signal Corps was successful in increasing production from about 200,000 per month at the beginning of the war to about 2,000,000 a month during 1943. The number of manufacturers was increased from a few small shops at 125 companies.

In this brief article it will not be possible to describe all the accomplishments of the Signal Corps during the war, but I believe several, at least, of the most significant developments should be mentioned.

By now thousands of words have been written on the marvels of radar which has been rightly credited with substantially decreasing the duration of the war. It is not so generally known, however, that the Signal Corps was responsible for the development and much of the research on radar until October, 1944. After that date the Army Air Forces gradually took over both research and development and procurement of radar equipment defined as peculiar to its arm. Virtually all of the important radar equipment actually employed in combat up to the end of the war, including the complete radar equipment of the B-29's, had been developed in its operating form while this part of the program was still under the Signal Corps.

The Signal Corps also played a major role in development of the VT "proximity" fuze, which ranks with radar and the atomic bomb as one of the most significant weapons of the war.

Until a few weeks ago we of the Signal Corps were united by a singleness of purpose. That purpose was Victory.

Today we find ourselves confronted by new problems which can only be successfully solved by continuous and united effort.

We must do our utmost to aid the communications industry in its reconversion to peacetime prosperity; we must speed the return to civil life of all officers and men whose services are no longer needed; we must do our part in recruiting and maintaining a well-trained Regular Army; we must encourage the establishment of strong and capable Reserve Corps—both of officers and enlisted men—and we must keep abreast of the latest scientific advances in order that the Signal Corps may continue to supply the Army with superior communications equipment.

Navy Chaplains

(*Continued from page* 122)

in World War II is told, in part, by these statistics; 92 decorations, 12 killed in action, 7 accidentally killed; 2 released from prison camps; 1 missing in action; 40 wounded.

A Chaplain's work, in peace, as in war is never done, so the individual Chaplain's strategy in peace, as in war, will continue. His Divine Commission to "bring God to men, and men to God," will be his guide as he continues to serve our peacetime Navy.

Military Transportation

(*Continued from page* 123)

nental Europe, Iran and the Philippines, while the Motor Transport Service handled the Red Ball, XYZ and ABC express operations in Europe, tortuous Highway No. 5 in the Philippines and planned the traffic pattern for the China lifeline—the Stilwell Road.

To handle the unprecedented flow of men and material, to operate the ports, trucks, harbor craft and trains, the Transportation Corps activated and trained 765 troop units in the United States, an additional 175 in overseas theaters.

Within this country the Transportation Corps funneled America's military might to the battle fronts through 8 principal ports of embarkation, 8 sub-ports and cargo ports; 19 port agencies; 17 troop staging areas; 10 holding and reconsignment points; 6 traffic regulating stations; 48 railroad open storage yards; 6 consolidating stations and 9 distributing agencies.

Charged with responsibility for the Army's marine operations, the Transportation Corps operated 186 Army-owned and bareboat chartered ocean going vessels including the 23 hospital ships of the Army's "Mercy Fleet" which evacuated 88,576 soldier patients from 7 December 1941 through the end of last August. Under Transportation Corps control, too, were more than 1600 other deep water vessels allocated to the Army by the War Shipping Administration and United Nations agencies. In addition, the Corps built up an Army fleet of 10,878 tugs, tankers, harbor boats and other small craft under 1,000 gross tons.

As a procurement agency, the Transportation Corps purchased and accepted War Department and Lend-Lease equipment valued at $2,052,000,000 between January 1942 and July 1945.

And now, though the fighting is over, the Transportation Corps is still actively committed. By the end of this year nearly three million American soldiers will have been returned home from Europe, the Pacific, Alaska and other far-flung U. S. theaters and bases, while a million and a half more U. S. Troops are scheduled for return to this country by June 1946. Repatriation of our overseas forces is a Transportation Corps responsibility that will not be completely discharged until the last American wartime soldier walks down the gang plank in the U. S. A.

That in brief is the story of the Transportation Corps in World War II, the story of numbers and tons and miles and passengers. The story of enough — on time.

But it's not the whole story. It doesn't tell of the Transportation Corps Port Company soldier on Omaha Beach, Luzon, Sicily, Okinawa. It doesn't tell of the Corporal who pilots and drives the DUKW. It doesn't refer to the TC railroader who pushed the trains across the mountains of North Africa and up through the valley of Iran. It doesn't mention the truck driver who jockied his load over the roughest roads of the world. It doesn't speak of the long-shoreman or the brakeman or the thousands of civilian helpers who moved the might of war within our own country. It doesn't tell of these individuals—they ARE the Transportation Corps!

Army Chaplains

(*Continued from page* 122)

are available.

In combat we have seen born a new conviction of the sufficiency of our God, and that faith is the foundation for a hope large enough to envision a reconstructed world in which men may live at peace. To that world of peace, as they change the uniform of their country for the vestments of a parish, those who served as chaplains will bring a rich experience and a deep understanding of the problems men have faced. Their voices will be heard summoning our nation to justify the sacrifices men have made, that that which they have won shall not be lost by those for whom they gained it.

Chemical Warfare

(*Continued from page* 123)

fire into caves and other hard-to-reach places. Thousands of American soldiers owe their lives to the fact that flamethrowers routed dug-in enemies after bombs, shells and grenades had failed.

Another surprise weapon was the 4.2-inch chemical mortar. Affectionately dubbed the "goon gun" by Chemical Mortar Battalions which used it, this light rifled mortar gave invaluable support to assault troops.

This mortar was so successful on land that it was subsequently mounted on boats to cover beach assaults in the Pacific. Ready for use at the time of the Japanese surrender was a recoilless mortar, half the weight of the other, which is capable of direct and deflected fire and the shock of the recoil is taken up by gases from the explosive charge escaping through the rear.

General Somervell hailed the 4.2 mortar as an outstanding CWS war contribution, while General Marshall credited the mortar, the incendiary bomb and the flamethrower with materially helping the offensive. CWS had produced some 10,000,000 shells for the chemical mortar by the time the war closed.

Besides smokescreens furnished by the chemical mortar, artificial fog to cover movements and installations was also provided by smoke generators, smoke pots, smoke grenades and aerial smoke tanks—all developed by CWS.

The fact that the Army was so adequately prepared for offensive and defensive gas warfare was undoubtedly a big factor in deterring our enemies from resorting to toxic agents. Since the spring of 1942 the CWS was ready to retaliate if the Axis had introduced this form of warfare. Its production of such agents was far in excess of anything the enemy could muster.

As Secretary of War Patterson pointed out:

"Tactics of our enemies did not force us to unleash many of the weapons or make use of the defensive against gas warfare which the Chemical Warfare Service developed. However, had it been necessary to make use of these developments, it is good to know that in this field we were undoubtedly ahead of the rest of the world."

War Production

(*Continued from page* 120)

reconnaissance planes; 24,000 military transport planes; 58,000 trainer planes 14,000 communication planes, and 2,000 special purpose aircraft.

New Naval Ships built during the 5-year period from 1 July 1940 through 31 July 1945, totaled 71,060 vessels, aggregating 8,250,000 displacement tons. This tremendous ship construction program has made the United States Naval fleet greater than the combined fleets of the rest of the world.

The bulk of Naval ship construction during the war years was in combatants, with 1,201 new vessels completed, totaling 3.6 million tons, and in landing craft, with 64,546 vessels completed.

Construction of Maritime Commission vessels from 1 July 1940 through 31 July 1945 quadrupled the U. S. merchant fleet —from 11.4 million deadweight tons to about 45 million tons.

The Army procured 17,400,000 rifles, carbines and sidearms, 2,700,000 machine guns and more than 315,000 pieces of field artillery and mortars. Since this was a shooting war, ammunition had to be procured for the armament.

Enough Army gun and mortar ammunition and aircraft bombs were produced during the 5-year period to load 210,000 freight cars in a train 1800 miles long or nearly as great as the air line distance from New York to Denver. Artillery ammunition exceeded 4,200,000 tons in weight, mortar shells weighed 377,000 tons, while aircraft bombs (Army and Navy) weighed 5,900,000 tons.

Other Army guns and equipment produced included the following:

Heavy field artillery (complete items), some 9,850 units; spare cannon for heavy field artillery 8,006; spare recoil mechanisms for heavy field artillery 4,031; light field and antitank guns 51,420; tank guns and howitzers 116,946; guns for self-propelled carriages 26,749; "bazooka" rocket launchers 476,628; mortars; 110,348, of which 37,428 were 3-inch or over.

During the period July 1940 through July 1945, 165,525 naval gun assemblies were produced; 164,081 of these assemblies were produced after December 1941.

Naval gun ammunition and rockets amounting to 1,347,000 tons have been produced since 1 July 1940. It would require nearly 27,000 freight cars to move these projectiles, or a train nearly 200 miles long, reaching nearly from Washington, D. C., to New York City.

Combat and motor vehicles produced from 1 July 1940, through 31 July 1945, include the following:

Tanks, 86,388; armored cars 16,438; scout cars and carriers, 88,077; tank chassis for self-propelled guns 16,018; trucks 2,434,553, of which some 244,071 were heavy-heavy, or over 2½ tons, 757,222 light-heavy or of 2½ tons; 442,031 medium, or 1½ and under 2½ tons, and 991,229 light, or under 1½ tons (mostly jeeps); and tractors, 123,707.

Communication and electronic equipment produced totaled some $10,659,000,000, of which $4,433,000,000 went for radio, $3,719,000,000 for radar, and $2,507,000,000 for other communication equipment, including some 5,262,000 miles of field and assault wire.

Communication equipment other than electronic — telephone, telegraph, wire, cable, etc.,—to a value of $2,500,000,000 was supplied to the armed services from July 1940 through July 1945.

All in all the communication and electronic industry need make no apologies, even to atomic power, for the magnitude of its contribution to the pre-invasion signing of the surrender terms in Tokio Bay.

These figures are testimony to the magnificent job done during the most trying period in our Nation's history by American industry and American labor. The use of these millions of planes, tanks, ships, guns, and rounds of ammunition by the men in our armed forces is even more stirring testimony to the American way of life. Together, industry, labor and military proved once again that they are an unbeatable combination.

Seabees

(*Continued from page* 120)

greater than the Guam, Saipan and Tinian bases combined.

At the time of the Japanese surrender offer hundreds of miles of military highway already had been completed. Anchorages were being developed at several locations along the coastline. These would have made possible almost continuous carrier attacks against the Japanese homeland. Harbors were being improved. Piers and drydocks were being placed in operation only three hours' flying time from Tokyo.

Okinawa's airfields were being developed by the teamwork of Seabees and Army Engineers. The basic plan was for the Army to revamp existing fields and the Seabees to build the new ones.

Twenty-two airfields and more than 25 miles of runways had been mapped. La-Guardia Field in New York would have had only half the capacity of the smallest of these fields. Heavy bombers would have been able to shuttle to Japan with maximum bomb loads on a twice-a-day schedule.

Iwo Jima was another base which formed part of the stage for the final curtain.

Allied planners actually considered Iwo Jima too small for a base when conquest of the island was first considered. The "too small" bit of land today holds the Pacific's longest airstrip!

As the British Isles were the stockpile point for the invasion of France, the Philippines were to have been the warehouse for the invasion of Japan.

On Leyte, Samar, and other islands in the Philippine Archipelago the Seabees undertook literally hundreds of construction assignments.

Completing the stage setting were bases in the Marianas from which our B-29's attacked. Guam, Saipan and Tinian were taken in mid-1944 and rapidly developed.

Guam today is a major all-purpose naval base. It has one of the Pacific's great anchorages, Apra Harbor, developed by Seabee waterfront and dredging battalions. Its land area is lined with miles of sturdy, heavy-surfaced roads. Five airdromes are in operation, some of them equipped with 8,500-foot asphalt-surfaced landing strips and as many as 200 hardstands.

On Tinian, Guam's neighboring Island, the Seabees did the entire job of constructing an airbase from which were launched some of the most potent air assaults against Japan's inner defenses.

Saipan, third of the key Marianas bases, also testifies to American construction prowess. Here Seabees and Army Engineers completed another large group of airfields.

Thirty-one thousand Seabee stevedores and almost a thousand Civil Engineer Corps officers comprised "Special" battalions. These were cargo-handling units which assisted mightily in breaking the logistics bottleneck which for a time threatened to delay the Pacific timetable.

Seabee members of Navy underwater demolition teams helped clear enemy beaches in front of troops making assault landings.

Other Seabees, trained into pontoon experts, jockeyed the causeways over which material and men moved ashore in the majority of Pacific landing operations. Still other specialists from the the Naval Construction Battalions were responsible for protective smoke cover in the combat areas.

Starting in December, 1941 as an entirely new organization with only a paper framework, the Seabees came a long way in the three and a half years which preceded Japanese capitulations. All but a small percentage of these Navy builders, who will serve as a peacetime cadre, will shed their uniforms within the next few months. As civilians they can look back with pride to the important part they played in setting the final stage for victory and in establishing a new Naval tradition.

Quartermaster Corps

(*Continued from page* 121)

It was procuring some 500 individual items of clothing in about 6,500 sizes; it was issuing footwear at the rate of 2,000,000 pairs a month, including 300,000 pairs of rebuilds from Quartermaster-operated shops, and Quartermaster repairmen were mending 1,500 pairs a month for return to users.

Exemplifying the diversified contributions of the QMC, during the last several months of the war it was training Infantry soldiers, veterans of combat warfare, to handle the War Dogs of the QMC's K-9 Corps.

Upon surrender of the Germans in May, the QMC at once put into operation plans formulated months previously and held in readiness for this contingency. Cargoes marked in code to indicate suitability for either or both theaters were halted at United States ports or retained aboard ships at European destinations. Immediately the flow of food and clothing was reversed to send the largest percentage through the Pacific pipelines and to increase the accumulation rate of reserves in that theater.

With the surrender of the Japanese in August, still another alteration in procedure had to be effected—and swiftly. Instead of procurement, the problem now became one of retrenchment — cutbacks, inventories and disposals of the materials which had not only been contracted for but those accumulated against the projected invasion operations against Japan.

But even prior to VE-Day, the Quartermaster Corps had begun preparation for the inevitable capitulation of the enemy. Part of that program was to initiate training courses by which selected officers could be schooled in conducting termination operations in a rapid but orderly manner. As a result, virtually all terminations were completed in less than 45 days following the cessation of hostilities in Asia.

It may be deduced that the past year has been the most hectic one since Defense Mobilization began five years ago. The QMC has weathered the two transition periods of the past 12 months and is ready to face 1946—the task of the QMC is far from completed—for the work of the QMC begins early and ends late. Wherever there are American soldiers, there must be Quartermasters to clothe, feed and otherwise supply them. When the last QM salvage outfit departs from the theaters, there still remains one final task—repatriation of those fallen whose kin request it, and the establishment of permanent resting places for those who will never return.

Fiscal Activities

(*Continued from page* 117)

That the plans made by the Audit Division of the Office of the Fiscal Director are standing up well in practice is evidenced by the fact that substantial settlements on account of termination of contracts have already been made.

Prompt payment of debts has always been an objective of the Finance Department. Its personnel and techniques have been geared to that end so that under the extreme pressure incident to the rapid separation of military personnel and the necessity of meeting commercial bills as fast as possible in order to provide funds for a return to normal operation, the challenge is still being met. Final pay of military personnel requires very careful consideration of the debits and credits accruing to the individual soldier and payment or collection of the net amount as the case may warrant. No soldier can be separated from the service until he has received his final pay, travel money, and first installment of mustering-out pay.

The pyramiding of foreign exchange problems cannot be escaped. It is estimated that these will continue at their present high level for another six months at least. Returning and transferring military personnel carrying many kinds of European or Eastern currencies constitute a problem for finance officers who must be kept informed as to the currencies that can be exchanged and as to the official rate that has been established for their exchange. A specially complicating factor is the frequency with which conversion programs are being put into effect by liberated countries.

Irrespective of how effective arrangements may be for the orderly tapering-off of fiscal activity, no plan can eliminate the necessity for receiving and adjusting charges or claims both in favor of and against the government, in the pay and allowance accounts of military personnel who have been separated from the service. In order to handle these as expertly and expeditiously as possible a special unit, the Army Central Adjustment Office, has been activated.

Only the continuing and thorough application of business methods has enabled the Finance Department to discharge the heavy responsibilities laid upon it during the course of hostilities. The same attention to detail, use of modern techniques, and devotion to the job to be done are expected to achieve the same high performance and outstanding results in the months to come.

The Navy's Story

(*Continued from page* 119)

reporting the actions. The recordings were flown to a rear base, censored, and broadcast from there to the States. A few ships in the fleet were also provided with full broadcasting facilities for greater coverage. Photographs were handled with the same speed, and radioed after developing.

Late in the war, indeed, we had communications facilities so complete that comprehensive plans for informational coverage were included as an annex to every operations plan. Somewhat in the way that every square foot of target area is assigned to particular planes or particular gun crews, complete instructions were given in this annex on what facilities were to be made available, and where, and how the correspondents might be best enabled in every detail to obtain their stories.

The Navy facilitated coverage of both the European and the Pacific wars by lending all aid and means possible to the press, radio, and magazine correspondents, to editors and to book authors and to newsreel and still cameramen.

The Navy supplemented this widespread coverage of its activities through correspondents of its own. Officers with qualifying experience were assigned to adapt feature material which more timely news would force the private correspondent to overlook to whatever public medium was best suited to it. One hundred and fifty enlisted correspondents scattered throughout the fleet carried out a more detailed and more intimate sort of news-gathering. They prepared short personal items for the home town papers of the Navy's fighting men. In addition, records were sometimes made by the fighting men themselves, which were sent to their families after being broadcast over their home town stations.

Because we have for some time had the largest Navy in the history of the world, the task of telling the public about their Navy has proved to be a vast one. The story has been told, however, in books, in magazines, on the air, in newsreels, in movies—everywhere. Alert correspondents, commentators and publishers were eager to tell the American people how the war was going, and we were eager to give them all assistance. We believe that the partnership worked well.

Best 'Covered' War

(*Continued from page* 119)

phases of the war in this country, we issued credentials for more than 2,700 to go to the various overseas theaters during the three years and nine months of hostilities. It is no wonder that this was the most thoroughly "covered" war in history.

Representatives of the press and radio were on hand as eye-witnesses during every major operation undertaken by our Army right up to the signing of the instrument of surrender in Tokyo Bay. They flew in our bombers on combat missions, they rode assault boats in every landing from Oran to Ie Shima, they lived in foxholes with our frontline men. Many correspondents gave their lives in line of duty, including men like Ernie Pyle who brought into countless American homes a detailed picture of everyday life at the front.

There is no better example of complete war "coverage" in history than that of D-Day in Europe. Approximately 200 American correspondents, photographers, newsreel cameramen and radio commentators covered some phase of that gigantic operation.

As extensive as the direct coverage of the war by correspondents has been, this has not been by any means the sole medium of providing information to the public. Army public relations officers have sent thousands upon thousands of stories directly to hometown papers of individual soldiers. Many thousands of photographs have been taken by the Signal Corps to supplement those taken by newspaper photographers. A voluminous newsreel record of the war was also made by Signal Corps cameramen and much of its released to the public through the regular newsreel companies. The Army produced many radio programs, designed to give the public a more complete picture of Army operations. Some of these, like the Army Hour, had millions of listeners every week. We produced a number of documentary films to bring to the public in graphic form the story of significant events. We brought combat veterans back from the front to make public appearances, tour war plants, tell the story of their personal experiences.

These are only a few of the measures taken by the Army to help inform the public, but they give an idea of the enormous effort put forth to see that every media was employed to the maximum extent. They brought to the public the full story of our setbacks and our victories, our hardships and our moments of triumph. They made the American people the best informed in the world on the progress of the war.

The JAGD

(*Continued from page* 117)

have been adjusted in the United States, and more than 7,000,000 cases have been handled by the Legal Assistance Offices in dispensing free legal advice to military personnel and their dependents.

The immense size of the Army, and its distribution around the globe have rendered the administration of military justice an enormous undertaking. I believe the hard-working and efficient judge advocates entrusted with this duty have done a splendid job. Their objective and that of the Department has been to guarantee to every person charged with an offense, from the highest to the lowest, the speedy, fair and impartial trial for which American military justice stands. In the overwhelming majority of cases they have succeeded.

Two major policies of the Judge Advocate General's Department throughout the war have been to eliminate unnecessary trials by court-martial and to promote the rehabilitation of offenders. While the total number of cases reviewed by the Department has been large in itself, it is gratifyingly small in proportion to the number of persons in the armed services—a fact which reflects great credit upon the deportment of the American soldier and upon the judgment and leadership of his commanders.

In yet another activity peculiar to this war the Judge Advocate General's Department has done pioneering work of permanent value. I refer to the planning of legal procedures for War Department emergency operation of war plants and industrial facilities taken over by the Army as a result of labor controversies. In these cases the Judge Advocate General's Department assigned qualified personnel as legal advisers to the Army representatives in charge of the plants. Largely as a result of this legal counsel and the procedures adopted, the management of these properties was effected without delay or disorder and production maintained during a crucial period in the nation's affairs.

As has been mentioned, the end of hostilities has not diminished the work of the Judge Advocate General's Department, and has in several fields actually increased it. Notable among the latter operations are those of the War Crimes Office, engaged in the detection and prosecution of war criminals both in Germany and Japan; the Claims Division, responsible for supervising the settlement of claims for injuries to persons and property arising out of non-combat activities of the Army; the Legal Assistance Branch, which cooperates with the civilian bar in providing counsel on personal legal problems to military personnel and their dependents; and the Special Clemency Branch, recently established to review some 33,000 records of prisoners now in confinement.

While an eventual reduction of the Department's work-load is anticipated, the military establishment and the legal structure of the postwar world will be so complex that the role of the Army lawyer will be more important than ever before.

Navy Procurement

(*Continued from page* 116)

During the fiscal year ended July 1941, while we were still engaged in a national defense program, the Navy added more ships of all types to its fleets than for any year since the peak of production during the First World War.

Great progress was made, too, in Naval aircraft production. For example, in the month of June, 1943, the dollar value of Naval plane acceptances was two hundred and fifty per cent greater than in the preceding January. Other major components of the Navy procurement program, including the base construction projects, the auxiliary vessel program, and the enormous requirements of maintenance and supply of the ever growing fleet, also accelerated by leaps and bounds.

Actual procurement for the Navy tends —the expression is used advisedly—to be highly centralized in Washington. Furthermore, upon the outbreak of this war the Marine Corps, although maintaining a separate purchasing organization and close coordination with the Army, was more closely integrated with the Navy in matters of procurement. In peacetime, Coast Guard procurement is handled by the Treasury Department; at the outbreak of war the Coast Guard by law became a part of the Navy, and even though its separate purchasing department continues to purchase independently a considerable proportion of its requirements, its over-all procurement activities are closely integrated with the Navy's program.

Naval officers, specialists in various commodities, products and technical business procedures, were physically located in the various War Production Board Industry Branches and Sections, working on an operating level with WPB personnel. Other officers served in various liaison capacities with the War Production Board, met regularly with its important policy-forming committees, and maintained contact with key executives to minimize interference with and to expedite accomplishment of Navy procurement.

The fact that our fleets were able to carry out their assigned tasks without delay in strategic plans attests to the fact that the Navy procurement program during World War II met its schedules on time and with the quantities of the needed war materials.

No comment of mine about the work of the Office of Procurement and Material, which I had the honor to serve as Chief since its inception on 30 January 1942 until the transfer of its functions to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Material Division) on 20 August 1945, would be complete without paying a well-deserved tribute to the excellence of the work of the Naval Reserve officers who constituted over 90 per cent of its officer complement during the war. These men, drawn from all fields of industry and the professions, were specialists in the various phases of procurement and production and their business knowledge and experience served the Navy well during the emergency.

It is my hope that in the post-war years the Navy Department will continue to use such men for terms of duty where they can continue to contribute to the efficiency of the Department's operations, particularly in the fields of insurance, procurement, labor relations, conservation, specifications and machine shop practice, to mention only a few.

Naval Supply

(*Continued from page* 116)

cars through every city and state in our nation, moving an average of 4,000 carloads of merchandise every 24 hours by war's end.

They had been responsible for the ordering, storing and issuing of more than 60,000 different items of supply at some 400 overseas bases, on 1,100 combatant ships, and on more than 1,500 auxiliary ships. They had served in every theater of operation, on every type of ship, on every advanced base, in every phase of logistics from aviation to submarine supply.

Supply Corps Officers established and operated seven air cargo terminals to handle priority traffic of critical material. Four of these were in the United States, one was in Hawaii, one at Guam and one at Samar, P. I. Through these terminals flowed 286 tons of airborne supplies daily in direct or indirect support of the Fleet.

The largest petroleum handling agency in history was operated by Navy Supply Corps Officers who were responsible for a volume of petroleum which exceeded the production of all the nations outside the western hemisphere combined, or one quarter of all United States production.

A major landmark in naval logistics was reached when Navy Supply Corps Officers introduced in 1945 a new "Catalog of Navy Material," a streamlined version of the famous naval catalog developed in 1917 by Rear Admiral T. H. Hicks. More than 60,000 standard stock items have been codified and given standard numbers for foolproof ordering and identification.

To achieve maximum utilization of supplies and efficient distribution, Navy Supply Corps Officers developed and perfected for naval use a nationwide "mechanical stock control" system which provided central control in Washington, D. C., of all stock in continental United States warehouses. This system permitted the moving of excess stocks from one area to another and reduced to a minimum surplus ordering.

More than 90,000,000 square feet of storage space for supplies to back up our Fleet were under control of Supply Corps Officers at war's end.

Of major importance not only for the prosecution of this war but also for our world trade in the future has been the development of new materials handling methods by Navy Supply Corps Officers.

An increase of 60% in beef shipments to the Fleet was achieved by the development of boneless beef boxed in fibreboard containers.

The introduction of a new payroll system and a streamlined accounting system will eventually save millions of dollars in manpower through simplification of procedures and increased efficiency in handling financial responsibilities.

At war's end, Navy Supply Corps Officers were preparing and mailing to American homes 2,682,000 family allowance and allotment checks per month in value exceeding $180,000,000.

The relatively small amount of surplus materials on hand at war's end is considered a major contribution to the nation's economy.

This brief view of the Supply Corps' accomplishments during the war gives but a partial explanation of why the United States Fleet could move steadily forward from Guadalcanal to Tokyo. Certainly such accomplishments as these are tribute to the officers, men, and civilians who worked together as a team in maintaining the longest and most powerful naval supply line in American history.

They tackled their job with courage, efficiency and perseverance. To them must be given the final credit for a task well done.

A-N Staff College

(*Continued from page* 113)

whose activities touched and required integration with those of the military forces.

The classes, of which twelve were graduated, were small, quality having been stressed rather than quantity. Sixty per cent were officers of the Army, equally divided among the Ground, Air, and Service Forces; forty per cent were from the Navy and Marine Corps: air, surface and staff corps represented. A token representation of State Department Foreign Service officers were included in each class, as were three representatives of the various services of the British Commonwealth.

Members of the instructional staff were carefully picked officers of all arms and services, selected because of demonstrated ability in combat in those specialties which the College was required to stress. They were changed frequently.

The course consisted of short periods, approximately a month in duration, of intensive instruction at the Army Air Forces School of Applied Tactics, the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth and the Naval War College at Newport. It included comprehensive demonstrations of air and ground weapons at Orlando, Oklahoma City, Forts Benning and Sill, and of naval weapons on board ships of various types. Students were generally of the ranks of colonel and lieutenant colonel and corresponding ranks in the Navy.

Academic instruction was avoided. The text books consisted only of plans, operation orders and after-action reports of all joint and combined operations. Research in these served as one method of disseminating lessons among the various theatres. Probably the greatest collection of research material on such operations is now in possession of the College. The duration of the course was approximately five months, which represented a compromise between that considered necessary to cover the scope adequately and the maximum period advisable to withdraw officers from active operations.

The wartime classes are now completed. A group of officers, picked for specific types of war experience, will soon report to study, write and revise, with the College facilities, doctrines for joint operations. Concurrently plans will be perfected for a post-war successor to the College.

The College has received fulsome praise for its contribution to smooth, understanding, interservice collaboration on theatre joint staffs.

Perhaps the greatest compliment to which the Army and Navy Staff College can lay claim is the universal approval of its continued existence, its scope widened and integrated with other courses covering industrial, political and research potentials, familiarity with which will be required by the highest military commanders and staff levels of the future.

Too much credit cannot be given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who saw the necessity for the establishment of ANSCOL and had the courage to withdraw officers from their posts of duty in the midst of war so that they might return thereto better trained to implement that all important requirement of joint or coordinated operations: "Unity of Purpose."

U. S. Engineers

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our various Allies — was not yet fully appreciated.

The result was that a hurried change in emphasis occurred since Engineer service units were being urgently called for in England, to prepare the Invasion bases there; throughout the Pacific, in China, Burma, India; and while it would be two years before the organic Engineer organizations attached to division and corps would see action.

As General Marshall pointed out in his report, our first consideration was to keep our Allies — already at grips with the enemy—in the field and fighting. Obviously, then, supplies, materiel and equipment produced in the United States had to be delivered to the fighting fronts. Engineers became responsible for building and maintaining these lengthening supply lines.

The Alaska Highway was an engineer service rendered an Ally—Russia. It is true that this highway was built partly as insurance against Japanese control of the north Pacific and as a guarantee of continued communications with Alaska and the Aleutians. But it was built, too, as a supply route connecting the series of airfields over which planes could move to the Red Army, and it was in this latter aspect that the Highway served its most useful purpose.

Our greatest supply link with Russia, however, was built by Army Engineers in Iran, starting with Red Sea ports which were all but built over and tremendously enlarged, and ending with terminals at Teheran in Red Army territory, with highways and rail lines in-between.

No less hard-pressed, however, was China, already at the tag-end of a ten-year war with Japan. Supply of China—by road and air since her ports were firmly held by the Jap — was essential to keeping her in the War. Thus Engineers set to work to hew out of jungle and unmentionable terrain the Ledo Road, countless airfields for the fueling and repair of planes bearing cargo on the China run, and to lay pipeline to pour priceless gasoline over the hump to American and Chinese troops.

This, too, was an engineer service for the Allies; and it is interesting to note that while this work was being initiated and largely carried out, few American troops had yet met the enemy. It is also worthy of note that, as the War progressed and we did join battle with the enemy, the demand for service troops materially increased. Although the Corps was hard pressed to provide troops for the huge operation of mounting the Invasion, the destruction of rail lines, bridges, rail yards, highways, ports, and other facilities on the Continent immediately thereafter imposed even more urgent demands upon the Corps. Preparing the bases and supporting offensives in the Pacific and in Burma intensified the demand for Engineer troops.

It was only natural that American Engineers should have responsibility for servicing the Allied Armies to such a large degree. Time was the main element of success in our joint venture. A generation of work, measured by ordinary standards of construction, had to be accomplished in only a few short months. Since no other country in the world—including Germany, whose much-touted Todt Organization lived upon slave labor and a minimum of machinery — was geared to such a construction pace, the one hope for accomplishing such a widespread mission in the allotted time was American construction methods and machinery.

In peacetime, U. S. Army Engineers have the job of controlling floods, maintaining harbor and navigational facilities along America's streams. Working closely with the nation's great contractors and constructors in this work, they faced the job of converting methods and equipment which had successfully met problems imposed by the rampaging Mississippi to military use.

How well this job of conversion was performed is best attested in the fact that, in less than three years we had overtaken and passed the Germans who had a ten-year start in their preparations for war. This record was chalked up in spite of the fact that U. S. Engineers' efforts were spotted around the world and in support of many Allies while German efforts were concentrated largely in one theater and behind one Army. That the Corps of Engineers should become the nucleus around which the Allied engineer service was centered follows logically from the fact that American engineering methods and techniques, in peace and in war, are not only unsurpassed, but hardly approached.

Work of the OPMG

(*Continued from page* 112)

the battlefronts, we found that they had been much propagandized. They never had been told things the German High Command or German Government didn't want them to know. They were told about the United States in terms of the Nazis—we were the decadent democracy. They had been indoctrinated by the propagandists who used Mein Kampf as their bible and in Mein Kampf, Hitler wrote: "Propaganda shouldn't even concern itself with the truth, if the truth favors the other side."

In order to combat such a state of mental indigestion, we decided to expose these prisoners, many of whom would some day go back to Germany and become leaders in whatever new civilization develops there, to the truth.

In order to handle the program in the lower echelons—the service commands and camps—we hand-picked and trained 150 officers, assigning at least one to each base prisoner of war camp with the title of assistant executive officer.

First, in order to teach how a democracy operates we turned to that cornerstone of a free government — the free press, and, subject to the approval of the camp commander, generally allowed any English language newspaper or magazine to circulate freely in the camps. The influence of a free press, I can say definitely, has changed many attitudes.

Next, we turned to the movies and placed in operation a special circuit which provided two balanced programs per week in every prisoner of war camp at a cost of 15 cents to each prisoner for each program. The programs consisted of selected feature pictures, depicting the American scene, which the major motion picture companies released for showing in the camps, OWI documentary films and newsreels.

Now as for books, we found a great lack of acceptable books in German, and so we published a series of paper bound editions in the German language which we sold to the prisoners for 25 cents each. Title's include Wendell Willkie's, "One World," Stephen Vincent Benet's, "America," and "Madame Curie."

In pursuing this program, we have had the active assistance of approximately 70 universities and colleges, who provided representatives to assist educational activities of prisoners by lending, renting or donating the books or outlines for study courses. Of inestimable assistance have been selected anti-Nazi prisoners of war, whom we have gathered at the "workshop" for this program at Fort Kearney, Rhode Island.

This program, I might add, is financed entirely by the prisoners themselves, through profits from their canteen purchases and by the charges for the books, movies, and newspapers that they buy. Neither has it interfered with the work program. They have done more than a billion man-days of work since coming to this country.

By Spring of next year, it is anticipated that all of the prisoners will have returned to their homelands. We believe that they will take with them a healthy respect for the United States as a victor.

Among our other functions, the broad-range and yet objective policy of training Military Police at the Provost Marshal General's School culminated in high praise from the Chief of Staff in his biennial report to the Secretary of War. In referring to the training of Military Policemen, General Marshal wrote, "The returns on this investment were specially rich in the drive across France which heavily depended on the forwarding of troops and supplies which had been put ashore in Normandy. Later in the collapse of German resistance the military police performed miracles in regulating the dense, rather chaotic traffic on the roads, burdened with combat troops and their supplies surging forward and millions of prisoners or displaced persons straggling in the opposite direction."

The ultimate in Military Police training asserted itself at the vital Ludendorf Bridge at Remagen last March when the MP Platoon of the 9th Infantry Division was cited for Battle Honors for maintaining control of the bridge "with a magnificent display of courage and devotion to duty."

In looking toward the peacetime Army, we have stressed that the highest type of soldier be assigned to Military Police duty for he has to make more on the spot decisions than any other soldier in the Army—whether he is on town patrol, riding the trains or directing traffic. He has, in most cases, no officer to ask for guidance when he makes a decision and he must use common sense, good judgment and fairness at all times.

As a sideline of this activity, the investigators who worked under policies and procedures outlined by the PMGO recovered approximately $2,000,000 in stolen government property, broke up extensive black market activities and smuggling rings, and, through the installation of Inspectoscopes (X-Ray like machines) at large Ports of Entry, detected much contraband U. S. property being shipped into the United States from overseas. Finally, the Army's Safety program, under the supervision of the PMGO, won for the Army Service Forces the award of the National Safety Council for the second straight year.

Because of space limitations, I cannot discuss in detail all the other functions of The Provost Marshal General's Office. Suffice it to say that with victory, we closed out most of our security functions, closed our civil affairs training schools, began the final work of co-ordinating records and reporting on American and Enemy prisoners of war, and set up a Demobilization Board for the orderly demobilization of our activities and personnel. At the same time we began working on plans for our future civilian defense, in view of new conceptions of warfare.

Central Pacific

(*Continued from page* 104)

ity has occurred speaks well for our preparations, our counter-intelligence, and for the loyalty of our people of Japaanese descent. With every available combat soldier going forward, credit should be given to the Organized Defense Volunteer units of the Territory for serving loyally as reserve forces. They were disbanded on 4 July 1945.

Supply. CPBC's largest task has been ordering and shipping equipment and supplies for forces throughout the Pacific. The Okinawa operation is an example. Planning its supply began in March 1944, even before the exact nature of the operation was known. Since the requisite supplies had to be on their way before the number and identity of the participating units could be determined, a system of block supply was developed. Visualize the ordnance and munitions, rations and fuels, signal and engineering equipment needed for this operation. Of Quartermaster supplies: 60,000 measurement tons, just to mount the units; 20,000 tons more to build up a reserve of six million rations in the forward area; another 260,000 tons for maintenance. Nearly 10,000 measurement tons of subsistence furnished to mount the Marines. Navy and Marines received from Army Quartermaster over 3,780,000 items, ranging from candy bars to clothing and calculating machines.

All units mounting from Hawaii were furnished full ordnance equipment and adequate supply of ammunition. Resupply and necessary spare parts had to be ordered for 210 days. Over 200,000 pounds of urgently needed items had to be shipped to Okinawa by air during May 1945 alone.

The Engineers prepared and furnished 1,500,000 copies of 130 maps and charts, a total weight of 111 tons. They furnished staggering amounts of equipment and material for base development, which they planned:—340,000 bags of cement, two million pounds of dynamite, nine million gallons of asphalt, 37 million board feet of lumber. Materials and spare parts had to be obtained from mainland sources.

The 330,000 measurement tons of equipment and supplies shipped from Oahu to Okinawa and Ie Shima had to be packed and loaded on ships. This and the transportation of some 38,875 troops were handled by Army Port and Service Command without interfering with the normal flow of traffic in the busy port of Honolulu.

Between 16 November 1944 and 31 March 1945, 25,539 persons were released by Central Pacific Base Command for duty in the forward area.

Considerable material was sent to provide entertainment and recreation for the forces in this operatioa.

Recreational centers and entertainment facilities were maintained in the Hawaiian area—at Kilauea Military Camp, a mountain resort; Maluhia, a Waikiki Beach center; Soldier's Beach on Windward Oahu, and the Willard Inn and Halekulani in Honolulu for officers and nurses. Major Maurice Evans, Shakespearean actor, guided the entertainment section producing stage shows and dramatic productions.

Training. Besides training our own personnel, many of whom have been supplied to combat and garrison forces in the successive operations, CPBC maintained staging areas and training facilities for numerous combat units, both Army and Marine. Much special training was given in regularly established schools. Outstanding among these was the Pacific Combat Training Center.

Closing out. A CPBC personnel center has been established, adjacent to docks and airfields, to speed the GI on his way. Here the same energetic team that gave him jungle and combat training on his way west has been reconverted to help him get his records and belongings in order and arrange his transportation eastward. They taught him to fight; now they are helping him to become a peaceful citizen again. By running shifts night and day, 1,000 men and women from all parts of the Pacific will be processed every 24 hours; and will receive accommodations and entertainment while they wait for transportation home.

Inspector General's Dept.

(*Continued from page* 112)

spectors general were under the immediate and direct control of the commander to whose staff they were assigned, and did not form an autonomous command under The Inspector General.

In the reorganization of the War Department, early in 1942, the Office of The Inspector General was placed in the War Department Special Staff, because it was realized The Inspector General could not perform his required duties on any other level. However, it was so arranged that The Inspector General would, upon request, act for any or all of the three major commands, *i.e.,* Army Ground, Air and Service Forces.

As the Army expanded to meet the needs of global warfare, so the Inspector General's Department had to expand to meet the demands of the War Department and to satisfy the requirements of each new command for an inspector general. This brought about an increase in the Department of from 60 officers in 1939 to 1438 officers early in 1945. Like many other staff organizations, The Inspector General experienced considerable difficult in obtaining officers with the required background and military experience needed to fulfill the duties of an inspector general. It was found necessary, therefore, to establish and conduct in the Office of The Inspector General, a short course or school term.

In order to keep abreast of the expanding business side of the Army, when service under the Selective Service Act was initiated in 1940, a new division was organized in the Office of The Inspector General, known as the Procurement and Construction Inspections Division. Officers in this organization were, of necessity, specialists, because they dealt almost exclusively with contracts and accounts in connection with the construction of military camps, and in the procurement of military supplies. Savings to the Government brought about as the result of corrective action taken upon the reports of inspections made by members of this division totaled many millions of dollars.

Soon after troops began moving from their training areas to ports of embarkation, and thence by ship to oversea theaters of operation, another group of officers became necessary as members of the Office of The Inspector General. This group was known as the POM Inspection Group, which, by direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff, inspected units prior to departure to ports of embarkation, to give assurance to the Chief of Staff that their organization and equipment met the necessary requirements of the theater for which they were destined.

No sooner had American troops landed overseas than individual complaints regarding treatment, conditions, pay, food, et cetera, began coming back through various channels to the War Department. Such complaints were not considered individually, but if a sufficient number indicated some fault in a standing policy or method of procedure for which the War Department was responsible, those matters had to be inquired into or investigated. To meet this new requirement, an Overseas Inspections Division was organized in the Office of The Inspector General, and its members were soon being dispatched to all parts of the world.

Also, with every major unit going overseas went an inspector general, to every far off land and corner of the earth. And from them soon came letters asking for information regarding the latest Army Regulations, Circulars, Bulletins and other instructions promulgated by the War Department, needed by those inspectors general to advise properly their commanders regarding procedures pertinent to their commands. To meet this need the Office of The Inspector General gathered together all new information and instructions issued, and each month printed a digest of them in an information pamphlet, copies of which were sent to every inspector general in the Army and to certain commanders.

During all this time the responsibilities of The Inspector General, as prescribed by law and regulations, were not only carried out within the Zone of Interior, but it soon was evidenced that many new duties had to be assumed in the interest of economy and efficiency. Also, appeals for assistance came from myriads of unexpected sources, and although many were without precedent, none was ever ignored or set aside without effort being made to rectify a wrong, adjust a discrepancy or improvise an expedient.

Established by General Washington in 1777, the Office of The Inspector General has been in continuous existence for over 160 years, and during that time its motto has always been DROIT ET AVANT. The high ideals implied by those words were well sustained and carried out wherever American troops were sent in World War II, and that was to the four corners of the earth.

Rolling Up the South Pacific

(*Continued from page* 105)

ties capable of repairing battle damage to the largest vessel afloat were moved out of the Area. Sufficient facilities have been retained to carry out Force Maintenance's present mission—routine upkeep of vessels assigned to COMSOPAC with the additional voluntarily-assumed chore of accomplishing strictly emergency repairs on vessels temporarily in the Area. Other repair facilities, besides those of Force Maintenance, are operated in civilian shipyards in Auckland, New Zealand, under cognizance of the U. S. Joint Purchasing Board.

Still growing, in contrast to this declining trend, was the U. S. Joint Purchasing Board in New Zealand, which procured more provisions and equipment during the past year than in any previous year. At the war's end, New Zealand was feeding about 500,000 personnel of the Armed Forces in the Pacific, and was providing some 90% of the fresh and frozen provisions for personnel of the South Pacific Force. Building and repair of ships was carried on in New Zealand, as was reconditioning of rolling stock and manufacture of certain items such as radio equipment and clothing. These services and materials were obtained under Reverse Lend-Lease.

Even before the Japanese capitulation, the process of rolling up the South Pacific Area and Force was well under way. The manner in which the job has been done to date is a tribute for all hands.

The National Guard

(*Continued from page* 114)

28th Inf Div (Keystone). France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany. Landed on Normandy beaches amid feverish preparations for the deep thrust from the beachhead. Stormed across three countries to penetrate the Siegfried Line into Germany and on a long, thin front in the Ardennes met the powerful German assault in December 1944, and held critical points in the line in spite of confusion all around it.

29th Inf Div (Blue and Gray). France, Holland, Germany. Landed on Normandy shores at H-Hour on D-Day in the face of the deadly cross-fire of German automatic weapons, mortar fire, and 88's set in the side of the cliff. In the capture of St. Lo, the attack on Brest, the path to the Roer, and sweep across the Cologne Plain, the 29th distinguished itself time after time in successive operations.

30th Inf Div (Old Hickory). France, Belgium, Holland, Germany. Came ashore in Normandy on 15 June 1944, spearheaded the St. Lo breakthrough and kept in the forefront of battle all the way onto Paris and into Germany. It was one of the first to enter Belgium and Holland. Relieved the 1st Division near Mortain and bore the brunt of the German assault in the attempt to split the American First and Third Army. Continued in combat to cross the Roer and the Rhine.

31st Inf Div (Dixie). New Guinea, Morotai, Philippines. The first combat action of the 31st Division in the Southwest Pacific occurred at Aitape in March 1944 where one regiment participating in the fighting along the Druinimor River killed more than 3000 of the enemy and played a major part in breaking the back of the by-passed Japanese Eighteenth Army. The Division continued in combat in the Wakde-Sarini area of New Guinea, initiated the attack on Morotai and later landed in the Philippines where they recaptured the former American air base at Valencia and captured Malaybalay, the last big enemy held city on Mindanao.

32nd Inf Div (Red Arrow). New Guinea, Morotai, Philippines. One of the first American divisions to land in Australia in May 1942, the 32nd remained in this area for a period of four months. They were ordered to New Guinea to defend Port Moresby, the first commitment of American infantry troops in offensive action against the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific area. The division endured countless hardships through grim fighting in the New Guinea campaign, completed in January 1943. The division's combat record at Milne Bay, Saidor, Morotai, Leyte, and Luzon is in accord with the finest traditions of a famous division.

33rd Inf Div (Prairie). New Guinea, Morotai, Philippines, Japan. Has fought under the Eighth and Sixth Armies during its combat career. The division took part in the New Guinea campaign driving the Japs from the Wakde-Sarmi area and jumped off for the second battle of Morotai. After completing operations on Morotai, the division moved to Luzon with the ultimate objective of liberating Baguio. For three months the Prairie division fought over the most rugged terrain on Luzon and during certain phases of the operation had the responsibility for a 65 mile front. The fight for Baguio was uphill all the way. The division remained in action against Jap elements on Luzon until the concluding phase of the Philippine campaign.

34th Inf Div (Red Bull). Tunisia, Italy. The first American division to be sent to the European Theatre of operations, the 34th spent more time in combat than any other division in Europe. Landing near Algiers in November 1942, the division remained in combat through the hardest fought campaigns of the war. Tunisia, Fondouk, Hill 609, Volturno, Mount Pantano, Cassino, Anzio, and Leghorn are familiar to this Division that represents only a part of a combat record which cannot have adequate description here. For the purpose of this article, the liberation of thousands of square miles of Italy must speak for itself.

35th Inf Div (Santa Fe). France, Luxembourg, Germany. Sailed from England 4 July 1944, and after completing the landing in France, drove the enemy back from LaMeauffe to take the key defense town of Chateau St. Gillis. Its next objective, the highground dominating St. Lo, was taken in a period of three days during which the enemy launched 12 counterattacks. Still streaking across France, the division crossed the Seine, Loire, Marne, and Meuse Rivers to capture Nancy. With the 26th Division, the 35th struck successfully to drive the Germans from Bastogne after which it became a part of the Ninth Army, remaining in combat to the Rhine and final crushing of the German Army.

36th Inf Div (Texas). Italy, Southern France, Germany, Austria. The story of the 36th during its twenty months of combat included hardships that have never before been exceeded by any troops anywhere. The long road to Rome, beginning with the fighting in Africa, and continuing via Salerno, Anzio, and Cassino was preliminary to the invasion of Southern France and the advance to the Rhine. The 36th broke the enemy resistance wherever met.

37th Inf Div (Buckeye). Munda, Bougainville, Philippines. The division sailed for the Southwest Pacific in May 1942. Elements of the 37th were attached to a Marine Raider battalion which landed in a sector of the New Georgia Islands and fought their way down the coast to rejoin the Division after the fall of Munda airfield. The division then relieved the Marines at Bougainville and in the subsequent fighting broke the back of the Jap Sixth Division, infamous for the rape of Nanking in 1940. The 37th accounted for some 8000 dead during the Jap attacks. Landing on the Philippines, the "Buckeyes" earned the name of "Liberators of Bilibid Prison." Participating in the capture of Manila, they moved into the hills of Luzon and continued to eliminate Japs until the conclusion of the war.

38th Inf Div (Cyclone). New Guinea, Philippines. The battle log of the division includes Leyte, Luzon, Corregidor, and Manila Bay. Spearheading the drive which annihilated Japanese forces on Bataan, the 38th is now known as the "Avenger of Bataan." It is most appropriate that a National Guard organization should be so called as it was there that the first National Guard unit met its severest action — the 200th Coast Artillery (AA) of New Mexico which was cited as "contributing in large measure to the successful defense of Bataan Peninsula" in 1942.

40th Inf Div (Sunburst). New Britain, Philippines, Korea. The 40th entering combat from Guadalcanal continued the offensive through the jungle of New Britain, initiated by the First Marine Division. The Division was among units chosen by General MacArthur to participate in the invasion of Luzon. In this campaign they were the first to reach Clark Field, captured Fort Stotsenberg and Camp O'Donnel, pushing the Japs into the Cabusian mountains. After 53 continuous days of combat in this general area, the division invaded Panay and with this mission accomplished crossed the Guimaras strait to invade Negros where its combat record terminated with the capture of Bacoled, capitol of Occidental Negros.

41st Inf Div. (Jungleers). New Guinea, Philippines, Netherlands, East Indies. From Papua to Zamboanga in the Philippines, the 41st has set a combat record which is among the foremost in the Pacific Theatre and has experienced jungle fighting at its worst. Among the highlights is a 1000 mile campaign through the New Guinea jungles, assault landing at Aitape, action at Hollandia, Wadke, and Biak where the division fought the first tank to tank battle of the Pacific War. From these campaigns they struck the Philippines with the invasion forces, and participated in the liberation of the Sulu Archipelago.

43rd Inf Div (Winged Victory). Russels, New Guinea, Solomons, Philippines, Japan. New England's 43rd takes place among the great fighting divisions of the United States forces. The division landed late in 1942 in New Zealand and in January 1943 started a record of hard fighting through four of the major campaigns of the Southwest Pacific—Guadalcanal, the Northern Solomons, New Guinea, and the Philippines. The historic operations, extending over a period of over two and one half years, established a record for the Division that might have been equalled but has not been exceeded.

44th Inf Div (New Jersey). France, Austria, Germany. The 44th first entered a combat area east of Luneville, France, and took part in the Seventh Army drive to secure the Vosges passes, and participated with the Second French Armored Division in the breakthrough. In subsequent action, the Division crossed the Saar River, withstanding six enemy counterattacks and eventually through persistent effort effected a penetration of two miles. By the end of the war it had occupied large areas of Germany and captured more than 44,000 prisoners.

45th Inf Div (Thunderbird). Sicily, Italy, Southern France, Germany. The 45th has an unusual history, unusual in that it has experienced four D-days—Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, and Southern France. The milestones, the winter line below Cassino, Rome, the Vosges mountains, Alsace, and Germany. Through 511 actual days of combat in the line, the Thunderbirds took everyone of its objectives, closing a brilliant record of achievement with the liberation of the prisoners of the notorious Dachau concentration camp.

A task force from the 45th Division, designated the 158th Regimental Combat Team, was dispatched to the Southwest Pacific where it covered itself with special distinction.

Americal Division. Guadalcanal, Bougainville, Philippines, Japan. This division was composed in part of regiments previously designated as separate task forces. The 132nd Infantry (Illinois), 182nd Infantry (Massachusetts), and the 164th Infantry (North Dakota) comprised the infantry arm of the division. While operation reports are incomplete, it is known that the division rendered distinguished service, many of its units receiving the Presidential citation for service with the First Marine Division.

Seasoned National Guard aviators were heavily drawn upon and taken from their units to spread their flying experience and mature judgment among the many hastily raised squadrons and installations of the Army Air Forces.

National Guard coast defense and antiaircraft units served as separate battalions and made phenomenal records in

(*Continued on next page*)

The National Guard

(*From Preceding Page*)

shooting down enemy planes in every theatre of war.

It is not possible to chronicle here the story of the deeds of valor, the courage and the unspectacular devotion to duty of National Guardsmen serving around the World. They have written new chapters to a story already famous in American military annals.

For the future, plans and policies of a new National Defense system have been prepared, predicated on some form of Universal Military Training.

War, as a present actuality, has passed but as a possibility it lingers in the minds of men. Now, in peace, the individuals and units of the National Guard are beginning to reorganize again so that this Nation will be prepared to defend its rights and liberties if another Tojo, another Mussolini, another Hitler, should ever arise again.

This is their service to the public.

Godspeed to America's civilian soldiers in years to come.

Navy-Industry Team

(*Continued from page* 118)

Cutbacks had already begun to make themselves felt. Some people left their war jobs because they wanted to make certain of establishing themselves in permanent, peace-time occupations. Some businessmen took their eyes off the war-production targets and began planning post-war activities. In many instances, it was not understood that cutbacks meant change of needs and not an overall reduction of requirements.

To top it off, MacArthur and Nimitz were making impressive headway in the Pacific.

But the facts of the war against Japan did not justify the optimism at home. Thus, with the last lap ahead, industry still faced its greatest challenge. Be it to the ever-lasting credit of American management and labor that they recognized and successfully met that challenge.

The role of the Navy's Incentive Division in helping that segment of industry producing for the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard to meet material requirements for the final Pacific push was one of convincing workers and management alike of the continuing need for certain items, and of impressing those concerned with manufacturing and processing these items with their direct responsibility for meeting schedules.

Among the major procurement programs in which the aid of the Incentive Division was requested were Escort Carriers, Electronics, Rockets, Cordage, Advance Base Gear, Spares for Hulls, Machinery, and Internal Combustion Engines, and Ship Repair.

Techniques, developed and proven through three years of stimulating Navy production, were intensified and specially geared to the particular problem involved.

It was felt undesirable to rely primarily on broad patriotic appeals. Instead, the attack was essentially educational. It was believed that to counter the optimistic trends it was necessary to inform workers about the nature of the war in the Pacific. Incentive activities in this informative area could be and were applied to all plants engaged in critical production.

In addition, individual campaigns were designed for major production programs.

Effects of the educational campaigns designed and executed by the Incentive Division were reflected in the production figures. Hundreds of reports from management testified to direct and specific results of incentive activity.

Such reports, as well as complimentary statements from within the Navy, will always be a source of satisfaction and pride to the small group of officers and enlisted men and women who constituted the Navy's Industrial Incentive Division. But they will be the first to state that their work could not have been accomplished without the full support of many other activities in the Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Corps.

In the final analysis it was industry—labor and management moving like a team with the Navy—that did the job. Employers and employees alike demonstrated that, if they had the information about what was needed and why, they would turn out the goods. This was democracy at work.

The ORC and ROTC

(*Continued from page* 114)

period. It is presently contemplated that approximately 25,000 Reserve officers will be on extended active duty at all times, in addition to their normal periods of active duty.

The post-war Army of the United States must lean heavily on the Organized Reserve Corps for its officer personnel. In addition to those needed for Reserve units and other Reserve assignments, the National Guard will draw from the Officers' Reserve Corps qualified officers to be appointed in the National Guard.

Therefore, it is obvious that the ROTC and the Officers' Reserve Corps are indispensable to the future Army of the United States. They constitute the keystone upon which the entire structure of the Army is built, and upon which the Nation must rely for its future national security.

Between World Wars I and II, Reserve officers not only sought to ready themselves for a national emergency, but a large portion of their number, through the Reserve Officers' Association, played an active part in keeping alive the ideal of adequate national defense, often in the face of general public apathy and even active hostility in some quarters.

From 1920 to 1930, nearly 50,000 of the World War I officers in the Organized Reserves were lost through attrition. Most of these men either became overage, physically disqualified, or for personal reasons did not desire to maintain their Reserve status.

To offset these losses and to maintain a steady flow of young officers into the Organized Reserves, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps will be expanded in the post-war years. The War Department early in October lifted its suspension of the Advanced Course, ROTC, in 129 colleges and universities and announced an "interim" ROTC program designed to produce Reserve officers until the permanent post-war ROTC can be placed in effect. The permanent program cannot be implemented until Congress determines the size and nature of the post-war Army.

The interim Advanced Course is designed particularly for World War II veterans who are entering, or re-entering college. Those with a minimum of one year's war service will be exempted from the 2-year ROTC Basic Course and those with a minimum of 6 months' experience will be exempted from the first year of the Basic training.

During the 2-year period covered by the Advanced Course, students will be paid a money allowance of approximately $370, based on the present daily cash value of the garrison ration, and an additional $70 to $75 pay for attendance at a 6 weeks' ROTC camp, which normally will come during the summer following completion of the first year of the Advanced Course.

Western Pacific

(*Continued from page* 104)

cific Area. This was more than two and one-half times the amount that had been received in the theater during the entire year of 1944. Since the first of March 1945, when the Port of Manila was opened, more than 483,000 troops have passed through this port alone.

To receive all these supplies and protect them until required by our invasion forces, Engineer units constructed or renovated some 17,000,000 square feet of covered storage space and made available an additional 83,000,000 square feet of open storage space. More than 1,300,000 cubic feet of refrigerated storage space were also provided to protect perishable stores.

Forty-three airfields were constructed by combat and service engineers with a total runway length of 41.68 miles and over 600 acres of hard stands, taxiways and aprons. More than one thousand miles of highway were reconstructed and maintained to keep supplies and replacements rolling. Staging areas for 600,000 combat troops were provided. Hospital construction made 36,140 beds available within the theater.

Thus, within the short space of a few months the Philippine Islands (and particularly Luzon) had been transformed into a sizeable storehouse of supplies to mount the final assault against the Japanese homeland.

Another important service of this great establishment was the activity of the Medical Corps.

It was a very great honor for the writer to be present in Tokyo Bay on 2 September when General of the Army Douglas MacArthur accepted the surrender of all Japanese Imperial land, sea and air forces, for the Allied governments aboard the United States Battleship Missouri. Another great highlight came with my return to the Philippines on 3 September to represent the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Army Forces Pacific at the surrender by General Tomoyuki Yamashita and Vice Admiral Denhichi Okochi of all Japanese armed forces in the Philippines. It was particularly fitting to have present at the Baguio surrender ceremony General Wainwright, our hero of Bataan, and Lt. General Percival of the British Army who had surrendered his greatly outnumbered Singapore garrison to General Yamashita in the early days of the war.

With the coming of peace to the Orient, although AFWESPAC's mission has changed, there still remains a great task to be accomplished. More than one million veterans must be assembled, screened and redeployed home and many thousands of liberated prisoners of war and internees must be speedily repatriated. And lastly, the millions of tons of U. S. supplies held in bases from Brisbane to Okinawa must be inventoried, protected and made ready for final disposition. When all these things have been accomplished, this great supply machine must be geared down to a peace time speed while still retaining the efficiency of war time tempo.

In conclusion, I desire to pay tribute and express my sincere gratitude to the thousands of Army Service Forces men and women who labored long and hard, thousands of miles away from home that the fighting man might move ever forward with the assurance that he would have "enough and on time."

Medical Care, Army

(*Continued from page* 115)

for warfare.

At every step he received expert attention, from the Battalion Aid Station, the Field or Evacuation Hospital, the General Hospital overseas and right on through to the General Hospitals in this country until the time he was ready for return to duty—or to civilian life.

Prompt, expert surgery was performed when necessary, plasma and whole blood were administered, penicillin and the sulfas were given—all the advances of medical science were expertly utilized to give each man every possible chance of survival.

The success of this plan of handling casualties is evidenced in the fact that almost 97 out of every hundred men who reached a hospital survived. This means about two and one-half times as many wounded men lived in this war who would have died in the last war.

They not only lived but they are in far better condition now than they would have been if they suffered similar injuries in the last war. Neuro-surgery, thoracic surgery, plastic surgery and other developments in techniques in this war have in a large degree saved World War II soldiers from scars and deformities that formerly would have been inevitable.

The over-all disease rate in this war has been less than one man per thousand per year. Nothing even remotely comparable to this has ever been achieved before. In the last war approximately nineteen men out of every thousand died from disease each year. During the Spanish-American War the figure was twenty-six in each thousand a year and in the Civil War sixty-five of every thousand men each year were fatalities because of disease.

Similar progress has been made in the care of the neuropsychiatric cases which are commonly known as combat fatigue or combat exhaustion. In the last war shell shock was the term used. The best of treatment has been used, including metrazol or electric shock, hypnosis sedation and group therapy but of just about equal importance has been the fact that the Army's psychiatrists in this war were organized to get to the men at the earliest possible moment. Frequently this meant that psychiatrists were performing their professional services within range of gun fire. As a result the great majority of these sufferers were returned to duty.

A new departure in this war has been the Army's Reconditioning Program which aims to complement the work of the doctor by giving patients physical, educational and pre-vocational training. Through this program the general health of the sick and wounded soldiers is improved as well as their mental attitude. Every effort is made to restore each man to the best possible mental and physical condition so that he can take his place as a self-respecting member of society when he leaves the Army.

With the war over the efforts of almost all the other arms and services engaged in this struggle are lessened. The Medical Department had a large part of its task ahead of it when VE-Day occurred. The thousands of sick and wounded in the European and Mediterranean Theaters had to be evacuated to this country. This task was performed in ninety days, except for the few non-transportable cases.

The disabled soldiers of the Pacific were brought back with the same dispatch following VJ-Day. Air transportation played a big part in this evacuation problem. At one time over 40,000 patients a month were being brought back to America.

With the sick and wounded back in this country the Army Medical Department still had a huge task ahead of it. At the peak there were well over 300,000 patients in the Army's General and Convalescent Hospitals in this country.

In addition to caring for these men the Army's doctors also have to give physical examinations to the hundreds of thousands of men who are being discharged.

Under the pressure of war there have been great advances made in medical science. During World War II medicine made gains that probably would have required a generation or more in peace time.

The American public can take comfort that the soldiers of this war received better care than any other Army in any war in history and they can also look forward to an additional bonus in the form of better medical and surgical treatment of civilians because of the strides that have been made by Army doctors during the war.

Naval Ordnance

(*Continued from page* 111)

ten times that number of fuzes were being produced every day. Research for the fuze was carried on in facilities operated by the Carnegie Institution of Washington and Johns Hopkins University.

Another weapon developed during this war was the electric torpedo, based on a German weapon fired from submarines, but leaving no tell-tale wake to announce its approach to enemy ships, nor the location of the submarine that fired it. A total of 3,200 electric torpedoes expended in action sank more than 300 Japanese ships and well over a million tons of shipping.

Tremendous advances were made in the development of automatic fire control devices which insured deadly and accurate fire by even the largest guns of the U. S. Navy. The devices, radar controlled, accurately determined the range for the big guns, so that plane pilots, spotting the hits made by the projectiles found them hitting with amazing precision.

Rockets, little known at the beginning of the war, were playing an extremely important role by the end of the war. Originally rockets were designed to provide protection during amphibious invasions, but ultimately they were serving a variety of needs. An imposing 300 missiles per minute could be fired from the newest rocket launching ships, completed, but not in action, before V-J Day.

In fighting the submarine menace in the Atlantic, rockets fired from planes played an important role. Aircraft rockets, developed for use against ships as well as land targets, proved successful during earlier phases of the war, and reached their highest peak in "Tiny Tim," a bomb-sized rocket, launched from regular wing racks, to blast the Japs first at Iwo Jima and again at Okinawa.

The Japanese were bottled up in their home islands by the tight blockade on shipping effected by Navy mines laid by Army B-29's. Mine warfare reached its highest point when the Army's Superforts parachuted the bomb-shaped underwater weapons into Japanese home waters by the thousands, cutting the Japanese off from much-needed supplies in established bases.

The terrific bombardment of the Japs in the Pacific meant getting thousands of tons of ammunition to remote island bases, and the setting up of a complicated system of ammunition depots that stretched around the world.

Production of these tremendous quantities of ammunition was the major ordnance job of the past year. By 1945, the ships of the Fleet were well equipped with guns and mounts. The greatest need was for ammunition. A monthly average of $29,210,411 went into ammunition in 1942, and this year when production reached its peak the Navy was turning out each month about $240,000,000 worth of ammunition.

As Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, I firmly believe a continuing program of technological and scientific research in ordnance to be essential for the peace and welfare of the nation.

The Navy's problem during this war in anti-aircraft defense provides one of the most expressive examples of the need for pre-war ordnance readiness. Appropriations were made in 1931 for the Farragut class destroyers, and the 5"/38 gun was designed for them. The best long-range anti-aircraft weapon in the Navy, the gun was available years before the nation needed it for actual hostilities. Before war broke out, it had already proved its potentialities, flaws had been eliminated, new techniques of fire control had been initiated, tooling facilities for its manufacture had been developed, and gun crews were trained, ready to go into action by the time the war began.

On the other hand, war had already begun in Europe before a gun for adequate close-in defense had been acquired. While the present 40mm and 20mm are the best close-in anti-aircraft guns in the world, they were deadline developments turned out in sufficient quantities just in time to check the enemy's air threat to the fleet.

Industrial Relations

(*Continued from page* 118)

In former years it often required one to three days to complete employment of an individual. This was too long, for the fleet needed its ships repaired, its ammunition delivered and its torpedoes readied immediately. This time was reduced to a few hours.

To help overcome the dire shortage of skilled workers, the Navy had established extensive training programs for its civilian forces. Many of these men were available at the time of our greatest need, early in the summer of 1945. More than 665,000 have received training of one kind or another.

In keeping with our fundamental objective of maintaining as many men as possible on jobs of the greatest urgency, a far flung safety program was given added stimulus. The Navy was recognized through several awards presented by the National Safety Council, but received its highest recognition in September, 1945 when it was given the Council's highest war time award for Distinguished Service to Safety.

As the headquarters organization for matters pertaining to civilian personnel administration in the Navy, one of our chief objectives was to bring to field officials a full understanding and knowledge of rules, regulations and policies of the Navy Department with respect to civilian employment. To clarify the mass of individual directives, circular letters and instructions from the Civil Service Commission and other federal agencies and amendments to our own directives, we issued what are known as Navy Civilian Personnel Instructions.

I would like to use this medium to again pay a sincere and grateful tribute, on behalf of the Navy, to all those thousands of loyal and patriotic Americans who served in the Industrial Navy. Their devotion to duty and spirit of self sacrifice forms a fine tradition that will live long in the hearts of men.

Civilian Science

(*Continued from page* 111)

have been brought into the war. One way would have been to recruit the scientists completely into the Naval and Military laboratories, as was done in England. This would have placed the administration of their work largely in the hands of the War and Navy Departments, subject to the usual government controls. It was wisely decided that the maximum flexibility, initiative, and administrative efficiency could not be achieved in this way. The arrangement adopted was the setting-up by executive order of the Office of Scientific Research and Development which had as its scientific and technical working body the National Defense Research Committee and the Committee on Medical Research.

Two organizations of a quasi-Government and emergency character in addition to the OSRD brought civilian scientists into war research, namely, the National Academy of Sciences with its operating body the National Research Council, and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.

It would be unfair to others to single out by name individual scientists who made important technical contributions to the improvement of old or the development of new weapons. There were thousands of such contributors. It is generally conceded that with respect to originality and individual resourcefulness the scientists in the Axis countries were as competent as our own, but that American science outdistanced the Axis powers in the superior administration of the overall effort thus making it possible for the available scientific manpower of the country to function with maximum effectiveness. The leaders of what may be broadly termed the civilian emergency scientific effort remained unchanged during the entire war period. These individuals deserve special mention among those who should be given the credit for the superb administrative efficiency which characterized the American conduct of the war in general. Dr. Vannevar Bush as the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development carried the overall administrative and technical responsibility for that organization. Under him Dr. James B. Conant as Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee; Dr. Alfred N. Richards as Chairman of the Committee on Medical Research; and Dr. Karl T. Compton as the head of the Office of Field Services administered the scientific and technical activities of the OSRD. Dr. Frank B. Jewett as the President of the National Academy of Sciences and of its working body the National Research Council; and Dr. Jerome C. Hunsaker as the Chairman of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics directed the activities of those organizations during that period.

The scientists and the laboratories of the Government Departments not normally concerned with war research also devoted most of their attention to such work during this period,—the Bureau of Standards and the Department of Agriculture making particularly vlauable contributions. In order to integrate fully all of the potentialities of these organizations with the Navy's own research and development work and with the Navy's needs required the adoption of an appropriate policy and the setting up of a mechanism to carry out the policy. The late Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy at the time, took an important step in July, 1941 to bring this about. He established in the Navy Department, an office for the coordination of research and development with the idea underlying that the relation of the Navy Department to these organizations would be cooperational rather than authoritarian. In carrying out this policy the primary mission of the Coordinator of Research and Development was to assist the emergency civilian organizations to work effectively with the Navy and to keep constantly before the Navy the capabilities of these organizations for solving the Navy's problems so as to extend their usefulness to the Navy.

To provide the mechanism of coordination and assistance a small, highly competent staff consisting mostly of Reserve Officers drawn from the ranks of scientists was built up in the office of the Coordinator whose principal duties consisted of bringing the scientists and the Navy together at all necessary levels. Liaison officers were in addition appointed for each research project, whose primary function it was to keep the users point of view constantly before the laboratory during all stages of development and at the trials of new equipment. These liaison officers were selected by the cognizant bureaus in most cases, or by the operating forces for their practical knowledge of the conditions to be met. They were frequently the officers who had taken part in the earliest informal discussions leading up to a research project. The general idea underlying this procedure was that development of a new weapon or device must be handled by a team consisting of the user, the scientist, the engineer-designer, the producing plant and the inspector. The importance of the part which each step plays depends on the complexity and nature of the equipment and varies with the stage of the development reached. The function of the Coordinator's office and of his staff was essentially one of keeping all the activities involved in step and speeded up by removing obstructions as they occurred until the equipment was actually in production.

Research and development on the part of the Navy itself also expanded very greatly during this period. It was carried on principally at the Naval Research Laboratory, the Naval Ordnance Laboratory, the David W. Taylor Model Basin, the Boiler and Turbin Laboratory, the Engineering Experiment Station, the Radio and Sound Laboratory, the Naval Air Materiel Center and by contract with many academic and industrial laboratories.

Great as were their technical and material contributions, the scientists contributed more and more as time went on to operational research, to strategical and tactical evaluation and to participation in the broader war policy deliberations. The realization is growing that the scientist must be admitted to full time and fully-trusted partnership in planning for the National defense in the future, and in the actual making of war if, unfortunately, we should again be faced with such a catastrophe.

It is difficult to measure quantitatively the part that science played in winning the war. Money expenditures and personnel employed provide some measure, but are at best unsatisfactory, because they do not take into account the high average ability and versatility of scientists. Expenditures for research and development devoted to the war effort will exceed two billion dollars, exclusive of the expenditures on the atomic bomb which will amount to another two billion dollars. In respect to personnel, the best approximation that can be made indicates that at the peak in 1944 about 60,000 research workers were employed on war work in addition to those on the atomic bomb program. Only about one-third of that number were scientists in the strict sense of the word,—the remainder were supporting personnel such as technicists, mechanics, etc. It is estimated that this was about 200 times as many as were engaged on such work during World War I. The trend is significant for the future.

The prediction was often made in the years just before the war that the totalitarian countries would have a great advantage over the democracies in turning science into the channels of war because of their ability to regiment immediately and effectively for this purpose all available scientific manpower and laboratory facilities. A very complete study has been made since the close of the war of the policies and procedures followed and the results achieved in this respect by Germany, Japan and Italy. These investigations reveal that in none of these countries was the handling of the scientific effort in any way as effective as it was in the United States. Proof of this is the fact that the Axis powers lagged behind the United States in practically every field of new developments. That this was the case is a tribute to the responsiveness of our form of government to meeting war emergencies, to the administrative genius as well as the technical competence of American scientists, and to the appreciation by responsible officers in the Army and the Navy that cooperational rather than authoritarian procedures insure the most original, the quickest, and the most effective results in bringing civilian science into a war effort.

Medical Care, Navy

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with all its wounded, gave us a preview of what was to come in the horrors of this war. It was not until the urgency of war that we developed life-saving methods by the use of blood substitutes.

Evacuation of wounded from Okinawa was conducted on a greater scale than in any previous campaign. During the 82-day period beginning with L-Day on 1 April and ending on 21 June, when Okinawa was declared secure, 30,000 patients were taken out by hospital ship and airplane. Approximately 1,000 others were evacuated by attack transports and other auxiliary ships. By L-plus-1-Day, four hospital ships were at the target area. Starting on L-plus-3-Day, 26 evacuation trips between Okinawa and the Marianas were made by nine hospital ships at semiweekly intervals. In all 15,000 patients were moved out by hospital ship. Especially equipped LST's executed extensive operative procedures and definitive treatment as casualty evacuation control ships. It was at Okinawa that, for the first time, evacuation of casualties by air attained the magnitude of evacuation by sea. Between 8 April and 21 June, 15,000 patients were flown to rear areas, a figure comparable with that handled by hospital ships. By contrast only 15% of the Iwo Jima casualties were evacuated by plane.

Doctors and hospital corpsmen themselves were among the wounded who reaped the benefits of logistics planning, new drugs and fast transport. The percentage of casualties among Medical Department personnel was extremely high in some amphibious operations. In the

Today, as the guns are silenced and thoughts are turned to peacetime pursuits, the Medical Department of the Navy prosecutes with undiminished energy its dual objective: Protection of the health of active duty personnel and rehabilitation of the wounded and sick.

The NACA

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For many years a systematic study of families of airfoils has been conducted at Langley Field and the work is unending. Hundreds of airfoil shapes have been studied and the aerodynamic data on each have been tabulated for designers' information. Reference to these data enables an aeronautical engineer to select airfoils which best meet the requirements to which he is designing.

New types of airfoils have evolved from continuing studies of air flow. For example, the NACA low-drag high-speed wing, such as used on the North American P-51 "Mustang," played a vital, even critical, role in the European war. The P-51, as a long-range escort fighter, enabled our heavy bombers to keep up the aerial penetration of Germany without prohibitive losses, thus achieving the collapse of German sources of vital supply.

While aircraft have not reached the speed of sound in level flight, fighter aircraft have been approaching it in dives. They have encountered control difficulties associated with the radical change in air flow which occurs at such speeds, involving the formation of shock waves in the air and flow separation. Practical solutions to this problem were arrived at on the basis of knowledge gathered by investigations in the high-speed wind tunnels at the Langley and Ames (Moffett Field) Laboratories. As a result, fighter pilots were able to extend the emergency speed and maneuverability limits of their aircraft to the maximum permitted by human physiology.

Systematic studies have taken stability and control out of the realm of guesswork and given an engineering basis for positive prediction. Knowledge of the nature of air flow has contributed largely to this achievement by the determination of aerodynamic coefficients for use in the mathematical determination of the response of an airplane in flight to variations in the aerodynamic forces on its structure.

Power Plant Research

The third division of NACA research activities lies in the field of aircraft propulsion; beginning with the source of energy, the fuel, and carrying through to the ultimate in propulsion systems and their performance as an integral part of the airplane.

At the beginning of the war this country was faced with the problem of producing sufficient quantities of high-octane gasoline to power the largest fleet of military airplanes in the world operating over unprecedented distances. In addition, we had the problem of improving the knock-rating of fuels for the condition of lean-mixture operation which was prerequisite to long-range flight. A third problem was the matter of selecting the fuel constituents which would result in gasoline of the desired performance; which would permit maximum quantity production; and which could be properly balanced out with the production requirements for other products using the same or similar constituents, for example, synthetic rubber. Responsibility for these vital decisions, which in effect were to determine whether or not we *could operate* our machines, rested with the NACA Fuels and Lubricants Subcommittee, whose Chairman was Dr. Walter G. Whitman of M.I.T. and the War Production Board.

At the aircraft propulsion laboratory of the NACA, located in Cleveland is the Altitude Wind Tunnel, which is the country's most important power-plant research tool. Large enough to accommodate a complete power-plant installation, including propeller and nacelles, the tunnel is equipped to reproduce atmospheric conditions corresponding to a 30,000 foot altitude at airspeeds up to 500 miles per hour. With this equipment it has been possible quickly to investigate engine installations under a wide range of operating conditions. Data from the Altitude Wind Tunnel contributed largely to the correction of engine cooling difficulties encountered in large bomber operations and have been helpful in establishing criteria for the efficient wedding of engines and propellers to particular airframes. To obtain the necessary information and to verify the effect of corrective measures by flight testing would have involved long delays and serious risk to planes and crews.

While jet-propulsion aircraft were not used in combat by the United States during the war, great progress was made in their development, and it is safe to say that the Air Forces would have been ready with superior jet equipment had the need for it become critical.

Flight Testing

The ultimate proving medium for aeronautical research is actual flight. To this end flight research groups are active at all three of the NACA laboratories. NACA pilots contributed notably to the military program by investigating the handling qualities and performance of numerous military airplanes. As accomplished engineers and pilots they were able not only to analyze defects, but to propose and verify solutions.

New Flight Era

It is natural that at all times the NACA constitutes an important part of the defense structure of this nation. In time of peace the NACA is engaged in research on the fundamental problems of flight. It is on the results of this research that our air power is constructed. By direction of the President, in time of war the NACA becomes a research agency for the armed forces. As such it applies itself to the immediate military problem at hand.

In resuming its task of basic research the NACA faces an enormous assignment both as to scope and as to urgency. New propulsive systems have opened up extraordinary high-speed possibilities. During the past thirty years we have spanned the sonic range of speeds and we now stand on the threshhold of flight through the transonic barrier and ultimately we must fly at supersonic speeds.

In effect we stand, with respect to these new regions of flight, about where we stood when the Wright Brothers made history at Kitty Hawk. The fundamental difference, however, is that the significance and implications of flight achievement are now fully appreciated throughout a competitive world. We are not alone in our desire for knowledge to apply to the swift and sure transport of men and things throughout the world. Today, the United States enjoys undisputed leadership in aeronautical science and in air power. Only by sustained research and vigorous application of its results can this leadership be maintained.

Science in Democracy

(*Continued from page* 109)

effect of the two atomic bombs was not on the two Japanese cities which they destroyed, but on the human mind. As science reconverts to peace, the evidence of all this will become clear. War was a potent force in the crucible of Destiny.

In war, we used science to defend democracy, to defeat its enemies, and to destroy their false philosophies. In peace, democracy must advance the use of science for a better life and make its benefits available to all.

Research and the War

(*Continued from page* 110)

before us. Obviously, any advance made during war in ways to preserve life or to make life easier and safer carries over into peace with undiminished value. And from peacetime applications of radar and other technical devices many advantages will derive. Though the full development cannot soon be expected, the control of atomic energy to which wartime needs hurried us can be looked to ultimately as a vast source of power to speed and simplify the work of a world at peace.

We can carry over from our wartime experience with research into the coming years, however, something of even greater lasting significance. Research as it serves in time of war sees its results carried to fulfillment and use with far greater speed than is true in times of peace. This is a natural consequence of a war emergency. But it is brought about by a spirit and method that can exist in peace as well as in war. For positive accomplishment, research into knowledge, embodiment of the results, and skilled use of the embodiment are the three essentials. No one of these can be well done in isolation. Each prospers as it is done in close relation with the others. Our nation in the war years just past set a new high in unselfish co-operation among scientists and engineers, industrial management and labor, and the military forces. It was the wholehearted teamwork of the three groups pulling together that made the great achievement possible. We shall need more of that spirit in time to come; it can prevail without the spur of emergency, if we try to have it do so.

I know something at first hand of the organization of the efforts of the scientific members of that team. Among American and British scientists operated the singleness of purpose that on the larger scale characterized the threefold effort. Researchers are necessarily individualists, for research is in a very strong sense pioneering. But individualists are the best teamworkers in the world when a great cause demands the merging of endeavors and the temporary subordination of special concerns. In times of peace, fortunately, we can dispense with rigid organization. It is important that we do so in the world of science, for during the war our efforts were centered on applied science—on research aimed at developing specialized applications of fundamental knowledge—so that we drew heavily on our stock of fundamental science and did not replenish it. Building that stock up again is the first requirement before us now, and it will be best met by independent pioneering research untrammeled by emergency organization. As the co-operative spirit of the war years is carried over into the resumption of pioneering research, however, science will benefit.

The integration of our research effort with the effort of industry and the effort of the military demonstrated again and more forcefully than ever that the most effective way to fight a war is under the temporary rigid controls which a continuing democracy voluntarily imposes upon itself as it girds itself for combat. Other things being equal, such a regime can outclass any despotism in bringing to bear on the struggle the combined efforts of science, industry, and military might. For closely analogous reasons, the free spirit which democracy engenders can, if it wills, collaborate in mastering the problems of peace with greater speed and skill than any other philosophy of government attains.

Pacific Spearhead

(*Continued from page* 107)

enemy airpower in the vast areas under assault, made it possible first to seize and then to develop such bases as Guam, Tinian, Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

7. *The Halting of the Japanese Offensive Southward Against Australia.* At the Battle of the Coral Sea, our carrier supremacy was responsible for frustrating the supreme Japanese attempt at expansion southward against Australia.

8. *The Halting of the Major Japanese Invasion Threat Westward Against the United States.* At the Battle of Midway, our carrier supremacy wrote failure across the supreme Japanese effort to push westward to the Hawaiian Islands and, beyond them, the West Coast.

The closing invasions of the war, at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, demonstrated more clearly than ever the unique role played by Naval Aviation in the Pacific. For the invasion of Okinawa, for example, the Fast Carrier Task Force sailed against Kyushu to destroy the Kamikaze nests there. The effort succeeded to the extent that it was 6 April 1945, before the enemy could make a large-scale air effort against our Okinawa operations, and by that date troops and huge quantities of basic supplies were already ashore.

Also at Okinawa, the support carriers, with their floating tactical air force, stayed constantly at work for more than two months to give the troops air support, and the Fast Carriers, launching platforms for a large air force, raised a shield between the enemy and Okinawa.

The effect of the qualitative superiority of Naval Aviation over the enemy was shown in the first quarter of 1945 when our carrier planes destroyed 2,800 enemy aircraft for a loss to us of 300. In the war as a whole, Naval Aviation accounted for more than 17,000 Jap planes while losing 2,700. Those figures are an indication of how Naval Aviation, operating as an integral part of the United States Navy, proved to be a decisive factor in the war against Japan.

The Atomic Bomb

(*Continued from page* 106)

Admiral Nimitz gave complete aid and cooperation in carrying out the Atomic Bomb operations against the enemy. He made available the Cruiser, Indianapolis, to provide safe and rapid transportation of the vital materials of the Hiroshima bomb from our West Coast to the Marianas. It is deeply regretted by all of us that only a few days thereafter that great ship fell victim to an enemy submarine attack with a heavy loss to the crew. Our people painted in bold letters on the Hiroshima bomb, the words—"In Memory of the Men of the Indianapolis."

General Eisenhower rendered aid of incalculable value on the several occasions when we asked for help. His Communication Zone maintained and administered our special intelligence group and gave them everything required to carry out their work. In particular, his intelligence officers were of the greatest assistance in securing the essential information about the enemy's activities.

The Air Forces were major contributors to the success of the Atomic Bomb project. General Arnold, early in the development, directed the Air Forces to provide complete coordination with the project and all needed personnel and equipment. Not only were the necessary aircraft made ready for the job of carrying the bomb, but a specially selected group was organized and highly trained for the difficult assignment of delivering the bombs.

In the theatre, General Spaatz, General LeMay and other Air Force Commanders gave the project the full benefit of their great knowledge, skill and experience. It had the same priority there that it had in the United States. The success of the two attacks gave ample proof of the fine performance of the Air Forces.

The Atomic Bomb did not win the war. It brought an unexpected end to a war already won by the combined efforts of the American people. Ending the war without an invasion saved the lives of tens of thousands of Americans.

The Aatomic Bomb was developed, manufactured and delivered by cooperation. We call it American Teamwork.

Cooperation on a world basis — of the kind and extent which made the bomb possible offers the solution to the problem of how to use the new force of atomic energy for the welfare and not for the destruction of mankind. It is going to take wisdom, patience, understanding and hard work from our leaders and our people and the leaders and peoples of the world to evolve that cooperation between them which will insure world peace, now and for generations to come.

Forward Areas

(*Continued from page* 105)

Commander Task Force 94 was not confined in his duties to the activities of one service, and personnel attached to various levels of the command were drawn from all branches of our Armed Forces. As a result, the successes and effectiveness of Task Force 94 were in large measure due to the coordination and cooperation of the Marine, Army and Navy units and personnel involved. The immediate supervision and control of each of the islands was vested in Island or Atoll Commanders who were drawn from each of the services. At the cessation of hostilities Iwo Jima and Tinian were under the command of Army Generals, Guam and Peleliu were under Marine Corps Generals, and Ulithi and Saipan were under Naval Officers. Such matters as ground, air and sea defense, construction, transportation and supply on every island involved the use of personnel from at least two of the services.

A tremendous amount of construction was required before the islands captured from the Japanese could be used effectively for further offensives. More than 500 miles of roads had to be built, much of this construction carrying a high priority. 17 airfields, containing 32 airstrips, were built. Here it was possible to utilize Japanese airfields in only a very few cases. Facilities were developed for storing 46 million gallons of aviation gasoline, and 600,000 barrels of fuel oil, in addition to large quantities of ammunition for air and surface craft. Housing, water supply and many other necessities had to be provided for hundreds of thousands of men. Hospitals with an aggregate of more than 26,000 beds were built and equipped.

Aircraft and surface craft were assigned to the operational control of this command for local defense, escort of shipping, air transportation, air-sea rescue, and offensive air-surface anti-submarine action.

Air-sea rescue, a responsibility of this command, affords one of the best examples of cooperative action among independent units. While the concern of the Air-Sea Rescue Unit of this command was area-wide, its greatest efforts were directed to ditched airmen raiding the Empire. For these raids a detailed system was developed involving the close cooperation of the XXI Bomber Command, the Strategic Air Forces, the 7th Fighter Command, and Commander Submarines, U. S. Pacific Fleet, together with the air and surface craft at the disposal of the Air-Sea Rescue Unit. The success of this system is revealed by the fact that from December 1944 to the end of July, 1945, out of 248 incidents involving 1233 airmen, 863 were saved. These figures make no allowance for the number of airmen who may have been lost through drowning or injury at the time of ditching.

My final war-time act was the preparation of plans and general supervision of the surrender of Japanese forces in the Marianas Area. The formal surrender at Marcus, Babelthuap, Chichi Jima, Pagan and Rota was accepted by Rear Adm. F. E. M. Whiting, USN, Brig. Gen. F. O. Rogers, USMC, Commo. J. H. Magruder, USN, Commo. V. F. Grant, USN-Ret., and Col. H. N. Stent, USMC, respectively. The surrender of Japanese forces at Truk was accepted by me on 2 Sept. 1945.

(The statements in the above article in no way represent the official opinion of the Navy Department.)

The Merchant Marine

(*Continued from page* 108)

When the productivity of the Liberty program and the decreased number of ship sinkings gave us a highly favorable balance of tonnage that replaced all the losses of the United Nations by the end of 1943, the Commission curtailed the emergency program and turned most of its facilities to the building of faster ships—though it required more time to build them. These were vessels, however, that not only would be more serviceable for war purposes, but for long-range commercial considerations as well. The Victory ship—the modern, fast vessel adaptable to rapid assembly methods that evolved from the Liberty program—came into production in 1944. Many of these, along with C-types, came to be military vessels, and when the third phase of our wartime Merchant Marine ended with capitulation of Japan, production of special vessels for specialized warfare in the Pacific was one of the Commission's special concerns.

A Merchant Marine is a long ways from being just a collection of ships. There must be men to sail them. And so far as I am concerned, the merchant seamen who took everything a ruthless enemy could throw at them cannot receive enough glory. Theirs was a magnificent job, performed courageously under the direction of more than 100 American shipping companies that were under the wartime control of the War Shipping Administration.

WSA is a war agency. Upon it fell responsibility for operation of every seagoing vessel under the American flag, and our maritime cooperation with other nations.

When hostilities ended, there were well over 4,000 vessels under WSA control. For the Merchant Marine, however, the task was far from completed. There were troops to be rotated or brought home, occupation forces to be supplied, shipments to go to liberated peoples and materials for the physical rebuilding of battle-scarred countries.

In September, the merchant fleet was busy in these tasks, and entering the transition period from war to peace. No longer was the prime requisite the physical stamina and courage to persist despite a dangerous enemy. In place of these were arising the problems of international maritime adjustments that will require the same high degree of mental courage, which problems the shipping industry can face with the knowledge that the country honors it for a job well done.

ASCOMO

(*Continued from page* 101)

Following the departure of the previous commander there was a short period of uncertainty with many changes in personnel. However, the remaining officers and soldiers were of superior caliber so that it was only a matter of a few weeks before a sound organization was evolved for handling the many changing problems. At this time the extent of SOPACBACOM's task was measured by the logistical support of approximately a half million men—Army and Navy—and the planning for rehabilitation of eleven divisions distributed over the North Solomons, Espiritu Santo, Efate, Fiji, New Zealand, and New Caledonia with headquarters at Noumea, New Caledonia. The defense of all the South Pacific islands also was assigned to SOPACBACOM.

Many of the plans prepared by SOPACBACOM failed to eventuate because of the unexpected rapidity of advance of the fighting line, which by the end of 1944 had, to all intents and purposes, passed beyond the extreme limits of the South Pacific. As early as March 1945 it was easy to foresee that in another month or two the work of SOPACBACOM would be reduced to routine supervisory direction of not more than three island commands, the principal one being New Caledonia. It seemed logical to eliminate a headquarters that was not fully and gainfully occupied so appropriate recommendations were made to Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Area which would accomplish that end. This solution was concurred in by Commanding General, POA.

The overall Pacific war also had taken on new aspects by the spring of 1945. Practically all the Philippine Islands were again under United States control, Okinawa was about to yield and our bombers were taking a heavy toll of Japanese installations wherever they could be reached. Obviously the time had arrived for a single Army Commander in the Pacific to plan for and execute the invasion of the Japanese home islands and the appointment of the supreme commander was announced with the coming of spring.

The experienced SOPACBACOM headquarters, being no longer essential to the operations in the South Pacific and the need for such a headquarters to plan for the logistical support of the invasion of Japan, resulted in issuance of orders on 13 May 1945 directing the transfer of SOPACBACOM to Manila. The advanced echelon reached Manila on 18 May and shortly thereafter the entire headquarters was redesignated as ASCOMO. Another month witnessed the complete transfer of this large headquarters as a single unit to the Philippine Islands.

The problems of ASCOMO seemed well on the way to solution when the collapse and subsequent surrender of Japan brought all plans to a standstill. However, the immediate need for revamping plans to take care of the occupation of Japan in support of the Sixth Army threw a new load upon all elements of ASCOMO. Eventually it developed that no major changes in organization were necessary. Only the places of landing and establishment of supply bases had to be redesignated. The organization still consisted of an overall headquarters with three operating base headquarters. Plans were revised to meet the new situation presented by our unopposed entry into Japan. By 14 September 1945 Headquarters, ASCOMO and the three base headquarters to operate at Kure, Kobe and Nagoya had reached approximately fifty per cent of their authorized strength. On that date the advanced echelon of Headquarters and Kobe Base went aboard ship in Manila headed for Wakayama, western Honshu. This point was selected by superior authority for reason that the Kobe harbor was not clear of mines and a temporary base had to bet set up at once. These units reached their destination on 25 September and began debarking.

Support for USMC

(*Continued from page* 101)

With the establishment of the First Marine Amphibious Corps in New Caledonia, the initial steps in organizing a Service Command were inaugurated in May 1943 with the activitation of Headquarters, Supply Service, First Marine Amphibious Corps. Under its cognizance were brought those Marine Corps supply agencies which were then located in New Caledonia, Wellington, and Auckland, New Zealand. Later the same year the Fourth Service Depot was organized and established in the Russell Islands preparatory to the New Georgia and Bougainville campaigns.

In order to provide immediate logistic support to the assault team committed to the Bougainville operation, a service regiment of very modest proportions was organized from within the Fourth Service Depot to support the 3rd Marine Division during its campaign. This was the initial effort within the Fleet Marine Force to give direct logistic support to a major unit in combat, and it formed the basis for the present service regiment of the Service Command, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Except for the Tarawa operation in late November, 1943 in which the 2nd Marine Division was solely responsible for its own logistic support, no major element of the Fleet Marine Force was again committed without an attached service element to provide logistic assistance.

With the activation of the V Amphibious Corps at Pearl Harbor (operating with the Fifth Fleet) in September 1943, heralding the concentration of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific in the Central Pacific campaign, a logistic agency paralleling that previously set up within the First Marine Amphibious Corps was organized.

In the summer of 1944 the First Marine Amphibious Corps was converted to the III Amphibious Corps (operating with the Third Fleet) and came under the wing of the newly established Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific whose headquarters were at Pearl Harbor. Concurrently, Headquarters, Service Command, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific was established at Camp Catlin, Oahu. Headquarters, Supply Service, III and V Amphibious Corps were abolished and for the first time all of the Marine Corps service elements in the Pacific Ocean Areas were brought under one centralized head.

As of 15 September 1945 the Service Command, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific consisted of the following major elements: The Sixth Service Depot and the Fifth Service Depot, primary distributing and repair depots for the Hawaiian and Marianas areas respectively; the Seventh and Eighth Service Regiments, mobile field organizations attached to and rendering direct support in combat to the III and V Amphibious Corps; and the 11th Service Battalion (Saipan), 12th Service Battalion (Okinawa), 17th Service Battalion (Hawaii), and the 18th Service Battalion (Maui). The service battalions were designed and organized as secondary supply depots each capable of rendering logistic support to a Marine division during its rehabilitation phase. To each of these major elements are attached such depot companies, ammunition companies, repair units, etc., as are necessary to permit them to perform their proper functions.

The end of the war found the Service Command still in a development stage. Many of the services contemplated have never been brought to full realization. Throughout the entire war its personnel has never been brought to its authorized strength due to the paramount requirement of replacing battle casualties in combatant units. At no time has the Service Command exceeded 12% of the Fleet Marine Force, and its present authorized strength of 15% places an almost superhuman task on its personnel. In spite of the handicaps with which it has been confronted, the Service Command, Fleet Marine Force has rendered adequate support to the combatant units and the importance and the necessity for the services which it renders in the conduct of amphibious operations are now fully and keenly realized by those with whom it has come in contact.

The XI Corps

(*Continued from page* 97)

on the South Dock Beach of Corregidor. The attack was made as planned and with the help of perfectly coordinated air and naval support, was highly successful. The conquest of Corregidor was brought to a successful close on the 28th of February after bitter, desperate, hand to hand fighting with more than 6,000 Nips counted dead, and many more uncounted sealed in tunnels and caves.

The assault and capture of Caballo, El Fraille (Ft. Drum) and Carabao Islands were next accomplished and Manila Bay was again in proper hands.

Once the Zig Zag Pass was cleared, Subic Bay opened, and the mouth of Manila Bay freed for the passage of Allied shipping, the Corps' initial objectives had been accomplished. In the meantime troops of the XIV Corps had moved south and were fighting in the City of Manila proper; that Corps had found it necessary however, to bypass the Ft. Stotsenberg area and leave the 40th Infantry Division to contain thousands of enemy troops in that area while the capture of Manila and Santo Tomas were assured.

Beginning 21 February 1945 several changes in boundaries and units were made and eventually the Corps found itself responsible for the all of Luzon south of an east and west line through Tarlac. The principal resistance was centered in the foothills of the Zambales Mountains west of Fort Stotsenberg; and in Antipolo-Montalban-Ipo Dam area east and northeast of Manila. The fighting was bitter in both areas, but by the end of June both were practically cleared. Troops of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 6th, 38th, 40th, 43d Infantry Divisions, the 112th and 158th RCT's and the 145th Infantry all served in the Corps for varying lengths of time and to them belongs the credit for the killing of more than 60,000 counted Japs, in most difficult terrain and against fanatical resistance.

The Corps was relieved of combat responsibility on 30 June in preparation for the invasion of Kyushu. The surrender however, changed the plans and the Corps was selected for the honor of leading the amphibious landing on the home islands of Japan. It landed at Yokohama on 2 September, and now occupies the Tokyo-Yokohama-Kanto Plain area with the 1st Cavalry Division, the 43d and Americal Infantry Divisions and the 112th Cavalry RCT.

North Pacific Force

(*Continued from page* 100)

In this same period Army and Navy medium and heavy bombers flew over two hundred combat missions against the Kuriles in addition to many reconnaissance and photographic flights. These flights involved flying 1500 to 2000 miles over open water in what is considered to be the worst flying conditions in the world. One of the most successful missions was a masthead attack by Army Mitchells on enemy shipping in Kashiwabara and Kataoka Wan on 10 May when direct hits were made on at least six ships. Added to the shipping losses and the damage and destruction to ground installations and aircraft was the virtual elimination of the fishing industries in the Kuriles.

These operations made it ever more difficult for the Japanese to maintain and supply their many installations in the Northern and Central Kuriles.

The possibility that Russia might enter the war against Japan made it necessary that we be prepared to assist in the defense of outlying Russian bases and secure safe convoy routes to the Maritime Provinces. The forces of the North Pacific were augmented by the addition of several destroyers, cruisers and small aircraft carriers. The latter arrived just at the conclusion of hostilities and the destructive power of carrier based planes was never visited on the enemy installations in the Kuriles.

A fitting conclusion to the long and difficult operations against the northern bases of the enemy occurred early in September when over sixty vessels of the North Pacific Force entered Mutsu Wan in Northern Honshu and occupied the Ominato Naval Base. On 9 September 1945, Senior Japanese Naval, Army and Civil authorities came on board the USS Panamint, flagship of Commander North Pacific Force, and received the terms of the Emergency Naval Occupation of Northern Honshu and Hokkaido.

Alaskan Department

(*Continued from page* 100)

a foothold, and had entirely lost the initiative in the North Pacific.

By November, 1944, we had established strong bases at Adak, Amchitka, Shemya, and Attu, by dint of shipping and construction feats which reflected the highest credit on the Army Transport Service and the Engineers. Both labored under the twin handicaps of extended supply lines—and the "world's worst weather." From October 1943 to October 1944, inclusive, 1,949,138 tons of cargo reached the Alaskan Department. The Engineers had, in the space of a year, transformed the bleak, once uninhabited islands into major bases.

As soon as the Battle of the Aleutians had been definitely won in its active phase, the Navy's surface units and air wing with Army Air Forces immediately carried the war to the Japanese defenses and installations in the Kuriles. Almost daily the enemy was subjected to strikes by bombers of the Eleventh Air Force and the Naval Air Wing.

Our position strengthened, our offensive was stepped up during 1944. Throughout the remaining months of the war, therefore, the North Pacific Task Force, under the command of Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher; his air wing, and the Eleventh Air Force were able to exert twofold pressure upon the Japanese —constant naval and air strikes and an ever-present threat of invasion from this quarter.

Offensive action, it is true, was confined to Air Force, Naval Air and Naval Surface units after 1943. But the Ground Forces played an equally important role. They were required to maintain their tactical training at the peak of efficiency, preparing constantly to repel any attempted invasion by the Japanese or to take the field in offensive action should an invasion be staged through the Department. While engaged in training and never-ending improvement of defensive positions in the generally fog-ridden islands, their sense of isolation was increased by the fact that military security made it necessary to deny all personnel that freedom of communication with the outside world that was enjoyed in some other theaters.

It is not believed that the Japanese were ever accurately aware how comparatively few troops garrisoned the Alaskan Department. The success of our campaign of readiness and threat is eloquently attested by the fact that Radio Tokyo frequently referred to the "strong forces in the North Pacific against which we shall defend ourselves bravely." And in maintaining their "brave defenses" they diverted aircraft, shipping, troops and materiel to their Kurile installations. These, if used in other theaters, would have resulted in the loss of many more American lives.

Third Amphibious Corps

(*Continued from page* 92)

way as to make his defense as costly as possible to us. Enemy artillery was met here in force never before encountered. Most particularly the enemy use of caves, both natural and man-made, while typical of Japanese defensive tactics, was developed and integrated here to a high degree. Elaborate networks of connecting tunnels and mutually supporting firing positions required constant pressure and ingenious use of weapons to bring about their reduction.

The reduction of the Shuri position, seizure of the city of Naha, the amphibious assault on Oroku Peninsula and the seizure of Naha airfield, the fierce struggle necessary to the capture of Kunishi Ridge, and the final dash to the southern coast were highlights of the campaign in the Corps zone of action. Working for the first time on large land masses with extended supply routes, extremely wet weather and over oft times impassable roads, both the individual fighting man and the higher echelons of command successfully met new problems in amphibious warfare. The Navy landed supplies at successively advanced locations as the battle progressed, and the engineers and naval construction battalions pushed a usable road network to the front lines as fast as physically possible. That, in combination with air-drop and laborious hand-carrying of supplies made possible the continued pressure on an enemy engaged in a well-executed delaying action.

An outstanding development in the operation was the willingness of the enemy to surrender in unprecedented numbers. In the Corps zone of action over four thousand prisoners of war were taken, of which the 6th Marine Division captured over three thousand. In addition to that loss, the campaign cost the enemy some 42,000 killed in the zone of this Corps.

The 2nd Marine Division, which had been originally retained afloat in Tenth Army reserve, was released on 14 April and the division returned to its base. However, one regimental combat team, the 8th Marines, reinforced, was recalled and after successfully landing and seizing two outlying islands, landed on Okinawa on 16 June and spearheaded the final drive to the south.

Okinawa was declared secured on 21 June 1945, after eighty days of fighting giving United States forces a powerful base for continuation of the assault on the home islands of Japan.

Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, USMC, was in command of the III Amphibious Corps from 10 November, 1943 until relieved by Major General K. E. Rockey, USMC, the present Corps Commander, on 30 June, 1945.

(STATEMENT: *The opinions and assertions contained in this article are the private ones of the writer and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the naval service at large.*)

Uncommon Valor

(*Continued from page* 93)

conform to the attack. The defense was predicated, however, on the sound thesis that with a numerical inferiority an American landing could not be prevented. and it was better to conserve strength in accordance with accepted tactical doctrine.

There was no way around so the battle developed into a hammer and tongs uphill frontal attack with men, tanks, artillery, naval gunfire and air attacks thrown against successive positions. As the front to the north widened the 3d Marine Division less the 3d Marines was released to the Landing Force and was placed in the center of the line. The enemy split in two on 9 March. On 16 March the island was declared secured, with only one small pocket remaining in the northwest corner. Over 20,000 Jap dead had been counted.

Meanwhile, other problems arose. We needed airfields to relieve the carriers. The gunfire ships were needed for other operations, and the exposed transports had to be unloaded as rapidly as possible to avoid undue exposure to enemy air attack. The gallant engineers and Sea Bees repaired airfields under enemy mortar and small arms fire. The capture of Suribachi on 23 February not only helped morale but provided a relatively clear area for urgently needed base installations. Small observation planes landed on 26 February. By the middle of March airfield construction was ahead of schedule.

The cost of this battle had been terrific; over 5,000 American dead and 20,000 wounded. That it was worth the cost has been demonstrated beyond doubt. Some 3,000 B-29s had landed on Iwo Jima by the end of the war; the bulk of them would have been lost with their invaluable crews without that haven. The possession of Iwo covered the north flank for the attack on Okinawa.

This was the final battle of the war for the V Amphibious Corps, although we had made full preparations for the landing in the Empire, and at this writing are enroute to help in the occupation of Japan. In eighteen months units of the V Amphibious Corps captured Tarawa, Makin, Majuro, Kwajalein, Roi-Namur, Eniwetok, Saipan, Tinian and Iwo Jima on the road to Japan. It has been a high honor for me to command a Division of this Corps at Roi-Namur and Saipan and to command the Corps at Tinian and Iwo Jima. I am proud to have commanded the brave men who through their efficiency, courage and tenacity made possible our steady advance across the Pacific. Furthermore, I am proud to have commanded the largest force of Marines ever engaged in a single battle.

On 16 March, 1945, Admiral Turner said that Iwo Jima was the best defended, best organized and most difficult objective the Fifth Amphibious Force had ever operated against. Lieutenant General Holland Smith said Iwo Jima was the toughest scrap the Marine Corps has had in its 168 year history. Admiral Nimitz said, "On Iwo where uncommon valor was a common virtue."

Marine Airmen

(*Continued from page* 88)

action, but it was the relatively slow-flying Marine SBD dive bombers, the so-called "egg-beaters," that took the stage and earned the glory in that campaign.

Their job was clearly defined, and one for which both pilots and planes were admirably suited—that of close bombing in support of the foot soldier. How well they did it has been adequately chronicled by the press and radio, and lavishly praised by Army officials including General MacArthur. But just for the record let me review a few of their accomplishments.

Sixth Army forces had fanned out from Lingayen Gulf, some elements driving north toward Baguio, while the main units executed their now famous dash down the central plains to Manila. Marine airmen were over them from dawn to dusk. Missions were short, and our pilots sometimes flew as many as three strikes a day.

They called themselves the "Diving Devildogs of Luzon," and under Major General Ralph J. Mitchell, commanding the First Marine Aircraft Wing, fully lived up to the name.

Aid was not wholly confined to close front-line attacks, however. The dive bombers ranged over most of Luzon, hitting San Fernando and Baguio, the summer capital, and such targets as Clark Field, Bataan, Corregidor and Fort McKinley on the approaches to Manila.

It was during the Army First Cavalry's lightning drive on the Philippine capital that the "Diving Devildogs" were credited with their most celebrated exhibition in precision pin-point bombing. Of their performance, the First's commander, Major General Verne D. Mudge, stated:

"On our drive to Manila, I depended solely on the Marines to protect my left flank against possible Japanese counter-attack. The job they turned in speaks for itself. I can say without reservation that the Marine dive bomber groups are one of the most flexible outfits that I have seen in this war. They will try anything once, and from experience with them, I have found that anything they try usually pans out in their favor."

This, with obselescent planes which had been written off the books, but ironically were still being flown by Marines on Mindanao when Japan quit.

The Mindanao phase of the Philippine campaign was a creditable chapter in Marine aviation history, although little known. First Wing crews continued flying close support and tactical missions and acquitted themselves admirably. But their efforts were overshadowed by new developments closer to Tokyo.

Iwo Jima and Okinawa caused the spotlight to be shifted, and both our land-based and carrier aircraft then got in their most telling blows of the war. Performing our secondary mission from flat tops both large and small, Marine Corsairs were ranging the China seas and joining the great aerial offensive over the Japanese home islands.

During the first 100 days of the campaign, or through 27 July, pilots of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing under Major General Mulcahy posted this box score:

500 enemy aircraft shot down in combat and 22 more probably destroyed.

Seven enemy ships either sunk or destroyed and 28 others damaged. Of smaller craft attacked, 36 were destroyed and 54 damaged.

Many individual exploits and personal feats of heroism both in the air and on the ground were recorded on Okinawa, as in other operations. But it was the collective teamwork of all concerned that established new and far greater respect for the Corps' air might. The aviation ground personnel and the air crews carried the load together, and so together share Marine aviation's part in the victory.

The Marine Corps, with its superb infantry, together with its shore-based and carrier aircraft, will continue to serve our country in peace, as it always has in war. I end, as I began: So long as there is a United States, there will always be a United States Marine Corps, and the final chapter in the history of our nation will, of necessity, include the history of the Marine Corps.

Pre-Invasion Assaults

(*Continued from page* 89)

cut, and destroyed before the main landing, with the loss of only one minesweeper.

To seize the Kerama Retto, about twenty miles west of Okinawa, Rear Admiral Kiland on 26 March brought in and landed the 77th Infantry Division under Major General Bruce. This division ran through these islands in true blitz fashion, killing hundreds of enemy troops, and capturing hundreds of "demolition attack boats"—light, fast, one-man power boats, each fitted with two depth charges to inflict underwater damage on our ships from close alongside. They were to operate against our transports after they arrived off Okinawa!

Kerama Retto gave us an anchorage for fueling our ships, replenishing their ammunition, making emergency repairs to those damaged by air or other enemy action, and servicing search and spotting seaplanes. All these activities were well underway before Vice Admiral Turner arrived with the main attack force.

The enemy had embedded 2,900 heavy posts in the reefs off the Okinawa landing beaches to prevent passage of landing craft. All but a widely scattered 200 of these were blasted out by the Underwater Demolition Teams under Captain Hanlon, finishing the job just one day before the landing. On this day also, heavy long-range artillery was placed on Keise Jima, a small island near Okinawa, to support the troop advance after the landing.

The Japs showed their displeasure at all our efforts by attacking our ships with Kamikaze planes at dawn and dusk, and with bombs at night; with submarines in the daytime, and with motor torpedo boats and a few of the previously mentioned "demolition attack boats" at night. No ships were hit by torpedoes, in spite of the fact that our heavy fire support ships were necessarily steaming at slow speed in small, sparsely screened units, delivering deliberate fire at the enemy defenses. Firing while dashing along the coast at high speed, and reversing course every few minutes, would have been safer for our ships, but also safer for the enemy's defenses.

The suicide planes, attacking in smaller numbers during this period than after the Okinawa landing, were mostly shot down by our fighters. Of those breaking through our fighter patrols, our ships' guns accounted for the majority. About ten ships were hit however, and of these a few had to be sent back to rear bases for repairs. Most of them continued in action, their officers and men glad of the chance to "play some more," as one destroyer captain put it.

The Japs never opened up with their shore batteries on Okinawa during these pre-assault operations. We gave them plenty of chance, as we wished to draw their fire, thereby gain additional intelligence on their gun positions, and destroy them. Actually, few fixed defenses existed in the immediate landing area. These were readily destroyed by our bombardment, and whether because of this, the non-arrival of expected reinforcements, or for some other reason known only to them, the enemy withdrew completely from the landing area, and from the Yontan airfield defenses north of it, on 30 March. While a bitter fight awaited the troops later, they landed on 1 April entirely unopposed.

Remember Pearl Harbor

(*Continued from page* 102)

activity in order to live up to its motto, "We keep the ships fit to fight."

After the flagship of his minesweeping fleet had been sunk by the Japs' attack on Pearl Harbor, Rear Admiral William R. Furlong, USN, was named Commandant of the Navy Yard, and directed the remarkable ship repair program until his retirement 15 July 1945, when he was relieved by Rear Admiral Edward W. Hanson, USN, former commander of a battleship division.

Pearl Harbor was a strategic outpost and shield to the West Coast of the United States. New bases have been obtained farther west, but Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, because of its size and more complete facilities, will remain the most important of our repair yards in the Pacific. Because of its strategic and advanced location, ships were returned to the Fleet in ten days to two weeks shorter time than if repaired in West Coast yards.

A number of ships were in the yard two and three times for damage repairs and went out again to the far Western Pacific to continue the fight against Japan.

The service given the Fleet at Pearl Harbor went beyond the installation of guns and machinery and repairs. It included the supply and loading of equipment and embarkation of men for naval and air and amphibious task forces. Thus, Pearl Harbor and its surrounding activities constituted a base for the combined operations of Army, Navy and Marines.

To give the service to the Fleet which it received at Pearl Harbor, necessitated a great expansion since 7 December 1941. The Navy Yard expanded approximately six times in the matter of shops, warehouses, new equipment, and the ability to turn out work.

Of the many miles of piers and wharves in Pearl Harbor, six and one-half miles have been completed since 7 December 1941, at a cost of $35,000,000, and a number of new graving docks and a marine railway have been added to the facilities.

The piers and the anchorages in Pearl Harbor accommodate several hundred ships. Several times entrances and exits in one day totaled over 200.

In estimating that the Yard has expanded six or seven times since the beginning of the war is not including the great increase in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor of barracks, storehouses, and acreage for storing fighting equipment, vehicles, supplies, and ammunition that have taken up many hundreds of acres of land to make this an efficient base.

The working force in the Navy Yard likewise increased over six times its size just prior to the war.

It will never be necessary to reiterate the slogan "Remember Pearl Harbor," and in the writer's opinion that base and adjacent facilities will always remain as the foremost Navy and Army bastion in the Pacific.

Service to the Fleet

(*Continued from page* 102)

relentlessly forward, destroy bases and installations with lightning speed, pinch off part of the enemy's fleet here and there, and yet, never return to a base for replenishment or repair of battle damage.

That "secret weapon" did not come easily. It was the result of months of planning, practice and experimentation. It involved hundreds of thousands of parts, the science of logistics, the training of thousands of men, coordination of fighting and service vessels, naval operations on a hitherto unsurpassed scale, delicate timing and speed.

This "secret weapon," the Service Force, consisted on V-J Day of 2,000 vessels of every kind, a gigantic armada in itself which would require two full days to pass a given point.

Under the old conception of naval warfare, Japan thought she was secure from American attacks as long as she held every land base within striking distance of Tokyo. By seizing the Philippines, Guam, the East Indies and all the other islands between her homeland and Australia, she figured it would require years for us to establish bases close enough to threaten her, and meanwhile the development of conquered territories would make her too strong to lick.

Because the Japs adhered to the old concept of naval warfare, that any fleet (by certain immutable laws) must be limited in its range of operations, they necessarily believed that our Navy could only make a few hit-and-run strikes at her powerful bases and then be forced to retire for replenishment and repairs. This assumption appeared logical because we were fighting so much farther from our bases and homeland.

Of course, as we knew it then, and they realize it now, the Japs committed one of their numerous monumental blunders.

We simply "did the impossible." We took our replenishments and repair facilities along with us. It was a tremendous undertaking.

Let us take, for example, the matter of refueling, always a dangerous and delicate operation at sea because of the possibility of collision and fire between the tanker and the fighting ship. Every nation worked at this problem but the United States was the only one to solve it. Our oilers now can come alongside a fighting ship while both are moving at identical courses and refuel in any kind of weather short of a gale. And, while the refueling proceeds, the oiler can send over provisions and receive back the sick and wounded for removal to hospitals in rear areas.

Another dangerous barrier that the Service Force hurdled involved the transferring of ammunition at sea. This was not a general practice but when Admiral Halsey and the other Fleet Admirals hurled the kitchen stove and then the lids at the enemy, putting them on the run, we could and did transfer ammunition to our fighters while under full steam.

In addition to these two very important operations, the Navy also perfected innumerable supporting requirements that go into providing unlimited range of operations for the fleet.

Any mention of the work of the Service Force would be incomplete without the Garrison Beach Party which lands while the sands are still hot. Each party numbers 100 officers and men and consists of the following components; beach master group, communications section, construction detachment, mobile boat repair unit, hospital unit, bomb disposal, mine disposal and a commissary section. They are charged with consolidating all beach facilities and were among our toughest Service Force units. Upon their efforts oftentimes depended the securing of a beachhead.

Unlimited range of operation . . . a new concept in naval warfare; this proved too much for the enemy in 1945.

This is the story of the "A Fleet," the Auxiliary Fleet that made up 29 per cent of all naval tonnage.

The XXIV Corps

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off the southwestern coast of Okinawa to provide a protected anchorage for naval use.

The 7th and 96th Divisions landed abreast on the Hagushi beaches along the western coast of Okinawa on the morning of Easter Sunday, 1 April, in the main assault. The 7th captured Kadena Airfield before noon and by the afternoon of the next day had cut the island in two. Both divisions then turned south, driving in the Japanese outposts until increased resistance indicated they had reached a strongly fortified zone. Meanwhile, the III Marine Amphibious Corps, forming the other major combat element of the Tenth Army, had encountered only light scattered opposition in the north.

The 96th assaulted the Japanese stronghold on 9 April when it began a series of attacks against Kakazu Ridge. Strong resistance developing against the 7th on the east coast further brought out the real strength of the Shuri positions and made clear that more troops, artillery and ammunition would be needed before it could be cleared.

A period of preparation followed. The 27th Division which had cleared small islands off the east coast moved into position along the west coast. The 96th shifted to the center of the line. Twenty-seven battalions of artillery including several battalions of Marine Corps artillery released to XXIV Corps were massed along the 4½ mile front. On 19 April a general attack began all along the line. For weeks the fighting continued savagely against thousands of fortified caves and underground positions manned by a strong, well armed and determined enemy who died in place. At the end of April the 77th Division which had seized Kerama Retto and had taken Ie Shima in sharp fighting, was brought into the line on Okinawa, replacing the 96th, and the 1st Marine Division was attached to the Corps, replacing the 27th which was relieved from the Corps. The III Amphibious Corps entered the line on the western flank at the end of the first week in May to take control of its 1st Marine Division which was later reinforced by the 6th Marine Division. After ten days' rest the 96th Division replaced the 7th and remained in the line until the end of the battle.

Shuri's concentric defense in the Corps zone was broken near the end of May with the capture of its eastern anchor by the 96th Division. The 7th Division, freshened by ten days' rest, sliced past the eastern flank and turned the enemy out of the Shuri area. Following this, the Japanese position on Okinawa deteriorated rapidly. The remnants retreated to commanding terrain in the south for a deathstand, where they were systematically destroyed in the Corps zone by the 7th and 96th Divisions while the 77th mopped up the Shuri area, and the III Amphibious Corps cleared the enemy from its zone on the west flank. Shortly before dawn on 22 June the Japanese commander committed hari-kiri. Okinawa was declared secure the same day.

The XXIV Corps accounted for over 75,000 of the more than 100,000 Japanese killed on Okinawa. In turn, it suffered heavy casualties in what has been called the most difficult, the deadliest, the most vicious and concentrated battle of the Pacific war, as well as the last great battle before the surrender of Japan.

On 15 August the Corps was directed to occupy Korea utilizing the 7th, 40th and one other division and Corps Troops. The 7th Division with Corps Headquarters landed at Inch'on on 8 September. On 9 September Seoul, the capital, was occupied, and the surrender signed. The 40th Division followed and began the occupation of Fusan, Korea on 23 September. The Third division was scheduled to move into southwestern Korea in October.

The Navy Returns

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ships during April and has continued to operate at that rate.

Although no large installations are planned, Naval Base Manila, under Captain Drake, is a "going concern"—and going twenty-four hours a day at that.

Major purpose of the base is to supply units afloat with fresh and dry provisions, small and ship's store stocks and to render other service except major repair. The boat pool provides water transportation for all activities and ships in the immediate area, including lighterage. It operates and maintains water barges, four fire boats—converted LCM's—and two hospital boats.

Transportation ashore is furnished by a motor pool which maintains from 1200 to 1500 vehicles. Except for units arriving with their own transport, this pool receives and reissues all rolling stock, including construction machinery.

Fleet Recreation Center, on Dewey boulevard, is only partially developed. However, from 500 to 1200 men are served daily with beer, coke, nuts, ice cream and hot dogs. Softball fields, basketball, volley ball, horse shoe courts and ping pong tables are seldom idle.

Naval Shore Facilities, small boat repair, receiving station, a base hospital and R.M.O., are CNOB activities located at Cavite. Receiving station has a present capacity of 3200.

On 8 February 1945, Naval Advance Base Unit No. 6, Captain R. E. Webb, USN, commanding, began coming ashore at Subic town. The former Naval base at Olangapo and the town itself had been almost completely razed by our departing forces and subsequent bombings. Rivera Point and Alava docks were partially destroyed. The Japs had made little attempt to repair or even clear this damage; in three years had constructed only 18 small wooden vessels there of the coaster type. Naval Base is now commanded by Captain W. R. Read, USN.

On 14 February, the area between Malabotoy and Manisbasco points, on the north-west side of the bay, was selected by Rear Admiral James Fife, Jr., as the site of the submarine repair base and rest camp.

The first floating dry dock, the ARD No. 7, arrived on 28 February.

On 23 March, NABU No. 6 was dissolved and Subic Bay established as a naval base. The base is so organized as to provide facilities for repair of destroyers, submarines and smaller craft, and major overhaul of PT engines. Service and supply of fleet units is accomplished through a large NSD, a tank farm and ammunition depot. In addition, an amphibious training command, a fleet training command, hospital, receiving station and fleet recreation center were established.

Tenth Army

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for a successful amphibious operation against Okinawa? Air and Naval superiority was a recognized requirement. The task of gaining control of the air and sea in the Ryukyus fundamentally fell to the Navy. The operation was covered by carrier-based aircraft and supported by surface units of the United States Fleet. Aiding in this task were units of the British Fleet and long range bombers from the Philippines which neutralized Formosa, and the very long range bombers of the 20th Bomber Command flying from bases in the Marianas to neutralize enemy forces in Japan. Once superiority of the air and sea in the Ryukyus was obtained, naval vessels carrying the amphibious forces in the Tenth Army could proceed to Okinawa. How then, was the island to be captured? Intelligence estimates placed 65,000-85,000 Japanese troops on Okinawa. Headquarters of the 32d Japanese Imperial Army, the 24th, and 62d Divisions, together with the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, comprised this force. The capabilities of a force this size necessitated the landing of at least 4 divisions simultaneously in order that a beachhead might be secured and sufficient strength built up to strike and destroy this enemy force. Landing 4 Infantry divisions simultaneously imposed several problems. A very large number of naval transports and combat vessels would be required. Adequate and accessible landing beaches must be available and success against the enemy forces after landing must be reasonably assured.

Studies of the Okinawa Gunto by Army and Navy staffs revealed the fact that the waters on the eastern side of Okinawa were less restricted and more favorable for naval operations than those on the west. A fringing reef was present around most of the shoreline of Okinawa. Landing beaches with sufficient capacity for a landing force of 4 divisions were few. The beaches bordering Nakagusuku Wan, (later renamed Buckner Bay) on the east coast, and a series of beaches extending north and south of the Bisha Gawa on western Okinawa were the most favorable.

One of the initial missions given the Tenth Army was the early seizure and development of airfields and airfield facilities. It was desired that land-based aircraft should become operational from Okinawa at the earliest practicable time, in order that carrier-based aircraft might be reinforced or relieved as the situation dictated. This consideration, together with the unfavorable tactical aspects encountered in operations from Nakagusuku Wan, made landings on the west coast of Okinawa north and south of the Bisha Gawa more desirable. Even though operations to the west of Okinawa were unfavorable from a naval point of view, the Commander in Chief Amphibious Forces, Pacific, accepted the proposed plan of landing on the southwest coast of Okinawa, north and south of the Bisha Gawa, on the so-called Hagushi beaches.

There were other operations in the Okinawa Gunto that were very important, but on a smaller scale. These were the amphibious operations against the outlying islands of the Kerama Retto, and of Ie Shima, Iheya, Aguni, and Kume. Landings were made in the Kerama Retto by the 77th Infantry Division 6 days prior to the main landing on Okinawa. These landings were made to secure the Kerama Retto for a naval anchorage and seaplane base. On 30 March, units of the 77th Infantry Division secured Keise Shima, and the 420th FA Group (155mm Gun) was emplaced to support the main landings on Okinawa. It was by good fortune that the enemy's force of suicide boats and boat crews were discovered and destroyed in these operations. The subsequent landing by the 77th Infantry Division on Ie Shima on 16 April 1945 was made to secure additional airfields and airfield facilities for land-based aircraft. The operations that secured Iheya, Aguni, Tori and Kume Shimas were executed during the latter part of May and the first part of June. These latter operations allowed our forces to establish air warning and fighter director facilities on land masses and to relieve the naval "picket" vessels of these duties. These "picket" vessels, principally destroyers and destroyer escorts, had taken the brunt of the Japanese kamikaze air attacks against our forces in the Okinawa area.

With the successful completion of the preliminary landing operations in the Kerama Retto and underwater reconnaissance and demolitions along the landing beaches, the stage was set for the main landings on Okinawa. During the night of 31 March over 1400 naval vessels of the United States Fleet converged on Okinawa. The dawn of 1 April found Okinawa shrouded with a ground haze, but the sea was calm and there was very little surf on the landing beaches. The Commander of the Expeditionary Force, Admiral R. K. Turner, USN, announced that conditions for a successful landing on Okinawa were favorable and designated 0830 as H-Hour. Debarkation of the troops from transports to the armored landing craft progressed according to schedule and without incident. The landing waves formed opposite their respective landing beaches awaiting the signal to move forward. Hundreds of naval fire support ships stood off the beaches and administered the pre-H-Hour bombardment, while overhead carrier aircraft orbited, awaiting the signal that would send them hurtling down to strafe and bomb the landing beaches just minutes before the leading assault waves landed. Japanese air and naval forces did not challenge the attacking forces.

At 0815 the H-Hour of 0830 was confirmed by the Epeditionary Force Commander. Between 0830 and 0840 the leading assault elements landed along the 8-mile stretch of beach north and south of the Bisha Gawa and quickly advanced inland against negligible resistance. By noon on the landing day both Kadena and Yontan airfields had been overrun and by the end of the day an Army beachhead from 3,000-5,000 yards in depth and 8 miles long had been established. Approximately 50,000 troops, together with large amounts of artillery, tanks, and other heavy equipment landed on Okinawa during the initial day.

Following the successful landing on 1 April was a period of rapid movement to exploit the unexpected lack of resistance on the beaches and to develop enemy dispositions. On the 2d of April the 7th Infantry Division drove completely across Okinawa and severed all north-south communications of the enemy forces in southern Okinawa. Elements of the III Amphibious Corps reached the east coast of Okinawa on the 3d of April and on the following day occupied the narrow Ishikawa Isthmus. Occupation of this isthmus effectively separated the enemy forces in northern and southern Okinawa. Meanwhile the 96th Division moved southward against scattered enemy resistance, while the 7th Infantry Division of the XXIV Corps extended reconnaissance south to the town of Kuba. The character of the enemy's actions at this time seemed to indicate he had elected to follow one of the alternatives listed below:

Intended to defend in southern Okinawa with all his forces, or the major part of his forces.

Had withdrawn the bulk of his forces to northern Okinawa, leaving only a small force in the south.

Had divided his forces, disposing one force in the northern Okinawa-Motobu Peninsula area while retaining the remaining force in southern Okinawa.

In order to ascertain the enemy's dispositions the Commanding General, Tenth Army, ordered the Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps, to push northward as rapidly as possible and determine the enemy's strength and location in northern Okinawa, and directed the Commanding General, XXIV Corps to push reconnaissance elements southward to uncover enemy positions in southern Okinawa. At the same time the Fleet Marine Force Reconnaissance Battalion was directed to reconnoiter the Eastern Islands guarding the approaches to Kimmu Wan and Nakagusuku Wan, and the Navy was requested to reconnoiter the beaches in Nakagusuku Wan to determine the feasibility of landing amphibious forces in that area. It had been planned to land the 27th Infantry Division on these beaches to reinforce the XXIV Corps. The Commanding General, Tenth Army, desired to determine the feasibility of this plan.

Movement to the north by elements of the III Amphibious Corps was executed rapidly and it became evident that northern Okinawa was lightly held. The reconnaissance of the Eastern Islands off Okinawa revealed that only Tsugen Jima was defended with an organized force. Reports from underwater demolition and reconnaissance teams on the beach conditions in Nakagusuku Wan were unfavorable and landings which would place forces on the flanks or rear of the enemy in that area, were believed to be unfeasible. Meanwhile the XXIV Corps encountered stiffened resistance south of the Futema-Kuba area and by 6 April a strong enemy position had been uncovered along the line Machinato-Kakazu-Ouki. Attempts to push the enemy from this line experienced little success because of the limited amounts of ammunition and materiel then ashore.

After considering the extended condition of the supply and communication lines, and the formidable position which the enemy forces occupied, the decision was made to prepare for a coordinated attack to the south to be made by the XXIV Corps on 19 April. By this time all elements of the XXIV Corps on Okinawa would have time to regroup and become familiar with the terrain. A sufficient amount of all types of supplies could be accumulated to support a sustained attack. The 27th Infantry Division, then in floating reserve at Ulithi, could be called forward and be in position, thus increasing the strength of the Corps. The III Amphibious Corps could best be utilized by continuing its present mission of clearing northern Okinawa, prior to further employment. The III Amphibious Corps' floating reserve (2d Marine Division) was not needed by the Corps, and while conducting feint landings off southern Okinawa on 1 April had sustained casualties from attacks by Japanese suicide planes. In view of the III Amphibious Corps needs and the danger imposed by enemy suicide planes, it was decided that the 2d Marine Division should be moved from the danger area. Hence it was ordered to return to Saipan and await call.

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Tenth Army

(*Continued from Preceding Page*)

At the same time that the request for the movement of the 27th Infantry Division to the Okinawa area was given to the Commander of the Expeditionary Force, a warning order was dispatched to the Commanding General, 27th Infantry Division, instructing him to be prepared to capture Tsugen Jima upon his arrival at Okinawa. On 9 April transports carrying the 27th Infantry Division arrived in the Okinawa area, and the 3d Battalion 105th Infantry landed on Tsugen Jima. After 2 days of fighting the enemy garrison was eliminated and the island secured. The reduction of this enemy outpost opened Nakagusuku Wan as a naval anchorage. The XXIV Corps continued to build up supplies and to make preliminary dispositions for a coordinated attack on 19 April. The 27th Infantry Division unloaded over the western (Hagushi) beaches and was released to the control of the Commanding General, XXIV Corps. The Commanding General, XXIV Corps, subsequently moved the 27th Division into position on the right (west) flank of the Corps, shifting the 96th Division to the center zone. Upon completion of these dispositions the Corps was disposed with three divisions abreast, the 7th Infantry Division on the left (east) flank, the 96th Infantry Division in the center zone, and the 27th Infantry Division on the right (west) flank.

Action in northern Okinawa, particularly on the Motobu Peninsula, had been precipitated by the III Amphibious Corps. After long, swift marches over difficult mountainous terrain, elements of the Corps closed in on an enemy force entrenched in the central mountain range of the Motobu Peninsula. Considerable difficulties were encountered in these operations as control of the widely scattered units was difficult, and poor or non-existent reads continually hampered supply operations. During the period 15-20 April the 6th Marine Division closed-in on the pocketed enemy from three sides and succeeded in destroying the greater portion of an estimated reinforced Japanese regiment. On 21 April the Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps, notified the Commanding General, Tenth Army, that all organized resistance in northern Okinawa had been destroyed and that his mission was accomplished. The III Amphibious Corps was then concentrated in the area east of Yontan airfield, preparatory to further operations in southern Okinawa.

The attack by the XXIV Corps on the Japanese held Machinato-Ouki line on 19 April was preceded by one of the greatest artillery and naval gunfire preparations in the Pacific war. The enemy defenses were concentric strong points, centered around precipitous escarpments and rugged hills. Each of these mutually supporting positions was a honeycomb of tunnels and caves. Air strikes, and artillery and naval gunfire reduced the enemy's mobility, severed his communications, and drove him into the protective cover of the caves, but these positions could not be completely neutralized by these means. The infantry soldier, utilizing the rifle, grenade and flame thrower, and supported by tanks, had literally to dig the Jap out of his rocky fortress. Such operations are necessarily slow and costly. Hundreds of caves had to be sealed and many concrete fortifications reduced before an appreciable advance could be made. On the left the 7th Infantry Division methodically reduced dominating Hill 196. In the center the 96th Infantry Division clambored over the Tanabaru escarpment after bitter and costly fighting. On the right the 27th Infantry Division crossed the estuary just north of the town of Machirato, and secured a bridgehead on its south bank. This bridgehead was exploited and the town of Machinato was captured. The advantage gained by this advance could not be fully capitalized upon, however, because of the enemy's determined resistance on the Kakazu Ridge (just north of the town of Kakazu and running from Southeast to Northwest) and the difficult terrain immediately east thereof. Enemy forces in this area succeeded in denying the advance of the left flank of the 27th Division and right flank elements of the 96th Division. It was only after Hill 196, the Tanabaru escarpment and Kakazu Ridge were captured that a general advance was made to the south.

Cracking the enemy's Machinato line, took approximately 12 days and resulted in the destruction of the principal elements of the Japanese 62d Division. The XXIV Corps suffered heavy casualties. Both the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions had been in continuous combat since 1 April and the 27th Infantry Division, although fighting only for approximately 10 days, had suffered heavy casualties in the fighting on Kakazu Ridge and south of Machinato. All three divisions of the Corps were reported at reduced combat efficiency because of fatigue and casualties. Adequate replacements were not available.

The III Amphibious Corps with its two divisions had been rehabilitating and was ready for further operations. The casualties suffered in northern Okinawa operations had been light and both divisions were at top combat efficiency. The 6th Marine Division, which had executed most of the operations in northern Okinawa, had been scattered over a wide area and all of its elements had been concentrated only a short time. The 1st Marine Division, however, was ready for immediate action. Because of the poor landing beaches, the strong enemy reserves still uncommitted, the character of the terrain, and the decrease in combat efficiency of units of the XXIV Corps, it was decided that the III Amphibious Corps would be committed in order that the XXIV Corps' divisions that had sustained the heaviest casualties might be relieved and rehabilitated. Accordingly the 1st Marine Division moved south on 1 May and took over the zone occupied by the 27th Infantry Division. The 77th Infantry Division, which had just completed the capture of Ie Shima, was moved into a rear assembly area on Okinawa preparatory to relieving the 96th Infantry Division. Upon completion of these movements the XXIV Corps was disposed with the 7th Infantry Division on the left (east) flank, the 77th Infantry Division in the center zone, and the 1st Marine Division on the right (west) flank. The 96th Infantry Division was in Corps Reserve. The 27th Infantry Division was released to the Island Commander Okinawa for security purposes, in northern Okinawa, preparatory to relieving the Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps of this responsibility.

The Japanese Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Ushijima, realized that his army was slowly being constricted and that defeat was inevitable unless the tide of battle could be turned. The loss of the Machinato positions made a prompt counter attack urgent. The 24th Division and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade were concentrated opposite the Tenth Army's right flank in the zone of the 96th and 27th Infantry Divisions. The enemy attack was scheduled for 4 May and was to be accompanied by amphibious landings in rear of both flanks of the American line. Futema and the high ground adjacent thereto were the objectives of this bold plan. During the period of 1-4 May the 1st Marine Division had relieved the 27th Infantry Division and the 77th Infantry Division had relieved the 96th Infantry Division. The Jap counterattack was launched as planned but against two fresh divisions. Hundreds of the attacking enemy troops were killed by the combined fires of the infantry and massed artillery. Both the 24th Division and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade suffered severe casualties and those of the counterlanding forces which succeeded in reaching the shore were quickly annihilated. The Jap counterattack had failed.

Meanwhile the Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps began preparations to move south with the 6th Marine Division and to take over a Corps zone on the right (west) flank of the Army front. These movements were completed by 7 May and the Commanding General, Tenth Army, assumed direct control of operations in southern Okinawa, preparatory to continuing the destruction of remaining elements of the Japanese 32d Army.

Upon establishment of a second Corps zone in southern Okinawa, the Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps committed the 6th Marine Division to action along the western coastal sector on the right flank of the Army on 8 May. Both Corps of the Army engaged in operations to secure an east-west line of departure just north of Shuri prior to a general attack to be executed by the Army. Both Corps obtained their designated departure areas and on 10 May the Commanding General, XXIV Corps used the rested 96th Infantry Division to relieve the 7th Infantry Division on the east (left) flank of the Army front. Four divisions were then poised opposite the enemy's Shuri fortress preparatory to the all-out attack. To the east the 96th Infantry Division occupied the Army's left flank zone; in the center the 77th Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division were in position; on the right (west) flank, was the 6th Marine Division. The general attack was launched on 11 May as a double envelopment of Shuri from the east and west, to destroy the enemy forces in the Shuri area and then to continue south to the end of the island. The initial stages of the attack were characterized by desperate close-in fighting and the liberal use of flame throwers and hand-carried explosives. Some units employed scaling ladders and cargo nets to scale the faces of precipitous escarpments. Positions such as Sugar Loaf Hill, Wana Draw (a deep ravine extending Northwest from the northwest edge of the town of Shuri), Chocolate Drop Hill and Conical Hill became symbols of the Japanese will to resist and the American soldier's determination to win. Finally on 13 May the 96th Infantry Division captured the crest of Conical Hill, opening the east coast corridor for an advance to the south to outflank the Shuri position. One by one the remaining centers of resistance fell to units of the XXIV and III Phib Corps. On 22 May the 7th Infantry Division was committed on the left flank of the Army through the corridor blasted by the 96th Infantry Division. Yonabaru was quickly overrun and the 7th Division seized the high ground south of Yonabaru overlooking Yonabaru Bay and Baten-Ko. Enemy resistance against the sudden thrust by the 7th Division was light initially, and it

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

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Tenth Army

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appeared that the enemy forces might be trapped in the Shuri area if the breakthrough could be exploited by maneuvering to the west in rear of Shuri and Naha. Fate in the form of adverse weather intervened. Wind storms and almost continuous rains prevailed for approximately 10 days. Movement of wheeled and heavy track vehicles all along the front was practically impossible. Infantry forces carrying light equipment made progress with great difficulty. Supply bridges were washed out and roads throughout Okinawa became quagmires. Engineer units worked night and day to keep essential traffic moving. It became necessary to supply units of both Corps by air drop and with amphibious vehicles from the sea. During this time (20-31 May) the enemy forces utilized the dark, stormy nights to withdraw from Shuri and occupy an escarpment position on the southern tip of Okinawa. The enemy had committed the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade against the III Amphibious Corps in the Asato area in an attempt to hold the left flank of his Shuri line and in desperation had launched a counter-attack against the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions in an attempt to retake Yonabaru. Both of these enemy counter-measures failed and heavy losses were inflicted upon his attacking units.

With the abandonment of the shattered Shuri position by the Japanese forces and advent of favorable weather, the tempo of advance along the Army front increased. The 7th Division drove rapidly to the southeast coast of Okinawa and on to the Chinen Peninsula. The 96th Division moved toward Iwa and the 1st Marine Division swung east of Naha and drove southwest in a maneuver designed to sever the base of the Oroku Peninsula, and trap the enemy forces defending the Naha airfield. The 6th Marine Division cleared all enemy forces from the town of Naha and made preparations for an amphibious landing on the northwest coast of the Oroku Peninsula. On 4 June the landing was made practically unopposed and the Naha airfield was quickly overrun. The maneuver of the 1st Marine Division, meanwhile, was successfully executed and elements of the division reached the southwest coast of Okinawa just north of Itoman on 7 June. Enemy forces on the Oroku Peninsula were trapped and slowly compressed into a small pocket. This pocket was reduced by 13 June and bodies of the Japanese Naval Commander and his staff were found in an elaborate, underground command post installation. All had committed hari-kiri.

Meanwhile, the 7th and 96th Divisions continue to advance southwest toward the Yaeju Dake escarpment. During the course of this advance the 77th Infantry Division was "pinched out" and reverted to Corps Reserve in the vicinity of Shuri. Again the enemy aided by severe weather which slowed down the American advance, had occupied terrain favorable to the defense—costly and difficult to attack. The strain of the campaign, the heavy losses of personnel and materiel and the deterioration of organization within the Japanese 32d Army was to have a telling effect upon the enemy's will to resist on this final position. Night attacks launched by the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions and 1st Marine Division experienced considerable success — many enemy troops were caught sleeping, their weapons unmanned. Slowly the Japanese forces deteriorated. Fanatical resistance was encountered along the Kunishi Ridge and in the area east of Medeera and Mabuni, but coordinated action by the Army during the period 17-18-19th of June, split the enemy forces into three pockets. The campaign was now in the mop-up stage. On 19-20 June elements of the III Amphibious Corps reached the south coast of Okinawa and the 7th Infantry Division captured the command post of the Japanese 32d Army. Okinawa was declared secure on 21 June, but roving groups of fanatical Japs fought on for days afterward. Some of the largest groups of prisoners in the entire Pacific war surrendered, between the 20th and 30th of June. Many Japanese officers surrendered, and by 30 June the prisoner of war total for the Okinawa campaign had reached 7,401. The Jap had fought well, along his predetermined lines of defense, but the American forces were not to be denied and the irresistible will of the American soldier to go forward and win proved to be superior to the Japanese fanatical psychology.

The capture and occupation of Okinawa and the principal islands in the Okinawa Gunto, enabled American forces to establish control of the air and sea in the Ryukyus area. Japanese sea and air communications between the empire and the islands to the south, including the Philippines and the mainland of China were severed. A base for further operations against Japan or its stolen territories in China, was established. When the war ended twenty-two airfields in various stages of planning and construction were located on Okinawa, and the outlying islands. The air potential of Okinawa was never fully developed or utilized. Japan's surrender prevented our forces from delivering the crushing blows that were being prepared.

The victory of the Tenth Army was not gained without losses. Army, Navy and Marine services lost invaluable officers and men as the price for success, including the Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., killed in action on 18 June in the last days of the campaign. Total battle casualties for the Tenth Army from 26 March to 30 June were 39,430, of which 22,654 were Army, 16,265 were Marine and 501 were Navy. The Army total included 4,549 killed, 18,010 wounded or injured, and 95 missing in action. The Marine Corps lost 2,734 killed, 13,388 wounded and 143 missing.

The Japanese Army suffered irreplaceable losses. The 62d Division, the 24th Division and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade were completely destroyed. 107,539 enemy soldiers were known to have been killed and 7,401 were taken prisoner. Many others undoubtedly lie buried in the hundreds of caves that were destroyed or sealed during the campaign. All of the enemy's supplies and equipment were either captured or destroyed.

Comparing the American total casualties with the total Japanese soldiers counted dead and captured of 114,940, gives a ratio of 3 to 1 in favor of the American forces and comparing the Americans total killed of 7,283 with the Japanese total killed of 107,539, gives a ratio of 13.3 Japanese soldiers killed for each American soldier lost.

The capture of Okinawa removed any remaining hope of the Japanese Imperial Command that it could stop the steady American advance towards the Japanese home islands. The next step would inevitably be invasion, and their experience on Okinawa must have proved to the Japs that they could no longer hope to oppose it successfully.

Air War in Asia

(*Continued from page* 85)

Theater. Air Command, South East Asia, under which I operated, was commanded by that fine and loyal British gentleman, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse. Without his continual all-out support and backing which he always gave, my job would have been impossible. Eastern Air Command was an integrated command of the USAAF and the RAF—not just two commands operating side by side—but one organization in which all units were intermingled, each doing that part of the job for which it was best adapted. Three of Eastern Air Command's task forces were commanded by U. S. Air Force officers and three by Royal Air Force officers.

During the entire history of Eastern Air Command, I received nothing but the closest and most cordial cooperation from RAF personnel, both in my headquarters and on the staffs of our various integrated forces. This spirit was exemplified by such men as Air Vice Marshal T. M. Williams, formerly assistant Air Commander, Eastern Air Command, and Air Vice Marshal the Earl of Bandon, who headed the RAF group which operated from fields in the Arakan.

At the beginning of 1945, the British IV Corps and Fourteenth Army were poised for the reconquest of Burma.

At this stage, our fighters had already established air supremacy over Burma. We had blasted Japanese communications to such an extent that they were unable adequately to supply their own troops.

The great obstacle was that of supply, since ground communications between India and Burma were entirely inadequate to support the armies in the field. The air was called upon to solve this supply problem and the air fulfilled its task in magnificent fashion. Under Brigadier General F. W. Evans, Eastern Air Command's Combat Cargo Task Force flew in supplies and reinforcements to the IV Corps and Fourteenth Army in a constant stream, thus making possible very rapid advances which were spearheaded by USAAF and RAF fighters, fighter bombers and mediums. Some idea of the extent of these operations may be gained from the fact that during the final stages of the Burma campaign, the Combat Cargo Task Force and Tenth Air Force transports delivered approximately 100,000 tons per month of food, ammunition and other supplies to the IV Corps, the Fourteenth Army and to the Chinese-American troops operating in North Burma under the able leadership of Lieutenant General Dan I. Sultan.

Rangoon fell early in May, after a combined airborne and amphibious landing, thus bringing the Burma campaign virtually to its close.

I should like to pay especial tribute to the Air Service Command organizations in both theaters, without whose contributions air success would have been impossible. The India Burma Air Service Command, under Major Gen. Thomas J. Hanley, Jr., and the China Air Service Command, commanded by Colonel Clarence P. Talbot, performed miracles in servicing, repairing and maintaining our aircraft.

In conclusion, it is my considered opinion that both in the India-Burma and China Theaters, air power was *the indispensable arm*. In both theaters, the air made it impossible for the enemy to supply his own troops, eliminated the threat of air opposition, served as artillery, using bombs, rockets and machine guns, for the ground forces, and most important of all, was the principal and often the sole source of supply for ground troops.

THE SUBMARINE OF TOMORROW may never match this jet propelled, atomic powered artist's conception. But, whatever science and invention may lead to, one thing is certain; We should *maintain the development of the submarine as a key security weapon* in proportion to our devotion to world peace.

SUBMARINES FOR SECURITY

In the Winning of the War . . . U. S. submarines played the leading role in foiling enemy aggression in the Pacific before it could seriously threaten American soil.

In Preserving the Peace . . . New developments in U. S. submarines can go far toward giving America the physical power needed to enforce her conception of worldwide social justice.

As America's highest Naval authority recently stated: *"For that reason I again urge the necessity of a substantial and alert post-war research program in military fields—and this research should be carried through to the actual production of pilot models."*

Our mission, as pioneer builders of U. S. submarines, is to maintain America's leadership in submarine invention and development through a moderate building program keyed to the concept that TO KEEP PEACE, WE MUST KEEP PACE.

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Third Fleet Operations

(*Continued from page 73*)

The losses and damage far exceeded any the enemy had been able to inflict.

By herculean efforts the Service Force repaired the typhoon-damaged ships in time to meet the planned employment schedule of the Third Fleet in support of the Luzon operations. Sortie was made from Ulithi 30 December, and heavy strikes went in against Formosa and the Nansei Shoto 3 and 4 January, despite unfavorable weather. Japanese suicide planes at this time inflicted damage on Seventh Fleet bombardment and minesweeping units in Lingayen Gulf; for 6 and 7 January our carrier efforts, in response to General MacArthur's request, were switched to the task of again successfully smothering the many Luzon airfields.

Plans and preparations had been made previously for a thrust into the South China Sea, seeking destruction of Japanese major fleet units, primarily the Ise and Hyuga, with their supporting units. Such destruction of the only important enemy fleet units south of Empire waters appeared to be the best way to remove the most dangerous and likely enemy threat to Seventh Fleet operations along the Leyte-Mindoro-Luzon supply and reinforcement routes. The time appeared opportune for execution of the plans and orders were so issued. Formosa was struck 9 January 1945, the date of the initial Lingayen landings, and that night the Third Fleet, with selected oilers in company, made the westward passage through Luzon Strait at high speed, employing Bashi and Balintang Channels. Almost unbelievably, the Fleet was not attacked or snooped, and course was set to the southwest.

The battle plan, based on the expectation of finding major enemy fleet units in the vicinity of Camranh Bay, called for a high speed run into the Indo-China coast, a predawn search to locate the enemy, and a joint destruction of enemy forces by gunfire and air power. On 12 January Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Camranh Bay, Qui Nhon and Tourane were struck, but no enemy heavy fleet units were found in spite of diligent search. Much shipping was destroyed; it totaled 41 ships (127,000 tons) sunk with another 28 (70,000 tons) damaged. Many of the damaged ships were beached and later wrecked by an obliging stationary typhoon of three days' duration. The French Indo-China Coast was left a shambles.

To complete the exploitation of the enemy weakness found in the China Sea, strikes were launched against Formosa, Pescadores, Amoy, Swatow, Hong Kong and the Hainan area 15 January; on the 16th Hong Kong, Canton and Hainan were struck again, heavily.

Profitable targets in the China Sea area had become scarce, and the shifting of the Third Fleet to an area east of Luzon (undetected if possible) seemed desirable strategically. There were two possible exits from the China Sea—via Surigao Strait or Luzon Strait. The Surigao Strait had the advantage of sheltered waters, permitting fueling and passage on a fixed schedule, but was utilization of a strategically awkward route, almost certain of detection. The Luzon Strait best fitted the overall strategy, afforded less chance of detection, but the currently stormy weather made passage on a fixed schedule problematical. It was determined to attempt passage of Luzon Strait, and the night of 20-21 January, the weather proving unexpectedly favorable, an expeditious but presumably snooped passage was made, Balintang Channel being used. Several unobservant and surprised enemy planes were shot down prior to and during the passage of Luzon Strait, but the operation was otherwise uneventful. 3800 miles had been covered in the China Sea without battle damage.

The phase of Third Fleet operations launched in support of the Luzon campaign came to a close with strikes on 21-22 January against Formosa and Nansei Shoto. Excellent results were obtained; very important strategically was the detailed photographic coverage of Okinawa obtained for use in the April landings. On 26 January, the Pacific Fleet units forming the Third Fleet passed to the command of Admiral Spruance, terminating the active five months' operation, carried through support of the Leyte and Luzon campaigns and culminated in the destructive raids in the South China Sea and strikes against the Ryukyus.

Commander Third Fleet and staff returned first to Pearl Harbor and then about 13 February to the Mainland for rehabilitation and for the purpose of securing firsthand the latest information on developments in materiel and techniques, procurement, distribution and training. Staff members made extensive inquiry into methods of air support as practiced in the European Theater, inasmuch as the tightening blockade of the Japanese Empire and the increasing magnitude of planned land operations accented the importance of this phase of air operations. Coordination between carrier and land-based air forces, particularly B-29's, was also discussed and studied both from a tactical and strategical standpoint. Staff members had opportunities to obtain latest data and developments in their specialties.

In late March, Fleet Admiral Nimitz designated Commander Third Fleet as Commander of the Mid-Pacific Striking Force, to be composed of all major surface units available in the Hawaiian area and in West Coast ports of the United States. This Force was charged with the interception and destruction of enemy raiding forces, envisaged as a potential Japanese "contribution" to the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations; necessary plans and preparations were made; however, no Japanese naval or air movements required translation of the plans into action.

April and early May was devoted to development of comprehensive plans to encircle and destroy the Japanese strength in the home islands; mid-May brought an assignment from Fleet Admiral Nimitz to relieve Admiral Spruance of command of assigned forces in the combat area on 27 May 1945. The Okinawa land campaign still had bitter fighting, although the final issue was not in doubt; fast carrier support, often in a direct support role, still was being furnished.

The pilots of the carrier force needed rehabilitation, and ships and materiel needed maintenance and repair, but it was impossible at this time to release them without unduly increasing the hazards to the Okinawa forces. One task group, daily, was used for CAP and direct support missions; two task groups were used occasionally. Units of the Amphibious Force continued to bear the brunt of Japanese air attacks but also continued to take heavy toll of the attacking planes. CVE units hit the Sakishima Gunto as often as neutralization appeared necessary; the Southwest Pacific Air Force was charged with Formosa air neutralization. Planes of Fleet Air Wing One, a task group of Third Fleet, based on Okinawa, continued to scour the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan on search and attack missions, tightening the blockade of the Japanese home islands and inflicting much damage on shipping.

Carrier fighter sweeps were made against Kyushu 2 and 3 June, and again on 8 June. Okino Daito Shima was bombarded on 9 June and Minami Daito Shima on 10 June. Both bombardments were augmented by air strikes which had for their chief purpose experimentation in the use of new fuzes and fire bombs against enemy anti-aircraft positions; there was an extensive by-product of destruction of enemy installations.

June saw the completion of the Okinawa campaign; on 21 June all organized resistance ceased on that island; on 26-29 June, Kume Shima was occupied without resistance, supplying additional radar security to the Okinawa installations. Fleet Air Wing One continued to search for and destroy Japanese shipping, covering the Yellow Sea and ranging far north in the Sea of Japan; close coordination was maintained with the Pacific submarine force in tightening the sea blockade of the Empire. Japanese air attacks tapered off to sporadic efforts against firmly entrenched Okinawa positions; a major naval and land phase of the Pacific war had been successfully concluded.

Completing a two weeks' period of repair, replenishment and rehabilitation, on 1 July the fast carrier force sortied from Leyte Gulf with comprehensive plans for the destruction of the remainder of the Japanese Navy and for inflicting maximum damage on enemy air power, shipping and installations. Task Force 37, the British fast carrier force, was not due to join until 16 July from a maintenance and repair period at Sydney. Careful preparations and coordination had been made for the carrier strike and surface bombardment plans. B-29's had made recent reconnaissance of northern Honshu and Hokkaido areas; Navy photo Liberators escorted by Army Mustangs covered the Tokyo area; a submarine reconnaissance had been made for possible mine-fields in areas selected for surface bombardments; barrier patrols were flown by land-based aircraft against possible Japanese reconnaissance planes; submarines made an anti-picket boat sweep to aid an undetected approach to the initial launching area; careful coordination with land-based air strikes was effected.

The elaborate and careful preparations paid handsome dividends. Complete surprise was attained on the initial strike against Tokyo airfields 10 July. Coming out of a weather front at 0200 Item and making the initial launch at 0400, Task Force 38 planes swept the Tokyo area unopposed. Flak was light and meager; enemy planes were found widely dispersed, revetted and usually degassed. VT-fuzed bombs were largely used, making damage appraisal very difficult, but a conservative sweep-up set destroyed planes at 109 and damaged at 231. The only airborne enemy planes destroyed were two snoopers near the Force. Many hangars and shops at airfields were destroyed or damaged, incidental to the major strike effort made against the enemy air force. The failure of the enemy to fight in defense of vital installations was surprising but not unexpected.

Poor weather prevented planned strikes against Northern Honshu and Hokkaido on 13 July, but 14 July brought slightly better weather that permitted air strikes against coastal targets and bombardment of Kamaishi; this bombardment, completed without opposition, was the first of a planned series against

(*Continued on page 152*)

TO YOU WHO WEAR THIS HONORABLE SERVICE BUTTON

Santa Fe Honors You

for a job well done!

All of us on the Santa Fe want to express our appreciation to every one of you victorious fighters, from buck privates to generals, from ordinary seamen to admirals, for a job well done.

We want to express our appreciation, too, for your patient consideration of crowded travel conditions you have had to meet. Your understanding of this condition has made our job of handling record-breaking traffic loads a lot easier.

Military and civilian traffic on the Santa Fe since Pearl Harbor has been the greatest in our entire history. The real test has been to make the same number of passenger cars we had before the war handle this tremendous load, as no new passenger equipment has been built since Pearl Harbor. (We expect delivery in early 1946 of our first new passenger cars since Pearl Harbor).

Santa Fe still has record-breaking loads ahead. We are helping move millions of you men back home in a matter of months, whereas more than two years were consumed in moving you to your fighting fronts. This is a happy job we have long awaited, knowing that no matter how tough it would be you men would understand that we, like yourselves, want to get you home as quickly as possible.

Yes, Santa Fe is about to finish its wartime job, thanks to each and every one of you.

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

Third Fleet Operations

(*Continued from page 150*)

coastal objectives within reach of ships' guns, and opened a new phase in the naval war against Japan, tightening the sea blockade and bringing the war intimately to the home islands. The air attacks were continued 15 July, and a task unit bombarded Muroran on southern Hokkaido, pouring in more than a thousand tons of explosives. There was great destruction of installations in this two-day period; the toll of ships and facilities was so great that it is believed the entire economic structure of this area was seriously impaired.

On 16 July Task Force 37 under Vice Admiral Rawlings joined the Third Fleet. Conferences were held aboard the Missouri and future plans discussed in detail. Plans were drawn for the integrated employment of Task Force 37 and 38 and close coordination of operations and procedure established. Attempts were made to strike the Tokyo area 17-18 July with indifferent success; fog and thick overcast hid most of the lucrative targets. A heavy surface force bombarded Hitachi, 50 miles north of Tokyo, the night of 17-18 July in bad weather, with only radar spotting available. In spite of handicaps the bombardment was successful in inflicting damage on the Hitachi Engineering Works and Hitachi Arms Factory. HMS King George V participated in the bombardment. In the afternoon of 18 July, with a slight improvement in bad weather conditions, a heavy strike was launched against the Nagato, moored and camouflaged at Yokosuka. Hits were obtained but destruction was not accomplished. Flak was the most intense yet encountered by Task Force 38 planes. An anti-shipping sweep by a light surface force off the Honshu coast near Tokyo the night of 18-19 July met no opposition but found no shipping targets; coastal radio and radar installations were bombarded before retirement.

A policy of sweeps by light forces was stressed in order to keep pressure on the enemy, to probe for weaknesses and reaction, to tighten the blockade, to adversely affect enemy morale and to inflict damage. Two sweeps were carried out the night of 22-23 July; one by Destroyer Squadron 57, around Ogasamara Gunto found no shipping but bombarded Omura. The other, by Destroyer Squadron 61 swept Sagami Nada and caught a 4 ship convoy, sinking two cargo ships, probably sinking another, and damaging an escort. A sweep of Kii Suido the night of 24-25 July netted no shipping but the task unit successfully completed its bombardment mission against coastal objectives.

On 24 July heavy air strikes were made in the Inland Sea area with combatant ships as the principal target. 22 warships totalling 258,000 tons were damaged. Seriously damaged were a BB of the Ise class, the CV Amagi, an unidentified CV, the CA Aoba, the CLs Oyodo and Kuma, the AG Settsu and 2 DD. In smothering adjacent airfields 74 enemy planes were destroyed and 137 damaged. 53 merchant vessels totalling 17,000 tons were sunk. It was a crippling, destructive blow at the Japanese Inland Sea Defense. A repetition of the strikes was attempted on 25 July, but bad weather reduced the effectiveness of the heavy strikes on the primary targets.

On 28 July our carrier planes of Task Force 38 returned to the Kure area to finish off the damaged remnants of the Japanese fleet. One battleship, believed to be the Hyuga, was seen to be on the bottom with topsides smashed and deck amidships under water, a result of the attacks of the 24th. At the end of the strikes of the 28th, all of the other heavy ships present, except the carriers, had been put out of action. One battleship was burning and apparently on the bottom; the battleship Haruna was beached and burning, with a large hole in her stern; the cruiser Oyodo was lying on her side; the cruiser Aoba was battered and burning with her stern on the bottom; the cruiser Tone was badly damaged and beached; one old cruiser was on her beam ends and beached; and the two large carriers, the Amagi and Katsuragi were severely damaged although still afloat. Many smaller ships were sunk or damaged; 136 planes were destroyed and 156 damaged. Planes of Task Force 37 (the British carrier force) sank a destroyer, 14 merchant ships and many small craft, and damaged many others, besides accounting for 34 enemy planes. 28 July marked the end of the Japanese Navy.

Heavy pressure on the Japanese forces was maintained and increased. Hamamatsu was bombarded 29-30 July; the Tokyo-Nagoya area was combed with heavy air strikes 30 July; destroyers swept Suruga Gulf and bombarded Shimizu 30-31 July. On 31 July a typhoon, threatening future strike areas, caused radical departures from planned operations; its passage was waited out. Northern Honshu was struck heavily 9 August in compliance with a request from General MacArthur to wipe out a concentration of enemy planes believed forming up for an airborne attack against our nearby bases; 251 planes were destroyed and 141 damaged. Kamaishi was also bombarded by heavy units this date.

To render strategic support to Russia in her first combat efforts in the Pacific War, and to capitalize on the unexpectedly profitable targets found on the 9th, heavy strikes were made again on 10 August. Discovery of two previously untouched apparent stockpile airfields enabled boosting the 9-10 August total of aircraft destroyed and damaged to 720. Little shipping was found; locomotives and railroad facilities provided profitable secondary targets.

Early in August estimates of the situation indicated that the collapse of Japanese resistance might occur within a matter of days. The Third Fleet had been scheduled to return to Eniwetok and Leyte for replenishment prior to resumption of offensive operations in September, but the trend of events necessitated the remaining in the Empire area in order to capitalize on any weakness of great magnitude which might develop. Orders were issued by Commander Third Fleet to keep the logistic pipe-line full in case it became necessary to indefinitely prolong operations in Empire waters; no single decision contributed more to the later success of the Third Fleet in reorganizing for occupation.

By 10 August planning was well in hand to meet by emergency measures the contingency of surrender; radical improvisations were conceived and laid out; the forces afloat were called upon to organize Marine and Bluejacket landing forces and to assemble groups of specialists and artificers to permit the establishment of temporary shore facilities and to operate seized Japanese facilities and equipment. Plans and organization included provision for the occupation and development of the Yokosuka Naval Base and air station, the manning of many enemy vessels with nucleus crews, the demilitarization of enemy installations, the rescue of our prisoners of war in Japanese hands, and supply drops to prisoner of war camps.

Diplomatic negotiations seemed to be progressing slowly, so the Tokyo area was struck again 13 August. Attacks were also initiated 15 August, and the "cease firing" order came even as the first wave of a carrier-plane attack arrived over the Tokyo area.

Third Fleet responsibilities in the occupation of Japan consisted of seizure and development of the Yokosuka area as a naval base site; coverage of airborne movements of Army troops, including assignment and stationing of ships for possible rescue use; transportation of Army forces moving by surface into the Tokyo area; provision for fire support and direct air support to meet any Japanese opposition; and quick rescue of our prisoners of war under Japanese control. Plans were drawn to accomplish these tasks and proved adequate.

On 27 August elements of the Third Fleet, after receiving Japanese emissaries, entered Sagami Wan; minesweeping was immediately initiated. On 28 August minesweepers and a few light units entered Tokyo Bay; on the 29th several heavy ships anchored off Yokosuka. The landings on the 30th were made without untoward incident; on 2 September aboard the USS Missouri, the formal surrender of the Japanese was received by General of the Army MacArthur and by representatives of the Allied Powers. An impressive and forceful note was added the surrender ceremony by the debarking at the Yokohama docks of the 1st Cavalry Division, brought from Luzon by the ships of Task Force 32. Troops of the Eighth Army continued to pour into the Tokyo area; by 13 September the initial phase was completed and the area well secured.

Task Group 30.6, organized early to deal with an anticipated necessity to provide adequate and quick rescue of our prisoners of war under Japanese control, proved effective and invaluable. Starting 29 August, ships were sent to waterfront camps on Tokyo Bay, and the prisoners of war found therein rescued from intolerable conditions. Operations were gradually widened, and fullest use was made of this Task Group. After evacuation from the Tokyo area, rescue missions covered the Nagoya and Sendai areas; by 15 September 7591 former prisoners of war had been rescued, processed, clothed, hospitalized where necessary, and evacuation to rear areas started.

Task Force 35, the fire support force, while not called upon to perform its intended task, nevertheless found unusual and profitable employment. Known Japanese suicide boat and torpedo nests and coastal batteries in the Tokyo area were first demilitarized and the midget subs, kaitens and boats destroyed or sunk; then a carefully-planned, methodical search was made of the Japanese Coastline in the Third Fleet zone of responsibility, utilizing all possible sources of intelligence, resulting in elimination of numerous potential threats to surface operations afforded by the cave-concealed Japanese midgets, boats, and torpedoes.

19 September saw the completion of Third Fleet tasks in the Tokyo area; those units which were to remain in Japanese waters were placed under Commander Fifth Fleet; the remainder prepared for early departure to West Coast ports. During this period of Third Fleet operations, planes destroyed totaled 3388; ships excluding small craft, 388; many additional planes and ships were assessed as damaged or probably destroyed. Personnel of the Fleet met exacting demands and performed arduous and unusual tasks with that intelligence, enthusiasm and courage characteristic of the American fighting man.

Knights of the Sea!

Charging full tilt into combat, often against tremendous odds, the men who rode the Elco PTs to victory are modern versions of the fearless knights of old. Never have craft so midget in size proved so mighty in deed. Never have officers and crews more richly deserved the praises of a grateful nation.

Elco PTs brought MacArthur out of the Philippines, stood station in the Aleutians, fought the Germans and Italians in the Mediterranean, attacked the Jap fleet at Guadalcanal, conquested New Guinea, were first to sight the French coast in the English Channel crossing, and spearheaded the invasion of the Philippines.

During the war Elco, concentrating exclusively on the mass production of PTs, *built more PTs than all other American shipbuilders combined.* Many new inventions were initiated and successfully carried out by Elco to make the Elco PT an ever more powerful naval weapon.

In anticipation of war requirements for PT boats, Elco built at its own expense a large modern plant which proved to be a national asset of great value. Elco plans to preserve this fine plant against possible future naval requirements by utilizing it to construct Elco pleasure craft, which will be fitting heirs to the fame of Elco PTs.

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Atlantic Training

(*Continued from page 67*)

cluding submarines. (2) To direct, command and supervise all training of assigned types of vessels. (3) To provide periodic refresher training for crews of operating vessels.

In carrying out these objectives during the fourth year of the war in the Pacific, COTCLant activities trained approximately 800,000 officers and men; they conducted the shakedown training of 593 vessels, from battleships to PT's; and they gave refresher training to 1,362 ships —a total of 1,955 ships.

The actual training was done by the 40-odd activities in the COTCLant family. These subordinates vary in size from small Naval District Representatives to large Naval Training Stations capable of training 20,000 officers and men at one time. The command determines the over-all policy for each of them and controls the curricula, training methods, organization, personnel (both instructional and trainees), and training equipment.

May, 1944, saw the merger of the Amphibious Training Command and COTCLant. This amalgamation resulted in COTCLant's assumption of responsibility for the entire amphibious program, previously conducted by the Commander, Amphibious Training Command, U. S. Atlantic Fleet. It included the training of all types of landing vessels and amphibious auxiliaries such as APA's, AKA's and LSD's.

While this increase in command responsibility was occurring, training at certain subordinate units began to decline as programs were completed. Training in net-laying, minecraft, destroyer escort, motor torpedo boat and amphibious pre-commissioning was operating on a reduced scale in the closing months of the war.

Ships redeployed to the Pacific were given 10 days of refresher training before leaving the east coast. The largest group, DD's and DE's, had been engaged in Atlantic convoy work and in anti-submarine warfare. In preparing them for the Pacific, COTCLant gave a less prominent place to anti-submarine warfare and stressed shore bombardment and intensive anti-aircraft training. LST's and LCT's returning from Europe for rehabilitation and redeployment formed another large group in the refresher program.

An ever present problem in any training organization is the elimination of lag between battle front developments and training methods. All training—and especially operational—must keep abreast of fleet needs and, when possible, anticipate them. COTCLant accomplished this by shifting emphasis when required, by adopting new methods, and by training in the use of new ships and weapons.

The emphasis on shore bombardment and anti-aircraft training became stronger and stronger and applied to all types of vessels as the Japanese surface fleet disappeared and their kamikaze attacks were intensified. To meet these attacks, specialized training was given, including the use of more radio-controlled planes in simulating aircraft attacks, intensive ashore and afloat training in fighter direction—both visual and radar, and additional anti-aircraft training.

The introduction of training in the Elwood High Speed Method of Fueling at Sea, additional drills in ammunition and bomb handling at sea are examples of new types of training given. These were introduced to help prepare ships for operating with the speedy task forces in the western Pacific far from supply bases.

New types of ships trained during the year included destroyer and destroyer escort fighter direction picket ships and the rocket firing LSM(R)'s.

This war-born activity, having earned a permanent role in the Navy, now looks forward to its first year of peace-time operation when its training methods, developed in a period of emergency, will be a heritage for peace. Telescoping the training of our peacetime personnel to accomplish a job in weeks which required months before the war, together with our ability to bring the portion of the Navy in reserve status to full fighting efficiency in a minimum of time, will make a substantial contribution to our peace-time preparedness.

War in South Atlantic

(*Continued from page 67*)

The task of convoying back and forth along the South American bulge between Rio de Janeiro and Trinidad was assumed gradually by Brazilian units trained for the job. As German submarines failed to return, the need for convoys ended and in March, 1945, they were dissolved for coastal traffic. In April, with the reduction of operations, our Fourth Fleet activities were redesignated South Atlantic Forces.

Blockade patrols and sweeps by planes and ships continued until Germany surrendered, although squadrons and units were continuously being detached and sent to the United States for other duty. Some units were turned over to the Brazilian services—Air and Naval. Thusly, two Destroyer Escorts, the "Alger" and the "Marts" were transferred under lend-lease in March, as was a squadron of PBY planes complete with spare parts. Six destroyer escorts previously had been lend-leased to Brazil so that the Brazilian Navy had a total of eight.

Training of Brazilian Navy and Air Force men prepared the way for their handling of the arms and tools they received. Brazilian Naval officers attended U. S. schools in Florida. U. S.-Brazilian Aircraft Training Units (USBATU) were set up for the instruction of Brazilian pilots and crews in the flying and maintenance of Catalinas and Venturas. In addition, Brazilians accompanied U. S. crews on training and operational sweeps. A course in aviation supply was given in the U. S. Naval Operating Base in Rio de Janeiro. Such varied ratings as Radiomen, Electrician's Mates, Machinists, Drydock and Radar specialists were given informal training in the use of the new and unfamiliar American equipment they now are using.

When V-E Day arrived, the Brazilian Navy was ready for the job of running an Air-Sea Rescue patrol along the South Atlantic routes flown by U. S. planes engaged in the redeployment of troops and combat aircraft. Our allies accepted the responsibility of guiding the westward bound planes from Africa to Brazil, supplying them with meteorological information and standing by for the rescue of crew and passengers of any that might be forced down along the way. This permitted us to detach many U. S. units and men for service in the Pacific.

Two plans of operations were set up for the movement, at the request of the War and Navy Departments. The Green Plan provided for the redeployment of troops from the European theater via Africa and South America; the White Plan for the return of combat aircraft. Routes were selected along two lines: Recife-Ascension and Recife-Dakar.

Months after the end of the European war, two German submarines surrendered to Argentine Naval authorities at Mar del Plata, Argentina. Arrangements were made for delivery of the crews and submarines to the United States.

The South Atlantic Forces were dissolved in August, 1945, when its Commander in the flagship Omaha departed Brazilian waters bound for Puerto Rico and command of the Caribbean Area and the Tenth Naval District.

Temporarily left behind in Brazil, are small Naval units whose task it is to wind up the details concerned with the final disposition of property and materials.

The U. S. Army and Navy Missions and the joint U. S. Army-Navy Air Mission to Brazil will maintain the traditional ties of friendship strengthened by joint allied struggle in battle.

In China

(*Continued from page 86*)

stantly by effective ambushes on Jap raiding and food-gathering parties, by attacks on barracks and depots, and by persistent sabotage of rail, water, and highway lines of communication. During the war's last year SACO troops killed more than 23,000 Japs, destroyed 209 bridges, 84 locomotives, 141 ships and river craft, and 97 warehouses. In the same year they did a magnificent job of rescue work, bringing 76 U. S. and Chinese fliers back through Jap lines to safety after they had been shot down in enemy territory.

Intelligence provided by Chinese-American coast-watcher teams which observed the movements of ships from high points along the sea, played an important role in the ultimate paralysis of Japanese shipping. Reports from these coast watchers to SACO headquarters were analyzed, condensed, and relayed to U. S. submarines and to planes of General Chennault's 14th Air Force.

The liaison with General Chennault's Liberators extended also to air-borne mining operations along the coastal shipping routes, in Jap-held harbors, and on the vital inland water routes of the Yangtze River. SACO provided the mines, special intelligence, and trained mine warfare officers. The results were thousands of tons of enemy shipping sent to the bottom, ports closed for weeks at a time, and Jap shipping routes forced further out into deep water where submarines could do their work.

Despite the fact that SACO Americans had to "live off the land" in many areas where deadly contagious diseases were common, Navy medical personnel compiled the remarkable record of never losing a man in China by disease. In addition, Navy doctors and corpsmen brought modern medical care to thousands of Chinese guerrillas and loyal civilians who had never known it before. These humanitarian services were a major morale factor in the maintenance of unrelenting Sino-American pressure against Japanese columns.

SACO has been called "the most closely integrated allied organization that ever surmounted a language barrier." Certainly it is true that Americans and Chinese —living, studying, working and fighting together in their common cause against Japan—achieved a powerful unity within SACO. They proved that the differences between Eastern and Western peoples can readily be dissolved in an atmosphere of genuine friendship and sincerity of purpose. It is reasonable to hope that the mutual understandings worked out between individuals of SACO during the hardships and bitter conflict of war will be helpful in peace-time relationships between China and the United States.

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Note How Easily Harness is Adjusted:

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TO REMOVE HARNESS; a simple tug at chest strap fitting and leg strap fitting automatically loosens the harness — then just detach in the usual way.

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Naval Forces, France

(*Continued from page 60*)

tense artillery barrages and the speed and dash of the assaulting troops quickly won footholds on the opposite banks. At once the Navy Units came into play, and ferried over supporting troops, equipment, artillery, and tanks. The LCVPs were busy holding up the pontoons against the strength of the current while the bridging was being laid. They were also used to patrol against swimmers, and floating mines, logs, and other debris which threatened the pontoon bridges. The LCM's were very useful in ferrying over tanks and artillery, and their great lift accelerated the transport of much heavy equipment. All the while, enemy air attacks and artillery fire harassed the operations, but the work proceeded quickly and without serious loss. On the Ninth Army front an LCM had the privilege of ferrying the Prime Minister of Great Britain, General Eisenhower, Field Marshal Montgomery, and Lieut. General Simpson to the opposite shore. The Unit with the Third Army assisted the crossings on a wide front, from Nierstein to the Lorelei Rocks, operating in the particularly swift currents of the Upper Rhine with great skill.

By early April, the Army Engineers had thrown over the Rhine so many pontoon bridges and had built enough railroad bridges at strategic points, so that the naval assistance was no longer needed. The landing craft were therefore transferred to the Armies, and the personnel were withdrawn and sent home. This inland operation was unique and the services rendered were highly appreciated and warmly praised by the military authorities.

In order to clear the port of Bordeaux where the Germans held in strength the entrance to the river Gironde, the Supreme Commander had ordered an operation by the French Army of the Atlantic. By direction of the Allied Naval Commander in Chief, supervision of the naval aspects of this operation was placed under Commander Naval Forces, France, acting in conjunction with General Devers of the Sixth Army Group, who supervised the land operations, including the support to be rendered by the First Tactical Air Force.

On 15 April the attack began upon German positions at Pointe de Graves and Royan, with bombardment from the sea, by the battleship "Lorraine," the cruiser "Georges Lejgues"; with heavy artillery barrages; and very powerful air attack by 1200 heavy bombers using Napom bombs. As a result, the Germans surrendered in two days. The next step was to clear the Ile d'Oleron, to the northward, as batteries there menaced the deep-water channel to Bordeaux. This was carried out two weeks later, with an amphibious assault across the estuaries of the Charente in LCVPs loaned for the occasion and again covered by Admiral Rue's squadron from the sea.

These operations were carried out thoroughly and expeditiously, and freed the great port of Bordeaux for civilian use as soon as mines were swept and sunken ships raised. All German-held western ports were surrendered intact, and without further damage or sabotage, in the unconditional surrender of 8 May 1945.

By the end of June 1945, the Command was dissolved, most personnel sent home, all ports of northern and western France were under full French operation, and our Navy only supervising at Cherbourg and at Le Havre for re-deployment of our Armies.

XX Corps

(*Continued from page 64*)

The line was held by three German divisions, two infantry and one panzer. A series of continued hammer blows by the 94th Infantry Division culminated in an out and out attack on 19 February which broke all organized resistance. By early afternoon of this day it had become apparent to me that a breakthrough had been achieved. I so informed General Patton who approved my recommendation to commit the 10th Armored Division early the following morning.

Advancing in two columns on parallel roads that ran the length of the ridges forming the backbone of the triangle, one armored combat command drove straight for the tip of the triangle at Tawern, while another armored combat command headed north along the Moselle. The speed and power of these spearheads overran Siegfried Line positions and road blocks which the Germans covered with heavy artillery and anti-tank fire.

Before the two divisions reached the west bank of the Saar, two enemy infantry divisions had been destroyed, 11,754 prisoners captured, and large numbers of enemy tanks and guns.

Continuing to make the most of the surprise element, I dispatched a column across the Saar and up its east bank to attack the key communications city of Trier, which fell 2 March together with a bridge intact over the Moselle River.

Capture of Trier set the stage for operations in the Palatinate, for ten days ending 17 March, armor and infantry in the vicinity of Zerf and Pellingen fought off the 6th SS Mountain Division along the line from Trier to Saarburg, which the Germans elected to defend as the last barrier west of the Rhine.

On 13 March the 94th, 26th and 80th Infantry Divisions attacked eastward and the 65th Infantry staged a diversionary attack from the Saarlautern area. For three days the infantry hammered steadily against stubborn resistance from strong forces entrenched behind improved natural and man-made obstacles, and on 16 March it breached and uncovered the main Siegfried Line.

An unparalleled opportunity now existed for the destruction, in place, of the first and part of the Seventh German Armies. The 10th Armored thereupon was again committed and exploited the breakthrough. The back of the German army in the Palatinate was broken. The 65th overran Saarlautern, the 80th cleared Kaiserlautern, and the XX Corps was on its way to the Valley of the Rhine and encirclement of enemy forces west thereof.

With the 12th Armored Division attached and committed, and the 94th and 80th Divisions motorized and moved through the Saar Valley and Palatinate, the Corps pocketed thousands of bewildered Germans, capturing 43,000 prisoners and an inestimable quantity of materiel. By 21 March the 12th Armored was on the Rhine.

There what appeared a new phase was entered, but in reality it was a continuation of the engagement begun in the Saar-Moselle triangle. Before elements of the Badly mauled German army which managed to escape between the Saar and the Rhine could dig in on the east bank of the Rhine, the 80th Division was rushed to the river in the vicinity of Mainz and an assault crossing was undertaken.

Two hours of heavy fighting under intense artillery and small arms fire saw the infantrymen secure a bridgehead on the heartland of Germany. At 0300 the Germans launched two strong counterattacks which were repulsed. A simultaneous crossing of the main river met with equal success and Hocheim was cleared by mid-morning.

At noon this same day corps engineers of the 160th Combat Engineer Battalion started construction of the 1896-foot treadway bridge across the Rhine at Mainz and the next day our armor was pouring across the longest treadway bridge in the European theater. The forward echelon of corps headquarters moved forward into Wiesbaden 29 March, and the 65th and 5th Infantry Divisions and the 6th Armored were passed through the bridgehead. By noon of that day the city of Frankfurt was clear of enemy resistance. By 1930 the engineers had a bridge across the Main at Frankfurt, and the attack north toward Kassel was continued with relentless pressure.

Kassel fell 4 April. The 80th Infantry Division teamed with the 4th Armored Division in the vicinity of Gotha and the 76th Infantry Division with the 6th Armored Division in the northern half of the XX Corps' zone to launch a parallel thrust to the east that completely smashed and overran German forces. One column ran to Erfurt, which was all but leveled after it refused a surrender ultimatum 11 April. Weimar accepted a like ultimatum delivered by the bicycling burgomeister of neighboring Troistedt, and its fall bared to the world the horrors of nearby Buchenwald.

Starvation, murder, cremation and dissection of helpless humans had taken place there in unbelievable terror and brutality. Two thousand citizens of Weimar were ordered to see for themselves the suffering and torture among the 21,000 prisoners remaining in the camp. General Eisenhower visited Buchenwald at my invitation and that of General Patton, and later, on General Eisenhower's invitation, members of Congress came to inspect the torture chambers.

Armor tipped columns took Jena 12 April, Seitz 15 April and on 16 April stood before Chemnitz across the Elbe, 150 miles inside Germany. In seven days 47,000 prisoners were taken. While preparing for a jumpoff against Chemnitz, after a surrender ultimatum had been returned unopened by the German commander, the XX Corps received orders to swing south and drive across the Danube into Austria. Thus began the final phase of combat.

A task force composed of tanks, mounted infantry and the rangers pierced enemy lines east of Nurnberg, which had been captured after heavy fighting, and swung rapidly south toward Regensburg on the Danube. Elements of the 65th took Neumarket after intense house-to-house fighting on 25 April.

An assault crossing of the Danube resulted in disorganization of the enemy south of the river. The 71st Division met strong resistance but succeeded in taking an airport and hundreds of Luftwaffe personnel. On 27 April Regensburg fell to the 65th Division.

The 13th Armored then was committed, sped south across the Isar and proceeded to the Inn River at Obernburg, on the border of Austria. Armor and infantry was poured across the Inn and the weary enemy, reduced to ineffectiveness, surrendered by the thousands. The drive reached and absorbed the great Austrian city of Linz, and spread south along the west bank of the Enns. Shortly after the XX Corps reached and crossed the Enns, contact was established with the Russians driving from the east.

On 9 May, the day hostilities ceased in Europe, it was my pleasure to clasp the hand of the commander of the Russian XX Corps on a bridge over the Enns River at Enns.

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

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Caribbean Command

(*Continued from page 66*)

bat Team, which left the Isthmus for the Pacific Theater on 8 May 1945, was trained in the Mobile Force.

Antiaircraft and harbor defense batteries of the Coast Artillery Command ringed the zone at strategic positions along both sides of the Canal and extended along either coast with tactical personnel maintaining a high degree of efficiency through constant practice firing and related activities. The defense system was integrated with a chain of radar stations situated throughout the coastal areas between Costa Rica and Colombia.

All three major commands of the Panama Canal Department trained personnel of the Latin American armies in various schools maintained at installations on the Isthmus. During the first year since October 1944, more than 250 student officers and a like number of enlisted men completed courses varying in duration from six to 13 weeks and covering all phases of Ground, Air and Service operations. Each course also includes 12 hours of instruction in sanitation, malaria control and prevention of social diseases.

Principal supplementary activity of the Command is the Military Missions Division, which was activated in May 1944 to maintain uniform policies among Latin American countries for hypothetical unified hemispheric defense.

All countries of Central and South America, except Brazil and Uruguay, are cooperating directly in the standard program of training and military counseling under the Military Missions Divisions. Brazil having the status of a commission was placed directly under the War Department when the South Atlantic Command was inactivated, while Paraguay came within the Command division at the same time.

The Military Missions Division, under the direction of Brig. Gen. Jerome J. Waters, Jr., functions through command channels in maintaining its highly successful project of indoctrination as coordinated by the commanding general.

Activities of the missions within the respective countries are not confined to military matters alone, but embrace such allied fields as public health and education, which have accomplished a considerable contribution to closer mutual understanding and inter-national friendship.

In addition to the assistance rendered within the countries, the program also provides more detailed and practical instruction at its training centers in Panama and Puerto Rico for qualified personnel selected by the governments concerned.

Another principal project was established in connection with the redeployment of troops from the European Theater to the Pacific Theater by way of the Panama Canal. The problem was efficiently handled through Operation Transit under the general supervision of Maj. Gen. John L. Homer, Deputy Department Commander, placing all facilities of the establishment on the Isthmus at the disposal of the troops for diversion from the strain of combat conditions.

Under Army supervision, all local civilian organizations and the American Red Cross presented a coordinated program of entertainment, recreation and hospitality that contributed immeasurably to troop morale.

Among other accomplishments during the past year were the transfer of 4,000 Grade Six and Seven personnel to the United States for use as Infantry replacements and the activation and training of 37 units for service in other theaters.

The Command also established the highly praised Army Air Forces Tropical Weather School in the Panama Canal Department, conducted extensive tests of jungle equipment and material that were such assets in other theaters, and made substantial progress in the suppression and prevention of tropical diseases.

Another Command operation was the preparation of necessary installations in support of the Green and White Projects which staged surplus troops and aircraft from the European Theater through the Antilles Department to the United States from 1 June 1945 to 10 September 1945.

With the reduction of the defense category of the Antilles Department in June 1945, all tactical units were withdrawn from Aruba, Curacao, Roosevelt Roads and St. Thomas, and the installations were placed on caretaking status.

Demobilization and reduction to projected peacetime strength now are being effected in conformity with War Department directives.

The VII Corps

(*Continued from page 56*)

corridors of advance over icy roads through snow-filled woods in temperatures below freezing. This relentless drive continued and the Germans were steadily forced back. On 16 January, VII Corps linked up at Houffalize, Belgium, with elements of the Third Army to the south, thus creating a solid Allied Front. Having successfully accomplished its mission, VII Corps was withdrawn from Belgium and reoriented 5 February in its former sector along the Roer River opposite Duren, Germany.

The VII Corps advance to Rhine River began on 23 February. Forcing a crossing of the Roer, VII Corps swiftly captured Duren and advanced to the Erft River in four days. A bridgehead was established over the Erft and the swift advance continued to the Rhine. The Corps captured Cologne after 57 hours of street fighting; also captured Bonn and by 9 March, had cleared its sector of 84 kilometers along the west bank of the Rhine.

On 15 March, the Corps was assigned a sector in the newly established Remagen bridgehead east of the Rhine and an attack was immediately launched to expand the bridgehead to the north and east. Three ponton bridges were expeditiously constructed across the Rhine as bridge sites were freed of enemy fire. By 25 March, the difficult mountainous terrain was cleared and the exposed left flank of the Corps was securely anchored along the Sieg River by the 78th Infantry Division. The 3d Armored Division then attacked through the 1st and 104th Infantry Divisions to spearhead a bold drive to the East. The 104th Infantry Division closely followed the armor, mopping up pockets of resistance. As the spearheading units rapidly advanced, the Corps' left flank assumed greater proportions making it imperative for the 1st and 8th Infantry Divisions to progressively push east and north so as to seize and secure this exposed left flank along the Sieg River. Meanwhile, the 3d Armored continued its daring drive, advancing 90 kilometers to Marburg in three days, then turning north and, advancing a record 90 kilometers in one day to the vicinity of Paderborn. The 9th Infantry Division was attached to the VII Corps to assist the 78th, 8th, 1st and 104th Infantry Divisions to hold the southern and eastern sides of the huge Ruhr pocket. Paderborn was rapidly captured and the encirclement of the Ruhr Valley was completed when the 3rd Armored Division contacted XIX Corps elements at Lippstadt on 1 April. At this time, the VII Corps was extended more than 200 miles as it had fought to the east, north and west simultaneously in order to hold two-thirds of the encircling arm that surrounded more than 350,000 enemy troops in the Ruhr Valley.

Leaving the Ruhr pocket behind, the VII Corps was reoriented to the east and continued its rapid advance on 7 April. A bridgehead which was established against stubborn opposition over the Weser River enabled the 3d Armored Division to break through and race eastward. Bypassing the Hartz Mountains, on the south, the armor followed by the 104th Infantry Division swept on to drive the German forces to the Elbe River. The 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions and the 4th Cavalry Group pushed into and around the Hartz Mountains, capturing 45,000 enemy troops. The city of Halle was seized by the 104th Infantry Division after five days of street fighting. By 23 April, all enemy resistance had ceased within the Corps sector west of the Mulde River.

On 26 April, VII Corps patrols established contact with Russian troops along the Elbe River which concluded the combat activity of VII Corps in the European Theater of Operations.

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Iceland Base Command

(*Continued from page 68*)

others, flying direct, found this island a refuge from what otherwise would have been a watery grave in the North Atlantic. At first the airdrome at Reykjavik, built by the British, was the only available landing field but in the spring of 1943 the airfields in the Keflavik area were completed by the United States Forces and paved a link in the chain of bases across the Atlantic. A steady stream of tactical aircraft began to pass through Iceland both winter and summer. From bases in Iceland also flew many of the bombers that attacked the German undersea menace.

Germany, as well as the Allies, had realized the need for Iceland as a weather station. Since weather moves in an easterly direction in this area, the weather over Norway and part of the continent could be predicted from the weather in Iceland. From Icelandic bases weather ships ranged over the North Atlantic and collected weather data which was forwarded to all units of the vast chain of weather stations maintained by the army.

An important part of the problem of operating a base in Iceland consisted in maintaining close liaison with other Allied forces. Defense systems were coordinated, supplies were traded and borrowed and an excellent record of cooperation was maintained.

The clearest indication of the excellent relations that have been fostered between the United States Armed Forces in Iceland and the industrious, cultured people of Iceland is to be found in the many highly complimentary editorials which were found in the Icelandic papers at the close of the war in Europe and again with the defeat of Japan. A wise choice of Icelandic-speaking army liaison officers helped to establish and maintain cordial relations. With the close of the war there are indications of further ties being made through both trade and education. President Sveinn Bjornsson has liberally expressed the gratitude of his country for the service which the United States has rendered.

The Icelandic people were drawn closer to the United States by repeated acts of German ruthlessness. Germany sank nearly all of Iceland's few passenger vessels and strafed a number of her fishing vessels. German atrocities in Norway and Denmark did much to arouse the anger of the people who have close ties to both of these countries.

Since the surrender of Germany the armed forces in Iceland have been gradually and systematically reduced. Reductions occurred when the European invasion coast was secured; but a policy of watchful waiting was maintained, and Iceland remained on the alert until Germany surrendered. Today a majority of camps have been closed and the land returned to the original owners. Surplus property is being shipped back to the United States or sold to Iceland. Much credit goes to the service units which under all kinds of weather and working conditions have built, equipped, serviced, and maintained the widely scattered installations on the island.

After the invasion of the European continent, Iceland served as a link in the chain of bases used for the speedy air evacuation of the wounded. With the final defeat of Germany, still another function was added, for it now became necessary to return most of the tactical aircraft which had been used on the continent and also to return many combat troops. This responsibility fell naturally to the Army Air Transport Command. Iceland has played a significant part in getting men, materials, and equipment to the fighting front as speedily as possible, and now it plays its part in seeing that the men are returned to their homes with the greatest dispatch.

The Iceland Base Command continues to function with its primary mission now being to facilitate the operation of the ATC, as it plays its part in the demobilization of the army.

Pacific Fleet Amphibians

(*Continued from page 80*)

our point of view it was considered relatively simple, as, in comparison with the amount of amphibious shipping involved in the Okinawa campaign, the forces involved were relatively small. It was, therefore, decided to use this campaign as a proving ground for several new methods of amphibious operations. The most important of these, perhaps, was the employment of a better integrated pre-D-Day bombardment force, under an Amphibious Group Commander, as it was believed that the knowledge of such a commander of amphibious requirements, plus the greater facilities afforded by his command ship would produce more beneficial results. Rear Admiral Blandy, Commander Amphibious Group One, was accordingly assigned this task, and with his force of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, he appeared off Iwo Jima on D minus Three Day and commenced the bombardment which contributed so greatly to the final capture of the island. Other tactical methods were also emphasized, such as the use of more small rocket ships, a better use of Underwater Demolition Teams, a better tactical arrangement for combatting enemy suicide planes, and a more liberal use of land planes which previously had been based too far away to be effective.

On D-Day the Joint Expeditionary Force came into the transport area without incident, and upon receipt of the order to "Land the Landing Force," Rear Admiral Hill, in command of the Attack Force, commenced debarking troops and equipment. Enough has been written about the actual battle for the capture of Iwo Jima, so it will not be gone into here. It is perhaps sufficient to say that the new techniques which we were trying here appeared reasonably satisfactory, so that we made few important changes in our plans for the Okinawa Operation. Although we were bothered somewhat by the suicide planes and minor air and submarine raids by the Japanese during this operation, from the point of view of the naval forces involved, the threat never became serious, one of the chief reasons being that Admiral Spruance kept the enemy's attention engaged by making the first sustained Fleet attacks on Japan and Nansei Shoto. Practically all of the fighting for the capture of this island was done by the Marines, who, in their characteristic fashion, fought a bloody battle until they finally conquered the defenders. They were heavily supported, throughout, by very heavy attacks by ships' guns and aircraft from carriers, principally CVE's.. The enemy's submarine effort was entirely frustrated.

After Iwo Jima there was only a brief period of time before the movement for Okinawa got underway. This expedition was the largest amphibious operation yet made in the Pacific, both as regards the number of troops and the number of ships involved. In addition, we knew that we were invading territory that the Japanese would defend to the bitter end, as Okinawa is one of the key islands to the whole Japanese scheme of defense.

The attack on Okinawa commenced on D minus 8 day, (24 March) when the Support Force of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, carriers, and minesweepers, again under Rear Admiral Blandy, commenced bombarding the defenses, and started sweeping mines. Underwater Demolition Teams arrived the next day and commenced operations. On D minus 8 day an Advance Force under Rear Admiral Kiland, Commander Amphibious Group Seven, commenced the capture of Kerama Retto for use as a naval and seaplane base. When the main attack forces arrived at the objective, the replenishing base for which these islands had been captured was in full operation. This base proved to be a major asset, as in its protected waters, ships were able to replenish fuel and ammunition, carriers were able to re-bomb, and the vessels which received severe damage from suicide planes were able to find shelter and emergency repair facilities.

The movement of the Attack Forces to the objective under Vice Admiral Turner was made in three Attack Forces subdivided into 12 separate groups. The forces were the Northern Attack Force, under Rear Admiral Reifsnider, Commander Amphibious Group Four, the Southern Attack Force, under Rear Admiral Hall, Commander Amphibious Group Twelve, and the Demonstration Group, under Rear Admiral Wright, Commander Amphibious Group Five. The first two forces embarked troops and rehearsed in the Philippines, the third at Saipan. In addition to the transports involved in these forces, there were attendant CVE, LST and LSM groups, all with their screens and supporting vessels. Within a few days the Army Reserve of one division arrived in two groups. In all, there were some 1400 assorted vessels involved, from battleships down through the scale to the small LCI types. These, of course, were involved only in the capture of Okinawa itself, but supporting this invasion, there was the Fifth Fleet, under Admiral Spruance, which kept the Empire under constant attack and throughout interposed fighters to destroy some of the suicide planes that caused us quite a bit of difficulty.

Once again we will leave the story of the land campaign to others, though we must say that General Buckner and his troops performed magnificently. The story of Okinawa would not be complete from a naval viewpoint without mention of the destroyers and destroyer escorts, other vessels of the escort type, and the LCI types, which took the brunt of the Japanese suicide airplane and small boat attacks. These vessels, plus our fighter planes, through their heroic actions in spite of serious losses, made it possible for the transports and troop supporting craft to continue the work of unloading men and supplies nearly 24 hours a day. The losses in both men and ships in these small vessels were severe, but through their gallant efforts, the losses in troops and ships in and near the transport area were low.

On 17 April, Rear Admiral Hill, who had been promoted to Vice Admiral and appointed as Commander Fifth Amphibious Force, relieved Vice Admiral Turner of command of the Joint Expeditionary Force. With this change in command, the Commander of PhibsPac and his flagship (Eldorado) returned to Guam to prepare plans for the invasion of Japan. From Guam the flagship shifted to Manila to permit staff consultation with General MacArthur's forces. During this period the Seventh Amphibious Force was transferred from the Seventh Fleet to PhibsPac under (now) Admiral Turner, thus consolidating all amphibious elements in the Pacific.

The submarine USS Flounder, launched at the Victory Yard of the Electric Boat Company, Groton, Conn., 5 Dec. 1942, sank one Japanese cargo ship of 4,000 tons, a German submarine of 700 tons, and damaged another Jap Cargo vessel of 5,000 tons in 13 months and six war patrols in the Pacific. Comdr. Carl A. Johnson, USN, was commanding officer at the time of commissioning. Other successive commanding officers have been Comdr. James Edward Stevens, USN, and Comdr. John Middleton, USN.

Submarines Support Fleet

(*Continued from page* 83)

It achieved distinct success in the Marianas and Palau campaigns and reached its greatest effectiveness in the Philippine campaign. On the day the Jap Fleet ventured out from its sheltered ports at Singapore and elsewhere, submarines from Australia and submarines from Pearl Harbor joined in attacks to support the rest of the United States Fleet in action against the Japanese Navy. Submarines drew first blood in this most decisive series of naval actions which we now know as the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea and the Battle for Leyte Gulf.

On 23 October, the submarine action in the Battle for Leyte Gulf began when the USS Bream damaged and put out of action the heavy cruiser AOBA off the coast of Mindoro south of Cape Calavite. Further south, the Darter and the Dace were patrolling off Palawan Passage when they discovered the Central Force of the Japanese Imperial Fleet which consisted of five battleships, ten heavy cruisers, one or two light cruisers, and about fifteen destroyers. These submarines reported their find and promptly attacked with torpedoes, obtaining thirteen hits in the three heavy cruisers. Two of these, the Atago and Maya, were sunk and the third was heavily damaged.

By dawn of 25 October, a patrol net of sixteen additional submarines had taken station east of Formosa, to cover all logical escape routes of the Japanese Battle Fleet to its homeland. Of these submarines, the USS Halibut was credited with sinking one 10,000 ton cruiser; and the USS Jallao sank a Natori class cruiser.

November and December of 1944 were warship months for the submarines of the Pacific Fleet. In these two months one battleship, two large aircraft carriers, one escort carrier and one converted carrier were sunk by submarines, and two large aircraft carriers were damaged. On 21 November, forty miles north of Formosa, the Sealion made a night surface attack on a large task force, sinking the Japanese battleship Kongo and severely damaging another. One week later the Archerfish, after a long and persistent chase south of Tokyo Bay, attacked and sank the large aircraft carrier Shinano with six torpedo hits. On 19 December, the Redfish, after having previously damaged a large carrier, attacked and sank the new large Japanese aircraft carrier Unryo. Earlier in November, the Pintado was credited with damaging a carrier of the Hayataka class, west of Luzon. On 17 November, the Spadefish sank an escort carrier off Formosa, and in the same month Queenfish sank a converted carrier near Korea. Japanese cruisers felt the blows from submarine torpedoes, too, during these two months. Lapon and Ray attacked two heavy cruisers off Santa Cruz. One of these, a Kumano class cruiser, was beached and later destroyed by aircraft. Hake put two torpedoes into a Natori class light cruiser south of Manila, and Bergall damaged two heavy cruisers, one so badly that it had to be towed into Singapore, never to leave again. Submarines took, also, a heavy toll of destroyers during this period. Cavalla, Flasher, Greenling, Haddock, Hawkbill, Pintado, Tilefish and Spadefish all sank one destroyer each. From December, 1944, until the end of the war, Pacific Fleet Submarines sank thirty additional destroyers and escort craft and twelve Jap submarines. The Batfish alone sank three Japanese submarines on three successive nights in Luzon Straits.

Every advance of our ground, air and surface forces deprived our submarines of areas formerly rich in targets; hence the last days of 1944 and through 1945, for the submarines, were days of working ever closer with Fleet units as the war narrowed down to a concentration of the areas surrounding the Japanese home islands.

On 10 November, for example, a seven submarine wolf pack left Saipan to clear the seas of Jap patrol vessels north of the Bonin and Volcano Islands. They were the Silversides, Saury, Tambor, Trigger, Sterlet, Burrfish, and Ronquil. For eight days, these submarines swept north, eliminating picket boats and patrol craft. This operation served as a dress rehearsal for similar sweeps made in February, 1945 for the Fifth Fleet and in July, 1945 for the Third Fleet to insure that no surface patrols who would be able to give warning of their approach would be encountered by those Fleets.

The change in submarine operations from commerce raiding to working with Fleet units did not mean an easier war for the submarines; it meant a different kind of war, a war that took them ever closer to the Empire and frequently into more shallow and restricted waters, including the Sea of Japan itself which, in spite of its minefields, was finally invaded.

For the plan of very long range bombing of the Japanese home islands by B-29's, our occupation of Iwo Jima was necessary. For this landing, the Spearfish reconnoitered the entire circumference of that sulphurous bit of rock, taking photographs and making charts so near to shore that men at the periscope could watch the Japs laboring on their airfields.

After Iwo came Okinawa, and out to this island went the Tinosa on a reconnaissance mission in which her partner, Swordfish, was lost. The reconnaissance information brought back by the Tinosa was of great value to the Fifth Amphibious Corps in the landings made in the Ryuku Chain.

With the B-29 bases in operation in the Marianas, and with the carrier forces adding their bomb loads to the strikes on Japan, lifeguarding for downed planes became a paramount submarine assignment. This duty was highly dangerous. It often meant working in shallow water with the added hazard of mines and increased danger from Japanese midget submarines. It required operating on the surface in sight of the Japanese homeland in broad daylight. Rescues within range of Japanese shore batteries were not uncommon, while at least two submarines made thrilling rescues in Sagami Wan only a few miles from Yokohama. Fine teamwork was developed between lifeguarding submarines and the Army and Navy aviators, protective air patrols hovered over the lifeguards and often guided them to men floating in Mae Wests or liferafts. In the month of July, 1945 alone, twenty-one submarines made thirty rescues in which eighty-five aviators were saved. No less than 511 airmen were saved by submarines on this duty in the course of the war.

What might be called the last offensive act of the Japanese Navy came in April, 1945, when Japan assembled the strongest force she could muster, presumably intended to meet United States forces off Okinawa. This was the Yamato Task Force.

The end of the most powerful warship the Japanese Navy had ever built began on the evening of 6 April 1945, with a contact report made by two submarines, the USS Threadfin and the USS Hackleback. Both submarines were patrolling off Kyushu and the approaches to Bungo Suido. Their prime mission was to detect and report enemy sorties from this area.

At 1940, on the surface eight miles from Fuka Shima, Threadfin made contact with the Yamato Task Force, which consisted of the battleship, two light cruisers, and ten destroyers, heading south. Threadfin trailed and reported the size of this fast moving enemy force until she lost contact at 2348. Hackleback, south of Threadfin, had picked up the Task Force at 2028 and, being unable to reach an attack position, had, also, trailed, sending contact reports until she, too, lost them.

At 0855 the following morning, search planes from the USS Essex sighted the doomed Japanese ships. Three hundred and eighty planes of Task Force 58 went in on a smothering attack. The Flagship Yamato, the Empire's symbol of naval strength, blasted with at least eight torpedoes and eight half-ton bombs, heeled over on her side, blew up and sank; and to the bottom with her went an Agano

(*Continued on page* 166)

Training Center for Glass —in war and in peace

Research is a habit that paid off in war.

Before the war, pressure of competitive enterprise, plus the researcher's inborn desire to make things better, led to many improvements in glass—to many new uses of glass.

War called for glass of precision quality—in mass-production quantities. Research men in the laboratories and plants of Libbey·Owens·Ford faced the task with "know-how" plus open minds as to new techniques. The result? Wartime demands were met quickly—*largely with existing facilities.*

Plants formerly devoted to making plate glass, window glass, *Thermopane**, safety glass and other civilian products immediately swung into production of bullet-resisting glass, optical and precision glass, self-sealing tanks, prisms, double-glazed windows for aircraft, glass for signaling mirrors, aviator goggles, tank vision blocks and enclosure units for aircraft.

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And research goes on—so that the techniques and advances learned under pressure of war may contribute to better living tomorrow. Libbey·Owens·Ford Glass Company, 91225 Nicholas Bldg., Toledo 3, Ohio.

*Reg. U. S. Pat. Off.

LIBBEY·OWENS·FORD
a Great Name in GLASS

Operations of I Corps

(*Continued from page* 95)

foot of the Villa Verde Trail, later used by the 32nd Division to outflank the strategic Balete Pass.

Pushing southeast from San Manuel the 25th Division successively captured San Quintin, Pemienta, Umincan, Lupao and San Isidro, destroying in each instance the garrisons consisting of tank elements, armored infantry and artillery.

The drive to secure the critical road net, at San Jose, on Highway 5 north to Balete Pass, was completed when the 25th Division met the 6th Division, which had driven in from the southwest.

The 6th Division, flanking the 25th Division on the south, ran into determined opposition, in the Cabaruan Hills, an isolated hill mass in the Central Plain. After several days of sharp fighting, the main enemy strength in the hill mass was broken. Leaving a mopping-up force, the Division pushed on south and east against light opposition. Guimba was captured and the Division wheeled north to meet the 25th Division in San Jose.

However between Guimba and San Jose lay Munoz, containing a Japanese armored regiment supported by armored infantry, artillery and anti-tank units. Here the Japanese Command committed a fatal blunder by refusing to employ the mobility of his tanks, choosing to dig them in as armored pillboxes. The fight for Munoz was brief but extremely bitter. Too late did the enemy realize that the 6th Division had slipped a regimental combat team around Munoz. The attempted withdrawal turned into a fantastic rout, resulting in the complete destruction of the Japanese forces remaining in the Central Plain north of Guimba.

The 6th Division in an encircling movement captured San Jose and upon being relieved by the 25th Division—pushed east securing Dingalan Bay on the Pacific Coast of Luzon. Luzon was split. A wedge had been driven between the Japanese forces, who had sacrificed a crack reinforced armored division and several provisional infantry battalions in a determined effort to maintain his withdrawal route from the south.

In the second phase, while the 25th and 6th Divisions pushed southeast down the Plain, the 43rd Division and the 158th RCT ran into murderous opposition in the mountains immediately adjacent to their landing beaches. The 158th RCT plunged north along the coastal road to seize Damortis, western terminus of the strategic Kennon Road, leading to Baguio.

The 158th RCT established a strong road block at Damortis to deny the Japanese the coastal road approach to our landing beaches, and turned east toward Rosario on the Kennon Road. For several weeks bitter fighting across the serrated ridges raged, terminating in the capture of Rosario.

The 43rd Division taking the brunt of Japanese coast defense artillery, and attacking a force several times its strength emplaced in fixed positions, finally secured the Bued River Valley between Rosario and Pozzurubio. During this attack the Division suffered relatively heavy casualties but exacted a tremendous toll of enemy dead, captured the huge supply base at Rosario and forced the Japanese into the rugged terrain south and north of the Kennon Road.

At this time the 43rd Division and the 158th RCT were relieved by the 33rd Division, reinforced, which launched a series of brilliant flanking attacks, driving the enemy back on Baguio. There were two avenues of approach to Baguio: the Kennon Road, from the south, and the Naguilian Road, from the west. The terrain between these approaches was a seemingly impassable jungle covered series of mountains. The 33rd Division bulldozed roads from Pugo into Baguio and from Aringay to Galiano, from which there was a road into Baguio. After the Japanese surrender, several of the Japanese Generals stated that it had not occurred to them that we would advance on Baguio other than by the Naguilian and Kennon Roads. Our advancing via these two bulldozed roads, over the jungle covered mountains, rendered untenable their defensive positions along the Naguilian Road, where they opposed the advance of the 37th Division.

The 37th Division, assigned to I Corps after taking part in the fall of Manila, was immediately ordered to attack along the Naguilian Road, with Baguio the objective. The Japanese, threatened by the rapid advance of the 37th Division and the threat of being outflanked by the 33rd Division slashing across the rugged terrain to the south, withdrew behind fanatical delaying forces, abandoned Baguio, fled north into the rugged terrain where according to a captured document, "—if the battle situation develops unfavorably for us and we find ourselves under continuous enemy pressure, we must withdraw into the mountainous terrain north of Baguio, in order to hang on doggedly in the Philippines and await the battle plan of later years." General Yamashita fled with his remaining troops and the 37th and 33rd Divisions entered Baguio and seized headquarters, signal and supply installations.

The Cagayan Valley was the Japanese bread basket; and remained as the one Japanese stronghold in northern Luzon. Thus, the third phase developed.

The fight to seize Balete Pass and Santa Fe, at the entrance to Cagayan Valley was the longest and hardest task which confronted the I Corps in the Luzon Campaign. Taking advantage of every foot of the mountainous terrain the Japanese held out for almost three months against the 32nd Division fighting along the Villa Verde Trail and the 25th Division driving north along Highway 5.

The 32nd Division starting from the Central Plain at Santa Maria, fought across 5000 foot mountains against an enemy determined to hold the trail at any cost. The terrain was so rugged that oftentimes a 36 hour litter carry was necessary to evacuate the wounded. Santa Fe, junction of the Villa Verde Trail and Highway 5, was the key to the defense of the Cagayan Valley and the objective of the 32nd and 25th Divisions.

The "Kongo Fortress" at Imugan, covering the Villa Verde Trail approach to Santa Fe, stood in the path of the 32nd Division. Every advantage of terrain was with the Japanese defenders. In order to avoid the heavy casualties incident to a frontal attack one Regimental Combat Team was withdrawn, sent around the base of the mountains and up Highway 5, passing through the 25th Division, to assault the fortress from the rear. The encircling movement was beautifully executed and highly successful. Imugan fell to the 32nd Division with a minimum of casualties. The Japanese sacrificed the remainder of their effective combat units in northern Luzon, plus many thousand untrained service troops, thrown in as reinforcements, in the vain attempt to save Santa Fe, which fell to the 25th Division, after the fall of Imugan.

The 37th and 6th Division were rushed up to exploit the breakthrough. The 6th Division wheeled to the northwest toward Kiangan in the central Cordillera Mountains, and the 37th Division, employing a flying column, raced north through the Cagayan Valley scattering a stunned and bewildered enemy before them to meet the Connolly Force, (a reinforced infantry battalion) which had marched around the western and northern coast of Luzon to seize Aparri and a battalion of the 511th Parachute Regiment which had dropped just south of Aparri to cut off the escape of any Japanese forces to the north.

All organized enemy resistance in northern Luzon ended on 26th June, 168 days after the I Corps made its initial landing on the Lingayen Gulf Coast. Too much credit cannot be given the Philippine Guerrilla Forces, northern Luzon, who fought highly successful independent actions and side by side with American troops, during the entire operation.

Newfoundland

(*Continued from page* 68)

on the Murmansk or North Ireland run. The great PBY war birds on anti-submarine patrol kept Newfoundland skies alive for many months. Newfoundland was one of the piers to that bridge of ships we built to Britain.

When the aircraft plants of the United States began to turn out more planes than our ships could transport the third mission of Newfoundland became evident. Until recently a military secret, it can now be told that across Newfoundland's Harmon and Gander Fields came thousands of bombers and fighter bombers on their way to the air war over Germany. This stepping stone to war, with fuel for planes, with rest and food for crews, was of inestimable value in contributing to success in Europe.

When the war in Europe was at its height, the litter planes began to land at our fields. These birds of mercy crossed paths in our skies with the bombers bound for war. With the end of the war, the traffic was reversed and thousands of the planes of the 8th, 9th and 15th Airforces came back to the United States by way of Newfoundland.

A never ceasing vigil was the contribution of the troops stationed in Newfoundland. This vigil was kept through the tedium and monotony of an existence, where there was no hope of glory. Anti-Aircraft and anti-submarine guns were manned 24 hours a day, 365 days a year from December 1941 until the last submarine had surfaced and hoisted her surrender ensign late in May 1945.

The weather, while not actually arctic in most of the island, was dangerous in its rapid changes and its North Atlantic gales.

When some of our troops redeployed to the States after V-E Day, they wore seven overseas stripes and had three months on an eighth. For them this had been one of war's hardest tasks; four years and four months of waiting and watching, of looking out to sea to watch our ships go by and our planes go over.

The conduct of our men during this ordeal was excellent. Contact with Newfoundland civilians was cordial and remains so. Americans came to Newfoundland as friends and remain as friends. That friendship is a tribute to the cordiality of our mission as is the successful completion of the war in Europe a tribute to the part the Newfoundland Base played in supplying and arming our forces there. Truly Newfoundland was a stepping stone to victory, that victory which resulted in the defeat of the pompous Mussolinis, the maniacal Hitlers and the slant-eyed Mikados.

"MICKEY," the secret Radar Bombsight... built by PHILCO



THE sensational story of "*Mickey*", the miraculous *Radar Bombsight* used by the Army Air Forces to demolish the Nazi and Jap industrial and war machines tells the secret war research and production story of Philco, *its manufacturer.*

When the need arose for large quantities of this new, secret radar bombsight, our Army and Navy came to Philco. And Philco research engineers, working with the Radiation Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology completed the design in record time. Philco production engineers devised *the first moving conveyor lines for radar* to speed the urgently needed production of "Mickey".

Mickey is a miraculous product of electronic science. It made possible *pinpoint precision bombing* day or night, in any weather, through clouds, storms or fog. Gen. "Hap" Arnold, Commanding the Army Air Forces is reported to have called it "the most important piece of equipment used by the aerial invasion forces in the invasion of France".

WHAT'S COMING IN RADIO from the laboratories that produced this miracle of electronics?

Now that Mickey, built by Philco, has completed its wartime missions, the Philco laboratories have turned from radar research to radio for the home. Their vital contributions to the progress of electronic science will produce the newest developments in the enjoyment of radio and recorded music . . . spectacular improvements in FM and television. Yes, Philco . . . the wartime leader in airborne radar . . . will resume its unbroken record of leadership in the radio industry.

PHILCO

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RADIOS • PHONOGRAPHS • FM • TELEVISION
REFRIGERATORS • FREEZERS • AIR CONDITIONERS

How Mickey, the Radar Bombsight, Works

Mickey radar (1) maps the land or sea over which a plane is flying, even at night or through clouds and fog; (2) shows the target on an illuminated screen and tells when to drop the bombs; (3) provides special beacon information that makes aerial navigation easy, to and from the target; and (4) warns of approaching enemy fighter planes. Mickey radar sends out super-high frequency radio waves which bounce back from solid targets and are picked up by the radar receiver and transformed into *a radar picture on a screen like the one in a home television receiver.*

Submarines in Pacific

(*Continued from page* 162)

class light cruiser and three more destroyers.

From that day until 14 August, when the Emperor of Japan agreed to capitulate, submarines continued their Fleet support, their lifeguarding, and the destruction of what ocean transport was left to an Empire desperately short of ships.

In the last ten months of the war, in addition to other assignments, U. S. Submarines reported sinking a total of 432 enemy ships, of which 124 were combatant craft, raising the confirmed grand total to about 1200 combatant and merchant vessels of over 500 tons, sunk by our submarines throughout the war.

These results, splendid as they are, were not obtained without loss. Fifty-two of our submarines failed to return to port and, in most cases, there were no survivors to tell what happened. Of these fifty-two, seven were operational losses suffered in groundings, collision, diving accidents, etc.; but the remaining forty-five were lost, or were presumed to be lost, due to enemy action. These losses are heavy and amount to about eighteen per cent of our total submarines; however, when we consider that Japan is reported to have lost 126 and Germany's losses ran into the hundreds, our American nation need have no concern regarding the ability of its ship builders to design and produce submarines that can take the most severe punishment, nor regarding the skill and daring of its sons who took these same submarines to sea and destroyed the bulk of the enemy's seaborne traffic in spite of all opposition.

The China Theater

(*Continued from page* 77)

The retention of China in the war was vital in the overall strategic plans in the Far East for the Chinese were successfully containing over two million armed Japanese in the area extending from Manchuria to Indo-China. If China were rendered militarily impotent, the bulk of these two million Japs could be quickly redeployed in the Philippines, the Ryukus, the Netherland East Indies, Malay, Burma, and Manchuria. Obviously the Allied advance on the penetration of the Japanese citadel would then be made more difficult—possibly prohibitive, regarding time, lives and resources. The Chinese and Americans in complete accord evolved a plan to hold Kunming at all costs and thus insure continuity in the valiant combined effort in the air and on the ground against the Japs.

Available Chinese forces and Commando units together with the Chinese and American Air Forces, were deployed as quickly as possible along the approaches to Kunming. Concurrently defenses were prepared for the Kunming area and a program was finalized to train and equip 39 Chinese divisions in the ways of modern war. Upon this new force which included two American trained Chinese divisions being flown back from Burma rested the final defense of Kunming and any offensive equipment, supplies and trained troops available, this was an ambitious program and there was little time remaining for its implementation.

Fortunately, from January to the last of March 1945 the situation remained more or less static and the Japanese delayed renewal of their major offensive in part because of the additional preparation required by the arrival of the American trained Chinese divisions. This delay provided additional time for Chinese preparation which later proved to be a decisive factor. In April 1945 the Japanese initiated operations to widen their inland corridor and attempted to seize important airfields in the Chihchiang area. The capture of Chihchiang then would open a road through Kweiyang to Kunming and to Chungking. Chinese defenses were strengthened and additional forces, including newly trained Chinese divisions flown in from Burma, were committed. In early May when Japanese forces moved on Chihchiang, the Chinese armies, advised and assisted by American liaison teams and supported by the Chinese and American Air Forces, resisted so valiantly that the enemy faltered and then turned back. The Far East Air Force by taking from China based Air Forces the air operations required along the coast of China had increased the intensity of support given to Chinese ground operations and the interdiction of ground lines of communication. With this action the crisis in China had passed. Thereafter the strategic initiative passed gradually and to an ever increasing degree to the Allied Forces. The 2 American trained Chinese divisions served too.

Kunming and Chungking were now relatively secure. The high tide of Japanese offensive had been checked and the Chinese forces had acquired sufficient training, combat experience, supplies and most important—confidence to justify the initiation of offensive operations. The supply situation, however, was critical and it was recognized that before large scale operations could be conducted in the Theater, it was vital that sea communications be established and thus increase the flow of supplies into China. Plans had already been developed to drive a wedge through the Japanese forces on the Asiatic mainland and to secure a port in the Canton-Hongkong area. Following these plans, Chinese forces continued to exert pressure against Japanese rear guard positions and in a minimum of time a Chinese offensive towards the coast was underway. At the end of the war in September 1945 Chinese forces had retaken Kweilin, Nanning and Liuchow and were poised to seize Fort Bayard as an initial port for supplies, and as a stepping stone to the capture of Canton and Hongkong as well as other strategic areas to the north.

The foregoing, in general, is the chronology of the last year of the war in China. Although not the decisive factor in the defeat of Japan, China Theater troops did compel the Japanese to retain over 2,000,000 armed forces in China and caused over 250,000 Japanese casualties. The American Air Force based in China by interdicting the major ground lines of communication and by virtually eliminating the Japanese air force in China was also a major factor in containing Japanese forces in China. In addition, China Theater operations contributed strongly towards maintaining economic and political stability, thus paving the way for China to assume her place as a strong and independent power in the society of nations.

It is impossible to recognize fully all of the individuals and echelons contributing to the success of these campaigns. The Generalissimo cooperated completely and put the common cause ahead of all other considerations. The Fourteenth Air Force under Major General Claire Chennault fought with a gallantry and effectiveness that would be difficult to match in any theater of operations. The Navy Group in China Theater and the OSS, brought out of China an increasingly rich accumulation of intelligence concerning China, Japan, and Manchuria.

Perhaps the most important factor, however, and the one which promises most for the future, was the facility developed by the Chinese and Americans to work together with mutual understanding and purpose. In all endeavors, including decisions by the Combined Chinese American Staff, training of the new divisions, and supply and combat operations, it was the combined effort of all concerned that produced the successful Sino-American team. This same partnership is continuing with the all important task of insuring that war torn China may evolve a strong unified and prosperous country and thus reap fully the fruits of victory.

Lifeline to China

(*Continued from page* 76)

Japs napping, and secured commanding ground overlooking the Road. A 20-day battle followed, and the Japs were forced to retreat.

On 27 January 1945, the long-awaited junction of Allied forces along the Ledo and Burma Roads was established at Mong Yu when the Chinese forces in Burma met their brothers from the Salween. Even before the last Jap positions had been cleared along the Road, the first convoy had left Ledo over the Stilwell Highway. It arrived in Wanting, China, on 28 January, one day after the last Jap had been moved out of the Road area. Lashio, rail terminus of the old Burma Road, fell to the Chinese on 7 March, and on 19 March, the Hsipaw-Lashio line was secured. British troops then moved south to capture Mandalay and finally Rangoon.

With the land blockade to China broken, attention in IBT turned almost entirely to supply. Chinese training was eventually transferred to the American forces in the China Theater. The American combat mission was virtually at an end.

During the first month of operation, 5,231 tons of cargo went over the Stilwell Road to China. Vehicles by the thousands began flowing to China to rebuild her transport system and equip her armies. A total of 46,482 tons of material were flown to China during the first month of 1945. Of this figure, 44,099 tons were carried by the Air Transport Command; 2,082 tons by the Chinese National Aviation Corporation, and 301 tons by other planes. Equipment and supplies moved over the world's longest supply line — 14,000 miles—from the United States to the bustling port of Calcutta, up the line of communications to Assam, and across Burma by air and road. In May, the pipeline to Kunming was completed and with it the telephone line. From then on, the supply operation proceeded at an ever-increasing pace.

By the end of August, the Americans in India and Burma had moved 938,588 tons to China. Of this total, net deliveries were 777,348 tons by air, 32,506 tons by road, and 33,651 by pipeline. Weight of vehicles delivered over the road—95,083 tons—made up the remainder of the grand total. (In July, 1942, the figure had been 111 tons). The peak month for Hump airlift was July, with a remarkable figure of 73,682 tons. The road's top month was June, with 32,807 gross tons which included 5,935 vehicles and 1,299 trailers. Bolstered by United States assistance, in supplies and training and morale, the Chinese—first of the nations to suffer from Jap aggression—struggled on, kept up the fight, and held approximately one-third of Japan's land forces in check while the Allies advanced in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. As the war ended, the gallant Chinese were battling triumphantly, advancing on all fronts.



B&W designed the boiler that was selected by the War Shipping Board for the "Hog Islanders" of World War I.

B&W Sectional-Header, Three-Pass Marine Boiler—the design selected for *all* Liberty Ships by the U. S. Maritime Commission.



Victory Ship boilers are of the Single-Pass, Sectional-Header Type—a design originated and introduced by B&W.

A high percentage of U. S. fighting ships are equipped with B&W boilers similar to the type shown above.

THE INVISIBLE NAMEPLATE ON THOUSANDS OF SHIPS...

THE familiar B&W nameplate stands out in bold relief on the boilers in thousands of the ships that make up America's mightiest merchant marine and Naval fleet. Thousands of other ships of these same vital fleets carry boilers that also bear—though *invisibly*—the imprint of B&W pioneering leadership and progressive engineering in marine boilers.

Actually, supplying large quantities of boilers to the United States Navy and Maritime Commission is only *one* of the ways B&W helped to speed wartime shipbuilding at the amazing rate of 3½ ships daily. It also supplied other boiler manufacturers with complete detailed working drawings and bills of materials so that they—*two* other boiler manufacturers in respect to Navy boilers and *ten* other boiler manufacturers in respect to boilers for the Maritime Commission—might also build *B&W* boilers and in this manner make B&W boilers and boiler parts duplicate and interchangeable, no matter by whom they are built.

We at B&W are proud of this cooperation with the Services, and also of the fact that B&W boiler designs and constructions have been so well thought of by the Services that they were adopted as standards to be followed by other manufacturers. This is only *one* of B&W's many contributions to the winning of the war.

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M-186

Japanese Reaction

(*Continued from page* 94)

being decreased greatly in every raid it became only a matter of time before the inevitable. It was difficult to judge which created the greatest damage, the bombings or the lack of fuel, without which protection was impossible . . ."[6]

The Philippine bases for an accelerated invasion of the Japanese home islands presented a prospect at which Imperial authorities were admittedly terrified and unprepared.

". . . The physical invasion of Japan engendered great apprehension. Despite the fact that the American B-29's were pounding the Empire, the Japanese Air Force hoarded its strength for use as Kamikaze planes against the invading fleet . . ."[7]

With admissions on record from ranking Imperial General Staff members that Japan's collapse was inevitable as early as March, 1945, roughly corresponding to the fall of Manila, the advent of the atomic bomb is seen as but a universally acceptable and "face-saving" way out.

". . . Japan was not defeated by the atomic bomb, nor the participation in the war by the Soviet Union, but by the fact that neither the military nor the government had any real ability . . ."[8]

Many Japanese agree that the most depressing factor was the helplessness of their own forces to interfere with tactical programs announced by the Allies. Whether it was that the Allies said they would re-occupy the Philippines or bomb certain cities, both soldiers and civilians bitterly contrasted such publicity with the curtain of secrecy behind which the Japanese government operated and their own ignorance of what was happening.

". . . Japanese intelligence throughout the Philippine campaign had been very poor . . . Yamashita acknowledged fighting a virtually blind war. However, both Yamashita and staff were aware that we had expert intelligence . . ."[9]

There was a general realization that the Allies were fighting with a combination of brains and machinery against which the much vaunted "Japanese spirit" was relatively powerless.

". . . General Yamashita expressed great admiration for the close coordination of all American arms. —Still speaking of Leyte— The weapon most feared by the Japanese had been our mortar and artillery fire. Aerial bombing permitted sufficient warning so that casualties could be limited . . ."[10]

The steadily growing realization of this situation sapped morale both on the far flung battle fronts and in the homeland.

". . . Staff officers of the Fifth Air Army gave much credit to the B-29 attacks against Japanese cities. The disruption of communications and the industrial system of small factories led to confusion in the military command, and fear in the civil population. The extreme scarcity of fuel products, as a result of the sea blockade, severely hampered Japanese air operations. Japan was defeated prior to the use of the atomic bomb . . ."[11]

There was a natural grasping at straws, in the willingness to believe the official line, as late as 14 August, that the Allied forces were being led into a trap. The Imperial broadcast of 15 August was a stunning blow as it was widely believed that it would be a call to fight to the last man, woman and child.

The degree of control attainable in a totalitarian state is well illustrated by the fact that the names of the Japanese carriers and other vessels sunk and damaged in the Battle of Midway, first appeared in the Japanese press on 12 October 1945.

". . . The resounding defeat dealt the Japanese Navy was perhaps the most decisive factor in the turning of the tables, for this war was primarily a war on and from the sea. At its high-water mark, the enemy fleet controlled the waters from Alaska to Australia in the Pacific and from Singapore to India in the Indian Ocean, probing as far West even as Africa. Then the attrition of that mighty Navy began. Control of the sea was decided overwhelmingly in the First and Second Battles of the Philippines . . ."[12]

Such ignorance did not, of course, extend to the higher levels, but available evidence indicates an almost total lack of effective liaison between services and branches of the services. The result was that while the Chief of the General Staff may have had a fairly accurate picture of the situation of the ground forces, according to Allied standards, he was inadequately informed of the situation with regard to the Naval and Air Forces. The same stricture applies to the other Chiefs of Staffs.

[6] Captain Ishiwata, Hiroshi, Staff Second Fleet.
[7] Lt. General Tazoe, Noburu, Chief of Staff, Air General Army.
[8] Colonels Omura and Yamaguchi, Staff Officers, Fifth Air Army.
[9] Lt. General Yamashita, Tomoyuki, CG 14th Area Army.
[10] Lt. General Yamashita, Tomoyuki, CG 14th Area Army.
[11] Colonel Miyashi, Minoru, Chief of Operations, Air General Army.
[12] Rear Admiral Takata, Imperial Japanese Navy.

Pacific Powerhouse

(*Continued from page* 87)

Marianas to Tokyo. In addition to the three airfields, a network of roads, water supply and fuel storage systems, housing, and shop facilities had to be installed on an island which virtually had been flattened under the merciless pounding of aerial bombs, long-range naval shells and rockets, and heavy and medium field artillery. Thus there was created a mammoth base only 950 miles from Honshu, which it was hoped would be the final assault target of the war.

Iwo Jima was only 950 miles from that final assault, but Okinawa, which was to be the scene of the next campaign, was much closer—only 325 miles from the target. The part this command played in securing, developing and exploiting that base is one of the great logistical stories of the Pacific war. Planning and execution of the Ryukyus campaign was conducted from beginning to end by MidPac's Tenth Army. The major elements of this Army were the XXIV Army Corps and the III Marine Amphibious Corps, composed of the 7th, 27th, 77th and 96th Infantry Divisions and the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions respectively. This was truly a joint operation in all its aspects, from the early morning hours on 26 March when elements of the Fifth Fleet disembarked the 77th Infantry Division on the small islands of the Kerama Retto until the Ryukyus were finally declared secure.

All of these landings were supported by mortar gunboats, improvised by the installation of Army 4.2" chemical mortars on LCIs, a type of seaborne artillery adapted to filling the dangerous interval between the cessation of naval support gunfire and the establishment of the infantry ashore. These were developed as a result of experiments conducted by personnel of this headquarters for many months before the operation. In the land fighting which followed, a prominent part was played by an entire battalion of flame-throwing tanks, designed and modified in the Middle Pacific. These weapons had been used in small numbers throughout the earlier campaigns, in many cases the only effective means of combatting the Japanese tactic of "holing-up" in the multitudes of deep caves characteristic of the terrain of islands in the Marianas, Palaus, Volcanos and Ryukyus.

The staggering responsibility that fell to my headquarters of supplying the forces put ashore on Okinawa can be readily understood when it is considered that by 1 August approximately 2,000,000 measurement tons of supplies and equipment had been discharged over the Okinawa beaches. Of the 110,000 enemy dead, the majority was killed during the 82 days of actual fighting. The landing of more than 116,000 measurement tons of ammunition from Army sources alone contributed to this enormous casualty total. A greater proportion of supporting corps and army artillery was employed in this campaign than in any other campaign of the Pacific war, and its skillful use contributed materially to the successful prosecution of the campaign and to the reduced number of casualties.

Development of the great base at Okinawa, for which ComGenMidPac had logistic responsibility, was proceeding at a swift pace when the end of the war arrived and made unnecessary the completion of originally planned installations. However, material was moving forward from the West Coast to provide for housing, messing and warehousing facilities for a total of 375,000 troops. Twenty-one airfield runways on Okinawa and Ie Shima were being brought to completion. Continuation of the war would have seen the installation on Okinawa of the very heavy bombardment wings of the Eighth Air Force, the weight of which, added to that of the Twentieth in the Marianas, would most certainly have reduced the remaining cities of Japan to rubble in short order. The establishment on Okinawa and Ie Shima of fighter as well as medium and heavy bombardment units of the Seventh Air Force, and subsequently of elements of the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces from the Philippines, meant to the Japanese that at no time during the day and night was the air over the island of Kyushu free of our aircraft, bombing and strafing every available target. In the matter of ports, highways and the ever necessary tank farms, pipelines and pumping systems, great progress has been made and the base stands today and will stand in the future as a monument to the skill, ingenuity, energy and imagination of the combined armed services of the United States.

The surrender of the Japanese on the battleship Missouri was brought about by the combined efforts of a great team, the Army, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard, and Merchant Marine, all backed up and supported by a loyal citizenry who performed an industrial miracle. We of the Army Forces in the Middle Pacific like to think that in operational planning, logistical support, and especially the careful training of the divisions for combat in our great Hawaiian Centers, we made no small contribution to the victory.

The XIV Corps

(*Continued from page* 98)

broken south and east of Laguna de Bay and down the Bicol Peninsula.

On 1 July 1945 the XIV Corps assumed the responsibility of hunting down Japanese remnant forces in Luzon. Its major combat units were the 6th, 32nd (Red Arrow), 37th and 38th (Cyclone) Divisions. The XIV Corps was relieved of this responsibility 19 Aug. 1945 and immediately began preparations for the occupation of certain areas of the Japanese homeland.

In the battle for Manila and central Luzon the XIV Corps killed more than 35,000 enemy, 17,173 of them in the Manila area. In the subsequent cleanup of Luzon the XIV Corps slew nearly 22,000 Japanese.

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180 Days

(*Continued from page 57*)

and 29th. Every man in the Corps was aware of the critical nature of this operation and worked tirelessly to prepare defenses, which would withstand a northern counter-offensive, as we expected Von Runstedt to launch a complementary attack to the more southerly effort. The terrain and allied troop dispositions favored this front as the other prong of a pincer movement. Fortunately this did not materialize.

23 February 1945 was a long-awaited day. The Roer River, flooded by the Gremans, had partially subsided, and on this date began our all-out attack which was to continue relentlessly until the Rhine was reached.

A maneuver to the left flank was performed immediately after the Roer crossing. This placed the Corps in the rear of the Siegfried line, thereby assisting the Corps on our left to cross and assault these fortifications. Thus the period was highlighted by the successful tactics of smashing heavily defended positions from the flanks and rear.

After the initial resistance was broken and artillery positions overrun, the Germans were disorganized and unable to prevent our armor and infantry from sweeping on through Erkelenz and Rheindahlen. From there on there was little organized hostile action to keep us from rolling on to within sight of the Rhine, where operations of adjacent units and adjustment of boundaries turned us again north to beyond Moers.

Here XIII Corps troops executed a maneuver that completely disorganized the enemy. The 5th Armored Division was swung from its position on the Corps south flank, across the zones of two infantry divisions and appeared in the matter of hours on the opposite flank. This hazardous movement was effected by rapid though careful planning and effective leadership. Krefeld, with a peacetime population of 171,000 fell, followed rapidly by Homberg and Moers.

The lucrative targets of the Ruhr were now within range of our artillery. The sweet justice of pounding with captured 88's and 170's the very plants, in which those guns had been built, fell to our lot.

On the Rhine we carried out an elaborate deceptive maneuver indicating that we would cross opposite the Ruhr. The enemy activated his defense to meet our threat. This facilitated the actual crossing made by the Corps on our north.

With the assault crossing of the Rhine effected by airborne and ground operations, XIII Corps crossed at Wesel and by capturing Munster set the stage for a break through from the bridgehead.

The Corps faced no well defined defensive organization from here on. However, numerous strong points developed. The general plan for reducing these resistance areas was to chop them into chunks with armor and then digest the chunks with infantry. The enemy order of battle changed rapidly with hastily arranged battle groups predominating. Only one tactical unit of divisional size opposed us during this phase.

Our armor was in the meantime making a rapid advance to the Weser River, pausing only momentarily to isolate Munster from the east. Some strongpoints and pockets of resistance were bypassed. Despite the speed of our drive, the enemy had learned a lesson from Remagen, as we found all bridges on the Weser and later the Elbe blown. Although this slowed down our advance temporarily, the enemy was more affected thereby for their destruction cut off considerable numbers of his troops. These were subsequently mopped up by our infantry.

Our crossing of the Weser was opposed by artillery and mortar fire, with scattered infantry action. A big job was next on the list: Hannover, largest city so far tackled in Germany, with a population of 472,527, lay in our zone. It was primarily an infantry job, and three regiments attacked. They completed this task in one day. The armor complemented this assignment by swinging around the city and blocking from the east.

From there on light to medium resistance was encountered to the Elbe. XIII Corps troops were only 48 miles from Berlin when they were ordered to halt and await our Russian allies on the Elbe. We captured a total of 249,000 prisoners of war, we liberated many thousands of allied prisoners and slave laborers and we cleaned up our assigned area in Germany. I am proud to have had the privilege of serving with the men who comprised this Corps.

XXI Corps

(*Continued from page 65*)

The axis of attack for XXI Corps was shifted sharply about 20 April from Southeast to due South toward the "National Redoubt" area in the foothills of the Alps. The XXI Corps was the first American Corps to cross the Danube River when tankers of the 12th Armored Division made a spectacular dash to seize intact a 600 foot bridge across the river at Dillingen on 22 April. Augsburg fell quickly and Munich was effectively isolated from West and South, falling to XV Corps on the left.

During the final days of the campaign as XXI Corps troops penetrated deep into the foothills of the Austrian and Bavarian Alps, tens of thousands of prisoners of war were coralled, bringing the total captured by the Corps in France, Germany and Austria to over 210,000 by VE Day. A large number of top-ranking generals were included in the total, as well as many important political figures. Among these were the great Field Marshal Von Runstedt, Field Marshal Goering, Admiral Horthy of Hungary, Reichministers Amann and Frick, and many others. Among the major units which functioned under XXI Corps at various times during these final operations were the 3d, 4th, 36th and 63rd Infantry Divisions; the 101st Cavalry Group and the 12th U. S. and 2d French Armored Divisions, and the 101st Airborne Division.

With the surrender of the German Army Group G effective at noon on 6 May, all resistance in the XXI Corps area ended, and the Corps issued orders to all troops to cease fire and halt in place. Elements of XXI Corps at this time were in the "National Redoubt" area with spearheads in Hitler's Berchtesgaden and the Inn River Valley of Austria.

Since VE Day the XXI Corps has been engaged in numerous occupational missions in Southern and Central Germany. The most difficult of these was undertaken during the month of June. Moving from Gmund to Leipzig, Germany, the Corps assumed control over approximately 11,000 square miles of territory in the provinces of Saxony, Thuringia and Halle, relieving the VII and VIII Corps of this responsibility. Late in June, following the conclusion of a new Russo-American agreement, the Corps was directed to initiate plans for the transfer of this vast area to the Russians. Between 1 and 4 July, on extremely short notice, XXI Corps carried out what has been called the greatest mass withdrawal of American Forces on enemy territory in the history of the U. S. Army. During

Following the relief by the Russians, the XXI Corps returned to its former command post at Schwabisch Gmund, Germany. The end of World War II with the surrender of Japan found the XXI Corps engaged in an occupational and administrative mission controlling approximately 150,000 troops of eight divisions, two brigades, and many special units, awaiting redeployment.

Fleet Marine Force

(*Continued from page 72*)

our Oriental allies, severed ocean lifelines between Japan and her stolen empire to the south, and drew tighter the noose of blockade around the enemy homeland. In addition, loss of the island dealt a crushing blow to the enemy's psychology. Here, for the first time during the entire Pacific struggle, Jap soldiers surrendered in great numbers, convinced, they admitted after being taken prisoner, that Japan could not win the war. That this opinion was fairly prevalent in Japan itself was indicated by the public statements of recognized spokesmen to the effect that "Japan stands at the crossroads of life and death." While the significance of these changes in Jap behavior and propaganda partially escaped us at the time, we now know that the war was then won, that as early as 22 June—the day after Okinawa was declared "secure" — Emperor Hirohito began trying to initiate peace negotiations through Russia.

The cessation of hostilities on Okinawa found the Army, Navy and Marine forces in the Pacific, still unaware of the imminence of Jap surrender, busily engaged in planning the invasion of the Island Empire. By the close of the war, the V Amphibious Corps, consisting of the 2nd, 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions, had reported to the U. S. Sixth Army for planning in connection with contemplated amphibious landings on Kyushu. The next mission of the III Amphibious Corps, with the remaining three Marine Divisions, had not been definitely determined.

With the surrender of the Japanese, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, was immediately called upon to furnish troops for various occupation missions. The first assignment, the occupation of Yokasuka Naval Base and vicinity, fell to the lot of the 4th Marine Regiment, reinforced, under Brigadier General William C. Clement as special task force commander, this being the first occupation force to go ashore from warships in the Tokyo area, on 29 August, 1945. At the time of this writing, late in September, other Marine units on occupation duty were the 2nd and 5th Marine Divisions of the V Amphibious Corps, on the island of Kyushu. The 1st and 6th Marine Divisions of the III Amphibious Corps had been assigned to duty in China.

As the end of the war brings to a close another long chapter in the history of the Corps, all Marines can take pardonable pride in the Corps' contributions toward victory over the Japanese. In all important amphibious operations in the Central Pacific, as well as in several of those in the South Pacific, Marines spearheaded the attacks. Marine Aviation which won fame for itself in the early days at Guadalcanal, has supported nearly every major move in the Pacific.

From Guadalcanal to Okinawa—all along the island stepping stones to victory — the Marine units in the Pacific have at all times measured up to the Corps' proud name and heritage. They have won for themselves an all-time honored place in military annals, and the lasting respect and gratitude of the American people.

A straight line is the shortest distance between two points. If you're stringing telephone wire, laying a cement highway, or building a railroad—the fewer the miles you have to cover, the less the job costs. All right—the same thing applies to the cost of things you buy in a store. The shortest, most inexpensive road from manufacturer to you, is Sears, Roebuck and Co.—the one outstanding practitioner of money-saving STRAIGHT-LINE DISTRIBUTION.

Pacific's Times Square

(*Continued from page* 103)

salvage, repair and dry-docking facilities, the United States Fleet's daring forays into enemy waters would have been curtailed markedly. To the Fleet, Guam is certainly "The Times Square of the Pacific."

In the first year of American occupation, an estimated 110 shiploads of construction materials and equipment were required to build permanent installations on the island. To make room for campsites and to provide ballast material, more than 30,000,000 cubic yards of earth has been moved. At the peak of construction, 12,000,000 board feet of lumber was shipped into Guam monthly.

Supplies are stored in hundreds upon hundreds of large and small Quonset huts and wooden sheds, all built in the few months after the Americans' return. Today, the island contains covered storage space amounting to 135 acres.

In July, 1944, there were only two semi-paved, two-lane highways of poor construction and several negligible bullcart trails.

To meet the needs of this important advance base, with its 210,000 military population, 350 miles of hard surface highway have been built, 100 miles of which is paved, including Marine Drive, a four-lane, express highway running along the busy west coast. More than 10,000 jeeps, and 15,000 other vehicles, ranging up to 20 ton cargo trucks, create a "Times Square" traffic. Almost 7,000 trailers, up to 50 ton capacity, operate from the island's motor pools. Traffic surveys have shown as many as 1,569 vehicles passing a given point in one hour.

Similarly, the American forces started almost from scratch in building Guam's airfields. The only airstrip completed by the Japs, on Orote Peninsula, was short, narrow and inoperational.

Guam now boasts five large airfields, including nine first-class strips. Some 60,000 lineal feet of airstrips have been paved, not including hardstands and taxiways. Harmon Field, a gigantic bomber repair base, has greater maintenance facilities than Hickam Field in Pearl Harbor.

With the airplanes on the island alone needing 13,000,000 gallons of aviation gasoline for the postwar month of September, supply, transportation and storage of fuel is recognized as a big problem.

In addition, during that month, 3,500,000 gallons of motor gas and 150,000 barrels of diesel oil were consumed by motorized equipment, and 425,000 barrels of black oil were supplied to the Fleet. Thirty-five miles of pipe lines are required to move this fuel, and well over a million barrels are stored in bulk.

In the field of communications, too, Guam can lay claim to superlatives. The island's installations comprise the world's largest radio station, with some 18,000 messages handled daily, and direct communication with such points as San Francisco, China, Manila, Tokyo, Vladivostok, and all ships of the Pacific Fleet.

Guam is further connected to the mainland by a 2,600-mile cable to Midway, second longest in the world, which was repaired several months ago after having been cut just before the Battle of Midway.

Units on Guam are linked by a modern telephone system, the first dial service to be installed in a Pacific forward area base. There are 7,871 telephones, operating over 177.06 sheath miles of cable, and 11,740.77 circuit miles, carried by 3,273 telephone poles. Five manual boards and three automatic boards handle many thousands of calls daily. All major trunking facilities and control cables, as well as telephone buildings, are protected against seasonal typhoons by reinforced storm guying.

To keep the island's nerve system humming, four gigantic power plants have been constructed, while work has been started on a fifth. When completed, these plants will produce more than 11,200 kilowatts of electrical power.

Guam is the medical, as well as the military, hub of the Pacific. Four Navy hospitals, three Army, and one Naval Military Government Hospital have a bed capacity of 11,140.

Approximately 65 sources of water supply have been developed to produce 10,000,000 gallons of potable water daily, which is distributed through 160,000 lineal feet of water mains. Part of this fresh water goes to the Fleet. For the storage of foodstuffs, there is 1,200,000 cubic feet of refrigerators.

The roads running through "The Times Square of the Pacific" lead to the Philippines, China and, of course, to Tokyo. Guam was a staging area for troops, supplies and ammunition headed for the Iwo Jima and Okinawa operations; while the fighting was still going on, thousands of casualties were evacuated through Guam; and Guam was the base to which one of the Marine divisions returned from each of these campaigns when the battles were over.

If maintained and made permanent now that Japan is vanquished, Guam's present facilities would provide: (1) Ship maintenance and repair facilities to service a sizable fleet; (2) Supply installations necessary to support the fleet operating in the Marianas and westward areas; (3) Supply installations and repair facilities for aviation; (4) Five major airfields.

Also, (5) Extensive communication facilities necessary for any large administrative headquarters; (6) A strategic location for administrative headquarters necessary for control of forces to be based in the Marianas area; (7) Sufficient land mass for the stock-piling of strategic reserves of material and equipment; and (8) Sufficient arable ground that could be developed by modern farming methods to yield crops over and above civilian requirements that could be provided military forces to augment fresh stores shipped from the United States.

A Marine PFC, captured on Guam in December, 1941, and held prisoner by the Japanese for 45 months, passed through the island in September, 1945, on his way home.

"This isn't the Guam I left," he declared in amazement. "This is the Seventh Wonder of the World. The only thing the Americans haven't changed on Guam is the mountains, and to tell the truth, I think a couple of mountains are missing!"

Battleships

(*Continued from page* 91)

and some have been forced to return to Navy Yards for damage repairs, not one of our battleships has been sunk since the treacherous surprise attack by a supposedly friendly power on the 7th of December 1941. This is true of no other type of ship. Carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines have been sunk, but the battleship has been able to better defend itself and, when hit, to take the damage without the same fatal results as on other types of ship. This is not because the crews of the battleships were better than those of other types but because the battleship is constructed from her keel up to withstand great damage in battle and still continue to fight.

The end of the fighting found the battleships at the front of our advance, bombarding the Japanese coastal cities and ready to support the landing of the troops on the Japanese homeland.

Naval Gunfire Support

(*Continued from page* 90)

"The enemy must be credited with unusual and painstaking concealment of vital defenses and gun positions. Our intelligence photographs were good but they could not show what neither the eye nor the camera lens could see."

"Against such defenses, long or medium range gunfire simply is not effective . . . the hard unpleasant fact must be acknowledged that direct hits must be scored repeatedly. This necessitates close point blank ranges and acute observation."

In consequence, the Naval gunfire support forces at Iwo frequently fired at targets from less than 2,000 yards offshore, and at such ranges, the effect upon enemy positions was disastrous. Many of his fixed positions capable of firing on the landing beaches were either destroyed or neutralized prior to H-Hour, and without this fire, the price in lives to the landing troops would have been prohibitive.

The price was high indeed, as it was, but it must be born in mind that the coverage possible in a given area of intensely concentrated and well fortified defense is limited by the time-ammunition-supply factor.

Iwo stands as the Marine Corps' shining hour, but without Naval gunfire support, heroism would have been insufficient.

The last and greatest beach-head of the war was Okinawa. The Japanese chose not to defend the beaches, but it was well known to the amphibious forces that strong defense installations had been built further inland to halt the march of our troops in their efforts to overrun the island.

With the advancing troops, fire support vessels ranged up and down off the beaches of Okinawa throughout the long and hard fought campaign, as shore fire control parties directed the main batteries of our older battleships, cruisers and destroyers in devastating salvos against the entrenched and holed-up enemy. In testimony, the dispatch files of the vessels participating in these bombardment activities bulge with messages of appreciation from commands ashore, who came to know that the accuracy of the Fire Support Group could be counted on to lay down a paralyzing and neutralizing fire wherever and whenever needed.

A statistic is impossible because of the number of imponderables and intangibles, but there is not a shred of doubt that Naval gunfire support saved untold numbers of casualties — numbering in the thousands—during these joint operations that led to the surrender of the Japanese, even as the Navy was massing its forces to cover a major Army operation against the mainland of the Empire. And equally indisputable is the critical damage inflicted on the enemy ashore by Naval guns.

To evaluate the intrinsic worth of gunfire support, as compared with the more spectacular weapons of the long range bomber and the aircraft carrier, is of little meaning or merit. Rather we can assess it best by saying that as a complement to those weapons in close support, it has proved its indispensability in modern warfare.

Naval Aviation

(*Continued from page* 61)

losing more submarines than the Allies were losing ships.

But the Germans were not easily defeated. Often our slim margin of control was almost wiped out. Repeatedly the Germans produced a new device or new tactics which might have swung the scales in their favor; repeatedly the Allies redesigned materiel and retrained men to maintain their margin. It was touch and go until V-E Day.

In December 1941 the Navy had only 10 patrol squadrons in the Atlantic and these were assigned to help protect the Panama Canal and to neutrality patrol along the northern sealanes. The planes were used for scouting and observation and, although most of them were armed, they and the men in them were scarcely a match for Hitler's veterans. Nevertheless, the Navy collected everything that could fly and sent it out along our East Coast, knowing that many a U-Boat would be driven off by the sight of a hostile plane in the air. The Army and the Civil Air Patrol played a vital part during this early period. But in spite of all that could be done, the U-Boats moved in and sank scores of our ships within sight of our beaches. So great was the early German success that if the sinkings had continued there would have been no Allied landings in Europe. Building more allied ships might have meant only more ships to be sunk, more American flags to be painted on U-Boat conning towers.

The Germans discovered, however, that American ingenuity and perseverance were too much for them. Every type of multi-engine aircraft that could be rounded up was sent out, although we knew that even an experienced pilot well-trained for operations in standard aircraft against surface and air targets was not qualified or equipped to combat these deadly underseas craft. The Navy not only developed new equipment and modified standard aircraft, but made these installations in the field, all the while augmenting its forces and training old and new personnel.

These efforts began to show real results early in 1943 and by spring the Allies had ringed the Atlantic with enough land-based aircraft and blimps, flown by enough trained crews and maintained by enough expert personnel, to drive the German submarines away from the coastal areas and out into mid-ocean. It should be remembered that these patrol planes and blimps were far more effective than is evidenced by statistics of subs sunk. Their presence forced the U-Boats to stay under water, where they were ineffective, or to move to other areas where there were fewer ships.

With the submarines concentrating in mid-ocean, the Navy introduced into the Atlantic the escort carrier, which even then was considered by many to be too small and too vulnerable for effective air operations against underseas craft. The first CVE to demonstrate effectiveness in anti-submarine warfare was the Bogue; the first to be awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for sinking subs was the Card. Later there were others, like the Guadalcanal which captured the U-505 and the Croatan which did pioneer work in night operations. Finally there were 13 CVE's and 15 VC squadrons fighting subs in the Atlantic. Only one CVE, the Block Island, was sunk, after she had boldly sought out and attacked a U-Boat concentration at night.

During this period, the submarines changed their tactics and instead of submerging, stayed on the surface to fight back with new and increased armament. This was costly to some of our aircraft but it was fatal to the Germans. Fitted with special types of armament, such as rockets, and operating as teams, our men attacked from altitudes ranging from 20 to 300 feet.

We laid great stress upon discovery and perfection of new types of armament, improved forms of radar and any other devices which appeared to promise results against the U-Boats. Civilian scientists from the office of Scientific Research and Development were brought in to work with the Anti-Submarine Development Detachment which carried out field tests of new equipment, conducted research to develop the most effective tactics for using the equipment and trained personnel.

During June, July and August 1943, aircraft established itself as the No. 1 U-Boat killer. During the latter month, three CVE's, the Card, the Core and the Santee, which following the pioneer work of the Bogue had had the benefit of special training in anti-submarine warfare, sank two-thirds of all the U-Boats they attacked.

The Germans revised their whole plan of submarine warfare. They redesigned their U-Boats and retrained their men; they installed new devices and adopted new tactics. They remained submerged in the daytime and came to the surface only at night.

So we perfected the aircraft searchlight, which had been developed at great effort and cost. Supplementing the work of patrol planes, CVE's had denied to the Nazis every area in the Atlantic where they would be safe from attack; now searchlights supplemented rockets and radar to deny to them any hour of the day or night when they could escape destruction.

The use of aircraft searchlights, however, intensified the problem of training because operating searchlights from aircraft required instrument flying of the highest quality. Taking off from the tiny deck of a CVE, a plane used its radar to find a U-Boat and approach within three-quarters of a mile. At that point, the searchlight was turned on, the vessel identified and the attack made, often while the U-Boat's gunners were firing at the oncoming aircraft. The men who participated in these actions represented the finest results of our whole system of training and logistics, a culmination of all our efforts.

Beaten back from our shores, smashed in mid-ocean, harried day and night, the Germans made their final effort. They equipped their U-Boats with an extensible Diesel intake and exhaust called the schnorkel which permitted the submarines to remain submerged to periscope depth for days on end. Before this invention, U-Boats could remain submerged, at most, for only two days. It was part of the anti-submarine warfare doctrine for planes to remain in the area until the sub surfaced. This new device forced the Allies to revise their tactics and develop new means to locate submerged subs. Even with radar they were hard to find; now we must patrol an area to the saturation point day and night.

Typical of this type of patrolling was the work of the land-based squadrons of Fleet Air Wing Seven. Flying from bases in Great Britain, five patrol squadrons demonstrated this technique effectively by "corking the channel." To bar U-Boats from the waters across which the Allied Armies invading Europe were being supplied, Navy Liberators combed every spot in the area assigned them every fifteen minutes night and day, good weather and foul.

Final efforts to beat "schnorkel" were typical of the Battle of the Atlantic; typical, that is, of the tempo, the improvisation, the brain-wracking, the endurance required of the men who had been thrown against the U-Boats since the early months of the war. But in one vital respect the final weeks were not typical, for then we had trained men and excellent equipment, we had an organization and an accumulation of experience. The men in the planes were the cutting edge of a fine tool.

The story of naval aviation's contribution in the Battle of the Atlantic, however, is a story of a gigantic, complex, organized effort, with teamwork between air and surface forces being a fundamental aim. Most of all, it was an effort applied with skill and courage by men, by individual Americans many of whom had been deep in their civilian pursuits only a few short months earlier. All of them, including those who played brilliant parts in the actions and those unmentioned in this or any other account, comprised the great weapon of naval aviation which was wielded so successfully in winning the Battle of the Atlantic.

Carrier Warfare

(*Continued from page* 84)

Enemy submarines were cleared, for all practical purposes, from both the Atlantic and Pacific by our anti-submarine carrier units. Our own submarines wrote a brilliant page in the Pacific war, but their opposition from enemy aircraft was very much reduced because the Fast Carrier Task Forces attained and maintained control of the air over the Pacific.

Our landing forces, both Marine and Army, are the fellows who actually took the various island bases which blazed our trail to victory. No one would knowingly detract from their glory. But in any technical discussion it is obvious that they could never have been landed without the preliminary work of the Fast Carrier Task Forces, nor could they have subjugated those islands without support of the Carrier Task Groups and Units.

The effect of the two Atomic Bombs which were dropped was stupendous. Had the Japs not surrendered when they did this effect might have been even greater. But the planes which carried those bombs were flown from the same bases as other long range bombers — bases gained, as previously stated, mainly through the work of the Fast Carrier Task Forces.

No one weapon, service, unit or force can be credited with winning the war. All were important, all were essential, from the tanker which provided the fuel to the survey ship which charted the hitherto unknown waters which were used for advanced bases. And our victory is the result of closely integrated, highly coordinated teamwork. But the fighting heart of our offense was the aircraft carrier.

With the preponderance of evidence now in the record to attest the importance of the aircraft carrier, not only as a weapon but in the evolution of methods of warfare, it is inconceivable that pre-war thinking should be permitted to relegate it to a secondary position in our postwar plans. And let us not overlook the fact that a Fast Carrier Task Force is essentially a Naval Air unit. It has flourished and prospered under the command of Naval Aviation and under the administration of the Navy Department. We should not radically change the organization under which, this power was built up, for one that is untried and inexperienced in this particular branch of Naval Warfare. We would do well to profit by this experience in our future plans for national defense.

This ship had no right to live . . . but she did!

Here is a picture of a ship that had no right to live.

But she *did* live!

And the story of *why* she lived illustrates the fact that our Navy is *more* than ships. Our Navy is also *men* . . . and *what* men!

The ship you see above . . . torn, shattered, and burning . . . is the aircraft carrier *Saratoga*, oldest in the Fleet.

She was so badly damaged that she literally had no right to live. According to all rules and experience, her hurts were grievous enough to put her on the bottom.

But her MEN . . . her crew of American seamen . . . refused to recognize the rules!

They brought her back! The survivors of what should have been the *Saratoga's* death brought her back more than 5000 painful miles so that her shattered flight decks could be mended, her seared super-structure and hangar deck renewed. They brought the *Saratoga* back so that she could fight again!

Once her gallant men had brought her safely into port, the *Saratoga* was turned over to other men . . . skilled shipyard workers . . . who repaired and refitted her in record-breaking time.

And so, because of men who loved her and would not let her die, old "Sara" has once more put to sea . . . a living example of the fact that a ship is only as good as the *men* who walk her decks.

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The Amphibious Eighth

(*Continued from page 75*)

strike the main blow against Luzon at Lingayen Gulf. Eighth Army would move up to Leyte to conduct operations to regain control of the central and southern Philippines, feint toward southern Luzon from Mindoro, and support Sixth Army in Luzon by delivering two sharp blows on the west coast above and below Manila Bay.

Before the first of the year, Eighth Army Headquarters had moved to Leyte and assumed control of operations in the Philippines below Luzon. The long drawn out task of hunting out the 27,000 Japs remaining on Leyte and Samar, to continue on a decreasing scale for several months as the Japs were gradually eliminated. At the same time, the Western Visayan Task Force, composed of elements of the 24th Division, feinted northward on Mindoro to keep the Japanese on Luzon interested in the possibility of a major landing in the south. This same force started a series of sixteen Eighth Army landings designed to clear the Visayan Passages of Japanese interference with our use of those sheltered inland waterways on the direct route from Leyte to Luzon.

At the end of January, 1945, as Sixth Army's XIV Corps moved down the central plain toward Manila, Eighth Army, supported by elements of the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh Fleet, entered into the Luzon picture.

On January 29, Lieutenant General Charles P. Hall's XI Corps, composed of the 38th Infantry Division commanded by Major General Henry L. C. Jones, the 34th Regimental Combat Team of the 24th Division, and supporting troops, struck on the Zambales coast about fifteen miles northwest of Subic Bay. The corps' missions included the seizure of our prewar naval base at Olongapo, the protection of the XIV Corps' right flank, and the blocking off of Bataan Peninsula. General Hall achieved complete strategic and tactical surprise and the assault waves waded ashore unopposed. The initial objectives were captured so rapidly that it was possible to hand the force over to General Krueger shortly after the landing. In three days, the corps captured Olongapo and moved out across the base of Bataan Peninsula toward Manila.

The second Eighth Army blow was pointed at Nasugbu, 45 air miles below Manila. The offensive-minded Major General Joseph M. Swing's elite 11th Airborne Division, reinforced, was slated for the job, one parachute regiment being held in reserve prepared for a parachute landing. Although the operation was designed as a reconnaissance in force, General MacArthur hoped that by achieving surprise and by acting aggressively the light force might be able to catch the Jap forces southwest of Manila off balance and neutralize them, thus sealing off Manila from the south and preventing the full concentration of the Manila garrison against XIV Corps to the north. In view of reports of large and shifting Japanese concentrations in the area, it was prescribed that no exploitation of a successful landing could be made unless personally ordered by the Commanding General, Eighth Army. The same limitation applied to committing the reserve parachute regiment from the air. It was therefore necessary for me to be personally present and I went in on D-Day to assume command in the field.

In our landing at Nasugbu on January 31st, we gained complete surprise and within three hours after the first men had come ashore I had made the decision to drive on to Manila. Brushing aside infantry-artillery delaying action, the 11th thrust inland to run up against a well organized position in hill masses flanking the road. On 2 February, the 188th Infantry under Colonel Robert H. Soule (made Brigadier General as a result of his conduct in this operation) decisively defeated the Japanese 31st Infantry, which held the positions, and drove on up the road the same day. The next day, the 511th Parachute Regiment dropped on Tagaytay Ridge, key point on the road to Manila, and moved out to spearhead the column. One hundred and four hours after the initial landing, we ran up against heavily fortified positions extending across the narrow corridor in the southern outskirts of Manila. These defenses, supported by artillery up to eight inches in caliber, were the only ones protecting the city. The penetration of these positions was still under way when the operation passed to Sixth Army control on February 10th. After the Nasugbu blow, the Japanese south of Manila at no time regained any semblance of effective organization. All the objectives of the operation had been won.

By the time Eighth Army's job in Luzon was finished, preparations were well under way for the Visayan Campaign. General MacArthur's strategic plan for the liberation of the central and southern Philippines was brilliant. First, bases for air and light naval forces on Palawan and in the Zamboanga Peninsula — Sulu Archipelago area would be seized to complete the isolation of the central Philippines, bring under our control the vital seaways to the west and south of the Philippines, and render the considerable Japanese forces in Mindanao and the Celebes strategically impotent. Then, the critical ports and developed areas on Panay, Cebu, and Negros Islands would be taken in a rapid succession of amphibious strikes. From these points, we would reach out to reoccupy the entire Visayan area. The liberation of isolated Mindanao was to follow. By conducting these operations concurrently with the Luzon Campaign, the entire Philippines would be free and the bulk of our troops made available for operations against Japan by the time Luzon was cleared.

To support our operations, we had the cruisers, destroyers, submarines, PT boats, and amphibious components of the Seventh Fleet; and bomber, fighter, reconnaissance, and transport elements of the Thirteenth Air Force as reinforced by four Marine air groups. Great credit is due the Seventh Fleet for their participation in the operations. Its intricate tasks of transporting our troops, protecting our convoys, and furnishing fire support for our landings were performed in a commendable manner. Although the strategic air battle in the Philippines had been won prior to the Visayan Campaign, the Thirteenth Air Force and the gallant Marine airmen performed invaluable services of close support, troop transport, air supply, and reconnaissance.

The veteran 41st Division under the leadership of Major General Jens A. Doe was given the job of securing Palawan, Zamboanga, and the Sulu Archipelago. On 28th February, a task force built around the 186th Regimental Combat Team landed against an estimated 1,700 Japs near the key Palawan port, Puerto Princessa. Probably never before had such a fighting-mad force assaulted a hostile shore—the 186th and its supporting air and naval forces had just heard the horrible news of the Japanese soaking in oil our prisoners held on Palawan and burning alive all except a few who escaped to tell the tale. But their hopes for quick vengeance were frustrated; the terror-stricken enemy fled to the hills. While reconstruction of the ruined Jap airfield was rushed, the force started the tedious process of occupying the remainder of Palawan and nearby islands and destroying the Japanese garrisons.

On 10 March, eleven days after the Palawan landing, under the cover of the planes of the Thirteenth Air Force and the guns of the Seventh Fleet, the remainder of the 41st, reinforced, assaulted the beaches west of Zamboanga City. The surprised garrison of about 8,000 was unable to defend its strong beach and airfield defenses and, by the day after the assault, our troops had seized the airfields and had driven down to capture fortified Zamboanga City. Harassed by extensive mine fields and spasmodic delaying action, General Doe drove the Japs back into their main mountain positions. At the same time, amphibious blows were launched against Basilan Island off the tip of the peninsula and against the Sulu Islands of Jolo and Tawi Tawi. It took over a month of heavy mountain fighting to knock out the Japanese resistance at Zamboanga, but by the third week of April, the bulk of the Japanese forces in the area had been destroyed and we had air bases at Zamboanga and on Tawi Tawi, only thirty miles from Borneo.

The next major strike after Zamboanga was against Panay Island. The 40th Division was withdrawn from the battle of Luzon and turned over to the Eighth Army for the job. The 108th Regimental Combat Team went to Leyte; the rest of Major General Rapp Brush's division formed the bulk of the task force which, on 18 March, waded ashore unopposed fourteen miles west of the port of Iloilo and raced eastward against light delaying action to take Iloilo in three days. The 2,200 Japs on Panay made no strong effort to defend the vital port and fled to the hills in disorder or withdrew to Negros.

There were an estimated 15,000 well-organized Japanese concentrated in the northwestern coastal plains of Negros and opinion varied as to whether we should hit them with the five battalions which were immediately available or wait until a stronger force could be built up. The rapid success on Panay, along with the consequent opportunity to catch the Negros garrison off balance, decided the issue and preparations for a landing on the central coast opposite Iloilo were initiated immediately. As an ace in the hole, we prepared the elite 503rd Parachute Regiment for a drop on northern Negros.

General Brush struck Negros on 29 March. A gallant little raiding party captured intact the vital Bago River Bridge, use of which was essential to our rapid northward advance, before the prepared demolitions could be set off. In the first two days, the 40th drove northward to take the key city of Bacolod and its airfields. The disorganized Japanese, unable to execute their scheme of blocking our advance up the coastal highway at the successive river lines lying across our path, started withdrawing into the rugged interior of the island as our troops continued their northward drive. By 10 May, northern Negros was ours. It had been unnecessary to drop the 503rd; it was brought in by water to aid in the reduction of the Japanese mountain positions which the enemy defended doggedly for weeks before they could be overrun.

On the 26th of March, between the dates of the Panay and Negros landings, the battle-wise Americal Division, reinforced, under Major General William H.

(*Continued on page 178*)

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The Amphibious Eighth

(*Continued from page* 176)

Arnold, initiated operations against the 20,000 enemy on Cebu Island by a two-regiment landing on a short stretch of beach seven miles below the Japanese strongpoint at Cebu City, the second largest port of the Philippines. Although the beach defenses were strong and had not been destroyed by our naval and air preparations, the shore line was not defended strongly. We were ashore rapidly and, after minor clashes with delaying detachments on the road from the landing beach, reached Cebu City within thirty hours. The Japanese made no determined effort to defend the ruined city but withdrew in good order to honeycombed positions which they had been preparing for months in the steep hills overlooking the harbor. Many of their tunnels and bunkers were of concrete and steel. The Japanese defense of their excellent position was unyielding. Initially, our losses in the heavy fighting were considerable and the third regiment of the division was brought in to deliver the knockout punch. In a wide enveloping movement of twenty-seven miles through difficult mountainous terrain, the fresh regiment caught the enemy unawares in an attack on his left flank and rear and completely defeated him. The Jap remnants deserted their positions and scattered to the north. While our troops and guerrilla forces cleared the island of remaining Japanese, the division's 164th Regimental Combat Team struck at Dumaguete in Southern Negros to eliminate the last important Japanese stronghold in the Visayas. Landing on 26 April against light resistance, our forces drove the ever-withdrawing Jap inland into the mountains; by 16 June, the last resistance was overcome.

Although officially not closed until 20 June, the Visayan Campaign was now virtually completed. Of the campaign, General MacArthur made the following statement of which my whole command is justly proud—"* * * my heartiest commendations for the brilliant execution of the Visayan Campaign. This is a model of what a light but aggressive command can accomplish in rapid exploitation."

The key points of the Visayas once seized, Eighth Army prepared for Mindanao. The strongest Japanese concentration on Mindanao, which later proved to be 30,000 strong, was on heavily defended Davao Gulf near Davao City. At the other end of a poor east-west road connecting the Davao Gulf to the west coast lies the Cotobato area where there were about 2,000 Japs. Midway along the road, another weak road leads northward to Macajalar Bay. Along this road was a third Japanese concentration of about 15,000. Another 2,500 were around Sarangani Bay on the southern tip of the island. An amphibious assault against Davao would be expensive in lives. It was decided, therefore, to strike at Cotobato and extend our control over the island from a base established there. This course would be slower but casualties less severe. It was not anticipated by higher headquarters that Davao Gulf could be reached overland for some months.

Major General Franklin C. Sibert's X Corps was designated to undertake the Mindanao operation. He was given two reinforced divisions—the 24th under Major General Roscoe B. Woodruff and the 31st under Major General Clarence A. Martin. Initial plans for a landing at Malabang, thirty miles north of Cotobato, were changed en route when guerrilla information was received that the Japs were withdrawing from the area and that guerrillas had occupied the objective airstrip. On 17 April, the 24th effected their main landing at Parang, ten miles above Cotobato; only a battalion went in at Malabang. The following day, Cotobato itself was taken amphibiously. The unpredictable Jap, caught unawares, attempted no strong defensive action at any point; we answered the opportunity he had presented with a quick thrust toward Davao. At the same time, an attempt was initiated to exploit as a line of supply the twisting, treacherous waterways of the great Mindanao River paralleling the Davao road to its midpoint. Mounted in the heavily-armed assault craft of the amphibious 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, a regiment attacked up the river line. Both the overland and water borne expeditions advanced rapidly. Brushing aside minor resistance, they reached the halfway point across the island in a four day drive. The enemy forces in the north were now cut off from those around Davao. The river route proved usable and the poor road was abandoned as a main line of supply.

Our unexpectedly rapid advance to the center of the island placed us within striking distance of Davao Gulf and created a remarkable opportunity to assault the "impregnable" Davao Gulf from its defenseless rear before the Jap could get set to meet us. The situation was reminiscent of Singapore; the heavy coastal defenses pointed the wrong way. General Woodruff didn't hesitate and, while the 31st moved up to strike northward toward Macajalar Bay, he drove on to Davao Gulf. 27 April, only ten days after our landing at Parang, the 24th reached the gulf. The beachhead established there freed us of the long and tenuous overland line of supply; we now could bring in our supplies directly by sea. The same day he reached the gulf, General Woodruff attacked northward up the coastal road with a regiment—objective, Davao City. Three days later he had captured the city, while the Japs dug in above Davao for a fight to the finish. The courageous advance of the 24th Division, strung out for fifty miles along a single poor road and thrusting into the middle of an enemy force numbering 30,000, is in my opinion one of the birght pages of the war. Rapid exploitation of opportunity and fearless offensive action had paid off to cut down a three or four months' job to a two weeks' task. With the taking of Davao City, the strategic victory was won, but one of the most brutal land battles of the Philippines Campaign had just begun.

The 31st Division ran into road trouble; the rain-soaked trail-like road, and especially its miles of corduroy stretches, disintegrated rapidly. We had anticipated this eventuality and, while General Martin's spearhead thrust forward supplied largely by air, a task force commanded by Brigadier General Robert O. Shoe and built around the 108th RCT of the 40th Division sailed for Macajalar Bay to secure a new coastal base. Landing on 10 March, the force fought southward against sporadic delaying action to contact the 31st Division thirteen days later. The new supply road was soon in operation and the two forces merged to destroy the enemy who had faded into the mountains east of the road.

In order to prevent this enemy force from withdrawing through the mountains and into the fertile valley of the northward flowing Agusan River of northeastern Mindanao, the 1st Battalion of the 155th Infantry, reinforced with artillery and guerrilla troops, was given the mission of advancing amphibiously ninety-seven river miles up the Agusan to establish a block on the enemy's line of withdrawal. Reaching the river's mouth on 21 June, by the end of the month the force had reached its objective and the Japanese caught between our two forces were hopelessly isolated in the mountains.

By the first of July, General Woodruff had eliminated as an effective fighting force the fanatical defenders of the Davao area and General Sibert was ready to initiate a three-pronged operation against the last large Japanese stronghold on Mindanao, the Sarangani Bay area on the southern tip of the island. The 116th Provisional Antiaircraft Group, converted to infantry duty, struck southward from the Cotobato-Davao Gulf road by amphibious craft, native canoe, bullock cart, and on foot through the roadless interior of southern Mindanao. The 1st Battalion Combat Team, reinforced, of the 21st Infantry Regiment landed amphibiously on the shores of the bay on 12 July. A third prong composed largely of the expeditionary battalion of the 110th Philippine Infantry Division came over the rugged mountain trails from the western shores of Davao Gulf. The Japanese offered only sporadic resistance, withdrawing in good order into the mountains to dig in. Our troops were still searching them out in the middle of August when Eighth Army relinquished control of the operation.

In July, 1945, after the close of the Visayan and Mindanao campaigns, Eighth Army embarked on the greatest task that had ever faced it. General MacArthur selected our headquarters to strike the main blow in the projected invasion of Japan, an asault from the sea on the heartland of the Japanese Empire—that great congested plain wherein lies Tokyo. We had taken over (1 July) mopping-up operations in Luzon (where we killed 22,000 Japanese) and had initiated preliminary plans for the invasion of Japan when the Japanese surrender changed our future mission from that of prosecuting a bloody campaign to leading a victorious occupation army into a defeated nation.

On 30 August, I accompanied the first echelon of the 11th Airborne Division to land at Atsugi Airport, fifteen miles west of Yokohama, and commence our occupation of Japan. When the plane bearing General MacArthur landed, only one battalion of infantry had arrived and I had the fantastic experience of riding with him en route to his temporary headquarters at Yokohama for an hour through approximately 10,000 well armed Japanese troops of doubtful temper. I remember that, at the time, our one battalion seemed very small. Since that day, the extension of our control has progressed smoothly. Our troops have performed their duties in a firm and dignified manner. On the surface at least, the Japanese have accepted their role as a defeated nation and have carried out our orders promptly and fully. There has been a minimum of misconduct on either side.

Eighth Army faces its new responsibilities with a deep realization of the importance to future world peace of imposing fully upon the Japanese people the stern terms of surrender. I, for one, will always remember and will be guided by the simple directive given by General MacArthur at the flag raising ceremony at Tokyo, when he said, "General Eichelberger, have our country's flag unfurled and in Tokyo's sun let it wave in its full glory as a symbol of hope for the oppressed and as a harbinger of victory for the right."



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THROUGH THE WAR, MAKERS OF U. S. NAVY MINE SWEEPING GEAR

Sixth U. S. Army

(*Continued from page* 71)

stroy our shipping in Leyte Gulf. In the historic Battle of Leyte Gulf which occurred during the period 24-26 October, this threat was turned back by our Third and Seventh Fleets. A large part of the enemy naval forces were sunk and the remainder withdrew in a badly damaged condition.

In spite of this disastrous naval defeat, General Yamashita rushed reinforcements to Leyte on all available craft, openly stating that the battle of the Philippines would be won or lost on Leyte Island. From Cebu, Panay, and Mindanao, enemy reinforcements came in barges, landing craft and other minor shipping; and from Luzon reinforcements poured southward in cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts and transports. In spite of terrific losses inflicted by our air attacks on his convoys, the enemy succeeded in landing a corps headquarters, and the bulk of five divisions, besides a considerable number of corps, combat and service troops. By early November, it was clearly apparent that Phase Three of the operation would be difficult and protracted, due not only to the heavy reinforcements which the enemy was rushing to Leyte, but also to the advent of the rainy season and to a lack of adequate air support caused by our inability to build airfields in the morass that Leyte had become.

Phase Three began on 3 November when X Corps advanced the 24th Infantry Division westward from its positions at Carigara. This division captured Pinamopoan on 4 November and then turned southward on Highway 2 in the direction of Ormoc. Shortly thereafter, it encountered strong and stubborn resistance on Breakneck Ridge which was not eliminated until 16 November. Concurrently, the 96th Infantry Division overcame strong hostile resistance west of Dagami as the 7th Infantry Division continued to concentrate at Baybay in preparation for an advance by XXIV Corps northward along the west coast.

While the enemy continued to push reinforcements into Leyte, Sixth Army was also being reinforced: by the 32d Infantry Division and the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team on 14 November; by the 11th Airborne Division on 18 November; and by the 77th Infantry Division on 23 November. With this added strength, Sixth Army was able to cope with the augmented enemy forces on Leyte and to continue its offensive without a let-up. The ensuing struggle for western Leyte was as bitterly fought as any in American history. With the rainy season at its height, bridges were washed out, roads disappeared in a sea of mud and the construction of airfields was wellnigh impossible. The immense task of supply, now that motor transportation, though used to the utmost, was impeded by the mud, was solved by the use of landing craft, amphibious tractors, native carriers and air droppings. As our troops drove deeper into the rugged and densely forested mountains, they were forced to subsist on reduced rations and to evacuate their wounded by tedious handborne means over almost impassable trails which often required three days to traverse. But the men met these difficulties with determination. The courage, fortitude and real fighting skill displayed by our troops in this phase of the Leyte Operation have never been surpassed.

While X Corps advanced slowly south and southwestward through the mountains toward Ormoc, the 96th Infantry Division and the 11th Airborne Division of XXIV Corps were laboriously driving westward over difficult mountain trails, and the 7th Infantry Division was pushing its way slowly northward from Baybay. At this time it was clearly apparent that the successful conclusion of the Leyte Operation demanded a shore-to-shore movement of strong forces to the Ormoc area in order to shut off the flow of the enemy's reinforcements and strike his forces in their vulnerable rear. This movement was put into effect at the earliest moment that amphibious support was available. On 7 December, following an overnight amphibious movement from the Dulag-Abuyog area of eastern Leyte, the 77th Infantry Division was committed in an assault landing south of Ormoc. It did this successfully, captured Ormoc on 10 December and, continuing its steady advance northward, made contact on 21 December with elements of X Corps which had fought their way from the northeast. Concurrently, the 7th Infantry Division, overcoming difficult obstacles of terrain and weather, cleared the west coast of enemy forces and established contact at Ormoc with the 77th Infantry Division and in the mountains east of Damulaan with the 11th Airborne Division. These contacts trapped the enemy forces remaining on Leyte and brought the campaign to the final or mopping up stage.

Meanwhile, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, which had landed on the Island of Samar on 24 October, pushed northward in conjunction with Philippine guerrilla forces, captured Wright on 14 December and established contact on the Wright-Taft Highway with the guerrilla forces advancing westward from Taft. Mopping up of organized resistance south of this highway shortly thereafter achieved Sixth Army's objective on Samar.

For Sixth Army, the Battle of Leyte was ended on 25 December 1944 when a battalion of the 77th Infantry Division landed at Palompon after a shore-to-shore movement from Ormoc. Palompon was the terminus of the enemy route of retreat and the one remaining Japanese port of entry on the west coast of Leyte. At this time, Sixth Army, preparatory to embarkation for the Luzon Campaign, relinquished control of further operations on Leyte to Eighth Army. The total number of enemy dead buried by our troops amounted to 56,263; however, the Japanese High Command publicly admitted that their attempts to defeat our forces had cost them 178,000 men.

The next step in the liberation of the Philippines was the seizure of southwestern Mindoro. The task force for this operation was organized in late October and included the 503d Parachute Combat Team and the 19th Infantry Regimental Combat Team, the latter being withdrawn from the Leyte Operation for this purpose. The bulk of the remaining troops consisted of construction engineers, service and air force units. This force, with its attendant equipment and supplies, was concentrated on the east coast of Leyte where loading operations commenced in early December.

As was earnestly hoped, the boldness and daring of this operation caught the Japanese completely off guard, and our assault landing on 15 December 1944 was unopposed. Quickly establishing a strong perimeter around the objective area, the Task Force proceeded with the expeditious construction of airfields and roads. Although hampered by repeated attacks by enemy suicide bombers which succeeded in destroying a number of our cargo ships and tankers, the construction effort on Mindoro continued as scheduled. Even a daring night raid of a strong Japanese surface force failed to impede our progress.

On New Year's Day 1945, control of forces on Mindoro passed from the Sixth Army to the Eighth Army. At this time our fighters and bombers were already operating from the Mindoro fields and were taking heavy toll of enemy shipping and playing havoc with the enemy airfields and communications on Luzon. Moreover, convoys bearing Sixth Army troops from New Guinea, the Solomons, New Caledonia, and the Admiralties were already at this time enroute to Lingayen Gulf for the Luzon Operation.

The Luzon Campaign, the third and most important step in the over-all plan for the liberation of the Philippines, was initiated on 9 January 1945 with amphibious assault landings on beaches in the Lingayen Gulf area of central Luzon with I Corps and XIV Corps abreast, the XIV Corps on the right. Our landings were preceded by three days of naval gunfire and air attacks, combined with minesweeping operations and the clearing of landing beaches by underwater demolition teams. The landings of both corps were virtually unopposed, but I Corps quickly developed strong opposition on its left front. Very early in the operation, it became evident that General Yamashita did not intend to join battle in the Central Plain of Luzon, electing instead to defend strongly what amounted to flank positions in mountain areas, apparently hoping by these means to cause us to fritter away our forces. The proximity of two reinforced enemy divisions in the mountains to the north and northeast of the beachhead required employment of most of I Corps in the task of driving these enemy forces back in order to make our Lingayen base secure. This had to be accomplished prior to advancing in force to the southward to seize the Central Plain-Manila area, which was the primary mission. Manila was 120 miles south of the base on Lingayen Gulf; and no other base would become available to Sixth Army until Manila could be reestablished as a port. Moreover, it was imperative that this be accomplished prior to the advent of the rainy season.

While I Corps, employing the 25th and 43d Divisions and the 158th Regimental Combat Team, slowly pushed the enemy back on the north and northeast flank, the 6th Division of I Corps, and XIV Corps, consisting of the 37th and 40th Divisions, advanced southward and secured crossings over the Agno River, preparatory to further advances in the direction of Manila. With the arrival on 27 January of the 32d Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, reinforced by the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, Sixth Army was enabled to continue its drive southward in earnest while safe-guarding its lines of communication and continuing attacks against the enemy defenses on the Army left. In rapid succession, the Clark Field area was secured and enemy forces were driven back into the mountains west of this area where they were engaged in a bitter struggle by the 40th Infantry Division; the 37th Infantry Division secured crossings over the Pampanga River at Calumpit; and, on the night of 3 February 1945, the 1st Cavalry Division, which had crossed the Pampanga River at Cabanatuan on 1 February and thereafter had advanced rapidly southward, drove into the Grace Park area of Manila and liberated hundreds of Allied internees who had been held by the Japanese in Santo Tomas University for the past three years. Meanwhile, the 37th Division advanced rapidly on Manila along Highway 3, making contact with the 1st Cavalry Division in north Manila on 4 February. In a desperately fought and

(*Continued on page* 182)

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Sixth U. S. Army

(*Continued from page* 180)

month-long battle, XIV Corps, spearheaded by these two divisions, destroyed approximately 17,000 of Manila's 20,000 defenders and succeeded in completely securing that city on 4 March 1945.

On 27 January 1945, meanwhile, Filipino guerrillas had reported that between 300 and 500 American prisoners of war, guarded by a small enemy garrison, were being held in a stockade at Pangatian just east of Cabanatuan. Although Pangatian was 25 miles inside the enemy lines, it was decided to take immediate rescue action. An Alamo Scout Group to make a detailed ground reconnaissance was promptly dispatched from Guimba. That same evening, 27 January 1945, a detachment of five officers and 115 men of the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion, personally commanded by the Battalion Commander, followed and rendezvoused with the Alamo Scouts and guerrillas early the next morning. Reconnaissance of the stockade area was completed on 30 January and, relying on complete surprise, the attack was launched early in the evening, even though a concentration of 800 enemy troops with tanks and trucks were known to be within two miles of the stockade. In a 30-minute fight, the entire enemy garrison was annihilated; and 512 Allied prisoners of war, liberated after three years in captivity, were moved to Guimba where they arrived on 31 January 1945.

Meanwhile, two additional amphibious assault landings had been made on Luzon by forces initially under Eighth Army control. The first, in the San Antonio-San Narciso area of Zambales Province, was made by the 38th Division and 34th Regimental Combat Team (24th Division) of XI Corps on 29 January 1945. On 30 January this corps passed to Sixth Army control and, after opening Subic Bay for development as a naval base and anchorage, attacked eastward on Highway 7, isolated Bataan Peninsula and prevented an enemy withdrawal thither. The second amphibious landing was effected at Nasugbu in Batangas Province, on 31 January by the 11th Airborne Division, reinforced by elements of the 24th Infantry Division. Driving rapidly northward on Highways 17 and 1, this force approached Manila from the south, passing to Sixth Army control on 11 February while in the southern outskirts of the city.

On 10 February 1945 the 33d Infantry Division arrived in the Lingayen area and was promptly committed in the zone of action of I Corps, relieving the 43d Infantry Division and the 158th Regimental Combat Team. Orders from the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, directed Sixth Army to complete loading of the 40th Infantry Division by 15 March for participation in Visayan operations; consequently, this division was withdrawn from combat at the beginning of March and moved to a staging area near San Fabian. The loss of this division, coupled with the decision that the 41st Infantry Division would not be brought to Luzon, made it necessary to recommit the 43d Division to combat after only a very brief rest. Moreover, in order to expedite operations south of Manila and to prepare for an amphibious assault in the Legaspi area of the Bicol Provinces, it became necessary in mid-March to return the 158th Regimental Combat Team to combat in the zone of action of XIV Corps. From this time on, Sixth Army fought the Luzon Campaign without reserve, solving this problem by rapidly shifting forces from place to place to gain superiority of numbers and fire power where most needed.

While the Battle of Manila was at its height, Sixth Army initiated operations to open Manila Bay to Allied shipping. In a combined overland and amphibious assault of 15 February against Mariveles, it established control over the southern portion of Bataan Peninsula, following this on 16 February with a combined airborne and amphibious assault on the island fortress of Corregidor which guarded the north channel entrance into Manila Bay. In a ferocious 12-day battle, the 503d Parahute Combat Team, reinforced by tlfe 3d Battalion of the 34th Infantry Regiment, a force totalling approximately 3,000 men, killed more than 5,000 Japs and secured Corregidor, thereby permitting minesweeping by the Navy in Manila Bay and opening the Bay to Allied shipping. Following the capture of Corregidor, the remaining islands in Manila were seized by XI Corps in a series of shore-to-shore operations, culminating in the capture of Carabao Island on 16 April 1945.

The primary objectives of Sixth Army had now been achieved. However, in order to establish control over the remainder of Luzon, many difficult operations had yet to be undertaken. The seizure of the Central Luzon Plain-Manila area had effectively divided the enemy's forces into three major groups: namely, that in southern Luzon inclusive of the mountains east and northeast of Manila; that in western Luzon; and that in northern Luzon. Each of these groups was isolated for all practical purposes. Some communication between northern and southern Luzon by circuitous jungle trails through the Sierra Madre Mountains was still possible, but the movement of heavy equipment or large bodies of troops over these trails was not practicable. On the other hand, the Sixth Army had the advantage of interior lines which enabled it to shift troops quickly from one area to another over the relatively good road net of central Luzon.

Consistent with his policy of defending mountainous areas, General Yamashita had organized a series of strong positions east of Manila, extending northward from Laguna de Bay to include the Ipo Dam area. His forward positions were so located as to permit him to bring long range artillery fire to bear against the city of Manila. Following the capture of Manila, Sixth Army commenced a series of operations against this fortified area, unhinged its southern flank, drove a wedge between enemy forces in southern Luzon and those northeast of Manila, and finally broke the last remaining organized enemy resistance on 21 May 1945. In conjunction with these operations, other Sixth Army forces drove south and southeast of Manila, opened Balayan and Batangas Bays to our shipping and cleared enemy forces from the area south of Laguna de Bay and west of Lake Taal.

Simultaneously with operations being conducted in central and southern Luzon, I Corps continued its relentless attacks, drove the enemy back along its front, and captured Baguio. After much arduous and desperate fighting in the mountainous jungle terrain along the Villa Verde Trail, the 32d Division made contact near Imugan with the 25th Division which had battled its way foot by foot northward along Highway 5 from San Jose, its advance culminating in the capture of Balete Pass. With the capture of the Balete Pass-Santa Fe-Imugan area an access route to the upper Cagayan Valley was obtained.

Meanwhile, the 158th Regimental Combat Team, reinforced, was dispatched to make an amphibious landing at Legaspi in the Albay Gulf area in the southeastern part of the Bicol Peninsula on 1 April 1945. It landed successfully, secured the northern exit of San Bernardino Strait, and, turning northwestward, drove up the Bicol Peninsula, cleared it of enemy forces and made contact with units of XIV Corps driving southeastward. The junction of these two forces on 3 May 1945 marked the end of all organized resistance in southeastern Luzon.

With the breakthrough in the Balete Pass-Santa Fe-Imugan area, and the subsequent debouchment of Sixth Army forces into the upper Cagayan Valley, the Luzon Campaign rapidly drew to a close. While the 37th Division of I Corps was dispatched northward into and down the Cagayan Valley, airborne forces from the 11th Airborne Division were landed in the enemy's rear to assist reinforced guerrilla units in blocking all possibility of his escaping to the north. When contact was established between these two forces on 26 June 1945, the Luzon Campaign came to a close with Sixth Army in complete control of Luzon. The only remaining enemy force of any size had been isolated in two pockets: one in the Sierra Madre Mountains east of the Cagayan Valley; and the other in the Kiangan-Bontoc area where the Japanese had elected to make a final suicidal defensive stand. The ultimate liquidation of these two pockets was tactically merely a matter of time. On 1 July 1945 by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, responsibility for the conduct of remaining operations on Luzon passed from the Commanding General, Sixth Army, to the Commanding General, Eighth Army. At the time of the turnover, the number of enemy dead buried by our forces on Luzon had reached 173,563. Contrasted with this figure, our losses amounted to 37,854 of which 8,140 were killed.

The Luzon Campaign wrote a chapter in the annals of American military history which deserves study. This campaign provides a fertile field in which to study the problems of command as applied to almost every type of warfare: an amphibious assault on a hostile shore; open, mobile warfare in flat terrain adapted to the employment of armored equipment; mountain warfare; jungle warfare; combined overland and amphibious assaults; a combined airborne and amphibious assault on a small, fortified island; fighting in a large city; an airborne operation to disrupt enemy lines of communication and cut off retreat; the use of rangers and scouts behind the enemy lines; and large scale mopping up operations. The versatility of Sixth Army troops in overcoming myriad unprecedented problems in this campaign is most noteworthy, and their record for devotion to exacting duty and tireless perseverance is remarkable.

Even before the Luzon Campaign was completed, Sixth Army was informed that a larger undertaking than any in which it had yet engaged was in store for it. General MacArthur assigned the most difficult task of the Pacific war, the initial landing on the Japanese homeland, to the veteran Sixth. Planning for the operation began in early June and increased in tempo upon the release of Sixth Army Headquarters from responsibility for the Luzon Campaign and with the arrival of Admiral Turner's Flagship in Manila Bay together with his staff of the Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet. The tremendous problem of assembling huge numbers of ships, men, equipment and supplies was, by mid-August, well on the way to solution.

At that time, however, the Imperial Japanese Government offered to accept the Allied terms of surrender.

"Have a Coke"

It's the
friendly
high-sign

Drink
Coca-Cola
REG U S PAT OFF

Training For Victory

(*Continued from page* 16)

will be the real master of its own destiny. Together with an active body of scientific research, a substantial trained civilian reserve behind our permanent establishments will guarantee our security in case of attack by an aggressor state. But, in my opinion, it will do far more than that, it will present to the world an available power so great and so readily mobilizable that it will discourage any plans to upset the peace of the world.

Recapture of Burma

(*Continued from page* 33)

other theatre of operations.

The three major forces which were to coordinate the final plan of operations were: The Northern Combat Area Command. These forces, which had previously been under General Stilwell were now under Lieutenant General Dan I. Sultan, and consisted of the Mars Brigade of two African Regiments (which had replaced the Galahad Force); as well as five Chinese American-trained Divisions, and the 36th British Division, which had replaced the Chandits. They were supported by the 10th U. S. Air Force, under Major General H. C. Davidson. The Chinese Expeditionary Force was also on the China-Burma Border supported by General Chennault's 14th U. S. Air Force.

The 15th Indian Corps, under Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christison, which was in Arakan, consisted of the 25th and 26th Indian Divisions; 21st West African Division (later relieved by the 82nd); the 22nd East African Brigade, and (for amphibious assaults) the 3rd Commando Brigade. This Corps was supported by 224 Group R.A.F. under Air Vice Marshal the Earl of Bandon.

The 14th Army, which consisted of the 4th Corps and 33rd Corps and was commanded by Lieutenant General Sir William Slim.

Supporting these forces were the Allied Air Forces in Burma. These included 221 and 224 Groups R.A.F., the 10th U. S. Air Force, and the Strategic Air Force.

The final drive, which was to culminate in the capture of Rangoon, and the virtual recapture of Burma, started in mid-November. Three main factors contributed to its success. Firstly, in the closing stages of the campaign, our forces were for the first time able to operate in open country, and to make the best use of tanks. Secondly, and as a result of this, the speed of our moves appears to have quite bewildered the Japanese, whose failure to appreciate correctly our intentions made their reactions ineffective.

But the third, and most important, factor was that of air supply, since the advance of the Fourteenth Army was so rapid that it was necessary to rely on air supply on a scale never hitherto attained.

In November 1944, the new and untried 19th Indian Division crossed the Chindwin near Sittaung, and made a spectacular advance through the jungle and over a formidable escarpment to join up with the 36th British Division, which had fought its way down the "Railway Corridor" to Indaw. The 19th Indian Division then turned South along the Railway and reached Shwebo on the 2nd December.

Meanwhile the 2nd British Division crossed the Chindwin at the Dalewa Bridgehead and, assisted by tanks, also made a swift advance to Shwebo, which it reached on 26 Dec.

The gap between the 19th and 2nd Divisions was filled by the 268th Independent Brigade, which succeeded in cutting its way through some of the thickest jungle in Burma. Yet another thrust was made by the veteran 26th Indian Division, which advanced down the East Bank of the Chindwin against stiff opposition as far as Menywa, which it captured after very hard fighting on the 22nd January. At this stage, a pause had to be made to allow stocks to be built up. Three Divisions were threatening Mandalay, not to mention the distant threat of the 36th Division.

The 4th Corps, headed by the 28th East African Brigade and the Lushai Brigade, was moving down the Gagaw Valley over tracks hitherto considered impassable for tank and transporters, and it was maintaining rigid security and complete wireless silence. Every bridge had to be strengthened or rebuilt. Meanwhile, to the North, just below Pakokku, the 7th Indian Division suddenly appeared and forced a crossing of the Irrawaddy at the Inter-army boundary between the Japanese 15th and 28th Armies.

The stage was now set for the battle of Mandalay. Mopping up in the confluence of the Irrawaddy and Chindwin was completed, and 19th Indian Division had forced two bridgeheads over the Irrawaddy to the North of the town.

The next move was to trap the Japanese in the Mandalay area.

It was after the loss of Meiktila and Mandalay that Japanese disorganization began to set in. They had no strong field force between us and Rangoon, and were forced to send the 33rd Japanese Army, also from the northeast of Burma, to the railway axis south of Meiktila to organize the remnants of the divisions which would oppose our advance.

The Race for Rangoon

The monsoon was due to break in the first week of May. This left a bare six weeks, including the pause necessary for mopping-up, reorganizing our forces, building up supplies, and for the 330 miles drive south. Yet, if Rangoon was not captured before the Monsoon broke, our forces would be stuck in the middle of Burma with little hope of being adequately supplied by air, owing to the appalling flying conditions, and no hope whatever of being supplied by sea.

In addition, therefore, to the Fourteenth Army plan to drive south it was also planned to launch an airborne and amphibious assault on Rangoon, mounted by the 15th Corps from Arakan.

The Fourteenth Army plan was to advance on two axes; down the Sittang Valley, and the 33rd Corps down the Irrawaddy axis, via Yenanyaung and Prome.

The 4th Corps on the Eastern axis, advanced 300 miles in 33 days, with the 5th and 17th Indian Divisions leap-frogging to their successive objectives: Pyambwe by the 10th April (in capturing which the 17th Indian Division killed 1,100 Japanese and captured 13 guns in one day); Pyinmana with its airfield on 21st April, by the 5th Indian Division, and Toungoo, with its group of airfields, on the 22nd April, which was some days ahead of what had been considered the most optimistic target date.

In the meantime, the 33rd Corps were operating in the West over wide areas of difficult country in the Irrawaddy Valley, so the race for Rangoon was between the approaching amphibious assault from the 15th Corps, and the desperate advance of the 4th Corps, which finally had less than one week in which to cover the remaining 144 miles if they were to reach Rangoon by the 1st May.

On 1st May, when the advanced troops of the 4th Corps were just south of Pegu, barely 40 miles away, and the 33rd Corps had reached Prome, the race was won by the 15th Corps. A Ghurka parachute Battalion was dropped at the mouth of the Rangoon River, to silence the Japanese guns, and the 26th Indian Division landed 20 miles South of Rangoon.

The Japanese, realizing that they were about to be trapped between the troops arriving from the sea, and those descending from the North, started to abandon the city. The enemy fought a small stiff rearguard action. Nevertheless, against our airborne assault from the South, by the 3rd May all resistance had ceased, and our seaborne troops entered the city and marched through Rangoon and out to the north, linking up with the land forces a few days later.

With the fall of Rangoon, Burma had been virtually recaptured. Its only port was now open, and the route to China completely secure.

The Japanese Divisions had been completely beaten. They had lost over 600 guns, and 150,000 of the enemy had been killed or captured for a loss of 20,000 Allied Forces.

The Army Air Forces

(*Continued from page* 18)

ity and will for further resistance. Air attack and air-sea blockade obviated the necessity of coping with the bulk of the enemy ground forces—an unprecedented development.

From the Japanese standpoint, the atomic bomb was really a way out. Because the bomb proved to be incredibly destructive, it was possible for the Emperor to surrender without too much loss of face. But it should not be forgotten that the Japanese position was hopeless even before the atomic bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The state in which General MacArthur's troops found Japan vindicated our whole strategic concept of the offensive phase of the Japanese War. V-J Day found us the first ranking air power in the world.

Such a position, enviable as it is, carries with it the mortal danger of complacency. Our dominance in the air is a guarantee of national security today; tomorrow it may prove to be as hollow as the legend of the Maginot Line. Here as well as abroad, new weapons and techniques are being perfected daily. The B-17 and the B-24, our great weapons in the attack on German industry, are at this moment obsolete. The airplanes of the near future will travel at supersonic speeds; so will guided missiles of immense range and great accuracy. The atomic bomb which fell on Hiroshima was a mere indication of the possibilities of its genre. Yet even that bomb has made the bomber formations which leveled Ploesti as outmoded as the Macedonian phalanx.

How, then, can we guard against the recurrence of another, infinitely more terrible and perhaps altogether paralyzing Pearl Harbor disaster?

One, we must have in being an up-to-the-minute air force capable of coping with any eventuality.

Two, we must have trained people to man those forces—enough of them to supply the experience needed for rapid expansion.

Three, and perhaps most important to stress at this time, we must have adequate research and development so that our equipment will be the best in the world.

Four, we must have a strong industry, also capable of rapid expansion, to produce enough of the best possible equipment in the shortest possible time.

Five, we must have bases, strategically located for effective operation.

Those are minimum basic requirements. They should be regarded as part of the price we pay to assure not merely our national security but our very survival.

The airplane that will never be built...



TODAY, American pilots are flying planes which were only fantastic dreams yesterday . . .

But we confidently predict that there is one plane that will never be built . . .

We predict that you'll never see a plane to which you can point and say, "This is the last word in aircraft development—*the ultimate in airplanes.*"

There will never be such a plane. **For man's conquest of the air has always been, and always will be, a *continuing* challenge to his ingenuity.**

True, under the impetus of war, aeronautical research and knowledge have advanced perhaps as much as 10 or even 20 years, almost overnight.

But this fact has only *increased* the challenge which must be met by any nation which hopes to achieve and maintain air supremacy.

Flying on borrowed time

We must not, ever again, forget the lessons we learned at terrific cost in this war.

We *did* forget, after World War I. And because we did, we lagged in aeronautical research and became a second-rate power in the air.

Today, America has gained pre-eminence in the air. **If we maintain that superiority it can become our best insurance against future attack by aggressor nations, and for an enduring peace.** That supremacy *must* be maintained.

A new tool for air supremacy

Here at Consolidated Vultee, we have just paid our share of a bill for two and a half million dollars—and paid it gladly.

For this two and a half million dollars has now given us a new tool for aeronautical research: **one of the most advanced wind tunnels ever built in America, perhaps in all the world.**

In this Southern California co-operative wind tunnel—sponsored and paid for by Douglas, Lockheed, North American, and Consolidated Vultee—men of inquiring minds will study, experiment, and test . . . constantly striving to develop American aircraft to new heights of efficiency.

Research only the first step

The work that will go on in this new wind tunnel is only the first step in insuring America from attack from the air in the future.

The best planes resulting from this research must be put into production in quantities so that manufacturing techniques and tools can be perfected . . . and to keep alive the nucleus of a manufacturing organization which can be rapidly expanded in case of another national emergency.

Our armed services cannot train flight and ground crews in the use of a new plane if only a handful of those planes exist. Nor can design and production "bugs," always present in a new plane, be eliminated by building only a few experimental models.

And so, in the future as in the past, it is the hope of the aircraft industry that its skills, ingenuity, and resources can be dedicated to designing, developing, and building reasonable quantities of ever-improving aircraft so that America will never again lack *proved military aerial weapons.*

LET'S KEEP AMERICA STRONG IN THE AIR!

CONSOLIDATED VULTEE AIRCRAFT CORPORATION

San Diego, Calif. Fort Worth, Texas Nashville, Tenn. Wayne, Mich. Vultee Field, Calif. *Member, Aircraft Industries Association of America, Inc.*

CONVAIR MODEL 37	CONVAIR MODEL 110	DOMINATOR	LIBERATOR	PRIVATEER	CORONADO	CATALINA	VOYAGER 150
Pan American Clipper	*commercial transport*	*4-engine bomber*	*4-engine bomber*	*search plane*	*patrol bomber*	*patrol bomber*	*4-passenger plane*

Fifteenth Army

(*Continued from page* 51)

land, most of Pfalz and that portion of Hessen lying west of the Rhine River. This area included approximately 14,000 square miles, had a pre-war population of 10,000,000 and was designated the Rhineprovinz Military District. In the area were included the important cities of Aachen, Cologne, Coblenz, Saarbruken, Kaiserslautern, Munchen-Gladbach, Mainz, and Pirmasens.

Problems of occupation were numerous and varied. Military Government was established; ardent Nazis and security suspects were rounded up; indigenous food was equitably distributed; displaced persons were fed; utilities which would aid the war effort were rehabilitated; and lines of communication of the First, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Armies within the occupational zone were maintained and protected.

Within the occupational area there were uncovered approximately 300,000 displaced persons of whom 90% were Russians. These were placed into 80 permanent centers and numerous temporary camps in order better to administer their needs pending ultimate repatriation. Prior to the time the area was turned over to the British and French, respectively, the Army repatriated 180,000 displaced persons by rail movement or air lift.

World War II's first war crimes trial of German civilians was held under the Army's direction beginning on 2 June 1945. Four Germans were convicted for brutal murder of an American airman who had parachuted to earth near Priest, Germany, in the Fall of 1944. Three were hanged on 29 June 1945 and one given a life sentence.

The Northern, or XXII Corps Area, comprising the German political districts of Dusseldorf, Aachen, and Cologne, was turned over to the British I Corps on 12 June 1945. The control of the Southern, or XXIII Corps Area, comprising the German districts of Coblenz, Trier, Saarland, Pfalz and that portion of Hessen west of the Rhine River, was turned over to the French II Corps on 10 July 1945.

Fifteenth Air Force

(*Continued from page* 50)

heavily attacked during March and April of 1945. Every concentration of rolling stock reported by our photo planes was immediately destroyed. As the major marshalling yards at Vienna, Munich and Linz were destroyed, rail traffic backed up into small cities and these offered very lucrative targets.

Finding nothing but sporadic air opposition the P-51 and P-38 fighters of the 15th Fighter Command were turned loose on communication targets. Strafing and dive bombing at will all over the Hun's back yard these fighters in the closing weeks of the battle destroyed 1,542 locomotives, 1,479 railroad cars and 699 motor vehicles, as well as many railroad bridges.

The 15th A.F. while primarily concerned with strategic bombing was, nevertheless, available to the Army Commander in the ground battle when the situation warranted such a diversion. It was these assignments, air-ground cooperation, to give assistance to our troops by bombing in close proximity to the front lines that appealed to our air crews.

Climaxing these, and the most outstanding, were the bombing operations, 9 to 15 April 1945 leading off the 15th Army Group's brilliant and decisive battle in north Italy. Six full scale air force attacks were made during this period of the battle against enemy troop concentrations and supply installations, one being the Fifteenth's biggest days effort when 1,233 heavy bombers with 650 fighters bombed in front of our Fifth Army on 15 April.

Though the major portion of the Fifteenth's effort was devoted to the targets enumerated, other highly important ones were subject to attack. The three ball bearing plants in our area, Steyr, Villar Perosa and Turin were either destroyed or badly damaged. The longest penetration by European based bombers and fighters was our attack on the tank factory in the heart of Berlin, Marienfelde Daimler Benz works, located 800 miles from our bases in Italy on 25 March 1945.

When on 8 May the Germans surrendered the Fifteenth Air Force had good cause to be proud of its achievements and of its contribution to the victory.

Soviet Collaboration

(*Continued from page* 36)

the main effort of the Red Army against the Japanese in the west. The bulk of their forces were thus assured of supply over the Trans-Siberian railroad because of its safety from Japanese interference as far east as the Irtusk-Chita area. Accordingly when war was declared a strong attack was made from the Chita area in the direction of Hsinking. At the same time a highly mobile force of motorized and Cavalry units started a wide envelopment from the Ulan-Bator area, south of Lake Baikal, which was to drive south through Mongolia and then circle east in the direction of Kalgan and Peiping. To support the main effort in the west, secondary attacks were to be made in the north and east. One of these was to be an offensive south from Blagoveshchensk, another an offensive southwest from Khaborovsk and still another west from the Vladivostok area. All of these secondary attacks were assured of continuous supply from stockpiles that had been built up, both from Russian sources and from a special American supply program that had started in October of 1944. The reserve that had been built up was sufficient to have sustained the Red Army's secondary attacks for several months even though the Trans-Siberian railroad had been cut or the Pacific supply route had been stopped.

The Soviet Far Eastern offensive was launched on August 9th, which was the precise date that Stalin had indicated to the western allies several months earlier. Japan collapsed about eight days later, but during that period the Red Army advanced on all fronts from 70 to 100 miles a day. There is little doubt that if the war had continued all of Manchuria and parts of North China would have been in Russian hands by the end of summer, 1945. Had the war continued the western encirclement aimed at Kalgan and Peiping would have been an operation of considerable military interest because of the supply problems which it involved. Roads were practically non-existent and water was extremely scarce. The supply problem might have been solved to some extent by pipe lines being laid as the attack progressed for the delivery of gasoline, oil and water. However, the bulk of supplies would have been dependent on truck transportation, moving cross country and off roads. While the terrain was suitable for this it would have been interesting to learn the effect of supply on the rate of advance in such operations.

Russian participation in the Far East was well coordinated with that of the United States. Naval and air action by the two countries was coordinated through the delineation of areas of responsibility. Arrangements had been made for the exchange of liaison officers between Soviet army and navy headquarters and those of General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. American weather teams were sent to Khaborovsk and Petropavlovsk to work with the Soviet meteorological service and broadcast the North Siberian weather to our Pacific naval and air forces. The United States was offered bases for B-29's in Siberia but because of logistical problems involved, the offer was not accepted.

It is believed that in all essential details the final phases of the war were marked with close collaboration between forces of the Soviet Union and the western allies. This undoubtedly had the effect of hastening the conclusion of the war.

Italy's Shin Bone

(*Continued from page* 54)

with IV Corps and liberated 24,580 square miles of Italian soil with more than 600 cities and towns.

The history of IV Corps is a story of determined men of many nationalities who fought with a unity of purpose and great mutual understanding to secure a peace, which God willing, will endure.

Battle of the Brenner

(*Continued from page* 48)

Developing new anti-flak techniques to meet every situation, masking batteries with white phosphorus bombs, feinting here—striking there, timing our coordinated fighter-bomber attacks against flak positions literally seconds before the bombers were to deliver the real punch and other successful measures permitted us to keep our flak losses at a reasonable minimum.

Weather, unquestionably, proved to be the best German ally during this phase. Truly, the Alps, the Apennines, the Adriatic and the Gulf of Genoa were breeding zones, producing more unpredictable weather than you could find in any other theater of operations. However, our pilots, flying in weather when even "ducks were grounded" kept up their unceasing hammering by day and night.

Photo reconnaissance proved we were winning the battle—we were destroying faster than the Germans could rebuild.

With the advent of spring came the long expected kick-off by the 15th Army Group. Winter had passed and with it went the thousands of burned-out vehicles, locomotives, rail cars, blasted rail and road bridges. The thousands of sorties flown by the tactical aircraft of the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force had paid off in an immeasurable way—the battlefield was isolated.

The big drive north began on 9 April 1945. The 12th Air Force fighter-bombers, who since February had been increasing the sortie rate to 5th Army support and the Desert Air Force, playing a similar role for the British 8th Army, went all out in advance of their ground offensive. The 12th Air Force's B-25s diverted at last from the Brenner gave their complete effort to the armies. Moreover, the heavy bombers of the 15th Air Force were moved under the operational direction of the 12th Air Force to carry out this final tactical phase of the air war.

The prior strangulation of the German life-lines and the isolation of the battlefield, coupled with this supreme and continuous air effort in advance of our ground forces, in great measure enabled the ground forces to conclude the war in Italy some twenty days later. Here, the German Forces suffered their first great surrender and complete defeat, paving the way for the final Allied Victory in Europe.

They also serve who stay and work

... for they forge the implements of war without which victory could not be won.

Among them are the Sun Oil Company's engineers who built the first large scale catalytic cracking plant in the world—and without catalytic cracking, America would never have had enough 100 octane gasoline to supply all of our war planes.

This is just one of the many reasons why we have been able to prove time and again that

"everything Sunoco does has victory as its purpose"

SUNOCO

SUN OIL COMPANY
PHILADELPHIA

Department of Justice

(*Continued from page* 20)

to the greatest possible recognition that a grateful public can accord him.

Closely connected with the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is the work of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. As its name implies, this Division has charge of criminal prosecutions in the Federal courts and among other things supervises prosecutions of all violations investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It has prosecuted several thousand violators of the Selective Training and Service Act, as well as persons who have violated other criminal statutes affecting war activities, such as the espionage and sabotage statutes, Foreign Agents Registration Act, the Censorship statutes and regulations, the Trading with the Enemy Act, statutes relating to fraud against the Government, and the numerous Acts imposing wartime economic controls, etc.

The Selective Training and Service Act expressly vests in the Department of Justice certain functions in respect of claims of conscientious objectors. It provides that if any such claim for deferment is denied by the local board and an appeal is taken from its decision, an inquiry and a recommendation shall be made by the Department of Justice. In order to carry out the functions vested in it by this provision of the Act, it was arranged that the Federal Bureau of Investigation should make an investigation of every such claim. Hearing officers were appointed by the Attorney General in each judicial district, to serve at a compensation of $1.00 a year, for the purpose of hearing the claims, and then on the basis of the reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and such evidence as might be adduced before them, making a report and a recommendation to the Appellate Board. These reports and recommendations cleared through the Department of Justice at Washington, and were transmitted to the Appellate Boards in the several States. By this means some uniformity in the handling of these delicate problems was achieved. This work was done in the office of The Assistant to the Attorney General.

The vastly expanded activities of the War and Navy Departments required the acquisition of a tremendous number of sites for various purposes, such as air fields, army camps, naval stations, and the like. Some of the acquisitions of real property were handled by purchase, and many others by condemnation. The legal aspects of all of these matters were in charge of the Lands Division of the Department of Justice, which became the largest real estate law office in the world.

The Claims Division of the Department is in charge of miscellaneous civil litigation. Among many other matters, it handles civil cases involving frauds against the Government, as well as the many admiralty claims in behalf of and against the Government, a large number of which arose during the War.

A number of miscellaneous war activities of the Department of Justice were brought together into a single division, known as the War Division, which was created for a temporary period. One of the delicate tasks performed by this Division was the supervision of the custody of those alien enemies who were deemed dangerous and who required either internment or parole supervision.

Another unit of the War Division is the Alien Enemy Property Unit.

The enforcement of the Foreign Agents Registration Act is also handled by the War Division.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service also had a share in war activities. All the dangerous enemy aliens apprehended by the Federal Bureau of Investigation were turned over to the Immigration and Naturalization Service for custody, which in turn established stations for their detention.

We now come to one of the most important functions performed by the Department of Justice in connection with the War. As the chief law officer of the Government, the Attorney General is the legal adviser of the President and of the heads of Executive departments. He has been constantly called upon to render formal opinions and to give informal advice on important and varied questions of law arising out of the prosecution of the War.

It will be seen from the foregoing account, that the Department of Justice has been very much of a war agency and in many respects has been the hub around which the war activities of other Government agencies have been centered.

German Reaction

(*Continued from page* 52)

that the American landings in Africa came as a complete surprise. Keitel said American security was excellent and transports passing through Gibraltar were believed to be British ships enroute to the Far East. Jodl on the other hand said the Germans believed the armada sighted at Gibraltar was enroute to landings behind Rommel's army.

Kesselring however claimed he anticipated the African landings and had been expecting them for six weeks before the invasion. He said he reported the impending landings three days before they took place but Goering would not believe him and refused his request for troops.

All three agreed that the German stand in Tunisia was dictated as the only choice to surrender as it would have been impossible to extricate the armies.

Turning to the Normandy operation Jodl said the Americans direction of the Allied invasion was appreciated as well as the strength of it. It had been expected earlier and "every good German soldier" expected it would be repulsed.

Benefiting by hindsight, Jodl believed it would have been possible to repulse the invasion had the Luftwaffe not been so thoroughly defeated. The German thought for a long time that there would be a second landing in the Pas de Calais area and strong forces were maintained there to counter such an attack.

Jodl reported the High Command was extremely surprised that it was not possible to cut off the Americans at Avranches by a counterthrust. They were surprised too by the audacious advances towards Brest. These were tactics to which they were not accustomed, he said.

Had the Germans withdrawn earlier in Normandy they could have held the Seine Line temporarily, thus permitting effective occupation of the West Wall with a covering position in front, Jodl said.

Keitel said the Germans were confident they could check the invasion they knew was coming. They were not sure where the strike would be made and held Brittany as the most probable site because of the three major U-Boat bases there.

Kesselring said he believed that if Germany had not had to hold troops in the West in anticipation of the invasion, Russia could have been conquered in the East.

Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt, former Commander in Chief in the West, said he expected the invasion daily after March 1944 and was prepared for unorthodox decisions on the part of the Allied High Command. When the invasion started he had just less than 60 divisions in his command. With 15 more he now believes he might have succeeded in repelling the landing.

Assessing the reasons for the long German resistance west of the Rhine, Keitel pointed out that it would have been better to retreat behind the Rhine but the disorderly retreat across the river endangered its defensive qualities.

Jodl said that so far as strategy was concerned the prolonged defense west of the Rhine made no difference as it was realized that the war was lost. But at the same time it was hoped that some political miracle might change the situation.

The choice between well prepared positions in the West Wall and unprepared positions deeper in Germany prompted the long resistance west of the Rhine, he said.

Von Rundstedt in a discussion of the effects of air power rated that force as the primary ingredient of victory for the Allies. He termed the Allied bombing of French railroads "katastrophal" low level bombing attacks on D-Day and D-plus-one on communication centers in the vicinity of the landings appreciably reduced road capacity to the beachhead. And he said fighter-bomber operations against road traffic played a major part in the success of the invasion operations and the subsequent breakout.

Behind air power Von Rundstedt rates the following factors in the order of their importance to the Allied victory. Manpower and artillery; infantry fighting ability; tank tactics, and lack of German manpower; and Allied strategy and its engineering and logistical achievements.

The Root of Our Victory

(*Continued from page* 13)

immediate problems. But basic to them, and of paramount importance to the United States and the whole world, is maintenance of an effective military strength in the post-war years. We must not destroy the power that has won us world leadership. That is the path to disaster. There is danger we may follow it.

Post-war reaction in a democracy tends to reduce its military establishment to impotence. In the past, the error has been remediable when attack threatened. In the future, it will be irreparable. If there is another war, the unready will be the conquered.

Further, we are joined with the other United Nations in a world organization designed to prevent war. A strong United States, because of its stabilizing influence, will facilitate that organization's ultimate success. But a weak United States, in danger itself, will promote unrest, destroy confidence in the organization's possible effectiveness. It cannot be strong if its leading member is weak.

Our self-interest and world responsibility both prohibit another retreat from the position armed strength has won us. We have expended almost three hundred billion dollars, inestimable natural resources and, above all, a quarter million American lives to free the world from aggression. A weak United States will invite the return of aggression.

Only an effective military establishment, planned and developed now, can assure us and the world the permanent security we must have.

Ninth Army's Operations

(*Continued from page* 49)

Tiger tanks, especially when maneuver room and firm footing were lacking.

When the Germans launched their counter-offensive in the Ardennes on 16 December, Ninth Army sent six divisions with supporting troops south to the "Bulge." With two Corps and only five Divisions Ninth Army dug in on a 38-mile front and prepared to meet any attack from North, East, or South.

In early February, after the Ardennes offensive had been turned back, a rapid and well executed regrouping was accomplished prior to a new offensive toward the Rhine. Ninth Army now had three Corps and seven Infantry and three Armored Divisions. It was planned to attack toward the Rhine in the direction of Neuss on 10 February. First Army was to protect the right flank. The north flank was more secure than in the November offensive since the British had cleared the pocket on our north flank between the Roer and Maas River ("Heinsberg Pocket") late in January. On 8 February the First Canadian Army had initiated a very powerful drive from the Nijmegen bridgehead to the southeast between the Maas and Rhine. This attack was one arm of a wide pincers. The other was the Ninth's attack to the northeast. However on 9 February the Germans demolished the discharge valves of the two big dams on the Roer and made the river impassable, thus making it impossible for Ninth Army to attack on the date originally planned. While waiting for the river to become passable additional troops including two infantry divisions and more supplies were received. Further training was executed. After the river had subsided to where it could be crossed the attack jumped off at 0330 hours 23 February preceded by a 45-minute artillery preparation. Initially two corps each using two infantry divisions effected the river crossing on a fourteen-mile front. The Germans were taken by surprise and never were able to react vigorously. The bulk of infantry of all four divisions crossed the first day, and heavy bridges were completed on the second day. On the sixth day the 2d Armored Division with a RCT of the 83d Division attached drove 8 miles between Munchen-Gladbach and the Erft river. At the same time remaining elements of the XIX Corps and both the XIII and XVI Corps pushed strongly to the North overcoming position after position. Great efforts were made to secure a Rhine bridge intact, but our troops were unable to reach the river before the Germans had destroyed all eight bridges in Ninth Army zone.

A number of interesting points concerning this portion of the campaign should be noted. The early crossing of the still flooded Roer river surprised the Germans. The sudden change in direction of the attack from the east to north caught the Germans unprepared and outflanked most of their prepared positions. Armor and infantry worked excellently together. The fighter-bombers of the XXIX Tactical Air Command worked closely with the ground troops. Due to adequate time for planning, good weather, and sufficiency of both troops and supplies concentrated for this battle, this operation was particularly well executed. It was practically completed in 10 days.

Preliminary planning for the next operation, the crossing of the Rhine, was begun during the latter part of November. Early in February 21st Army Group outlined definite plans. A 10-mile stretch of the Rhine between Wesel and the northern face of the Ruhr industrial area was given Ninth Army to permit crossing by one Corps. On the early morning 24 March the XVI Corps effected the assault crossing of the Rhine. A heavy artillery preparation preceded the crossing. Two divisions had their infantry battalions across by the end of the first day. Success of the crossing was assured by using every type of special equipment available, including LVT's, DUKW's, DD tanks, and LCM's, and by the constant air cover furnished by the fighter-bombers of the XXIX Tactical Air Command. By the second day three Class 40 floating bridges were in position. As expected, drives to the south and southeast into the densely populated Ruhr area met stiff resistance. While two corps pushed east, one corps guarded the bridgehead. On 1 April the 2d Armored Division made contact with the 3d Armored Division of First Army at Lippstadt and the encirclement of the Ruhr was complete. The XVI Corps completed reduction and occupation of its portion of the Ruhr Valley area by 14 April. Four days later the First Army completed its drive from the south and the entire pocket with its 325,000 prisoners was eliminated. Meanwhile the XIII and XIX Corps each with two infantry and one armored divisions pushed east against crumbling resistance.

On 11 April the 2d Armored Division raced 52 miles to reach the Elbe river near Magdeburg. The next day the 5th Armored division made a similar advance and closed to the Elbe. Two bridgeheads over the Elbe were secured but one was abandoned in the face of heavy German resistance. The bridgehead in the vicinity of Barby was reinforced and built up. Here as plans were being developed to continue the attack to Berlin 65 miles away orders were received to stand fast along the Elbe. Contact was made with the Russians near Zerbst 30 April.

The conduct of the Ninth Army's last military operation, crossing the Rhine and advancing to the Elbe, was based on the observance of two fundamental principles of military procedure. First, careful planning and preparation for the river crossing, and second, decentralization of command for the exploitation. Though the last named called for the assumption of considerable risk from time to time, it gained in speed and flexibility by capitalizing on the aggressiveness and initiative of the subordinate commanders.

Canadian Air Force

(*Continued from page* 35)

rect support of the Russians. In the closing days of the war the tempo of bombing activities increased to such an extent that on one occasion the fifteen squadrons provided over 500 aircraft for two attacks on Duisburg within twenty hours and frequently had 290 airborne on a single mission. The last bomber operation in which the R.C.A.F. squadrons participated was that on Wangerooge, an island in the East Frisians, on 25 April; following this they were occupied with the transporting of liberated prisoners of war and supplies.

The day fighter squadrons were relentless in harrying the enemy both in the air and on the ground and were notably effective in assisting to route the German Army in the St. Vith-Houffalize pocket and in supporting the Second British Army in the crossing of the Rhine. The night fighters operating from the continent carried out defensive patrols against night raiders and flying bombs while the intruders patrolled enemy airfields far into Germany.

One transport squadron operated between Great Britain and the continent, participating in the airborne lift in the Rhine crossing of 24 March and in addition to its regular transportation duties evacuated liberated prisoners of war and casualties. The other Dakota (C47) squadrons performed similar duties in India and Burma. Following the cessation of hostilities in Europe the squadrons were joined by one of the heavy bomber units which had been re-equipped with Liberators and diverted to transport work. Their duties consisted mainly in the transporting of repatriated prisoners of war and other personnel from the Far East to the United Kingdom.

The functions of R.C.A.F. Coastal Command squadrons were varied. One, which had been flying Catalinas over the Indian Ocean for almost three years, completed its work in that area and returned to England in the spring of 1945. Two Sunderland squadrons in the British Isles and one Canso (PBY) unit in Iceland did yeoman service in the protection of convoys in the North Atlantic and the approaches to Great Britain. A fifth squadron, equipped with Beaufighters and later with Mosquitos, operated off the Norwegian coast in search of enemy shipping, while a sixth, flying Leigh-Light Wellingtons, did similar work in the Bay of Biscay, English Channel and the Irish Sea.

To meet the needs of the Canadian Army in the field three Air Observation Post squadrons were formed in the last months of the war. Commanded by Army officers and with Army pilots, but administered and maintained by the R.C.A.F., they acted as the eyes of the Army in directing counter-battery shoots and artillery ranging.

In Canada the R.C.A.F.'s activities were two-fold — coastal operations against U-boats and training. The comparatively small number of sinkings in the R.C.A.F.'s patrol area in the North West Atlantic testify to the success of the first named operations. The large number of graduates of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, which at its termination on 31 March 1945, had trained 131,553 aircrew for the R.A.F., R.A.A.F., R.C.A.F., and R.N.Z.A.F., is the proof of the second.

After V-E Day the R.C.A.F. turned to three tasks:

(a) the formation of a force to share in the occupation of Germany,
(b) the constitution of a Pacific Force, which owing to Japan's capitulation did not get into action, and
(c) the demobilization of personnel not required for (a), (b), or the post-war R.C.A.F.

Seventeen squadrons remained overseas in the occupational force and for transport duties; of these seven have been disbanded and only ten remain. Until plans for the post-war R.C.A.F. can be determined an interim force is being organized, in which personnel sign up for a two-year period with preferential consideration for entry into the permanent force at the end of that time.

Fiscal Policy

(*Continued from page* 19)

They can, therefore, make their plans with full assurance that they can obtain their principal when they need it. At such times, the Treasury can refund the securities they have held by offering new securities suited to the needs of the new investors who will take over. The national finances, as we move from war to peace, are in good shape to contribute to stability and flexibility in the economy and to help in attaining the fullest possible utilization of our human and material resources.



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You've probably wondered why the millions of Ford cars have stayed so shining bright through the war years. The secret is a typical Ford "first" —the use of synthetic resin enamel.

This Ford-pioneered enamel is a truly lasting car finish. It holds indefinitely its original color and luster. It protects more completely than other finishes, for it can be applied in thicker coats, and requires no sanding to polish it. This synthetic enamel adheres more firmly to bodies and fenders. And this long-life finish also means added economy for Ford owners, for it reduces car-finishing time from several weeks to a few hours.

In 1928, Ford introduced its use on certain car and truck parts. Five years later, methods of applying it to the entire car were perfected, and since then all Fords have been finished in synthetic resin enamel. Ford's own plant produces more than a million gallons yearly. In normal times, 3000 gallons flow to the spray booths and dipping tanks daily.

Synthetic resin enamel is one of many results of the Ford Motor Company's desire to better products and processes continually. This attitude will bring many more Ford "firsts"—and ever-finer Ford built cars and trucks.

TUNE IN . . . THE FORD SHOW . . . *CBS, Tuesdays. 10-10:30 P.M., E.T.* **THE FORD SUNDAY EVENING HOUR .** *ABC, Sundays. 8-9 P.M., E.T.*

Ford

EXPECT THE "FIRSTS" FROM FORD!

Franklin D. Roosevelt

(*Continued from page* 12)

enormous popularity. A great many of his public words and actions—the Quarantine Speech in 1937, repeal of the Arms Embargo provisions in 1939, aid for Britain and the first peacetime conscription in 1940, Lend-Lease and many other drastic measures before Pearl Harbor in 1941—would have constituted political suicide for one of lesser prestige and personal power.

History will not overlook the ironic fact that many of those who are now frantic in their efforts to assign to President Roosevelt sole blame for the setback at Pearl Harbor are equally frantic in their efforts to deny him any credit for the miraculous record of American achievement which began with the mustering of our manpower and the mobilization of our industrial strength long before we were attacked and which reached its culmination in the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

Wherever the final blame for Pearl Harbor may be fixed—if, indeed, it ever is fixed—the fact remains that when the Japanese attacked us, and when their Axis Allies in Europe declared war on us, this nation was better prepared, spiritually as well as militarily, than it had ever been for any war in our history.

In December, 1941, the Japanese had perfected plans and assembled the strength which enabled them to project their forces perilously close to the North American continent, to Australia and to India. At the same time, the Germans were deployed powerfully on the English Channel, the isles of Greece and the Libyan Desert, and were battering at the gates of Moscow; they had established themselves as absolute masters of Europe and were seriously threatening to break through into Asia, there to link up with the Japanese.

By December, 1942, the whole world picture had changed: the tide of Axis aggression had been turned and the initiative on all fronts had passed or was rapidly passing into the hands of the Allies. There is no doubt that this gigantic reversal within one year was produced largely by the applied power of the United States, both through our own military efforts all over the world and through the substantial aid that we were able to deliver to our Allies. This could not have been accomplished had we not been prepared to an unprecedented extent.

This prevention of defeat and the achievement of victory cannot be measured solely in terms of so many men, so many guns or airplanes, so much tonnage. In this war—more, perhaps, than in any previous war—the political factor was of vital importance. Hitler had proved that by his long and tragic series of "bloodless victories" even before the first shots had been fired and by the moral disruption with which his propaganda and his Fifth Columns facilitated the tasks of his armed forces in one conquest after another. Similarly, the Japanese, with their "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and their slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics" had waged campaigns in the political field no less determined than those waged by their Army and Navy.

With the formation of the grand coalition of the United Nations in Washington, less than a month after Pearl Harbor, the global political war was joined. All efforts (and they were diabolically skilful efforts) to split the United Nations failed. It was the long-established Axis which disintegrated—first, with the surrender of Italy, then with the defection of the satellites, and finally with the collapse of the dictatorial regimes which ruled Germany and Japan. At the same time, through the years from 1941-1945, the progressive strengthening of the resistance movements within the occupied countries of Europe—and, notably, in the Philippine Islands—was of necessity effected by political rather than by purely military means.

There can be no doubt that President Roosevelt was the pre-eminent world leader, the supreme strategist, in the political conduct of the war.

An avowed believer in "first things first," he knew that there could be no secure future for civilization if the war were not won—and it was won, on all fronts. But he was also profoundly concerned with the organization of the peace that would follow the war.

We do not yet know whether he succeeded or failed in his attempts to lay the foundations for an enduring peace in which there might be freedom from want and freedom from fear everywhere in the world. That will be decided by history. But those who participated in the winning of the war, and who survived it, can help to shape the course of history, as Franklin D. Roosevelt did.

The Most Powerful Navy

(*Continued from page* 14)

Indo-China Coast between Saigon and Camranh Bay. Further attacks are also carried out on Formosa.

January 22-24, 1945—Okinawa and Iwo Jima are again struck by Third Fleet carrier planes and the latter by surface units.

January 29-31, 1945—Further landings are effected on Luzon.

February 13-15, 1945—Manila Bay defenses bombarded by force of light cruisers and destroyers.

February 16-17, 1945 — Fifth Fleet makes first carrier strike on Tokyo and adjacent targets.

February 17, 1945—We land on Corregidor less than three years after the noted Rock fell to the Japanese.

February 19, 1945 — We land on Iwo Jima.

February 25, 1945—Fast carriers again strike Tokyo.

March 1, 1945 — Carriers hit Nansei Shotos and we land on Palawan carrying Philippine campaign southward.

March 18-19, 1945—Fast carrier force attacks Kyushu on the Inland Sea.

March 26, 1945—We land on Keramo Retto 20 miles west of Okinawa.

March 27-28, 1945—Surface forces of the Navy bombard Minami Daito, 200 miles east of Okinawa.

April 1, 1945—The Navy lands Marine and Army forces on Okinawa.

April 7, 1945—Carrier aircraft sink the Yamato, Japs' most powerful remaining ship, and other fleet units.

April 29-30, 1945 — Fast carrier task force continues strikes against Nansei Shoto Islands below Japan.

May 13-14, 1945—Carrier planes strike Kyushu and Shikoku, two islands of Japan proper.

June 2-8, 1945 — Planes from carrier force continue their raids on Kyushu.

June 12, 1945—Our light Naval forces shell one of the middle islands of the Kurile group stretching north of Japan.

June 30, 1945—We cover invasion and capture of Kume Island, west of Okinawa.

July 10, 1945—Over a thousand Fleet carrier planes hit Tokyo and Honshu coast.

July 14, 1945—A thousand carrier aircraft pound Hokkaido in northern Japan.

July 14-17, 1945—U. S. Fleet shells Jap cities at point-blank range; first time in history the sacred soil has been attacked.

July 17, 1945—Fifteen hundred U. S. and British carrier planes strike Tokyo.

July 19, 1945 — Camouflaged remnants of Jap fleet hammered by our carrier planes in Tokyo Bay.

July 24-25, 1945 — Planes from Third Fleet carriers smash remainder of Jap fleet in Inland Sea off Japan.

July 28, 1945—Nearly every Jap carrier and battleship in Kobe-Kure area knocked out by Third Fleet planes.

July 30, 1945—U. S. battleships stand off Japanese coast and shell Hammatsu, steel city, while carrier planes blast Tokyo area.

August 9-10, 1945—U. S. and British fleets shell Kamaishi in Japan, and Third Fleet planes pound northern Honshu.

August 13, 1945—In the last strike of the war, the Third Fleet sends a thousand carrier planes against Tokyo.

When final victory came on August 14 it was a little difficult to remember the stringent circumstances in which the Navy had found itself at the beginning of the war. In the autumn of 1942, for example, out of three aircraft carriers in commission in the Pacific theatre, only the USS Saratoga at one point could operate. By July 1st of this year, we had 20 big carriers and more than 70 escort carriers—and Naval aviation had demonstrated its ability to spearhead our attacks.

The Navy's growing emphasis on aviation is demonstrated by the following figures: in the first half of 1945, commitments for "Aviation, Navy," which came to around $3,600,000,000 were five times larger than the same commitments for the last half of 1944. In part this was due to longer-range ordering. But in part also it reflects the growing emphasis on Navy airpower. In ratio, the money was well spent in this war. U. S. Navy planes downed six Japanese aircraft for every one of ours that was lost. Navy and Marine fliers together destroyed over 17,000 Japanese planes in the Pacific.

But no one group or arm can be credited above the others. The war was won by teamwork. One of the most invaluable weapons in both the European and the Pacific parts of the war, for example, was the close coordination developed in amphibious operations. The spirit and precision of all forces—Army, Navy, Marines and coast Guard—working together where the operation required it was responsible for winning many battles and saving many lives. Nor does the Navy or the United States fail to recognize that the teamwork, cooperation and strength of our Allies was vital to the common goal.

Above all, backing at home was indispensable to victory. Here is a telling comparative figure on how the Navy had to grow to meet its responsibility to the American people. In the last half of 1940 *after* the United States had awakened to her danger and the Two Ocean Navy Bill had become law, Naval expenditures were nine hundred million dollars. In the first half of 1945, those expenditures reached fifteen billion, nine hundred million dollars. From now on, as war becomes more scientific, I am convinced it is imperative to be so well prepared that the Navy will never have to take a chance on growing that quickly again.

In addition, we fought this war largely with what might be called a minute-man Navy. Ninety per cent of its officers and eighty per cent of its men were reservists —all honor to them. With the growing trend toward specialized scientific knowledge, however, I should stress most pointedly that we must anticipate that trend with an adequate number of specially-trained, well-prepared men.

WHILE MACHINE GUNS chattered and angry war planes roared overhead ... when tanks and trucks rumbled and battleships thundered offshore ... the machines of war had the kinds of petroleum products they needed, *and all they needed,* to help them do the Big Job ...

And as the petroleum industry and its scientists met the hot challenges of war, these things, too, entered the fight: toluene for TNT, synthetic rubber from oil, the destructive M-69 Fire Bomb, super 100-octane aviation gasoline, flame-thrower fuel, lubricants that functioned in extremes of temperature, fog-dispersal units, smoke-screen apparatus ...

Now the noises of war are stilled. Out of the fight have come important new petroleum knowledge and vastly increased processing facilities. Before us now are better oil products for a faster-moving, faster-working mechanized world. Exactly what the future holds, for America or any other nation, no one can say. But at Esso Laboratories our staff of technicians and our great research facilities continue to expand, so that we may ever more ably take crude oil from the earth and turn it into hundreds of useful products to meet the growing needs of human existence and progress. This work goes on ...

This work goes on ...



STANDARD OIL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY • BAYWAY, NEW JERSEY

OPERATING THE **ESSO** LABORATORIES

The Canadian Army

(*Continued from page* 34)

many has taken the form of an occupation group organized on the basis of one division.

While the European war was still being bitterly contested, Canada was making preparations for the day when, with the enemy in the West defeated, she would be free to turn her energies to the war in the Pacific. The problem of how she could best make an effective contribution to the War against Japan and fit in with overall Allied plans, was discussed at the Quebec Conference of 1944. Following subsequent consultation between the Canadian and United States Army Chiefs of Staff, it was agreed that the Canadian Army participation should take the form of a force comprised of one infantry division with the necessary ancillary troops. This would operate against Japan in the Pacific Theatre under command of United States Army forces. To achieve the necessary integration it was necessary to bring back battle-tested troops from Europe, assemble this force in Canada and reorganize and re-equip it along United States lines, prior to moving to Camp Breckenridge, Ky., for completion of its training.

Due to the arrival of V-J Day, sooner than was anticipated, the Canadian Army Pacific Force was deprived of the opportunity of proceeding to the Pacific Theatre to fight, not only alongside, but as part of, the United States forces who had by their magnificent efforts pushed the battle to the very threshold of Japan proper. The sudden capitulation of Japan, however, has led to this being an unfinished chapter in the long history of friendship, cooperation and comradeship in arms which has characterized the neighborly relationship of the United States and Canada.

One particularly satisfactory result of the surrender of Japan was the liberation of the Canadian contingent who, in 1941, had taken part in the defense of Hong Kong. These liberated prisoners of war were repatriated to Canada through facilities provided by the United States.

From the time war broke out in 1939 the Canadian Army has been made aware of the mutuality of interests which exist between the armed forces of the United States and Canada. This has been given practical expression in the various joint undertakings for the defense of the North American Continent, in the free exchange of military information and in the generous way in which facilities have been extended for the specialized training of Canadian Army personnel in the United States. Through cooperative effort during the war the armed forces of our two countries have come to know each other and have learned to work together. I have every reason to hope that this is but the beginning of a long and enduring association, for this would indeed be a happy omen for years yet to come in a troubled world.

Their Finest Hour

(*Continued from page* 35)

soldier developed a considerable respect for his tenacious enemy of Rommel's Afrika Korps he knew he'd get him in the end . . . Two famous warships—HMS Renown and Prince of Wales—were sunk easily, almost casually, by the Japanese. Singapore and Hong Kong fell.

The British Army dogged and resentful had taken the rap too often. Though the stream of war material from America was becoming a torrent the time of this victory was not yet and the weary soldiers of the desert found themselves once more with their backs to Alexandria. In 1942 the British Army struck El Alamein, Rommel gave battle was outfought and broke back across the desert. This was the moment for which England had waited since the dark days of 1940. With the 8th Army at their heels the Afrika Korps limped for Tobruk for Benghazi for Tripoli. There was to be no mistake this time. The hunt was up, the Americans had landed in North Africa and were fighting side by side with the British.

To Sicily up the bitter length of Italy over the narrow seas once more to Normandy to Holland, Belgium and Germany the Americans and the British went together to the battle, and in years to come the same actions will be fought again by Cotswold and Connecticut firesides.

The Seventh Army

(*Continued from page* 47)

enemy positions in the region northeast of Sarrebourg. This was accomplished by the XV Corps.

The Army plan, at this point in early December involved a double attack. The XV Corps comprising the 44th, 100th and the 12th Armored Divisions was ordered to drive north-eastward through the Low Vosges, while the VI Corps on the right, comprising the 45th, 103rd, 79th and the 14th Armored Divisions, was to drive north-eastward in the Alsace Plain. This drive became in effect a six-pronged offensive. The story of the Seventh Army during the first half of December is the story of these divisions pushing the German First Army back to and in some places partially through the Siegfried Line.

As a result of the German offensive in the Ardennes, the Seventh Army was directed to discontinue its attack and revert to the defensive. With the Third Army shifting to the west and north, the Seventh Army was in the precarious position of having to defend on a front of over a hundred miles. No unusual developments occurred until the last of the year, when intelligence indicated that the Germans were making preparations for a full scale offensive to the South on the West side of the Vosges. Corps Commanders were amply warned and during the early hours of New Year's Day, the enemy launched their operation "Northwind," designed initially to seal the Saverne Gap and split the Seventh Army in half. For twenty-six (26) days the Germans, employing up to sixteen (16) divisions, furiously attempted to effect breaks along the entire front. Fortunately, the stubborn fighting qualities of our troops, coupled with timely arrangements for defense, held the enemy with only a minimum loss of terrain.

During the above mentioned operations by the Seventh Army, and throughout the winter, the First French Army had been opposed in the High Vosges, from west of Colmar to the Belfort Gap, by the German Nineteenth Army. In order to reduce the "Colmar Pocket," the American XXI Corps comprising the 3d, 28th and 75th Divisions and subsequently the 12th Armored Division, was dispatched to assist the First French Army. By 9 February all German resistance in that area had ceased. The XXI Corps then returned to take over the left sector of the Seventh Army Zone.

Plans were now being made to assume the offensive and on 15 March the Army launched a surprise attack with three Corps which never lost momentum until the termination of the war. In eleven days the entire Army had passed through the Siegfried defenses and one Corps had two divisions crossing the Rhine.

On crossing the Rhine River the Seventh Army was turned south, instead of continuing to the northeast, in order to prevent the Germans from concentrating in, and effecting a last stand in the Bavarian Alps. The remainder of the story is one of a disintegrating German army and of American troops in on the kill. Cities fell one after another; Mannheim, Wurzburg, Nurnberg, Ulm, Augsburg, Munich, Salzburg, Innsbruck. The VI Corps returned to Italy through the Brenner Pass.

This brief summary of the activities of the Seventh Army has made no mention of the gallantry and individual bravery of the men and units comprising it and to cite their accomplishments would take from now to eternity to recount. Even though all of their exploits are not written on the pages of history, each one, either here or beyond, must have in his heart a feeling of deep pride, in that he has proven to the world that he can and will fight to preserve his country.

The Canadian Navy

(*Continued from page* 34)

ceased. For some four months thereafter, Canadian minesweepers were engaged in making the English Channel safe for merchant shipping.

Meanwhile plans had been laid for Canadian naval participation in the war against Japan. Some 13,500 combatant personnel were to be employed in a striking force consisting of the most up-to-date cruisers, light fleet carriers and destroyers, and in a force of escort vessels.

The sudden close of the Pacific War prevented full realization of these plans, but a number of Canada's ships played their part in this theatre. A Canadian cruiser, H.M.C.S. Uganda, joined the British Pacific Fleet in April, and assisted in the support of Okinawa operations by the bombardment of air installations in the Sakishimo Islands and targets on Miyako Island. H.M.C.S. Prince Robert, an anti-aircraft cruiser, was included in the naval force which accepted the surrender of Hong Kong. The newly-commissioned cruiser H.M.C.S. Ontario is at present engaged in tasks related to the enforcement of the Japanese surrender. Meanwhile a considerable number of Canadian naval personnel have been serving in Royal Naval vesels and in aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm.

In recent months Canadian naval vessels have been assisting in the repatriation of Canadian service personnel from overseas and from Newfoundland. Six escort destroyers and a number of frigates have been employed on this duty.

The demobilization of "hostilities only" personnel, and the disposal of surplus vessels, are now proceeding rapidly.

Canada's Navy is preparing to meet its continuing responsibilities. A permanent naval force of some 10,000 personnel will form the initial peacetime nucleus. This will be supplemented by a reserve force of 18,000 who will serve in "Reserve Divisions" in Canada's larger cities. The fleet will consist of modern cruisers, light fleet carriers with their air squadrons, and fleet destroyers; and a number of destroyers, escorts and minesweepers will be held in reserve. The first of the aircraft carriers, Warrior, will commission in December of this year. As in the past, permanent naval bases will be operated at Halifax on the Atlantic Coast and Esquimalt on the Pacific.

The co-operation and friendship between the forces of our respective countries have been a source of strength in war. I am firmly convinced that the same spirit will continue in the peace.

With V Corps

(*Continued from page* 55)

Corps launched an attack early in February, and on 10 February captured the famous Roer River Dams, thus permitting the remainder of the First and Ninth United States Armies to launch the attack which carried them to the Rhine. V Corps protected the right flank of the First Army and the left flank of the Third Army while advancing to and crossing the Ahr River, occupying a sector on the West bank of the Rhine from the South bank of the Ahr, to the vicinity of Andernach, North of Koblentz. The Corps crossed the Rhine River on a bridge built by the Corps Engineers at Honningen. The 2nd Infantry Division advanced to the Southeast while the 9th Armored Division moved South along the East bank of the Rhine. The 69th Infantry Division crossed the river and captured Ehrenbreitstein, advancing to the North bank of the Lahn River. The Corps then moved rapidly East on the right flank of the First Army, breaking out of the Remagen Bridgehead, capturing Limburg, and sending a task force to capture Idstein, North of Wiesbaden. The Corps swung North at Giessen, on the outside of the First Army, and advanced to the vicinity of Warburg, sealing off the Ruhr Valley. This operation of the Corps threw the German armies into such confusion that they were never able to form again and their defeat was accelerated.

Here a sharp turn to the East was made, and the Corps advanced between Kassel and Gottingen, crossing the Weser River. Liepzig was captured on 18 April with over 1100 88mm antiaircraft guns being overrun by V Corps troops. The Corps was halted facing the Mulde River on 18 April and contact with the 58th Infantry Division, XXXIV Corps, and Fifth Russian Army was made at Torgau on the Elbe on 25 April.

On 30 April the Corps moved its Command Post South from Naumburg to Grafenwohr in Bavaria, moving the 2nd Infantry Division into its new sector. The 1st Infantry Division, 97th Infantry Division, the 9th Armored Division, and the 16th Armored Division came under command of the Corps and V Corps was attached to the Third United States Army at 0800, 4 May 1945. On the morning of 5 May, the Corps attacked East towards Prague, Czechoslovakia. The 16th Armored Division entered Pilsen on the morning of 6 May, and the Corps Command Post moved to Pilsen on 7 May 1945. The Corps was halted with its forward elements along the general line Karlsbad—Pilsen—Budweiss; a detachment was at Welchow, Northeast of Prague, escorting German officers who were delivering surrender instructions to German troops. On 9 May, hostilities ceased, and the Corps found itself with over 150,000 German prisoners of war and nearly 300,000 displaced civilians from twenty-two different countries in its area.

After the cessation of hostilities, all American troops in Czechoslovakia were placed under command of V Corps. The Corps was relieved by the XXII Corps at noon, 17 June 1945, and on 19 June, started moving to the LeHavre area for redeployment to the Pacific. The advance party arrived in the United States aboard the Marine Dragon on 5 July. The main body arrived aboard the West Point on 11 July 1945.

V Corps captured 334,515 prisoners during its operations on the continent. It was the first Corps Headquarters ashore on 6 June 1944 and, in its operations prior to 1 November 1944, had participated in all the operations of the First United States Army, including the capture of Chambois and the closing of the gap between the Americans and British, South of Falaise. The Corps also captured the cities of Paris, Sedan, and Luxembourg. Troops of the divisions operating under the Corps were the first American troops to enter Germany and pierce the Siegfried Line on the evening of 11 September 1944.

The XV Corps

(*Continued from page* 58)

In the course of its operations, the XV Corps crossed twenty-three major rivers, four mountain ranges and made deep penetrations into the Austrian Alps. These natural barriers were all defended by the enemy.

Except for a period during the winter when the XV Corps was ordered on the defensive due to happenings on other parts of the front, the XV Corps was continually on the offensive, first, spearheading the advance of the Third Army across Normandy, later advancing on its right flank to Luneville, and then throughout its offensive operations under the Seventh Army it was the left flank Corps of the Army. Continually called upon to protect the flank of an Army and generally making the main effort of that Army, the XV Corps was nevertheless able to accomplish every mission assigned to it throughout the entire period of combat. The XV Corps crossed France and Germany and when victory over the German Armies had been gained on 9 May, it had crossed into Austria, an advance of 1200 miles.

At the conclusion of hostilities the following letter was received from the Commanding General, Sixth Army Group:

"HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH ARMY GROUP
Office of the Commanding General
APO 23

10 May 1945

SUBJECT: Commendation.
TO: Commanding General, XV Corps, APO 436, U. S. Army.
THRU: Commanding General, Seventh Army. APO 758, U. S. Army.

In the glorious victory which we have just won, you and the officers and men of our Corps may well be proud of your great record as part of the 6th Army Group. As spearhead in many of Seventh Army's drives, you have borne the brunt of the attack, and the impressive successes of that Army bear witness to the effectiveness of your efforts. Your country has every reason to name the XV Corps among its military greats.

You joined my command at the time when an attack through the treacherous Parroy Forest in Northern Alsace was underway. After swiftly clearing this area, your forces composed the main effort of the Seventh Army to break through the naturally strongline of the Vosges to the Rhine. By a series of bold maneuvers, the Saverne Gap was breached and Strasbourg was taken in a breathtaking dash to the Rhine. You then turned north to the Siegfried Line and were proceeding against the German border when the Ardennes Offensive forced a halt on your front. In late December and early January, you were required to hold a greatly extended line against determined enemy attacks, but your troops repulsed every thrust.

When on the entire Western Front an offensive was launched early this spring, your Corps once again headed the advance of the Seventh Army. Reaching the Siegfried Line, after bitter fighting you took Zweibrucken and Saarbrucken and broke through to the Rhine. This fabulous river, once considered an important military barrier, proved no obstacle to your troops. Precise planning and perfect execution made possible a successful assault on 26 March 1945, as you plunged across with almost no pause.

In your drive deep into Germany, Aschaffenburg and Nurnberg were encircled and captured. Munich, one of the most sacred of German cities to the Nazis, was assaulted and seized in a decisive action. Several days later Salzburg fell to your troops, as they entered Austria and broke the last remnants of German resistance before you.

In our hour of triumph, I salute you and the officers and men of the XV Corps. Your spectacular deeds, exemplifying the courage and resolution of the American soldier, give your country, as well as yourself, the greatest of pride and satisfaction. That the XV Corps was part of my command in the struggle now ended always will be a source of deep inspiration to me.

/s/ JACOB L. DEVERS,
/t/ JACOB L. DEVERS,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding."

The Drive to the Roer

(*Continued from page* 63)

for Regimental, Divisional and XIII Corps to take over the battalions deposited on their new line. It also eliminated a formal relief to accomplish this change of boundaries and front.

The main effort by the 29th found rugged going and since the 30th would not now be required in the Linnich operation (now assumed by the XIII Corps) it was given a segment of the zone of the 29th to facilitate the completion of the operation. It was actually completed, except for two small pockets, one day later than estimated.

The Corps had taken 7,200 prisoners—62 towns—71 sq. miles and had suffered 5,000 casualties. German killed and wounded are not estimated.

Every town was strongly defended and provided a fine opportunity of maneuvering against their flank or rear instead of assault frontably. The attack on Wureslen earlier had proven the cost of frontal attack. It fell easily when flanked on critical terrain. The operation was as hard fought as any offensive operation I have witnessed in two years hard fighting.

The 2nd Armored drew German armor and certainly is a clear example that armor must fight armor. It is erroneous to expect Tank Destroyers to do this job.

Tanks were slowed to 2 or 3 miles per hour in moving across country. But they moved; and, in mud that would balk a quarter ton. Track extensions were the life savers; but more floatation is needed; even at the expense of speed. Speed over 20 mph. is seldom required. Even in fast moving situations this rate will go a long way in a short time.

A battalion of English flame throwers did fine work with the armor. They were willing to wade in and take risks. The auxiliary fuel trailer towed behind their tank was valuable and seemed not a great handicap to their maneuver.

Throughout there was outstanding leadership and planning. Time for planning local attacks was well taken for attacks not planned usually failed or were unduely costly in men.

The heavy armored divisions have staying power the lighter ones cannot meet. It is doubtful if a light armored division could have carried through to the Roer as the 2nd Armored did. Tank losses, light and medium, were some 160—something over half recoverable. Personal losses in tanks hit averaged about ¼ the crew.

After closing on the Roer the front of the 30th was held by corps cavalry attached to it. The river had overflowed in front of the 2nd Armored so that they covered it with reconnaissance troops. Both these divisions were then pulled back for rest and to prepare to take up the fight east to the Rhine. They were therefore in excellent shape and at full strength when the Ardennes attack was launched by the Germans. Both were moved rapidly to that sector and both did excellent work there. The 29th with attached cavalry took over the whole corps front under the XIII Corps; while the XIX Corps moved to the Hurtgen Forest Area and took over new troops.

North Apennines—Po Valley

(*Continued from page* 45)

Bitter opposition was encountered from the start. The tough battle-wise warriors of the 442d, which had been secretly moved to Italy from France, were joined by the 473d Infantry Regiment, recently converted ack-ack men, and the advance went forward slowly but steadily with fighting every step of the way, and with normal heavy losses increased by the big naval guns of Punta Bianca which had been turned against them.

By the 9th of April our troops were well on their way into Massa, clearing out enemy strongpoints and gathering enemy prisoners as they went.

Early on 14 April the 10th Mountain Division, under IV Corps, with two regiments abreast, jumped off and began its drive toward the Po Valley. The initial effort, an attack on the towns of Vergato, Sussano, and Montese, was successful but only after the Division assisted by the BEF had overcome by hard fighting, stiff and determined enemy resistance.

Preceding the offensive action of the 15th, the 15th Air Force and XXII Tactical Air Force, the latter under Brigadier General Thomas Darcy, sent hundreds of heavy, medium, and fighter bombers loaded with high explosive and incendiary bombs over the lines directly in front of the attacking infantry. An intense artillery barrage drove the enemy into his dugouts, disrupted his communications, and shattered his nerves.

On 15 April, following this aerial and artillery action, II Corps launched the South Africans and 88th Division in their attacks. Five and one-half hours later on Monday, the 91st Division and the 34th Division attacked. By now the full weight of Fifth Army was driving toward the Po Valley. From left to right in the Fifth Army line were the 92d Infantry Division, the 473d and 442d Infantry Regiments, the 1st Infantry Division (BEF), the 1st Armored, the 10th Mountain, the 85th Division, the 88th Division, the 6th South African Armored, the 91st and 34th Infantry Divisions and the Legnano Gruppo.

Directly in front of the troops in the central sector were two enemy-held peaks which had become symbols to the men of the Fifth Army. These two features, Monterumici and Mount Adone, completely dominated the surrounding terrain. They had to be taken before any advance could be made in the II Corps sector. Following another aerial assault by fighters and fighter bombers, the two heights fell on two successive days before the coordinated and combined attacks of the 88th and 91st Divisions. Once past these obstacles, the front moved rapidly, but heavy fighting, characterized by strong separate unit actions, with significant losses to our troops, continued.

Early in the morning of 21 April, men of the 34th Division's 133d Infantry Regiment on tanks of the 752d Tank Battalion rumbled up Highway 65 into Bologna.

A Task Force of the 10th Mountain Division, headed by Brigadier General Robinson E. Duff, Assistant Division Commander, rushed north and reached the Po on the evening of the 22d. Next morning the remainder of the division moved up and in the face of a hail of enemy small arms, mortar and "88" fire, using improvised rafts and locally available rowboats, established a firm bridgehead on the north bank. The 85th and 88th Divisions crossed the Po on the 24th, and on the 25th the 91st Division and the 6th South Africans cleared the north bank.

The German Armies as an effective fighting force had been eliminated south of the Po. Their units had been broken, transport crippled, communications disrupted, supplies and installations destroyed or captured, and their personnel losses had been severe.

Once across the Po, victory was near. The battle had changed from a heavy attack on a determined enemy in highly organized defensive positions to a pursuit of thoroughly disrupted enemy forces, but not yet beaten or destroyed.

There remained in the northeast the German Adige River Defense Line, which extended along the southern tips of the Italian Alps. The key to this line was the city of Verona, lying at the base of the mountains near the southeast tip of Lake Garda. This line was breached rapidly with the Fifth Army front moving up so fast that the disorganized enemy had little opportunity to man his defenses.

By this time in the west, quickly seizing every opportunity, the 1st Armored and the 34th Divisions had cut their way through the retreating enemy forces and were well on the way to sealing off all other escape routes.

The climax came at 1800 hours on 2 May, when, with the cities of Milan, Turin and Genoa, all centers of essential military activity, in our hands, with German prisoners being rounded up by the thousands, word was dispatched to our troops, then driving toward the Brenner and Dobbiaco Passes, that the Germans in Italy had surrendered. The fighting was over. All enemy forces in Italy and Western Austria had surrendered unconditionally in the first theater-wide surrender, soon to be followed by the end of all fighting in Europe.

Mediterranean Air Forces

(*Continued from page* 44)

Russian armies, hitting troop and supply concentrations, bridges and railroads.

During the early spring of 1945 Kesselring began making devious surrender negotiations for his Italy-based forces. He was, however, recalled to the Western Front in mid-March and negotiations broke down with his successor, Von Vietinghoff, who, it became apparent, planned to pull back into the Austrian Redoubt. Our air power had isolated the battle area by the Po River and Brenner Pass campaigns, and was largely free for operations in close support of the Ground Forces. We had an effective combat strength of 4,393 planes against 130 of the once overwhelming Luftwaffe. Every U. S. heavy bomber had two trained crews to alternate missions and reduce fatigue.

On 9 April 1945, 825 Fifteenth AAF heavies carpet-bombed in front of the Eighth Army with 1,692 tons of fragmentation bombs. Accuracy was rated "superb." Late that afternoon the British Eighth Army attacked across the Senio River. Next day 848 heavies again carpet-bombed in front of the Eighth Army, dropping 1,792 tons of bombs. A large airborne landing behind German lines was planned for 12 April. Weather caused a postponement, and by the 14th, when the U. S. Fifth Army attacked southwest of Bologna, the airborne landing was no longer necessary. The following day the Fifteenth AAF sent out its largest force, putting 1,235 heavies over the lines to assist the break-through of the Fifth Army. From then on there was no stopping the Allied advance. Backed up against the bridgeless Po, the Germans left practically all of their heavy equipment behind and swam across. Beyond the Po there was no organized enemy resistance. In three weeks, fighters and fighter-bombers destroyed 4,226 motor transport vehicles and damaged 4,401. The Germans disintegrated, divisions and corps surrendering en masse. By the end of April there were 137,000 German prisoners, and on 2 May General Von Vietinghoff surrendered his remaining forces.

The war for MAAF was over. It and its predecessor organizations had dispatched 1,178,243 sorties since the opening of the North African campaign in November 1942, had dropped 674,195 tons of bombs, shot down 8,721 enemy aircraft and destroyed 4,888 on the ground, and, for victory, had paid the price of 9,347 planes and 3,863 American airmen known to have been killed in action.

Tactical Air Operations

(*Continued from page* 46)

under a system of controls which was steadily perfected, while its bombers struck at critical targets immediately behind the battle lines. In the steady push to the Rhine the Moselle bridges became the special targets of the bombers, and air-ground cooperation was never more in evidence than in the springing of the Saar-Moselle trap.

Aircraft of the Ninth Air Force prepared the way for the airborne operation east of the Rhine by bombing towns and road networks in the vicinity of the drop zones prior to the attack, and by the provision of cover for the attack itself.

Attacks on communications targets were coordinated with the ground movement which encircled the Ruhr and bagged some 300,000 prisoners. Out of 14 bridges assigned to the Ninth, 10 were destroyed and the remainder rendered at least temporarily unserviceable, while systematic cutting of rails added to the effective isolation of this battlefield. Such accomplishments were effected in the face of the heaviest concentrations of mobile flak that the Ninth had experienced.

As the American advance swept eastward to the Elbe, to Czechoslovakia and to Austria, the Ninth continued its efforts despite enemy opposition and adverse weather. The advance of the battle front required the establishment of new fields east of the Rhine if air-ground cooperation were to be provided with proper speed and in the desired intensity. This was done. The GAF was driven back upon a small number of fields where aircraft were heavily concentrated. The Ninth was quick to capitalize upon the appearance of such appropriate targets. Bombers once again concentrated their effort upon stopping enemy rail traffic by attacks on marshalling yards. Fighter-bombers, for their part, devoted themselves particularly to the provision of armored column cover. Nevertheless, they were able to render service to those same columns by escorting the transport planes carrying the fuel.

Other services were rendered by the Ninth Air Force during this period. At critical moments devastating attacks upon enemy headquarters contributed to the disorganization of his forces. Moreover, aerial reconnaissance was always as active as its resources and weather allowed.

From November 1944 to VE-day the Ninth Air Force sought to perform its triple mission. Neither weather nor difficult terrain could long fetter its movements or limit its operations. Its tasks were infinitely varied, but its flexibility and skill in the use of its weapons enabled it to perform them all with conspicuous success. In particular, friend and enemy alike testified, as did Guderian, to its "extraordinary mastery of air ground cooperation." On such a record, developed in the course of the air-ground operations which led to the unconditional surrender of the enemy on 8 May 1945, the Ninth Air Force is proud to report that it accomplished the missions assigned to it by Field Manual 100-20.

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

Eastern Sea Frontier

(*Continued from page 59*)

equipped with highly sensitive underwater listening gear and coordinated directly with blimps overhead to fully investigate all contact reports. Local defense craft patrolled the swept channels day and night to attack any submarine which might successfully evade the offshore forces.

Squadrons of Liberators, Mariners, and Catalinas covered an area several hundred miles to sea with day and night flights to attack any submarine daring enough to attempt surfacing for scouting purposes or to recharge batteries. Blimps made similar day and night patrols over the areas closer to the coast.

This plan was fully effective when the enemy made his first intensive attempt at attacks late in March and during April. During a period of about five weeks there were five or six enemy submarines operating in Frontier waters from Cape Hatteras to the Gulf of Maine. For most of this period substantially all north and southbound merchant shipping was moving independently to speed up cargo movement for the climax in Europe. Yet with all of these attractive targets available the enemy submarines succeeded in torpedoing only five ships, two of which reached port after the action. Two of the enemy submarines were sunk by surface craft and the others were all probably attacked more than once by the patrolling forces.

The last submarine attack in the Western Atlantic occurred on the night of 5 May only 60 miles from the scene of the first attack which occurred on 14 January 1942. A coastwise collier, proceeding to Boston loaded with coal, was torpedoed and sunk about five miles off Point Judith, Rhode Island. Within three hours the submarine was being attacked by two destroyer escorts, units of an escort group which had just safely delivered a trans-Atlantic convoy to New York. Repeated attacks soon sank the submarine with the loss of its entire crew. The ships involved had many trophies for their collection, gathered from the debris which came to the surface after the sinking.

After the Nazi surrender, five enemy submarines proceeded to Eastern Sea Frontier ports, escorted by units of the Atlantic Fleet which intercepted them at sea after their acknowledgment of the surrender terms. The first of these, U-858, arrived at Cape May on 14 May, followed by four others at Portsmouth, N. H. So ended the last round of the Battle of the Eastern Sea Frontier.

XVI Corps Operations

(*Continued from page 62*)

the river at three sites, and the 79th Infantry Division made the assault at two sites. Both divisions utilized many types of assault craft, and engineers rapidly completed treadway and ponton bridges. So successful was the crossing operation that by the end of the first day, the Corps had moved 26 battalions of infantry, armor and field artillery into its bridgehead, suffering very few casualties. Moving eastward between the Lippe River and the Rhein-Herne Canal and expanding its bridgehead to allow two other Corps to pass through, the XVI Corps committed the 8th Armored Division and the 35th and 75th Infantry Divisions against elements of a German Parachute division, two volksgrenadier divisions, and a panzer division opposing it. On 2 April 1945, the Corps held a 37-mile front along the Rhein-Herne Canal and Dortmund-Ems Canal as a part of the Allied envelopment which trapped over 300,000 Germans in the Ruhr pocket.

Moving to assist in the elimination of the Ruhr pocket, the XVI Corps attacked south into the densely populated Ruhr industrial area on 3 April 1945. An attack by the 75th Infantry Division preceded a coordinated drive in which the 35th and 79th Infantry Divisions and the 17th Airborne Division later participated. The Corps augmented this force on 9 April 1945, as it employed the 95th Infantry Division, the 8th Armored Division, and the 15th Cavalry Group, welded into a powerful task force, in an attack from the east toward Dortmund. The Corps wiped out stubborn enemy resistance in the large cities of Essen, Duisberg, Dortmund, and Unna as it advanced south to the Ruhr River where it met other forces attacking from the south and east in the elimination of this pocket.

Having successfully completed three important combat missions under the Ninth Army, the XVI Corps on 18 April 1945, assumed responsibility for occupation and military government of an area covering approximately 6,300 square miles with a population of 4,950,000, comprising the provinces of Laender-Lippe, Schweig-Lippe, and the greater portion of Westphalia. Troops under its command during the period included the 29th, 35th, 75th, 79th, and 95th Infantry Divisions, the 17th Airborne Division, the 55th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, and the 15th Cavalry Group, as well as the XVI Corps Artillery. The Corps met and successfully solved countless administrative problems incident to its mission prior to releasing responsibility for this area to British forces on 6 June 1945.

Persian Gulf Command

(*Continued from page 66*)

to Washington, D. C. to assume new important duties in the office of Army-Navy Liquidation Commission and Brig. Gen. Donald P. Booth succeeded to the Command of PGC.

At the first of the year 1945, the other top key positions of PGC were held by the following named personnel—

Chief of Staff: Brig. Gen. Samuel M. Thomas, GSC
Asst. Chief of Staff for Administration: Colonel Edward W. Shugart, GSC
Asst. Chief of Staff for Operation: Colonel Daniel P. Caulkins, GSC
Asst. Chief of Staff for Supply: Brig. Gen. Roy C. L. Graham, GSC
Director, Military Railway Service: Brig. Gen. Frank S. Besson, Jr.
Director, Signal Service: Colonel George S. Combel, S.C.
Director, Port Service and Commanding Officer, Gulf District: Brig. Gen. Bernhard A. Johnson, U.S.A.
Commanding Officer, Desert District: Colonel Francis R. Dryden, C.E.
Commanding Officer, Mountain District: Colonel Gustave A. McAnderson, Inf.

The primary function of the command continued to be the delivery of supplies to the Russians. However, the capabilities were never used to the full in 1945, because cargo arrivals by ship in Persian Gulf ports never reached the capacity of the corridor. From time to time prior to V-E Day capacity prescribed by the War Department was reduced as more economical routes, such as that to the Black Sea ports, became available for delivery of war supplies to the Russians.

Mention was made above of the discontinuing of MTS operations. In December, the Truck Assembly Plant (TAP I) at Andimeshk was shut down, the equipment dismantled and shipped to the Russians for their use in connection with the cased trucks to be received at the Black Sea ports.

Early in 1945, studies proved that the three territorial districts in the command could be dispensed with, and all operations under the curtailed program could be run for GHQ. This reorganization allowed the release of the personnel from the three district headquarters. The first shut-down of a major installation, however, was closing of the Port of Bandar Shahpur on 7 February. In the same month the last airplane for Russia was assembled at Abadan.

With the completion of all truck assembly in March, and the Truck Assembly Plant (TAP II) at Khorramshahr dismantled and shipped to the Russians, the operation of the Iranian State Railway remained the only one of the initial operational functions of PGC. This railroad operation continued until the War Department announced that the mission of the command was completed on 1 June.

Thereafter, shipment of personnel from the theatre, repair and preparation of equipment for shipment and the shipment of equipment and supplies from the theatre were the principal functions of the command.

On V-J Day General Booth was reassigned to other duties in the War Department and Colonel G. A. M. Anderson, Inf., assumed command. On 1 October PGC ceased to exist as a separate entity, being incorporated as PCGS into AMETO.

Pertinent Figures on the Persian Gulf Command

Delivery of Cargo to the USSR (in long tons. Long ton equals 2,240 Pounds)

Grand Totals

Railway	2,997,592
Trucks and Cargo	1,235,088
M. T. S.	409,956
Planes	36,018
UKCC	480,731
Total	5,159,385

Record Months in Long Tons

Mil. Rwy. Service (July 1944) includes 6,547 long tons of Eastern Command Cargo	171,381
Number of Trucks Assembled (July 1944)	8,628
Cased Motor Trucks and Cargo (Weight) (August 1944)	62,036
Motor Transport Service (July 1944)	36,727
Number of Planes (November 1943)	432
Weight of Planes (November 1943)	3,456
UKCC ex Khanaqin (June 1944)	21,944
Total (July 1944)	288,644

Above figures include tonnage delivered to the Russians only.

Total Long Tons Discharged at Ports From April 1943 Through May 1945:

Khorramshahr	2,618,947
Bandar Shahpur	1,015,333
Margil	446,430
Total All Ports	4,100,152

Truck and Plane Assembly (1942 Through May, 1945)

Total USSR Cargo Trucks Assembled and Delivered	166,760
PGC Cargo Trucks Assembled and Del	5,664
Planes Assembled and Delivered to USSR	4,879

15th Army Group

(*Continued from page* 42)

planning to make a last-ditch stand and prolong resistance from a redoubt comprised of the Austrian and Bavarian Alps. It was appreciated that the Germans would hold the rich Italian northland as a supply source for and as a buffer to such a redoubt as long as possible, and that rather than attempt a voluntary withdrawal to positions behind the Po River and subsequently the Adige, the enemy would fight where he stood. If forced to withdraw, they would attempt to delay successively on each river line, using floods and demolitions to slow our advance.

As preparations for Fifteenth Army Group's 1945 spring offensive reached the stage of completion, the Eighth Army front extended from the Adriatic Sea on the east along the Senio River to a western boundary with Fifth Army in the Apennines just southeast of Bologna. The western two-thirds of the line was held by Fifth Army from the boundary with Eighth Army on the east through the chill, abrupt Apennines to the Ligurian Sea a few miles south of Massa.

Spring approached, the weather cleared, and the powerful Allied air arm pounded the enemy with increasing effectiveness. Thirty enemy divisions, among the best left to him, had been held in Italy from other fronts where they were sorely needed. These troops would be the logical choice for prolonged resistance were they allowed to remain intact. To hasten the end of the European war these divisions had to be destroyed.

Fifteenth Army Group attacked. Two preliminary operations preceded the main attacks. First, Eighth Army cleared the Comacchio spit and established a bridgehead over the Reno River on the eastern Adriatic flank of the line. Three days later, 5 April, Fifth Army launched a diversionary attack on the opposite end of the line directed on Massa. On 9 April, following an unparalleled air assault on enemy front line positions opposite Eighth Army, Eighth Army crossed the Senio River and pressed the weight of its attack toward Budrio.

Fifth Army, delayed two days by bad weather, launched the Fifteenth Army Group main effort on 14 April, following a forty-minute air preparation and an artillery barrage which saturated known enemy gun positions. Mines and resistance from the rubble of strongly prepared enemy positions made progress in the mountainous Fifth Army zone slow for the first few days.

20 April was the day on which the approaching victory first was foreshadowed when Fifth Army debouched from the Apennines into the Po plains and cut Highway 9 west of Bologna. Fifth and Eighth Army troops entered Bologna simultaneously the following morning.

The first, most difficult phase of the Fifteenth Army Group offensive was over. Fifth Army was out of the mountains into the flatlands of the Po Valley, and Bologna had been captured. The second and third phases followed without pause and in rapid succession.

Exploitation south of the Po proceeded with lightning speed. One Fifth Army column streaked north to the river and quickly established a bridgehead in the vicinity of Ostiglia. The giant Fifth and Eighth Army pincers closed at Finale—significant name!—and another Fifth Army column advanced rapidly northwestward to Piacenza.

After several days of bitter fighting, Eighth Army had shifted its weight from northwestward to north; had broken through the Argenta gap, so-called because operations were limited to a narrow corridor of dry ground along Highway 16 between flooded fields; and had reached the Po River north of Ferrara.

Both armies crossed the Po, Verona fell, an armored column to Como and the Swiss border blocked the escape of the Germans in the Maritime Alps. Thus was the third phase speedily accomplished, but almost anti-climactically. The effectiveness of the German armies had been destroyed south of the Po River.

Fifth Army contacted Seventh Army in the Brenner Pass, the French were met near Noli on the Italian Riviera, and Eighth Army columns joined Yugoslav partisan forces in Trieste.

The long Italian campaign was over.

The Navy in Europe

(*Continued from page* 43)

withdrawn and replaced by the forces necessary for port operations on the French Coast and for maintenance of supply lines to provide reenforcements and materials. Vice Admiral A. G. Kirk, the senior U. S. Naval Commander under the Allied Naval Commander in Chief (Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey, R.N.) was designated Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, France. Under the administrative command of the Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in Europe, Admiral Kirk was responsible for direct U. S. Naval participation in combined Allied operations on the Continent. Rear Admiral John Wilkes served as Commander, U. S. Ports and Bases in France. Le Havre and Rouen were made available in October for the landing of supplies and troops. When the Scheldt was cleared in December, ships went directly to Antwerp, where a U. S. Naval Port Office assured unloadings, which reached a total of 22,000 tons daily.

The allied offensive had slowed down at the end of October when the German frontier was reached from Holland to Switzerland. Throughout the winter months, the army groups under General Montgomery in the North, under General Bradley along the Seigfried Line and under General Devers in Alsace prepared to drive into Germany. In the early months of 1945, after Rundstedt's counter-offensive had been defeated, the allied armies successfully turned or penetrated the Seigfried Line and reached the left bank of the Rhine.

The next strategic problem was the launching of the offensive across the river. In this phase of the planning the U. S. Navy was called upon to improvise operations to assist in the Rhine crossings. Especially selected and trained naval units were prepared to assist the American armies to cross the Rhine. LCVP's which had been used effectively in the Normandy landings and other amphibious operations, were used together with LCM's, for ferrying troops and material across the Rhine. They were invaluable also as night river patrols and in the maintenance of the bridges thrown across the river by the U. S. Army engineers. Closest cooperation between Army and Naval forces was necessary during these operations, particularly during the assault period and the few days following. This cooperation made possible the swift and successful invasion of the heart of Germany by the Allied forces.

The LCVP units, which had been in training since October 1944, had to solve special engineering problems arising from the use in fresh water of craft originally designed for salt water. American naval units participated in the First Army's crossing in the Remagen bridgehead area on 11 March, in General Patton's Third Army crossing near Oppenheim on 23 March, and also in the Ninth U. S. Army's assault south of Wessel on the following day.

The Navy was also called upon, in plans originally made in November 1944, to assist in operations to reduce German pockets of resistance in the Gironde Estuary and in the Bay of Biscay area. In these operations, to be carried out chiefly by French forces of the Sixth Army Group, the naval forces were to be under the command of Vice Admiral Kirk, USN.

In the winter of 1944-45, the U. S. Naval Command in Europe, while meeting current problems of Naval operations in Europe, had prepared for the action that would be necessary after Germany surrendered. In enforcing surrender terms, the Allied Navies were assigned responsibility of the demobilization and disarmament of the German Navy and for naval demilitarization of Germany. Agreement had been reached at the Moscow Conference, October 1943, on tripartite action to be taken after German unconditional surrender. When the European Advisory Commission was set up, to work out surrender terms and plans for Allied Military Occupation and Government of Germany, Admiral Stark, as Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in Europe, was designated Naval Advisor to the U. S. Member (Ambassador Winant). A Post-Hostilities Committee of his staff prepared early in 1944 preliminary plans for post-surrender activities.

In July 1944, Vice Admiral William A. Glassford, Jr., USN, formerly head of the U. S. Military Mission at Dakar, was assigned duty in London as Deputy ComNavEu for Occupied Countries. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, USN, was designated to serve as Commander U. S. Naval Forces in Germany, responsible for all U. S. Naval activities in connection with the enforcement of surrender terms. He would also act as the U. S. head of the Naval Division of the Allied Control Council, and as advisor to General Eisenhower in formulating policies on naval disarmament and demobilization and on control of merchant shipping.

In the plans approved by the Allied governments for the military occupation of Germany the U. S. was assigned responsibility for the occupation of the Weser River Enclave which included ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven. Rear Admiral A. G. Robinson, USN, was ordered for duty in the Weser River Enclave as Commander, U. S. Ports and Bases, Germany.

Several thousand officers and men were assembled, at the end of 1944, to be trained for duties in Germany. At the U. S. Naval Base at Rosneath, Scotland, courses were offered in military government techniques, port operations, German history and the German language. With the collapse of the enemy, these forces were moved into Germany. By the end of April 1945, the U. S. Navy had begun its tasks in the Bremen-Bremerhaven area. Shortly after the surrender of Germany, Admiral Ghormley established his headquarters as Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Germany, at Frankfurt, and opened offices in Berlin for the Naval Division of the U. S. Group, A.C.C.

Special missions were assembled in London to represent the U. S. Navy in liberated countries. Officers and men were assigned as naval components of the SHAEF missions to France, Denmark, Holland, Norway and Belgium.

In its post-hostilities activities in Europe the United States Navy is adding another creditable chapter to its long and glorious history. The task assigned has not been spectacular but it involves painstaking and exacting effort.

Seventh Air Force

(*Continued from page* 79)

Palaus. One C-47 landed on Pelelieu with a cargo of hydrogen for the ground forces nine days after the island was invaded, coming in under an arc of American artillery fire.

The month of June found the Seventh preparing for its major move into the Ryukyus, from where it was to get its first chance at the Japanese homeland. On 1 July, Mitchell bombers made the first medium bomber strike of the war against Kyushu, second largest Nip home island. Two days later, Liberators joined in to make the first heavy bomber attack, other than Superfort raids, on the homeland.

This was the start of the great 45-day offensive by the Seventh, joined in later by the Fifth Air Force, to neutralize Kyushu, which was necessary before any invasion of Japan could be launched.

Invader A-26's, flown by the first pilots and crews to be redeployed from the European Theater to the Pacific, and P-47 Thunderbolts, armed with rockets, bombs and machine guns, flew on coordinated missions with the Mitchells and Liberators to blast war industries, shipping, communications, railway lines and railway marshalling yards.

Zealously guarded aircraft of the dwindling Jap air force, being saved by the enemy for use against our future invasion forces, were strafed, rocketed and bombed by low-flying Seventh Air Force planes which had complete mastery of the air over Japan. Occasionally, when the enemy sent up interceptors, he suffered extremely high loses from our fighters and bomber machine gunners.

Approximately 3800 tons of demolition and fragmentation bombs and 1400 fire bombs each with 160 gallons of Napalm were dropped against the enemy during the period from 1 July to 14 August.

Results of these raids saw Kyushu completely neutralized. Shipping on the Inland Sea from Korea and from China to the home islands had vanished. Internal transportation had come almost to a standstill. Japanese industries suffered blows from which they may never recover.

Meanwhile, photo reconnaissance planes arrived on Okinawa early in July, and their crews began mapping all air fields, communications, supply dumps and war factories on the island of Kyushu, Shikoku and southern Honshu.

When offensive operations against land targets were halted on 13 August, the Liberators continued their surveillance, reconnaissance and weather missions along the China coast and over Kyushu, and dropped propaganda leaflets and messages on Japanese cities. Mapping activities of the photo planes were expanded to include the Nansei Shotos and Korea.

In addition to carrying on the mounting air offensive against the Jap homeland during July and August, the Seventh Air Force took over the air defense of the Ryukyus on 15 July, when the Second Marine Air Wing and the 53rd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade passed under its operational control.

Marine Corsairs and P-61 Black Widows, patrolling the skies 24 hours a day, were so effective that few enemy planes penetrated their ring to bomb Okinawa.

Another major problem confronting the Seventh was that of traffic control of the Ryukyus. Literally thousands of aircraft from the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Thirteenth Air Forces, the Air Transport Command and the Navy were using the Ryukyu airstrips regularly, and the war's end found the greatest concentration of aircraft ever gathered in the Pacific on these airfields.

When the Seventh Air Force moved from the Central Pacific to the Ryukyus, it was transferred from the jurisdiction of the Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas to General George C. Kenney's Far East Air Forces, and thus teamed up with the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces for the final assault on Japan itself. With General Douglas MacArthur as its new theater commander, the Seventh moved out of a theater of operations commanded by the Navy for the first time since November, 1943.

Changes were also made within the Seventh Air Force command. Brigadier General Thomas D. White, deputy commanding general of the Thirteenth Air Force, replaced Major General Robert W. Douglass as Seventh Air Force commander in June. At the same time, Brigadier General Carl B. McDaniel became deputy air force commander, and Brigadier General Harold L. Mace succeeded Brigadier General William J. Flood as chief of staff. Last December, Brigadier General Lawrence J. Carr replaced Brigadier General Truman H. Landon as commanding general of the VII Bomber Command.

The Great Circle

(*Continued from page* 82)

May and June are not good months for combat operations in the Aleutians or over the Kuriles. Yet in May of 1945, the Eleventh Air Force dropped a record tonage of bombs over the Kuriles and surpassed its own record the following month. In the first 7½ months of 1945, Eleventh Air Force bombers dropped more than twice as many bombs on Japanese targets as they had from September of 1943 to January of 1945.

The weather remained unchanged, too. Frequently less than half the days of each month were suitable for missions, with either terminal, target, or route weather preventing combat operations. But on days where conditions permitted the scheduling of flights, the Eleventh Air Force carried on "all-out" missions, occasionally sending as many as 80 per cent of its available aircraft to the Kuriles. Instead of harassing attacks as carried out in 1943 and 1944, the planes were directed to destroy specific targets. The Japanese fishing industry in the Northern Kuriles was reduced to almost nothing. Bomb damage photographs testify to the pin-point accuracy of the bombardiers. Had the war lasted two months longer, the Eleventh Air Force would have run out of targets.

This pioneer flying in the Aleutians and over the Kuriles had an important post-war significance, however, not recorded in the number of bombs dropped or the number of ships sunk. A look at the globe tells the story.

The shortest route from the Far East to North America, from Tokyo to Seattle, for example, lies just 50 miles south of Adak Island, one of the major bases in the Aleutians. It is over 1,500 miles shorter than the route from Tokyo to San Francisco via Luzon, Guam, Kwajalien and Hawaii. This Great Circle route is also the shortest route from North America to Shanghai, Nanking, and other cities of the Far East.

Prior to 1944, the barrier to future development of the Great Circle route, aside from the Japanese, was the weather. Little was known about that cauldron of storms that lies south of Kiska. There were stories of "williwaws" that tore the wings off planes, of impenetrable fogs and sudden icing, of clouds that could reduce visibility over an airfield to zero in 20 minutes. For the men who flew the Aleutians in the early days, all this was true. For untrained men without reliable navigation aids, the Aleutians are still dangerous. But men of the Eleventh Air Force have proven that the Aleutians can be flown, safely and regularly, by competent men, equipped with sturdy aircraft and the many navigational aids that have been developed in this war.

Final proof and the justification for many months of unpleasant living, where the sun is rarely seen and the wind blows almost all the time, was given to men of the Eleventh Air Force on 3 September 1945, when a C-54 carrying motion picture films of the Japanese surrender, flew from Tokyo to Adak in 12 hours, refueled and flew on to Seattle and Washington. Total flying time for the trip: 31 hours. As the silver ship, coming from Tokyo, landed with a 400-foot ceiling and one-mile visibility at the mountain-girt Adak air base, Eleventh Air Force men could be excused for a small smile of pride. They knew the route could be flown—they had helped make it possible.

Naval Aviation

(*Continued from page* 78)

down 440 planes, and destroyed 353 on the ground.

Fleet Air Wing ONE, operating from the Okinawa area from 26 March to 12 August of this year, exemplifies the accomplishments of this branch of Naval Aviation. Searching out the enemy's activities in the waters from Hong Kong north was the prime mission of ONE. As a secondary mission its planes sank 254 enemy vessels, totaling 187,555 tons, and damaged another 289, totaling 180,275 tons.

I should like to emphasize several aspects of Naval Aviation's role in the last ten months of the Pacific War.

The initial carrier plane raid on Tokyo in February was the first in which American planes, in any quantity, bombed a Japanese city from low altitudes. Their performance proved planes could survive the antiaircraft fire at low altitudes and attain greater bombing accuracy.

The Philippines and Okinawa campaigns afforded the supreme test of carrier aviation's ability to stand up against land-based airpower. For the first part of the Leyte invasion and throughout the height of the Okinawa battle, we depended almost entirely on carrier based planes to fight off the enemy's continuous and aggressive attacks. We succeeded. True, we suffered losses. But we meted out more punishment than we took; we stayed within range of enemy land-based planes for weeks, even months, to fight every day; and, we accomplished what we purposed—air cover and close support for the ground troops.

There is no denying that the suiciders were often successful. However, they did not stop our operations. A defense for Kamikazes was developed which made it possible to continue effective offensive air operations against the Empire.

A third noteworthy aspect of the last year of fighting was our Navy and Marine pilots' successes in close support work. Close support involves flying at low altitudes over enemy territory, and aiming bombs, rockets and bullets at obstacles in the infantry's path. Often the targets were only 200 yards ahead of our infantry. The toll of enemy targets obliterated and the accolades of the foot soldiers attest the fliers' successes.

War's end found Naval Aviation completing the blockade of the Empire, relentlessly destroying the enemy's airpower, attacking vital targets by accurate, low-level bombing, and preparing for invasion.

Soldiers in Overalls

(*Continued from page 21*)

Good Neighbor Policy. The result of it all was this: The armed forces got what they wanted. Not a gun was sold for lack of ammunition.

What was it that they wanted? They wanted everything. Soldiers in uniform got what they wanted from soldiers in overalls.

All who fought the war were not attached to the armed forces; they were not soldiers, sailors or marines in fact, but men and women of the Interior Department deserve this designation. They were fighters though they were not in uniform and they contributed to the winning of many a battle. As a notable instance, take the case of eighty military geologists in the Geological Survey who supplied charts and maps to the military forces. These charts and maps were highly technical geologic and topographical maps. They told those who studied them where the best places were for digging wells, for locating springs and streams in foreign countries. The maps were magic keys to enemy positions.

Sixty-six men and fourteen women were in that gallant little band of scientists who worked night and day—most of them far from any battlefield—to help our conquering soldiers, sailors and marines to know what they might expect even before they set foot on enemy terrains.

The Interior Department held nothing back, and I am proud of its record. One item alone is stupendous. Under the guidance of Interior Department experts, mining in all fields was improved, but the record was broken in the mining of domestic iron ore. During the war, the United States produced more iron ore than any other Nation on earth, on an average of 93,847,000 long tons a year.

The list of accomplishments is long and great. Aside from helping to win the war, however, the men and women of the Department have helped to formulate a long range plan for the peace; mostly in the conservation of our fast diminishing natural resources. The war drained these pretty badly. Some of our mineral supplies went close to the vanishing point. In order to protect the America of the future, the Interior Department—to use a baseball phrase—is still in there pitching. The battle is over for others, but not for us.

Battle of the Atlantic

(*Continued from page* 39)

The last sub blitz directed at the United States was launched in March 1945. It was in considerable strength but was met in mid-ocean by the most powerful anti-submarine striking force the U. S. Navy had ever put at sea. While a few subs trickled through these offensive screens we still had sufficient support forces near our own coasts to handle them effectively.

This last chapter of anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic was filled with many sensational encounters and daring exploits.

Only three weeks before the Germans surrendered we smashed the final blitz of a formidable pack of U-Boats whose commanding officers had orders to blanket the East Coast from Maine to Florida. Our forces were so disposed that they thwarted this attempted intensified U-Boat campaign. At the same time they were fully ready to counter any possible Rocket Bomb attack from seaborne apparatus. We sank five U-Boats during this blitz. Three more U-Boats were sunk during the last phase of the Battle of the Atlantic.

It is known now that German scientists had planned more than one effective weapon to launch against our home land. It was a race against time. Had our own defenses not been adequate, ready and alert and had the allied strength in Europe not been so great, the Huns might well have caused grave apprehension.

During the European War the Atlantic Fleet escorted 17,707 ships. Organization and routing of these ships in convoy was ably administered by the Commander Tenth Fleet. It required 3,732 escort trips to protect the convoys. Less than a score were sunk in convoy. The Atlantic Fleet and ships in convoy cruised more than 50,000,000 miles in the Battle of the Atlantic to say nothing of the millions of miles flown by our pilots patrolling the vast stretches of the ocean. We know definitely that we sank 126 U-Boats, most of them far from shore. We probably sank more than this but definite proof must be obtained before credit for a "kill" is given.

Seeking out and destroying U-Boats to keep the sea lanes open was but one of the many jobs of the Atlantic Fleet. The forces of the Atlantic Fleet conducted the amphibious operations against the enemy in Morocco, and participated actively in Sicily, Italy, Normandy and Southern France.

Atlantic Fleet Training Commanders trained tens of thousands of officers, upwards of a million men and have shaken down some 1500 combatant and auxiliary type ships and nearly 3000 amphibious vessels for the Pacific. These men and ships gallantly and effectively engaged the enemy in battle in the Pacific, some within a matter of weeks after their departure from the Atlantic training area.

Across the Atlantic the Fleet maintained weather ships and at Greenland a Patrol detachment. Many of these ships were manned by Coast Guard personnel who did a magnificent job, frustrating Nazi attempts to establish weather stations in the area.

At present the Atlantic Fleet is operating an extensive network of beacon and rescue ships to guide and safeguard the planes loaded with soldiers returning from Europe.

Operations against the surface raiders and U-Boats in the South Atlantic were just as tense as in the North Atlantic but the hunting was probably more difficult. We established a blockade to halt the traffic of vital supplies between Japan and Germany with the invaluable assistance of Brazil's bases from which to operate.

Long before the trend of victory was apparent, in fact during the darkest days of the Battle of the Atlantic, the courageous government of Brazil, with the full support and approval of the people of Brazil, threw her weight and full strength to the Allied cause. Throughout the war Brazil exerted every energy to the successful prosecution of the war.

The Allies made a great team out there in the Atlantic. On numerous occasions we operated jointly with the British. Throughout the war we operated with the Canadians. Nothing was left to be desired in our relationships and mutual understandings of each other's problems and the methods to be employed in solving them.

The Commanders of the Eastern, Caribbean, Gulf and Panama Sea Frontiers figured prominently in the Battle of the Atlantic. They kept our coastal areas clear.

I cannot let this occasion pass without taking my hat off to the officers and men of the Atlantic Fleet. That goes for regulars and reserves. I make no distinction. We are all in the Navy, and they all, officers and men, acquitted themselves with honor.

Sixth Army Group

(*Continued from page* 38)

headed by American forces and with French troops closely following, the allies struck swiftly and hard, their mission being to capture and destroy as much as possible of the German strength in southern France before it could be withdrawn to prepared defensive lines.

In three-prong drives along the Riviera coast and up the Rhone valley the racing allied units trapped retreating German elements, cut their communications, destroyed their equipment, and accomplished the virtual destruction of the 19th German Army. By 12 September junction was made with the American 3rd Army driving down from the north, thereby sealing off thousands of the enemy in the vast area to the southwest.

French resistance forces, rising magnificently everywhere, were of inestimable help then and later, harassing the Germans, providing superb intelligence, and finally aiding in the ultimate defeat of the enemy when they were absorbed into the regular French army.

The relentless pursuit continued so swiftly that progress ran 60 days ahead of schedule; control passed from Allied Force Headquarters in the Mediterranean theater to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, in France.

At 0001 B hours 15 September 1944, by SHAEF order, 6th Army Group assumed command of American 7th Army, French 1st Army, and the French and American forces holding the Italian-French frontier and containing the German "pockets" to the south and west.

The original time-table was discarded; plans were continually revised; supply lines were often outdistanced and the onrushing armies occasionally had to pause to build up reserves of ammunition, fuel and food. Resisting bitterly, the Germans finally withdrew to powerful defenses in Vosges mountains, a line that never before in military history had been breached.

Yet in November, after careful preparation, the 7th U. S. and 1st French Armies broke through the Saverne and Belfort gaps, smashed the line of the Vosges and raced across the Alsace plain. Press dispatches carried the triumphant message that after four years of intolerable Nazi oppression and after only 97 days of swift, relentless Allied attack, our forces were "keeping watch on the Rhine."

Sixth Army Group temporarily was ordered to the defensive when the Ardennes breakthrough constituted a serious threat farther north; then hurled back a German counter-offensive in northern Alsace in January, and again resumed the attack.

Coordinating its drive with the 3rd Army to the north, the Seigfried line was erased, the Saar was overrun and two German armies were destroyed west of the Rhine. The river barrier was crossed on 25 March; then began the race to seal off the entrances to Germany's "National Redoubt." This was accomplished; our iron ring extended from Berchtesgaden to the Brenner Pass.

Nazi overlords, fleeing the destruction of Berlin, were trapped in spectacular succession: Goering, Frank, Kesselring, Von Runstedt, plus dozens of lesser chiefs—an unending procession of military and political fugitives of once-powerful Nazism.

The end came swiftly. On 5 May, German Army Group "G" surrendered unconditionally. Hostilities in southern Germany ceased. Three days later, following the surrender of the German forces in the north, "V-E" day was proclaimed.

Sixth Army Group's mission was completed—but not without cost. In the allied military cemeteries, among the hills and plains of France and Germany, rest those comrades whose memory must insure that the victory they helped to win shall endure forever.

Victory in Italy

(*Continued from page* 41)

Navy and the United States Navy continued to render invaluable support to land operations and to utilize to the full their dominance of the Mediterranean seaways. The great strategic bombing campaign succeeded so brilliantly that it ran out of oil targets and industrial targets and strangled the Luftwaffe at its source. From its Italian bases, the 15th Air Force ranged irresistably from the Balkans to Austria, Germany and France, and teamed effectively with the Allied heavy bombers from the north. On several occasions it rendered support to the advancing Russian Army in Hungary. No less decisive was the tactical bombing; striking at enemy communications and installations, and furnishing close support to ground forces.

Special praise should be given the supply and service forces. The hard-won experience of two-and-a-half years of active operations in the African-Mediterranean Theater bore fruit in a magnificent performance.

Just as this Theater produced the first elimination of an Axis member from the war, so too did it force the first surrender of the German Wehrmacht. As early as the end of February 1945, German commanders in Italy had sought terms of capitulation. Representing both the Waffen SS and the Wehrmacht, emissaries were in contact with Allied Force Headquarters and learned that no terms would be discussed but that they would have to yield unconditionally. The success of our April offensive destroyed the German hope of securing conditions and on 29 April the representatives of the two branches of the German command signed the instrument of capitulation at our headquarters. This took effect on 2 May and brought about the surrender of all forces of the German Army Group Southwest in Italy and Jugoslavia. Operation TORCH of November 1942, had reached its triumphant conclusion.

Royal Navy In Pacific

(*Continued from page 33*)

On 17 December, H.M.S. Howe, the first of our four battleships, steamed into Sydney Harbour. For some weeks she was the only major unit east of Ceylon. At this time, ships of what was ultimately to become the British Pacific Fleet were scattered over the oceans and seas of the world. We still were required to maintain powerful forces in the Home Fleet, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Most of the ships which we were able to withdraw had to be refitted and "tropicalised" for what was then thought to be the long war ahead. But if anyone thinks that the British Pacific Fleet was our "second team," I would remind him that of four battleships, fourteen carriers, nine cruisers and thirty-two destroyers which later arrived in Sydney Harbour, only one cruiser had been built when the war began.

By mid-January, four of our Fleet Carriers — Indomitable, Indefatigable, Illustrious and Victorious—were ready to move forward from Ceylon. They had been "battle-training" there for some weeks, attacking targets in Java, Sumatra and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. On their way to Australia, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Philip Vian, they made a most successful and damaging attack on the Japanese oil resources at Palembang in Sumatra. They arrived unscathed in Sydney early in February.

Meanwhile, the assembly of the Fleet Train under the command of Rear Admiral Douglas Fisher was going ahead, and arrangements had been completed to enable us to use Manus in the Admiralty Islands as a forward staging point and anchorage. But each day it became clearer that distance was to be our main adversary, and logistic support our biggest problem. Throughout these difficult weeks of planning and organising, the accumulated experience that the United States Pacific Fleet had gained in three years of ocean operations was of tremendous help to us, and it was readily and generously made available.

It had always been agreed that the British forces should be under American operational control, and while this relieved us of much of the detailed work of operational planning, it also, in some ways, increased our difficulties in that we had no long range picture of the exact operations we must plan to support. We had, in fact, to plan for all eventualities.

By mid-March, our first task force was assembled at Manus, and I was able to announce it as "ready for action." It consisted of two battleships, four fleet carriers, six cruisers and elements of four destroyer flotillas. It was commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, flying his flag in H.M.S. King George V., with Vice Admiral Sir Philip Vian in command of the carriers in H.M.S. Indomitable. A few days later, designated as Task Force 57, under the operational control of Admiral Spruance, it sailed for Ulithi.

On 27 March, Task Force 57 struck at Japanese airfields in Sakishima Gunto in support of operation "Iceberg"—the landings on Okinawa, which began at dawn on 1 April.

Through April and most of May the attacks went on—two days striking, three days replenishing—with a bombardment to lend variety to an unspectacular task.

It was during this phase of the operation that the British Task Force received its first baptism of Kamikaze. Three of our carriers — Indomitable, Formidable and Victorious—were hit, but none was out of operations for more than a few hours, and damage and casualties were mercifully slight. A destroyer—H.M.S. Ulster—was bombed and seriously damaged but successfully towed to Leyte.

By mid-July, the British task force, replenished and re-inforced, reported back for duty. This time it was assigned to Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet and designated Task Force 37. In conjunction with Task Force 38, under the command of the late Vice Admiral McCain, it took part in those culminating attacks against the Japanese home islands which did so much to bring Japan to her knees. Fliers from the British carriers accounted for 600 Japanese planes and more than 250 Japanese ships of all sizes. Battleships, cruisers and destroyers bombarded targets on the mainland of Japan on several occasions. Task Force 37 continued in action until the cease-fire sounded.

No account of the Royal Navy's activities in the Pacific would be complete without reference to the work of our submarines which were operating under Admiral Fife from Fremantle and Subic Bay. One of them—H.M.S. Tactician—torpedoed and sank a Japanese cruiser in most difficult circumstances in the Java Sea. One of our midget submarines entered Singapore and blew up another Japanese cruiser lying at anchor inside the net defences. And day after day, they nibbled away at the Japanese resources, sinking junks and minesweepers, shelling railways and bridges right to the last.

On 16 August, Admiral Nimitz signalled to me: "The close co-operation and support provided by the British Pacific Fleet have been of great assistance in beating Japan."

We are proud to have been in at the kill.

III Corps Operations

(*Continued from page 53*)

opposite the enemy's tough Roer River line south of Duren. On 25 February, elements of the 1st Infantry Division passed through VII Corps' bridgehead on the north flank, attacked south, secured a bridgehead in their own zone which enabled the rest of the division to cross. The 1st then struck south, prepared the way for the 9th Infantry Division which had recently replaced the 82nd Airborne Division. The 9th then crossed, expanded south and prepared the way for the 78th Infantry Division.

On 6-7 March, III Corps, led by Major General John Leonard's 9th Armored Division, made a lightning advance. Initially orders were to advance due east to the Rhine; later they were changed to turn south to meet Third Army. III Corps included the Ludendorff Bridge as an objective of the 9th Armored Division, and Corps took further precaution to request the air not to bomb it and directed the artillery to use only pozit and time fire on it. Credit for daring execution goes to Brigadier General William Hoge's CC"B," who on that eventful day of 7 March, rushed across in spite of enemy fire. Two small charges had been set off by the enemy, but the bridge was satisfactory for one-way traffic. By 9 March, a total of 17 battalions of infantry and some tanks were on the far side of the Rhine. A treadway bridge was completed on 10 March, a ponton bridge on 11 March. The Rhine had been conquered at a minimum loss in men and equipment, and the whole course of the war changed and materially shortened.

The Ludendorff bridge collapsed a few hours after the writer assumed command of the III Corps on 17 March. The bridge had served its purpose.

With limited forces First Army pushed all possible gains. The bridgehead was aggressively and steadily expanded. Resistance increased with the Germans sending reserves from the front of the 21st Army Group. Montgomery, poised to attack on 24 March, sensed the relief in the North and graciously thanked the Americans at Remagen. On 21 March III Corps Headquarters was established east of the Rhine—the first foreign Corps since Napoleon. General Hodges rapidly concentrated First Army's strength within the bridgehead and when the green light was given on the 25th, struck out into the heart of Germany, then turned north to complete the encirclement of the Ruhr. The III Corps in the center of this mighty spearhead had its 7th Armored Division in the lead, supported closely by the 9th and 99th Infantry Divisions. In the first 52 hours the armor advanced 62 miles against heavy resistance and every obstacle—a classic example of correct use of armor, with infantry partly motorized, mopping up and in close support.

The Ruhr pocket was ordered liquidated, and III Corps (7th Armored Division, 9th, 99th and 5th Infantry Divisions, 14th Cavalry) was ordered to attack to the west. For a while the Germans tried desperately to break out to the east with armor and later by infiltration, but failing, took up the defensive. Concentrated attacks broke their line and constant night and day pressure kept them off balance. Then, hopelessly cut off and thoroughly whipped, they surrendered by whole Corps! Perhaps the largest group of German PW's to surrender in a single day, 16 April, gave themselves over to the 5th and 99th Infantry Divisions and the 7th Armored Division. U. S. Forces took 317,000 Germans in the pocket; of these III Corps took 105,768.

During the closing days of the Ruhr pocket, Corps was moving elements East and completing plans for operations on the Elbe River front of First Army. But changed orders on 16 April sent the Corps the very next day to Bavaria. American units long since had become adaptable, flexible, mobile, always ready. While rear units completed the surrender of thousands in the pocket, other Corps' units moved Southeast 275 miles in a single day. There the "Phantom," now consisting of the 14th Armored Division and the 86th and 99th Infantry Divisions and 14th Cavalry, became the South unit of Patton's Third Army. Crossing the Danube on the 26th of April, the Isar four days later and the Inn in two more days, the Corps was halted by Third Army within a few miles of the Alps.

This is indeed a condensed account of the III Corps, but let all remember that it was the unit which:

1. As part of Patton's Third Army on 22 December 1944 struck hard at the underside of Von Rundstedt's Bulge, relieved Bastogne and carried the offensive back to German soil.

2. As part of Hodges' First Army drove across the Cologne Plain and seized the Remagen Bridgehead.

3. Continued east of the Rhine with the great spearhead of the First Army and then did a remarkable job of quickly wiping out the eastern and central portion of the Ruhr Pocket.

4. Moved quickly back to the Third Army in Bavaria and pursued the cracking Wehrmacht to the Austrian Alps.

Dubbed Phantom by surprisingly showing up at critical places and made famous by seizing the Remagen Bridge, the III Corps became great by winning extraordinary successes. The greatness of a unit comes only by a full understanding of men and by an ability to take advantage of opportunities.

Army Ground Forces

(*Continued from page* 29)

virtue of their presence, imposing the will of the conqueror upon those who had been conquered. Certain of them would remain to keep this policy in force so long as necessary.

The winning of this last war was a team victory; a triumph of "the balanced force" advocated by Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, commander of Army Ground Forces from the inception of that command in March, 1942, until his death on the battlefield in July, 1944. In that force, the ground troops—and particularly the infantry—were a key member. In November, 1942, General McNair remarked that while "much is said these days about the technical and complicated equipment manned by a modern army, the fact remains that the most compelling need in this, as in past wars, is the front-line fighter and his leader. . . . Victories are won in the forward areas—by men with brains and fighting hearts, not by machines."

In the recent conflict, all branches of the ground forces proved their worth on many occasions, both as team-members and independent agents. At Cassino, in Italy, the German-held monastery was taken only by infantry envelopment. In Germany, such barriers as the Hurtgen Forest were invulnerable to all but infantry action. In the Pacific, Japanese positions at Tarawa, Kwajalein and Okinawa defied the mightiest efforts of air and naval bombardment and capitulated only when encircled by ground troops. Jungle warfare, wherever waged, was successfully concluded only by foot soldiers.

The infantry-artillery team proved itself the most effective of all army alliances. Many enemy positions were taken by the infantry without loss, without even firing a shot, after an adequate artillery preparation. Some of our commanders considered artillery the main factor in their ground advances and enemy prisoners credited American artillery with almost supernatural powers.

The Armored Forces, which were not extensively used until the Normandy Campaign of Europe, from that time until the end of the European War, more than justified the faith placed in them by early advocates.

The Coast Artillery, important in itself in the early campaigns of Bataan and Corregidor, was later represented more and more by its offspring, the Antiaircraft Command, which did much to insure the success of the European beachheads and which, in the case of an isolated action such as the Remagen bridgehead over the Rhine, was almost solely responsible for the success of an individual operation.

The Cavalry, operating not on horses but with the most highly mobile of our combat vehicles, fulfilled its traditional role of scouting and screening our ground movements and, first to encounter enemy mines and ambushes, suffered relatively heavy casualties in that mission.

As previously stated, Army Ground Forces organized, trained and equipped an army of 89 divisions and supporting troops. This was found sufficient since the Russian army of more than 400 divisions sustained the brunt of the German ground attack, since the Allied naval strength made it possible to use our ground forces at the exact point needed at just the proper time—thus preserving the principle of mass—and since our air forces enabled the ground fighters to go up against an enemy already greatly softened by blows from above.

The originally prescribed mission for Army Ground Forces — "to provide ground force units properly organized, trained and equipped for combat operations"—was accomplished by March, 1945. At that time, 80% of the ground forces were already overseas and 16% were available or becoming available for foreign combat. The remaining 4%, made up of men returned from, or disqualified for, overseas service, was operating the training establishment in the United States. Only a small miscellany of tactical units (aggregating 100,000) remained at home. More than 96% of the tactically organized ground forces was overseas or en route thereto.

The Army Service Forces

(*Continued from page* 32)

portant tasks of peace are the demobilization of men and the disposal of property. Our men are coming home and we are discharging them at a rate far above the highest estimates of the planners. We are disposing of property rapidly. In this latter effort, speed must be predicated on other factors—we must be sure that the government makes as good a bargain as possible on each piece of surplus property and we must dispose of this property with as little waste motion as possible.

The lessons we learned during the first three years of war were a godsend during the last hectic six months of battle and the first months of the cleanup. The Army Service Forces still is a young organization. For the first time in our nation's history all the Technical Services—Medical, Engineer, Transportation, Signal, Quartermaster, Ordnance and Chemical Warfare worked along with the Staff Divisions under one command. We were running the biggest business in the world and we had to use both standard business principles and systems of our own devising to make it work.

Army Service Forces job in World War II will end when the last civilian-soldier has returned home and the last piece of surplus equipment overseas and in this country has been turned over to disposal agencies. With what we have learned during the war years, we should accomplish this job at maximum speed and with a minimum of waste.

The Marine Corps

(*Continued from page* 30)

employment of artillery. A fresh division, the Third, landed and took over a zone of action in the center and the attack moved doggedly northward. On the twenty-seventh day the enemy's final defensive position along the northern crags was broken and the Third Division pushed through to the coast. Iwo, the inevitable island, was secure. Japan's ring of inner defenses was breached.

Meanwhile, the Third Amphibious Corps, operating as part of the Tenth Army, was preparing to strike even closer to Japan. Landing unopposed on Okinawa on the left flank of the Army forces, it turned northward to eliminate intense but scattered resistance in the mountainous northern half of the sprawling island before reassembling in readiness for further amphibious operations. Circumstances, however, required that it be committed to assist the forces which had encountered opposition of a sterner character in the south. With two divisions, First and Sixth, it took over the critical coastal zone of action on the western flank. Terrain favored maneuver and the massing of supporting fires, a factor which both opponents exploited to the utmost. Time and again the Third Corps dislodged the vital enemy left flank which clung tenaciously to a series of bastions arranged in depth and designed to preserve contact with the sea. Time and again the enemy, driven from one position, reformed his lines on even more favorable ground to the south until finally he was driven from Naha and the dominating terrain to the east. This was followed by an amphibious thrust at Oroku Peninsula, and a final drive to the south which signaled the collapse of the most skillful enemy defense of the war.

At Okinawa, the Third Corps was supported for the first time by Marine Aircraft, carrier borne and specially trained for close support operations. This was the realization of an aim which had long been deferred due to the urgent demands which found our aviation fighting valiantly and well in every quarter of the Pacific but not always in accordance with their distinctive mission — close support of the amphibious attack.

Peace, as it has in all wars, found the Marine Corps at full strength, in high morale and eagerly awaiting its next assignment in the unfolding drama of the conflict. Now as it turns to the duties of peace and reconstruction, it remembers that the victory was made up of the specialized contributions and great good will of the men, the organizations and the services who worked together so wholeheartedly toward achievement of the common end. In this respect, the Marine Corps feels with a sense of satisfaction that its efforts, begun in 1921, represented a contribution to the War in the Pacific on a scale far exceeding its slender weight in numbers.

Coast Guard at War

(*Continued from page* 31)

ing its rescue stations, lighthouses and other aids to navigation along United States coasts, Great Lakes, and navigable waterways.

The Coast Guard also continued with its wartime port security responsibilities until final victory, but this work was performed by ever decreasing complements of men. A volunteer citizen force, who performed port security duties without pay for a certain number of hours each week, first made this possible. Organized on a part-time military basis, uniformed and under service regulations while on duty, they enabled the Coast Guard to man more ships and overseas posts than otherwise would have been possible. At the beginning of 1945, as the menace of invasion of American shores ceased, many coastal patrol vessels and units were taken out of commission.

All combat personnel thus made available through the latter months of 1944 and early 1945 were also sent to the Pacific to augment the ever-growing force of Coast Guard personnel, some of whom had participated in that theatre's activities since before Pearl Harbor.

The service is now ready to take up its traditional functions of law enforcement and lifesaving, benefited through wartime experiences by developing modern techniques. Air and sea power are combined with an effective communications system to provide for speedier rescues; and the use of the helicopter is expected to help with rescues in inaccessible places.

Its wartime service practically completed, the Coast Guard is being geared to resume its peacetime role—establishing and maintaining aids to navigation; providing services for distant American possessions; performing weather, ice, and seal patrols; preventing smuggling; enforcing maritime safety regulations—fighting outlaws or the vagaries of nature, actually guarding United States coasts and possessions.

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Sailing to Tokyo's Door

(*Continued from page* 17)

From Army and Navy aircraft bombs fell on Japan in an unending stream during the month preceding surrender. Air strikes mounted to new fury with carrier planes assaulting by the thousands. The carrier strikes were the most audacious of the war, and were coordinated with U. S. and British Fleet bombardments of Jap coastal cities.

Early in the morning of 10 July, some 550 Superforts put to the torch the minor war production cities of Sendai, Gifu, Sakai, Yokkaichi and Wakayama. With the light of blazing cities to guide them, the carrier planes smashed straight at the ruined Jap capital and its seventy or eighty surrounding airfields. Vice Admiral John S. McCain's Task Force 38 sent wave after wave of planes over Tokyo. Approximately 1000 aircraft blasted the city with bombs and rockets. Task Force 38's planes alone destroyed or damaged 340 enemy planes on the ground and shot down two prowlers. In the meantime, the 5th Air Force Mustangs from Okinawa struck as far north as the Yellow Sea.

While Jap leaders speculated on the whereabouts of the 3rd Fleet after the attack was broken off, the battleships turned their guns on shore targets. Two hundred and fifty miles to the north, the carriers struck again at shipping installations and cities on southern Hokkaido and northern Honshu. Climax to the naval battering came on 17 July with 1,500 British and United States carrier planes again hammered Tokyo and the surrounding area.

Victory was not without its cost, however. Although these July attacks were relatively without casualty, the Fleet ran into trouble in early June. A howling typhoon crippled more than 21 Third Fleet ships between Southern Japan and Okinawa. The cruiser Pittsburgh, the most damaged, lost 104 feet of bow.

The attacks on the Japanese homeland were not the only large scale attacks in the last few months prior to victory. Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's 7th Fleet penetrated the waters of Macassar Strait in late June, fought off an air-borne torpedo attack and shot down three Jap aircraft. Later, the fleet returned to Borneo and bombarded shore positions in Balikpapan Bay.

The submarine fleet was hardpressed to find targets for their torpedoes during the last month. The underseas fleet, however, managed to find an enemy cruiser and 10 other vessels in Far Eastern Waters and sent them to the bottom.

The victory in the Pacific was the greatest ever achieved in modern history by one Navy over another.

The victory at sea was not achieved alone, however. Our gallant allies stood by our side, taking in stride their own losses in men and ships, but making the enemy pay a disastrously high toll—it was a victory for Allied teamwork on land, sea, and in the air.

And supporting the United States Navy was the work and industrial skill of the people of the nation. The men and women of industry increased fleet tonnage from a little more than two million and a half tons to 15 million tons, making it possible for a total of 100,000 units to join the Fleet since Pearl Harbor.

Today, with our Allies we have won a war. But in the peacetime years ahead, the great task of keeping our strength in seapower remains. Let us see that the sealanes of the world are never denied to us—for we have proved that the nation which loses its seapower and control of the seas goes down to defeat.

Continental Way Station

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operation and servicing of this air line through tropical Africa form one of the bright chapters in American air achievement.

ATC operations in the theater are now concentrated on the main line from Casablanca to Cairo, to Karachi. Regal C-54 "Skymasters" now fly this route daily, covering the distance from Casablanca to Cairo in approximately twelve hours, and going on to Karachi in another twelve. Feeder lines are still maintained to Oran, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Benghazi . . . way stations on the transcontinental line . . . and other supplementary lines to the Levant and Turkey and to Saudi Arabia.

At Payne Field, just outside Cairo, a plane of the Air Transport Command lands or takes off about every three minutes, day and night, week after week. In June of this year a C-46 aircraft engine, shining and new, was loaded on a cargo plane at this base, ticketed for China. Somewhere in that engine was the 50,000,000th pound of air freight to pass through Payne Field. A few weeks later the 200,000th passenger was a little bit surprised at the attention that surrounded him as he stepped off the plane.

The work of the Signal Corps in this theater deserves particular notice. Its relay stations form a highly important unit in the round the world communications net work of the War Department, did yeoman service in carrying the heavy load of communications, before, during, and after the Yalta Conference, and are a basic factor in maintaining uninterrupted communication with India, Burma and China theaters.

The health of troops in an area such as AMET involves many different and pressing problems. The wide variety of conditions, involving in one place tropical heat, and exposure to the many diseases of the tropics; in another the monotony and peculiar difficulties of an assignment in desert wastes; and the nearly universal problems of sanitation and malaria, have all placed an unusual and continuing burden on the officers and men of the Medical Corps assigned to AMET. The work of the malaria control units in particular has resulted in phenomenal reductions in the incidence of malaria among exposed troops. Meat and fresh food inspections have materially raised the standards of food offered locally to the Army for purchase, and have again resulted in lowered dysentery and internal disorder rates among the troops.

Diplomatic and political activities provide constant interest and not a few surprises. In February, when the late President Roosevelt came from the Yalta conference to Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal Area, to receive aboard his cruiser the King of Egypt, the Emperor of Ethiopia, and King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, the security of the entire program was entrusted to AMET headquarters. The safety of the President demanded that no word of his presence in the area, or departure by sea leak out until his ship had cleared Gibraltar on the way home. The maintenance of that security, in such close proximity to a world center of communications like Cairo, required the highest type of security measures, carefully planned, and coordinated, and ruthlessly maintained. The secret was well kept.

Beyond special occasions of this sort rests a daily background of contact, negotiation, and discussion with governmental officials of all the countries involved. AMET is not a war area, where all other considerations are subordinate to military necessity. Here the maintenance of good will toward the United States, recognition of the Army's mission and cooperation in its achievement rest on our ability to deal in the spirit of warm friendship and mutual trust, with different sovereign nations, each properly aware of its own sovereignty.

Unlike many of the war theaters controlled by a combined allied headquarters, the United States and British headquarters in Cairo are separate. Nevertheless liaison is close, and a spirit of mutual cooperation and understanding exists which not only facilitates the accomplishment of the common task but also could well serve as a model for the kind of collaboration we shall badly need in the days of peace to come.

Agriculture in the War

(*Continued from page* 22)

than average, it can produce 25 or 30 percent more than it did. As long as consumer purchasing power remains high and relief needs for food are great farmers will probably have a market for conconsiderably more than its pre-war production. Ultimately, farmers must look to full employment in this country to absorb their expanded production. The Nation summoned agriculture's expanded production capacity into being. Farmers hope the Nation will find a peacetime use for it.

A U. S. soldier shows members of the Saudi Arabian Army the intricacies of a Browning Automatic Rifle.

Dept. of Commerce

(*Continued from page* 23)

1. A 30-year series of daily synoptic weather maps. These maps were used in strategic and tactical planning and as an invaluable aid in front-line weather forecasting. A similar project was completed for a three-year series of southwest Pacific synoptic reports.
2. Microfilming, coding, tabulation and summarization of aerological records for many foreign countries comprising approximately 1,500 station-months of observations.
3. Routine and special forecasts for extended periods of time covering most of the active war theatres. These forecasts are credited with contributing to the success of some of the major military movements of the war.
4. Special storm warning services to include warning nets around military bases, important air fields, munitions factories and ordnance plants where thunderstorms constitute a serious hazard.
5. Special training in forecasting for armed service personnel.
6. Miscellaneous work on special technical problems, preparation of climatological guides, and other general studies.

BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE:

The wealth of commercial and economic data pertaining to foreign countries gathered and analyzed by the Bureau over many years was drawn upon heavily by all war agencies.

The Bureau not only aided in plotting for destruction many strategic installations in enemy countries but assisted in the preparation of civil affairs handbooks for the guidance of military government officials after the occupation.

At the request of the Army Education Branch the Bureau prepared the text for a number of publications pertaining to management the problems involved in the establishing and operating of small businesses, and these publications were made available to Army personnel.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION:

The Civil Aeronautics Administration aided the military in developing the nation's airfields and shared its technical skills with the Air Forces. It supervised the building and improvement of hundreds of airports certified as vital to the national defense; furnished technical experts on aircraft design and maintenance; and aided in training thousands of Army and Navy pilots.

NATIONAL INVENTORS COUNCIL:

The National Inventors Council during the war reviewed 201,000 written suggestions from American inventors, granted 14,000 personal interviews, and aided in developing many devices and methods of value to the armed forces. As testimony to its effectiveness, both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have requested that its work be continued.

The Council was instrumental in developing, among other things, a dry battery that would furnish efficient service in the tropics; a signaling mirror used by aviators and sailors adrift at sea; a magnetic mine detector; and the processing of milkweed floss to substitute for kapok in life rafts and life belts.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS:

The Bureau of the Census performs a peace-time function that is well known, but the part it played in the war may not at first glance be apparent.

In the frantic days of conversion from peace to war, data furnished by the Bureau were of inestimable value in outlining the Selective Service program, in determining farm acreages needed for food production, and in determining the availability of factories for war production.

INLAND WATERWAYS CORPORATION:

The Inland Waterways Corporation was active during the war in the transportation of essential war materials and its equipment was used to tow Navy combat vessels built at inland shipyards to tidewater.

The Corporation was charged with the chartering, maintenance and repair of tugs, towboats and barges constructed by the Defense Plant Corporation for the transportation of bulk petroleum products which figured so largely in the victory.

PATENT OFFICE:

The Patent Office painstakingly reviewed all patent applications received during the war and withheld from publication by proper authority such of the patent grants as would give aid to the enemy.

Miracles Take Time

(*Continued from page* 28)

times of a strong enough force equipped with the most modern weapons to permit immediate reaction. If by chance the scientists and physicists of the future should develop an actual defense against such attacks, it is even more obvious that the defense mechanisms will have to be maintained perpetually in almost a hair trigger state of readiness and efficiency.

The character of these airborne weapons will change from year to year. This change will result from scientific, technical, and production improvements actively put in motion from five to ten years previously.

All evidence, therefore, points to the necessity of recognizing time as a controlling factor in our national security. It may not be possible on the next occasion to buy it through the efforts of Allies. We may, and probably will, be the first objective of any aggressor.

Prevention of war will not come through weakness. We have tried that and failed twice in 25 years. If we are to be strong enough to insure our own safety and do our proper part in meeting our obligations we will need to act promptly.

The first step in our program must be to recognize that from now on we must spend our time before the crisis breaks, for we will never again be able to buy it afterwards. And I believe that it will always be later than we think.

Congress and the Army

(*Continued from page* 27)

House knew more than that it was for a "secret purpose of great national importance in connection with the war effort." The project involved was, of course, the development of the atomic bomb. The fact that an appropriation of such magnitude could be made under these terms indicates the team-work and mutual confidence which existed between the parties concerned. On previous occasions in our national history there has been much bickering over war expenditures. In this war there has been trust and cooperation between the national legislature and the War Department.

It should not be inferred, however, from what has just been said, that the attitude of Congress has been one of negligent carelessness. Congress has not sought to interfere with strategy or tactics, but has kept a watchful eye on many matters involving the expenditure of large sums of money or the welfare of our inducted citizen-soldiers. Through what was known as the Truman Committee, later the Mead Committee, in the Senate and the Committee on Military Affairs of the House, investigations have constantly been made through the war years of possible waste or other abuses that might exist here or there in the vast military establishment, and the attention of the War Department and sometimes of the public has been called to conditions requiring some corrective action. The War Department has welcomed these investigations in most instances and has found them helpful in bringing about its own desired solutions for problems that have been raised. In these respects, as in others, Congress has been discharging its responsibilities to the people of the United States while affording the maximum of support to the able leaders immediately directing the war effort.

Department of Labor

(*Continued from page* 24)

the U. S. Conciliation Service through its commissioners disposed of more than 25,000 controversies. In 95 per cent of the cases that reached the Service before a work stoppage occurred, commissioners were able to settle disputes without a strike. Only their occasional failures made the headlines.

At the risk of slighting other Bureaus and Department functions, I must mention a wartime program of Emergency Maternity and Infant Care for the wives of servicemen. Administered by the Children's Bureau through the states, this plan has meant better care and nursing for more than 950,000 mothers and babies —and it brought new peace of mind to husbands and fathers in uniform.

Since 1918, as an outgrowth of the first World War, women workers have been a special concern of the Labor Department. And the Women's Bureau, created 25 years ago, can point to a fine record of accomplishment, culminating in the wartime contribution of 20 million women workers.

The Division of Labor Standards is another agency which I am forced to neglect, but I must cite the Division's National Committee for the Conservation of Manpower in War Industries and its active, nation-wide campaign to prevent a million industrial accidents during the present year.

In concluding this all too brief recital I want to disclose the peacetime role of the Labor Department in our growing, evolving democracy. This Nation faces a difficult period of transition from war to peace—and beyond that a longer and more sustained effort to make secure the victory our armed forces won.

The Department of Labor can help us balance our economic equation at high prosperity levels by promoting a fuller measure of economic justice and wider opportunity for the Nation's wage earners.

EXPERIENCE

The sure hand of experience shows up in every drop of Old Grand-Dad. Here a careful selection of ripe grains is combined with masterly handling at the still and long storing away in staunch oak until flavor and mellowness reach their peak. The sum total is as rare an old bourbon as a man ever sniffed or sipped. Head your next list of guests with the Head of the Bourbon Family.



OLD GRAND-DAD

Bottled in Bond—100 Proof—4 Years Old

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NATIONAL DISTILLERS PRODUCTS CORPORATION, NEW YORK



If an 18th century chemist could analyze the materials in our automobiles, refrigerators, cameras, typewriters . . . he would report most of the metals "impure."

He would be right. By mastering the use of controlled "impurities" in metals, the metallurgist has given us *alloys*.

Not satisfied, the metallurgist has devised subtle processing techniques that make metals and alloys many times stronger, harder, tougher, more responsive to machinists' tools, more defiant to rust and corrosion. And he sets no limit to further progress.

The science of metals has come of age only in the last centruy and a half, since the time when Paul Revere founded the company that bears his name. As fabricators who, time and again, have helped manufacturers do the seemingly impossible with metals, Revere offers you the knowledge of the metallurgist merged with the skill of the artisan to meet your practical problems. Upon request, a Revere Technical Advisor will gladly consult with you about metals. Write to Revere Copper and Brass Incorporated — Executive Offices: 230 Park Avenue, New York 17, N. Y. *Listen to* Exploring the Unknown *on the Mutual Network every Sunday evening, 9 to 9:30 p.m., EST.*

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